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ABSTRACT 
South Africa has always been cited as an example of protracted social conflict by the 
analytical conflict resolution school. Given that appellation, the conflict, in terms of the 
understanding of that school of thought, would not have been amenable to resolution, 
and yet many observers hail the South African democratic transition as a miracle of 
transformation. This thesis, using a detailed application of the various elements of 
protracted or deep-rooted social conflict, demonstrates that South Africa is indeed an 
example of protracted social conflict.  
 
Given the application of pre-negotiation initiatives, and the establishment of a unique 
National Peace Accord, negotiations were enabled, and successfully delivered a 
democratic election, and so far, also a sustainable democracy. The establishment of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was the result of a realization on the part of 
a wide spectrum of South African leadership and  conflict resolution professionals, that 
negotiation alone would not provide conflict resolution for South Africans, and that 
there was therefore an additional need to deal with the deeper issues of conflict, if the 
settlement were to prove sustainable. The question remains whether ours represents 
a successful  resolution of the conflict from the theoretical perspective of the analytical 
conflict resolution school.  
 
A close examination of South African socio-political issues across a number of 
domains regarded by the analytical conflict resolution school as important, indicates 
that while the requirements for conflict resolution were indeed met in the South African 
case, their more advanced stage of resolution; conflict provention has not been 
satisfied. That explains the fact that many tensions, much violence and intolerance 
remain. South Africa’s democracy has not been infused with analytical conflict 
management institutions, basic human needs have not been substantially met and 
valued relationships remain elusive. Because protracted social conflict is cyclical, we 
can expect high-levels of conflict behaviour to haunt, and even threaten our fledgling 
democracy. It is argued here that a coherent theoretical approach to the South African 
conflict management process would have produced a more sustainable outcome, and 
we recommend the continued use and institutionalization of analytical conflict 
provention processes to secure the future of our country. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This is a study of the conflict management interventions that accompanied 
and enabled the political negotiation process, and the eventual transition to 
democracy in South Africa. It presents a critical evaluation of the effectiveness 
of those interventions and their shortcomings, through the lens of the 
Analytical Conflict Resolution approach. It then provides a critique of that 
theoretical approach, based on the South African experience. 
  
South Africa has a long history of social conflict. Historically the country has 
experienced high levels of often violent conflict between the various political, 
ethnic and language groupings within its population. The country has, for 
instance, experienced conflict among various African ethnic groups such as 
that between the Zulu, and other Nguni tribal groups along the Eastern 
Coastal region, commonly known as the Mfecane, or Difaqane. (See, for 
instance Johnson, 2005: 48 - 62) 
 
It is widely recognized that the indigenous Khoi and San peoples living in the 
region were also hunted to the point of near extermination by both European 
settlers and African newcomers to the country. Another conflict, culminating in 
a war at the turn of the 20th century, between the republican Afrikaners and 
the British colonial power, which left deep and long-standing divisions  
between English and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans could also be 
regarded, at the very least, as an example of deep-rooted social conflict 
(Johnson, 2005: 48 - 62, Davenport, 1977). 
 
Although these conflicts could all be regarded as examples of protracted 
social conflict; some of them even including elements of genocide or ethnic 
cleansing; the quintessential South African conflict that has captured world 
attention, and  attracted so much scholarly deliberation and debate, has been 
the political power struggle between South Africans of European stock and 
their African compatriots. It is this conflict, essentially a conflict between white 
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and non-white South Africans, and its management in the late twentieth 
century that forms the subject matter of this study. This conflict has regularly 
been classified within the conflict literature as an example of deep-rooted, or 
protracted social conflict.1 Deep-rooted conflict is regarded as being 
unamenable to management by standard means. That is why it is also 
considered to be protracted. When the conflict was transformed, at its height, 
from an armed struggle, termed at the time by the National Party government, 
as a “Total Onslaught” which had to be countered, according to their thinking, 
by a “Total National Strategy”,  into a negotiated settlement, the changes 
came very suddenly, and in most quarters, very unexpectedly. It caught, not 
only the observers, journalists and social scientists by surprise, but the 
protagonists as well. Theoretically speaking, it ought not to have happened. 
 
The transition was accompanied by increased levels of violence, and complex 
levels of interaction. Although the focal point of the transition was undoubtedly 
the negotiation process for the establishment of a new, inclusive democratic 
political dispensation among the main political parties, it was additionally 
characterized by second track processes, pacts and an attempt to deal with 
the long-standing, deeper-rooted consequences of the protracted social 
conflict, that has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention and much heated 
debate. Just as South Africa was previously presented in the literature as a 
model of racist oligarchical rule, the country’s conflict management efforts 
were subsequently often euphorically held up, as examples to the world, of 
international best practice in the management of deep-rooted social conflict. 
 
Despite an initial euphoria, and talk of a miracle having happened, a decade 
after the establishment of democracy, there are serious fault-lines emerging, 
in the country,  that gives cause for the questioning of the South African 
process. Has conflict resolution taken place, or had there simply been a 
superficial settlement? This is the crux of the problem that this thesis sets out 
to examine. 
                                                 
1 The two terms refer to the identical type of conflict, with Deeprooted social conflict being the term most often used by 
John Burton, and Protracted social conflict being used more commonly by Burton’s colleague at George Mason and his 
collaborator in the CAC, Edward Azar.  
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The thesis attempts to demonstrate firstly, that South Africa is indeed a case 
of deep-rooted social conflict, if measured against the theory of the Burtonian 
scholars. Although often labelled as deep-rooted conflict, there has never 
been a clear and comprehensive attempt at demonstrating the ‘fit’ of the 
South African case with the theory of protracted or deep-rooted social conflict. 
A brief history of the South African conflict will be presented as background (in 
Chapter four). We will next compare the South African situation to Edward 
Azar’s model of protracted social conflict (in Chapter five), as it is probably the 
most comprehensive attempt by the Analytical Conflict Resolution school, to 
categorize the deep-rooted, or protracted social conflict type. 
 
Methodological issues will be dealt with in Chapter two. We will set out our 
own standpoint, explain the qualitative approach being followed, and explain 
the abductive and deductive reasoning approaches that will be used. The 
research questions leading the study will be presented, and the sources of 
data to be examined, and the method of data collection will be elaborated 
upon. 
 
According to the theory of protracted social conflict, traditional methods of 
conflict management, especially the power-based negotiation approach, 
should not successfully resolve deep-rooted social conflict. We therefore aim, 
secondly, in the central focus of this thesis, to analyze the implementation of 
the “Second Track” (Chapter six) processes that were used, largely behind the 
scenes, as well as the implementation of the South African National Peace 
Accord, perhaps the most important of the pre-negotiation pacts (Chapter 
seven), and the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Chapter 
eight). We will assess these interventions, the intention behind their uses, and 
to the best extent possible, the effectiveness of their impact on the South 
African conflict.  
 
To shed additional light on these interventions, we will be looking at the state 
of South African society ten years after its initial settlement (Chapter nine), to 
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critically assess the impact of these processes, and to try to answer the 
question of whether or not the South African conflict was truly resolved. This 
assessment will be made through the lens of Analytical Conflict Resolution 
theory, as articulated by John Burton and Edward Azar and their colleagues of 
the Centre for Conflict Analysis, which is contextualized in the overview of 
theories of conflict provided in Chapter three, and more fully explained in 
Chapter four.   
 
A third aim will be to shed critical light on the theory, and the theory of 
practice, of Deep-Rooted, or Protracted Social Conflict, using South Africa as 
a significant case of the phenomenon. Though we accept the notion that all 
conflicts are ultimately sui generis South Africa and its experiences of conflict 
management will hopefully also illuminate the very notion of deep-rooted 
social conflict, and the management of other cases of deep-rooted conflict 
receiving attention around the globe. Literally, what are the lessons for the 
analytical conflict resolution school,  that can be taken from the South African 
experience?  
 
1.2 Terminological clarification: 
This study is in the field of deep-rooted social conflict and its resolution. It will 
therefore be necessary to provide a clarification of the central concepts being 
used in the chapters that follow.  
 
1.2.1 Social conflict  
Social conflict is a complex phenomenon, which refers to the behaviours, 
attitudes and structural underpinnings of contention among social collectives 
(Galtung, 2002). Himes provides the following definition: "Social conflict refers 
to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to 
defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power resources and other 
scarce values" (1980: 14). Pruitt and Rubin (1986- 14), however, write that: "... 
conflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' 
current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously." A full understanding 
of this field necessitates a broad understanding of the theoretical literature 
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emanating from a number of different scientific endeavours. Many of the 
social sciences provide partial explanations of various aspects of social 
conflict, which necessitates an overview of this body of scholarship that will be 
provided in Chapter three of this study. The theoretical overview provided in 
Chapter three will also serve to situate the theories of deep-rooted social 
conflict that particularly inform this study. 
 
1.2.2 Deep-rooted social conflict 
The particular form of social conflict that forms the basis of this study is known 
variously as deep-rooted social conflict, or protracted social conflict. It is 
associated with a number of conflict-ridden societies around the world, in 
which, in the thinking of the conflict resolution school, frustrated basic human 
needs are a central causal aspect in the conflict. Typically, because of their 
deep-rootedness, these conflicts are extremely persistent, despite many 
attempts to settle them. This persistent nature has given rise to the usage of 
the alternative term; protracted social conflict. Chapter four will provide further 
elaboration. John Burton (1990:15) offers the following description of the 
phenomenon: "Deep-rooted conflict includes cases of conflict with authorities, 
between authorities, and among persons and groups within societies. It 
involves cases that arise out of demands on individuals to make certain 
adjustments in behaviour that are unacceptable, and probably beyond human 
tolerance and capabilities.” (Burton, 1990: 15).  Burton goes on to state that 
“…In such cases, it is not possible to contain conflict within existing 
frameworks, except over severely limited periods of time.” (Ibid: 15). 
 
1.2.3 Conflict Resolution 
By conflict resolution, we refer to the addressing of the fundamental causes of 
the conflict; not just its superficial aspects. In this regard, conflict resolution 
should be distinguished from the mere settlement of conflict, which aims at 
simply modifying the more contentious aspects of conflict behaviour. In the 
words of Burton, therefore: ”By the resolution of conflict we mean the 
transformation of relationships in a particular case by the solution of the 
problems which led to the conflictual behaviour in the first place.” These 
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issues are pivotal and will be further elaborated upon in our Chapter four 
which presents the Analytical Conflict Resolution approach to the conflict and 
its management. 
 
1.2.4 Conflict Provention 
Burton has coined the term “provention” of conflict, to deal with the need that 
he perceives to deal with the causes of conflict before conflict becomes 
manifest. In his own words, he states:  "Provention is thus concerned with 
social problems generally, with altering environments that led to conflict, and 
with creating environments that mitigate conflict.", and "...the removal of 
causal conditions, and the positive promotion of environments conducive to 
collaborative relationships - extends the scope of our concerns beyond the 
narrow area of conflict resolution." (1990: 18) 
 
He maintains that the need to coin such a term indicates that the need has 
been overlooked by the conflict management literature. 
 
1.2.5 The Analytical Conflict Resolution School 
The particular theoretical perspective utilized in this study is that associated 
with the conflict resolution school, or, more accurately, the Analytical Conflict 
Resolution School.  This group of scholars, or scholar-practitioners as they 
like to call themselves, established a transatlantic collaborative network 
known as the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict. They distinguished 
themselves from those in their parent discipline of international relations, by 
taking on a distinctly applied approach to their subject – attempting to 
intervene in some of the more intractable conflicts of the time – in Cyprus, 
Northern Ireland and the Middle East. The elder statesman of the group, to 
whom most of these scholars defer, is John Burton, and the core group 
consists of Burton, Edward Azar, Denis Sandole, Christopher Mitchell and 
Michael Banks. Other scholars are less closely associated with the group, but 
do collaborate from time to time. It is especially Burton who attempted to 
provide the group with a theory of human behaviour in the form of his basic 
human needs theory, adapted from the work of Sites and Davies, and 
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ultimately Abraham Maslow. It is Azar who has provided the theory with its 
most compelling characterization of the nature of deep-rooted, or protracted 
social conflict. The school further distinguishes itself by attempting to go to the 
roots of conflicts, to resolve them, by addressing human needs frustrations, as 
opposed to merely settling them. In this they are explicitly trans-disciplinary, 
borrowing extensively from the fields of psychology, industrial psychology, 
social psychology, and other social sciences. Their favoured approach to 
conflict resolution, is via the medium of intervention in the form of analytical 
problem-solving workshops. 
 
When we allude to the Analytical Conflict Resolution School, it is this group to 
which we specifically refer; ours is therefore not a loose or general usage of 
the term.2 
 
1.2.6 Second Track Diplomacy 
Second track, or track two diplomacy, as it is often termed, refers to unofficial 
diplomatic exchanges between prominent individuals within conflicting parties. 
It is explicitly not the leaders who negotiate, but influential others, who 
preferably are able to persuade decision-making leadership to enter 
negotiations. 
 
We begin our thesis by providing an overview of the various theories of 
conflict that inform and underpin the Analytical Conflict Resolution Approach. 
                                                 
2 The term Conflict Resolution is commonly used extremely broadly, referring to almost any attempt at conflict 
management, regulation, amelioration or settlement. 
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CHAPTER TWO :  METHODOLOGICAL  APPROACH 
 
 
I would caution against the acceptance of the dichotomy   
between fact and value which defines contemporary  
mainstream social science, and which has led to an  
overemphasis upon quantitative methods in the name  
of an objectivity which is at best suspect. Conflict Resolution  
should be a normative discipline; it should be prescriptive. 
(Scimecca, 1990: 2005) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Research, according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1973:1804), is 
“an investigation directed to the discovery of some fact by careful study of a 
subject; a case of critical, or scientific inquiry.” It is appropriate, therefore that 
we begin our study by explaining our research strategy and methodology. 
 
According to Babbie and Mouton, research methodology, refers to the various 
methods, techniques and procedures that are employed in the process of 
implementing a research project research (2001: xxvii). Every piece of social 
research therefore demands a clear set of steps in order to achieve its 
objectives. This chapter addresses the methodological issues with regard to 
the current research project below, including sources of data, the issues of  
research motivation, triangulation of data sources, the case study, the 
research questions and sub-questions, theoretical perspectives, research 
standpoint, and methodological limitations. 
 
2.2 Motivation for the research 
According to Cheldelin et al, research projects are traditionally undertaken for 
one of two fundamental reasons. Either the researcher wants to better 
understand the world, or alternatively, they want to solve practical problems. 
In the case of these practical researchers, their accomplishments were 
measured in terms of “problems solved or practices improved” (2003: 17).  
Cheldelin et al (2003:18) go on to write as follows: “Today the distinction is 
blurred. Most researchers in social science – whether inside or outside the 
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academy – construe their work in both basic and applied terms. A discernable 
trend toward a merging of theory, practice, and research is evident, 
particularly in the field of conflict resolution.” 
 
This researcher has long been intimately involved in the field of social conflict 
and its management, and fascinated by the search for a better understanding 
of conflict and its management.  Especially the field of deep-rooted social 
conflict, the distinctiveness of the basic human needs approach, and the 
need, or otherwise for specialized approaches to resolve this conflict have 
stimulated him towards undertaking the study.  
 
The South African case also holds a special interest for this researcher. It has 
often been stated in the analytical conflict resolution literature, that in South 
Africa, we had a prime example of deep-rooted social conflict. The case has 
also been made repeatedly in local and international academic publications, 
that we resolved our conflict; that a miracle was achieved. The notion of a 
miracle is antithetical to science, however, and this prompts a closer 
examination of what really happened in South Africa. This is important for 
thinking about and understanding ways to continue managing conflict in South 
Africa, after 1994, as well as understanding the lessons to be learned by other 
countries still grappling. 
 
This study is therefore motivated by a twofold interest such as discussed by 
Cheldelin, et al (2003) above. Not only do we wish to shed light on the theory, 
and theory of practice of analytical conflict resolution, but additionally, we wish 
to point to problem areas in the South African case, that need urgent 
attention, if the initial conflict management successes are to be sustained. 
 
In this endeavour, a qualitative, and multi-layered approach will be followed, 
including elements of literature survey, and including a review of surveys 
already carried out, personal interviews, personal communications and 
participant observation. An effort will be made to provide a “thick” description 
of the subject matter, making use of triangulation of a number of sources of 
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information along the way, and interpreting these via a process of abductive 
reasoning. We will elucidate each of these concepts below. 
 
2.3 Research questions 
Our research question therefore is: To what extent do the conflict 
interventions applied in South Africa, including pre-negotiation workshops, the 
South African National Peace Accord and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, accord with the theoretical assumptions and prescriptions, of 
Conflict Resolution, and what do we learn from their implementation? How do 
they compare as Protracted Social Conflict Management Strategies. There 
are a number of sub-questions that arise 
 
Sub-questions:  1  Is SA a true example of PSC? 
                      2  Is the theory of PSC spurious? 
                      3  Has Macro-Political Conflict in South Africa been   
                                     resolved? Has it been provented?  
 
We aim to distil the essential elements of conflict resolution from a thorough 
examination of the analytical conflict resolution literature, isolating the various 
indicators of resolution. The South African socio-political experience will then 
be examined for evidence of these indicators of resolution. 
 
2.4 Theoretical perspective 
2.4.1    Epistemological traditions 
All social science research is underpinned by one of three main 
epistemological traditions, being objectivism, subjectivism, and constructivism. 
These epistemologies represent our fundamental understandings of 
knowledge at its most basic level. Objectivism operates on the understanding 
that research can lead us to “know and to verify an objective truth”. 
Diametrically opposed to objectivism, subjectivism asserts “infinite 
interpretations of events, none of them superior to another” (Kayrooz and 
Trevitt, 2005: 115, 116). This study accords with the constructivist 
epistemological tradition, which posits an objective world, mediated by the 
individual’s conceptual lens, or framework. According to constructivist 
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epistemology, our knowledge is invariably mediated by our own experience 
and understanding. This tradition clearly occupies a middle ground between 
objectivism and subjectivism (Ibid., 115). 
 
2.4.2   Analytical conflict resolution theory 
The field of conflict analysis, management and resolution is a multi-
disciplinary one. Perspectives of most of the social sciences are brought to 
bear upon the study of conflict. The author intends to examine the South 
African conflict transformation process through the lens of the analytical 
conflict resolution/basic human needs approach, that is fully discussed in our 
Chapter four below. Our motivation for this particular theoretical approach is 
that South Africa has consistently been cited by the analytical conflict 
resolution scholars as a typical example of deep-rooted social conflict. It has, 
however, not yet been demonstrated by these scholars that all of the elements 
of the deep-rooted, or protracted social conflict school are  present, and the 
South African case has not yet enjoyed a thorough analysis in respect of this 
perspective.  
 
However our approach is not uncritical of this perspective. The study of 
conflict as a distinct subject is still in its infancy, and the analytical conflict 
resolution school is very much a developing perspective. There are 
weaknesses that we recognize;  especially that the approach is perhaps not 
as engaged in the larger debates of the social sciences as it might be. It will 
therefore benefit from any criticism, and possible refinement that will ensue 
from its considered application to the South African case. Additionally, the 
analytical conflict resolution perspective will have to be contextualized within 
the broader context of the corpus of theory around the context of social 
conflict. Although the conflict resolution approach seems a part of the liberal 
project3, and that has sometimes been forwarded as a weakness of the 
                                                 
3 According to Tidwell (1998: 149),  “…there is little doubt that the philosophical underpinnings of democratic liberalism 
serve as the basis upon which much conflict resolution rests. This is interesting, because much of the analytical work 
done by those in conflict resolution does not specifically come from this tradition. Whether democratic liberalism is in any 
way better than any other set of philosophical statements about the organization of life is debatable.  Yet it appears that 
most processes of conflict resolution grow from and support the ideals of democratic liberalism.” Tidwell goes on to 
equate the conflict resolution approach with utilitarianism in seeking the greatest good for the greatest number. Yet this 
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approach, in that it presupposes a value system that is not universally shared 
by all parties in deep-rooted conflict, it is also a major strength in that it 
represents a recognition that there is scope for human action to alleviate the 
human condition, and that we are not slaves to our nature, nor to our 
conditioning.  
 
This work represents a test of, and therefore a contribution to the conflict 
resolution approach, and hopefully a further elaboration, recognizing some of 
its shortcomings – for instance, that there is a marked prescriptive rigidity in 
the literature concerning the management of deep-rooted social conflict. In 
this sense then, our theoretical perspective accords with the tenets of critical 
inquiry, as explained by Kayrooz and Trevitt (2005: 117) as follows: “It [Critical 
inquiry] is thus normative, critical, and immensely practical. It is oriented to 
improved understanding directed at development and change, not research 
output for knowledge’s sake. Through reflective processes, it generates 
insights that empower those who are involved to remove constraints to human 
freedom, health and dignity.”  
 
2.5         Qualitative research: 
Whereas this thesis adopts a qualitative approach, it is necessary for us to 
make the distinction here between the two major approaches to scientific 
research; the quantitative and qualitative approaches. Kayrooz and Trevitt 
(2003: 114) provide the following table which usefully sets out the differences 
between the two approaches. 
 
Table 2.1  A Summary of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
 
Research Approach Qualitative Quantitative 
Level of knowledge about 
the topic 
A little known about topic A lot known about topic 
Purposes To understand and to explain 
from actors’ own frame of 
To seek causes and to 
predict social phenomena 
                                                                                                                                            
does not square with Burtons explicitly stated position that it is minorities that are important in any situation – that 
their needs satisfactions are as important as everyone else’s no matter what the numbers. 
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reference 
Orientation Close to the data; the “insider”  
perspective 
Removed from the data: the 
“outsider” perspective 
Main questions What is your experience of 
this event? What are useful 
explanations/interpretations of 
this event? 
What is associated with this 
event? What 
facilitates/inhibits this event? 
What are the causes and 
consequences of this event? 
Strength Valid: real, rich, deep data Reliable: hard and replicable 
data 
Philosophical underpinning Naturalistic, constructivist 
(includes critical theory and 
postmodernism) 
Positivism and post-
positivism (includes 
experimental, quasi-
experimental and 
correlational research) 
 
Increasingly, researchers in the social sciences, claim that qualitative 
research processes do more justice to their subject matter than do 
quantitative approaches, so that, according to Moser “…qualitative research 
has become to a greater and greater degree a serious competitor to the 
traditional analytical empiricism.”  According to Greene (1994),  the Cartesian 
foundationalism of positivistic science with its strong emphases on objectivity, 
specific methods, detached neutrality and grand theory – has already been 
“deposed and dethroned”.  There is an assertion within the ranks of qualitative 
researchers, that the experiential quality of described events cannot be 
measured by quantitative standards alone (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 106 – 
107). 4 Kayrooz and Trevitt (2005: 112,113) stress the complementarity of the 
                                                 
 
4 According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), Quantitative methods are oriented around a consciously selected subset of 
variables, and use certain prerequisites (random selection, experimental controls) which require the neglect of all other 
variables which may also affect the findings. In contrast, qualitative methods encompass specific contextual knowledge 
to the full extent and aim at generating theories from contextual information. Human behaviour cannot be understood 
without reference to the meaning and purpose with which human actors associate with their activities. Qualitative data 
can take these into account better than quantitative research. There is a disjunction between grand theories and local 
contexts. The perspective of an outsider who is uninvolved and removed from his object of study, has little or no 
significance for the insider view of the individuals, groups or societies being studied. The advantage of qualitative 
research procedures is that it helps to uncover these insider perspectives and theories. The qualitative process of case 
reconstruction is “more significant” than generalizations, even those which are statistically significant, in that it is not 
necessarily a statement concerning the specific case being studied. Qualitative research gives greater emphasis to the 
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two approaches, however, and make the point that many research projects 
combine elements of both the quantitative and the qualitative, in their strategy 
and design.  
 
The methodological approach to this study will be a multi-level approach, 
consisting of a number of distinct avenues that will be merged to capture the 
rich complexity of the subject matter. This researcher takes a leaf out of 
Moser’s (1999) book, using abduction as an operational, logical principal. This 
seems fitting, as it is in accordance with the qualitative approach, and also 
because it is the approach that Burton himself has explicitly used to develop 
his human needs theory of deep-rooted social conflict (1984:x, 1987: 255).   
First  proposed by Charles Peirce in 1903, abduction is an alternative process 
of logic to induction and deduction, that is admirably suited to the qualitative 
approach.  
 
The abductive process, according to Peirce, (in Moser, 1999), can be 
described according to the following steps: “The surprising fact C is observed; 
but if A were true, C would be self-evident; consequently there is ground to 
suspect that A is true”. Where this study is concerned, stated very baldly 
according to the same relationship: The surprising fact (miracle) of South 
Africa’s peaceful settlement (resolution) has been observed. If, and only if, 
according to Conflict Resolution theory, Problem Solving workshops had been 
applied, the resolution would be self-evident; consequently there is ground to 
suspect that Problem Solving workshops were applied.5 According to Burton 
(1987), for Peirce, hypothesis formation is the “major point of scientific 
interest”. The abduction process was so called, because it stressed the need 
                                                                                                                                            
process of generating meaningful theory. “In the process of abduction, the phases of discovery and the subsequent test 
phases alternate and interact in a spiral movement” ( Moser: 6 ).  
 
5 According on Wirth (1997, cited in Moser), “While in deductive logic the premises are given and the valid conclusions 
are sought, in abduction the conclusion is given and the possible premises (rules and case) must be achieved by 
“reduction” This means that the research process is accompanied by both the hermeneutic inquiry into prerequisites as 
well as the pragmatic inquiry into possible effects. Thus abduction does away with the competition between hermeneutic 
understanding and scientific explanation. Instead, both appear to be established on the abductive ability to draw 
conclusions as “cognitive phenomena of complementary.” 
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to “go back and find out how hypotheses have been arrived at”.  Abduction will 
be underpinned by three aspects: A “thick” description of the objects being 
studied, the use of triangulative procedures, and safeguarding through 
specific criteria of quality.  
 
Because Peirce emphasized the need to query our assumptions at all times 
“…until our hypothesis has been reduced to something almost axiomatic and 
from which deductions could be made.” (Burton, 1987: 255), the abductive 
process also tends to produce a repetitive research process that continually 
modifies and retests its assumptions, so that it has been said that researchers 
that use this process do not know what it is they are trying to prove when they 
set out (Moser, 1999:). To some extent this has been true of this project. 
Burton (1990: 20) maintains that this approach is especially appropriate for 
social problem-solving and conflict resolution “…because in many instances 
there cannot be testing…”. 
 
2.6 Triangulation 
Triangulation is a technique of enhancing research reliability, by the use of 
multiple research methods. Denzin puts it as follows: “By combining methods 
and investigators in the same study, observers can partially overcome the 
deficiencies that flow from one investigator or method.” (Babbie and Mouton, 
2001: 275,) Triangulation is a strength in a research design, to be sought 
after, and not a weakness. According to Babbie (2002:107), in ideal 
circumstances, a research project should always bring more than a single 
research method to bear on a topic. 
 
2.7 Research Standpoint 
According to Moser, elaborating on the qualitative approach, the researcher is 
not standing outside of the world that he is studying. “His position is rather in 
the very middle of that which he is studying. While attempting to solve its 
puzzles, he never knows to what degree his position itself defines them. It is 
therefore less a matter of drawing conclusions in the shape of generalizations, 
but rather of forming informed conclusions that can be called ‘abductive’.” 
(1999:16).  This holds true for this particular work in that the researcher 
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operated in the midst of the phenomena of which he now seeks to make 
meaning.  It is our contention, however, that this does not compromise the 
work as scientific enterprise, on two counts. 
 
Firstly, we can agree with the qualitative argument of Greene (1994), for 
instance that there is no intrinsically external observation possibility, and 
secondly, that this internal situatedness need not detract from the notion of a 
third-party standpoint, in the same way that, in conflict intervention, although 
the third party should endeavour at all times to treat conflicting parties in an 
impartial or objective manner, yet, the third party still is a part of that conflict, 
especially in the case of the “insider partial”6 interventions, such as those 
observed in the South African conflict management process, and as 
discussed in the chapters below. The role of participant observer has become 
well-established in qualitative research, allowing the researcher a particularly 
advantageous position from which to assess context, body language and 
other information which might prove elusive to survey methods, for instance 
(Babbie and Mouton, 2001:293). Additionally, the passage of time between 
the observation and the research, in its own way provides a certain distance, 
enhancing the possibility of reflection and objectivity.  
 
The conflict resolution standpoint has much to commend it. It represents a 
huge step forward on the pre-existing perspectives in that: 
• It is a self-conscious attempt to provide a general theory of social 
conflict 
• It specifically addresses the occurrence of deep-rooted social conflict. 
• It rejects the power-approach. 
• It rejects power and statist-oriented approaches to conflict termination. 
• It puts the human being at the centre of its concerns – human beings 
assume primacy. 
• It recognises a tentative connection between human agency and 
institutional structure – that is at the core of much social conflict. In this 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the insider partial role, see Lederach (1997: 50)  
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sense it has much in common with the structurationist approach of 
Giddens, although this is nowhere made explicit in the work of its 
pioneers. 
 
It is our intention, from the standpoint of John Burton’s analytical conflict 
resolution approach, to reflect on the elements of the South African 
transformation, and from a critical standpoint, to point out some shortcomings 
of the Burtonian approach, with a view to its further elaboration and 
strengthening. Also, on the basis of this exercise, to point to shortcomings in 
the South African case, that indicate the need for continued vigilance 
concerning the ongoing process. Conflict is after all about more than warlike 
behaviour – it is waged in many ways and on many fronts, sometimes 
destructively, and sometimes constructively. 
 
2.8 Sources of Data 
Because the thesis speaks to the theory of deep-rooted social conflict, a 
significant aspect of the approach will be based upon a review of the literature 
surrounding the study of social conflict, particularly that body of the literature 
that has entitled itself the analytical conflict resolution approach. In this regard, 
the output of John Burton, its central figure, from 1969 to his latest work in 
2002 will be in the spotlight. We will examine his approach through his own 
writing, and that of the other members of the conflict resolution school who 
cluster around his ideas, including Edward Azar, Michael Banks, Ronal Fisher, 
Chris Mitchell, and Denis Sandole, as well as drawing on the insights of those 
interlocutors who have engaged critically with this material over the years. 
Much of this theoretical work has been gleaned from a thorough reading of 
Burton’s books, from Controlled Communication in 1969, to his last full work: 
Conflict Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime, written in 
1997.  Most valuable has been the four volume Conflict Series that appeared 
in 1990, and which Burton intended to capture his life’s work, from its 
theoretical underpinnings to its recommendations for practice. Another 
extremely valuable source of information on this theoretical discourse has 
been the body of writing in the scholarly journals, where the state of 
contemporary critical debate appears. In this regard, The Journal of Conflict 
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Resolution, Negotiation Journal, Peace and Conflict Studies, and International 
Journal of Peace Studies, have been particularly valuable. Electronic sources, 
such as the Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution have also proven 
most useful. Given this extensive overview of Burton’s output, we are able to 
provide an historically-situated exposition of the development of his work. 
 
Also, the literature dealing with South Africa’s history of conflict, and the 
transitional passage to democracy, including pre-negotiation conflict resolution 
initiatives, the National Peace Accord, and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, will be engaged, within the context of violence and negotiations. 
Again, although reference is made to general historical and sociological 
source material, the dominant authors consulted will be those working within 
the conflict resolution paradigm. Primary source material including newspaper 
reports and reports of individuals involved in resolution processes will also be 
accessed.   Additionally, original documentation, such as the minutes of 
meetings, reports and personal communications will be used. Newspaper 
articles, though primary sources in respect of certain events that form part of 
the study, are often quite unreliable, sometimes presenting slanted versions or 
explanations of events.  They do, however in the spirit of the qualitative 
approach allow us to capture the the thoughts and emotions of prominent 
actors who were interviewed at the time. In this regard, the journal articles are 
regarded as more reliable, and will , where possible, provide the mainstay of 
the information used. 
 
The literature will also be scanned for evidence of resolution in the current 
situation in South Africa.  A number of opinion surveys on the state of social 
cohesion and reconciliation in South Africa are available, such as those of the 
Institute for Reconciliation and Justice, Idasa and Institute of Race Relations, 
for instance, and these will be closely examined, and analyzed for information 
pertinent to the analytical conflict resolution perspective. This is fully justified 
according to Babbie (2002: 323), who writes that “Existing statistics can also 
provide the main data for a social scientific inquiry.”  
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Newspaper articles, as primary sources, will also be used to provide evidence 
for or against the actual achievement of conflict resolution in South Africa. 
 
The data collected from the literature survey will be augmented by a series of 
strategic interviews, held with theorists and practitioners within the field. In this 
regard, for instance, conflict practitioners who operated within the context of 
the National Peace Accord will be interviewed, to compensate for the dearth 
of written work on that particular intervention initiative.   
 
There is an additional source of data that will be presented here and that is 
the data presented by the author, who as facilitator, mediator, co-decision-
maker and  participant observer, participated in many of the processes being 
analyzed in this work. This “participant observation” provides a valuable 
perspective on the National Peace Accord, the development of community 
policing, and in respect of discreet conflict management initiatives in post-
apartheid South Africa, in all of which he was intimately involved. 
 
As has been mentioned above, through a process of triangulation of the 
various data sources, it is intended that the author will present a “thick 
description” of the subject matter.  
 
2.9 The South African Case 
The South African conflict and conflict management process will therefore be 
treated as a single case study of conflict management. The phenomenon of 
the management of deep-rooted social conflict in South Africa is to be treated 
as a crucial case, in the sense used by Ekstein below,  to confront the 
theories of Azar and Burton, concerning protracted or deep-rooted social 
conflict and its management. The case study method must be defended at the 
outset, as it has come in for some criticism in the past, although it has 
received greater acceptance in recent years7. 
 
                                                 
7 Babbie and Mouton (2001: 280 – 281) indicate that case studies were criticized as having little scientific value, during 
the sixties, which has given them a bad name. They have subsequently been redeemed by the use of additional 
techniques such as triangulation and thick description, however. 
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By case study, we refer to the study of a single case, that can be whatever 
bounded system is of interest, whether it be an institution, a programme, a 
responsibility, a collection or a population (Stake, 1983: 283). According to 
Yin:  
 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
-   investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its  
    real-life context, especially when 
-   the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are  
    not clearly evident” (1994: 13). 
 
The dedicated conflict management features of the South African transition to 
democracy certainly fall into this category. 
 
Stake goes on to write of the case study in social science literature as 
featuring: 
 
“…descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving a myriad of not highly 
isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by 
personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps 
narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion and 
metaphor. Comparisons are implicit rather than explicit. Themes and 
hypotheses may be  
important, but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the case.” 
(1983: 283, 284) 
 
Critics of the case study method hold that it is a weak technique of data 
collection. They maintain that, because it is based on the collection of data 
from a particular instance or event, out of a much larger population of 
instances or events, it cannot provide data of any significance concerning the 
regularity or probability of the social behaviours under examination.  
 
While this critique is valid, we stress that generalization based on observation, 
whether of a single case, or a representative sample of cases, is not the only 
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valuable theoretical exercise.  Numerous scholars in the social sciences 
stress the valuable contributions to be made by the case study method. 
 
According to Stake, for instance, case studies can be used to test hypotheses, 
especially to examine single exceptions that indicate that an hypothesis is 
erroneous (1983: 283).   Ekstein (1975:113) supports this argument thus “…if 
theory can compel particular case interpretations, then particular cases could 
invalidate or confirm theories”  
 
Ekstein insists that much case study scholarship is lacking in rigour, which 
gives the whole genre a bad name (Ekstein, 1975 and Yin, 1994). He 
distinguishes five different types of case study (1975: 96) of which only two 
enjoy his approval -  the plausibility probe and the crucial case study. The 
crucial case study, would be a  “…well chosen case – one that is somehow as 
crucial for a theory as are certain experiments (or indeed natural 
observations) in the physical sciences” (Ekstein,1975:117). 
 
It is our contention that the South African case does constitute a crucial case 
for the testing of certain of the central propositions of the theory of protracted 
social conflict. The argument for this contention will be made in Chapter five 
below, drawing largely on the work of Edward Azar. 
 
Through triangulation of the material presented here, it is our intention to 
develop a rich understanding, or “thick description” of the processes being 
described will be produced, against which the theory of conflict resolution can 
be measured, and recommendations and policy advice be brought to bear for 
the improved management and resolution of conflict in South Africa, and 
further afield in Africa and abroad, although, in the spirit of qualitative 
research, we understand that transferability of learning from one context to 
another is not necessarily straightforward, and that all contexts are unique.  
 
2.10 Limitations of the study 
This study is ultimately an ex post facto evaluation of a series of conflict 
intervention activities that took place in South Africa between 1985 and 2004. 
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There are certain limitations that are commonly deemed to apply to assessing 
the impact of conflict intervention exercises. We will cite Ross (2004) as he 
enumerates these. 
 
Ross (2004: 8) makes the point that the procedures required by experimental 
and quasi-experimental approaches are very difficult, if not impossible to 
apply in conflict resolution initiatives carried out in the context of conflicts 
which may often be extremely intense. Difficulties that Ross lists are that 
typically there are often more independent variables than cases, there is no 
random assignment of subjects to treatment groups, difficulty in gaining pre- 
and post-test measures, contexts in which interventions are implemented are 
constantly changing, project goals shift, there is uncertainty about what 
constitutes success, problems of instrumentation arise. Selection bias, 
reactivity, too few resources, and poor designs all contribute to the difficulty. 
There can also be additional issues of confidentiality and data collection that 
further limit evaluation work. Ross continues that often at best qualitative, not 
quantitative data,  are all that is available to judge whether a program or 
activity was successful. 
 
Because conflict resolution initiatives are generally small-scale projects with 
comparatively few participants and include activities that are difficult to 
replicate in standard formats, when significant effects are found, one can 
legitimately ask the extent to which they can be attributed to the content of the 
intervention as opposed to the personal characteristics of the intervener(s).  A 
further methodological problem is that the interventions are rarely isolated 
changes in a social or political environment. It follows that “…it is not realistic 
to think we can be very precise about the degree to which any single 
intervention is responsible for diminished political violence or any move 
towards settlement that might emerge" (Ross, 2004: 9).  
 
Ross (ibid) indicates that these limitations can be offset by the following 
techniques, among others: using multiple criteria of success, criteria for 
transfer, tracking goal evolution of the disputants (and interveners) over time.  
Ross further indicates in a footnote that "This leads to the hypothesis that 
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perhaps single projects cannot be fully evaluated by themselves but must be 
understood in terms of what else is taking place in a region, the need for a 
division of labour and specialization among projects, and a consideration of 
what projects accomplish themselves but also what they accomplish in 
working with others" (2004: 9). 
 
Much of Ross’ discussion is pertinent to this particular study. Outside of a 
laboratory situation, and without pre- and post-test opportunities,  it is always 
difficult to know whether outcomes are the result of specific interventions, or 
whether they are the result of extraneous factors in the broader environment. 
 
Additionally, we reiterate the point made above that, in keeping with the 
qualitative approach, we understand that all conflict situations are sui generis, 
and that no learning from the South African context can be simplistically 
transferred to other contexts without proper contextualization or the taking into 
consideration of unique cultural political and economic factors. 
 
We next consider the various theoretical approaches to our understanding of 
social conflict. 
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CHAPTER THREE : THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
The history of humankind and the rise and fall  
of civilizations is unquestionably a story of conflict.  
Conflict is inherent in human activities. It is  
omnipresent and foreordained.  
(Isard, 1992:1) 
 
What’s effectively needed is a ramified, penetrative 
perception of the present, one that makes it possible  
to locate the lines of weakness, the strong points ...  
In other words, a topological and geological survey  
of the battlefield - that is the intellectual's role  
(Foucault, 1977). 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The aims of this chapter are to present a brief, broad exposition of the nature, 
scope and role of conflict as a social phenomenon, and to provide an 
introduction to the most important theories of social conflict and its 
management in order to contextualize both the South African conflict, and the 
theories that we use to explain it. Because the focus of this thesis is 
particularly on the “analytical conflict resolution8” school, because of its central 
relevance to the South African case, and to this thesis, this approach will only 
be very briefly introduced here. It will be dealt with in greater detail in the 
following chapter which is entirely dedicated to its exposition.  
 
                                                 
8 Although the broad field of conflict and peace studies is sometimes alluded to as the conflict resolution field (see for 
instance Kriesberg, 1997: 51 – 75), that term is most frequently and more correctly applied to those theorists, such as 
John Burton, Sandole, Mitchell, Groom and others who have focused on longer-term resolution, as opposed to the mere 
settlement of deep-rooted social conflict. For most of these theorists the concept of basic human needs also assumes 
central importance. 
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It is not our intention to be exhaustive in our overview of the approaches to 
conflict. There are traditions that have not been included here. We will 
endeavour to provide an explanation of the genealogy of the basic human 
needs/deep-rooted conflict school because of their links to the concept of 
conflict resolution, and the work of John Burton. The theories that are 
presented will therefore largely be those from which the conflict resolution 
theorists have drawn their ideas, and those with which they have engaged, 
either in agreement, or in argument. Much of the work that we include, such 
as human needs theory, and the frustration aggression hypothesis, may not 
even be universally regarded as properly constituting social theory, as they 
take the case of the individual human person as point of departure, and are 
less concerned with the social context. This, however, is the foundation of the 
theory that has been developed by the conflict resolution school, whose 
analyses we use as point of departure for our thesis. 
 
Before concentrating on the academic theories of conflict, however, we will 
endeavour to provide a general exposition of conflict, its attributes and 
consequences, and its manifestation in society. 
 
3.2 Conflict in society 
Conflict is truly a ubiquitous social phenomenon. It is experienced by all of us 
much of the time. It is the inevitable result of the living in close proximity of 
vast numbers of intelligent, complex beings with ambitions and goals that are 
not always compatible in the context of a world of finite resources. 
 
Generally speaking, conflict is seen in a negative light. It is commonly 
regarded as something to be avoided or something to be prevented. This 
author has, for instance, in the course of a career of training a wide variety of 
groups in conflict management, frequently asked such groups to provide 
words that they associate with the term "conflict". Most frequently, though not 
exclusively, responses included some of the following words: “violence, killing, 
fighting, hurting, argument, shouting, damage to property, destruction, pain, 
misery”. These are mainly words denoting actions of sorts. This would 
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suggest that most people associate conflict with certain forms of behaviour, 
that are more commonly perceived as negative, rather than positive.9 
 
Although this tends to be more of a popular perception of the phenomenon, it 
is also a perspective commonly found in the scholarly literature on the 
subject.10 Attitudes towards social conflict are largely conditioned by our 
understanding of the phenomenon, however, and the definitions that we give 
it, and this aspect therefore deserves some attention in this chapter. 
 
Conflict is very important, in a positive sense, in that it continually challenges 
us with contradictions that must be resolved. Most individuals feel 
uncomfortable when confronted with a conflict situation, and that is in fact part 
of the utility of the phenomenon.  
 
We are always stimulated to do something about conflict – to resolve the 
problem, or to relieve the discomfort or the tension. Conflict is therefore a 
stimulant to action. In this sense, conflict can be seen as the engine of social 
evolution, or as Rubin et. al. put it, conflict is "the seedbed that nourishes 
social change", pushing us ever onward, and provoking us to find new and 
perhaps better ways of organising, producing and simply being. Sometimes 
we try to avoid the conflict, but mostly this strategy is unavailable, or leads to 
a deterioration in the situation. Conflict also has the result of enabling a 
                                                 
9 Training workshops in conflict handling skills to assorted groups between 1992 & 2004 
 
10 The literature is replete with references to conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, and similar terms. See, for 
instance, John Burton, etc in this regard. On conflict prevention, Luc Reychler (1994:1-19) has attempted to provide a 
thorough, discursive exposition of the concept, situating conflict prevention within the broader conflict management 
category. He traces the “popularization of the concept of the diplomacy of the post-Cold War ers, where”…preventive 
conflict management has become a feasible option”. Reychler is attempting to provide terminological clarity where, he 
admits there is much confusion. Even within his clarificatory discourse. It is obvious that some confusion still prevails. 
According to Reychler, conflict prevention refers to a “particular kind of conflict management which can be distinguished 
from conflict avoidance and conflict resolution” (1994:4).It includes “…measures which contribute to the prevention of the 
undesirable conflict behaviours once some situation involving goal incompatibility has arisen” (1994:4). Despite the 
distinction made between conflict prevention and conflict resolution mentioned above, Reychler proceeds to include 
conflict resolution under ‘alternative methods of peacemaking, within a scheme of “conflict prevention measures”. Much 
conceptual confusion clearly still remains, even among some of the foremost scholars, surrounding terminology, that 
stems largely from the inability on the part of the largely Realist, or power-politics tradition, to recognize the latent 
aspects of social conflict. 
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synthesis of interests, as well as the fostering of group unity (Rubin, G. Pruitt, 
D. and Kim (1994-7, 8) 11. 
 
We should not ignore the fact that there is, however, also a decidedly negative 
aspect to the phenomenon. Conflict pursued destructively, or handled poorly, 
can have immense costs. Given the technology currently available for its 
pursuit, social conflict threatens the very continued existence of life on our 
planet.12 Since the end of the Cold War, approximately 30 million people have 
been killed in wars of one sort or another 13. Ronald Fisher has stated that 
approximately one trillion dollars per annum are spent annually on warfare, or 
the preparation for warfare (Fisher,1997:1). As costs go, however, this 
represents only the tip of the iceberg. The costs in trauma, broken lives and 
broken families are far, far greater. And this only represents the area of 
warfare. Less dramatic public conflicts, industrial conflicts, organisational 
conflicts, and domestic conflicts produce additional costs measured in lost 
opportunities for development, efficiency, and damaged relationships, among 
others. 
 
Some literature has focused on the idea that there are ideal levels of conflict 
in society. Too much conflict, or poorly handled conflict in a state would lead 
to various institutional failures, anarchy and collapse, while too little conflict 
would lead to a lack of innovation and societal stagnation. The same would 
hold for conflict in organizational or family settings. 
 
There can therefore be no doubt that the pursuit of a scientific understanding 
of conflict is an important goal of social inquiry, as such an improved 
                                                 
11 Louis Coser (1956), in his seminal work “The Functions of Social Conflict” has famously listed a number of the 
positive functions that conflict plays in society. 
 
12 The negative and positive aspects of social conflict are well captured in Rubin, Pruitt and Kin 1994. Social Conflict: 
Escalation Stalemates and Settlement (7 - 9). 
 
13 See for instance the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) report on the scale of poorly 
managed conflict in the period following the end of the Cold War. See also the introduction of Van de Goor,L., 
Rupesinghe, K., and Sciarone, P., (eds), 1996, for an overview of the destructiveness of conflict inter and intra-national 
conflict in the early Nineties 
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understanding would undoubtedly assist us in the improved prediction of 
episodes of conflict and its management or resolution. 
 
Before proceeding with an excursion through the various approaches to and a 
definitional unpackaging of the study of conflict, it will be useful to establish, in 
broad terms, the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon, using a model 
developed by the author, in 1992.  
 
3.3 The Bases of Social Conflict 
 
Conflict in society has many bases, or causes. It may be based on value 
differences, clashes of interests, unfulfilled needs, misinformation, past 
relationships, or structural situations, or any combination of these. We will 
deal with each of these separately below. 
 
3.3.1  Value-based conflict: 
Origins of conflict are often to be found in the fact that different people hold 
different values. These values may be of a religious nature, or they may be 
political, or ideological. In this way, capitalists may clash with communists, or 
Muslims with Hindus or Christians. Many of the ongoing social conflicts in the 
world are based on value conflicts. Such conflict is notoriously difficult to 
manage, due to the zero-sum nature of many value systems. 
 
3.3.2  Interest-based conflict: 
Much social conflict is based on the fact that most of the material 
requirements of human beings are in great demand, and there is only a limited 
supply. Demand for resources is infinite,  but their supply is finite. In this 
sense, people are eternally in competition over scarce resources, such as 
money, land, jobs and powerful positions. Most of the conflict among 
individuals and groups is based on competition for scarce resources. 
 
3.3.3  Needs-based conflict: 
Another source of conflict is to be found in the denial and frustration of basic 
human needs. Following the theories of the noted psychologist Maslow, all 
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human beings have basic human needs which they are driven to satisfy. 
Whereas some of these needs are physical in nature such as a need for 
nutrition and shelter, others are largely psychological, and are much more 
difficult to define. They are nonetheless quite real. Some of these needs are 
needs for identity, security and control. The denial of these needs leads to 
much deep-rooted social conflict. 
 
3.3.4  Data-based conflict:  
Much social conflict is based on misperception, misunderstanding and/or 
miscommunication. Because our social reality is so complex, our brains are 
continually attempting to sift important facts from the unimportant. Generally, 
we try to make the information we receive "fit" into the pictures of reality that 
we already accept. Thus it is that as individuals we perceive reality in highly 
selective ways, generally seeing only one side of the picture. 
 
Once we have a certain image of an event, we tend to communicate the 
image as we perceive it, exaggerating those aspects that fit into our 
framework. This strengthens the distortions, and can give rise to conflict, 
where, objectively speaking, there is none. 
 
3.3.5  Structural Conflict: 
Other important sources of social conflict are to be found in social, political 
and economic structures, which pit human beings against each other in zero 
sum relationships. This is often the case in the workplace, or in the institutions 
of the state. Structure designed in a particular era or setting, for a particular 
set of circumstances may be entirely inappropriate in another era or in a 
different place, but may persist, nevertheless, causing much unnecessary 
conflict. 
 
3.3.6  Relationships in Conflict: 
Often, current conflicts are caused by past relationships. Where some 
individuals or groups have historically coerced, or cheated others, this leads to 
distrust among parties in the present, and so the tensions may be 
perpetuated, even where there is no objectively existing conflict. 
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As we start to think about the bases of conflict, it should become evident that 
conflict is rarely uni-dimensional. It is, unfortunately often based upon a 
number of different causes. Thus it may be simultaneously a structural 
conflict, but with important needs and interest dimensions. This generally 
makes dealing with it extremely difficult.  
 
The longer a conflict persists, the more a history of the conflict impinges on 
the present, and the less amenable it tends to be to resolution. We therefore 
find various conflicts around the world, that seem to have always been with 
us, and that defy all attempts at resolution. We call these protracted social 
conflicts, that need highly specialized forms of intervention, if they are to be 
managed at all.14 The South African conflict was widely regarded as an 
example of protracted social conflict. 
 
The multi-faceted nature of conflict could helpfully be diagrammatically 
represented as in figure 3.1, below: 
                                                 
14 See Bradshaw, G., Conflict Handling Skills Training Manual, 1992. Institute for the Study and Resolution of 
Conflict,  UPE, Port Elizabeth 
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Figure 3.1 The Conflict Cube 
 
What follows is the definitional "unpacking" of the concept of social conflict. 
This is followed by a brief exposition of the most important theoretical 
approaches to the study of social conflict in the social sciences, and the 
development of a conceptual matrix for understanding the relationship 
between those approaches, as a context for the discussion of the theories of 
deep-rooted social conflict that follow. 
 
3.4 Towards a definition of Social Conflict 
One very useful way of developing the concept of social conflict is by looking 
at a number of different definitions of conflict provided by some of the 
important scholars in the field, and drawing from these, some of the important 
aspects of an essentially complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. We begin, 
however, by stating that with the term social conflict, we distinguish the 
interests 
data 
needs 
relationships 
values 
structures 
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phenomenon from inner conflicts15, and concentrate on the phenomenon as it 
relates to interactions among human beings in their social context. 
 
 According to Rhoodie (1991: 21), "Social conflict normally occurs where 
groups of people compete for scarce resources." This definition reflects the 
widely-held belief that conflict is normally about contention over access to 
scarce material, or positional resources.  Himes provides a different emphasis 
in his definition: "Social conflict refers to purposeful struggles between 
collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to 
gain status, power resources and other scarce values" (1980: 14). This 
definition takes that of Rhoodie mentioned above further and additionally 
implies that conflict is always a conscious, and intentional activity, and that by 
implication therefore, it is always also deliberate.  
 
Similarly, according to Deutsch, a conflict exists whenever incompatible 
activities occur (1973: 10). Although Deutsch's definition is far broader than 
that of Himes, both writers imply an action component for conflict. Pruitt and 
Rubin (1986- 14), however, write that:      " ... conflict means perceived 
divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot 
be achieved simultaneously."  This echoes the reference to "purposeful" in the 
definition of Himes, and suggests that conflict is always the product of 
conscious intention on the part of those involved in it. This position also 
reflects the position of many other conflict theorists, including Coser (1956), 
and Kriesberg (1973). It does not include an explicit reference to an action 
component, however, and could therefore also pertain to conflict as a 
condition or situation. 
 
Kriesberg, separates the concept "objective conflict" from what he calls social 
conflict, on the grounds of objective conflicts being the underlying situation, 
giving rise, in some instances, to social conflict (Kriesberg, 1973: 19). This, in 
                                                 
 
15 By inner conflicts we mean internal conflicts within individual people, such as the conflict that we have between the choices 
of investing a given sum of money in order to provide security for our old age (long term good), or spending it on more 
immediate gratification (short term good). 
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the view of the present writer, creates confusion. It implies that situations of 
social conflict where actions have already taken place, need to be 
conceptually distinguished from "objective conflict", and this would clearly not 
necessarily always be the case. 
 
Sandole (1987:289), borrowing from biological terminology makes a 
distinction between genotypic (underlying)  and phenotypic (action) 
phenomena in conflict. “What most of us see or think of when we observe 
conflict situations are phenotypic phenomena: the claims and demands of the 
parties, their behaviour, (of an attack by one side on the other); the results of 
their behaviour (casualties) and the level of their interaction (interpersonal, 
intergroup, interorganizational and international). It is also on the phenotypic 
plane when we observe differences among the specific manifestations of 
these abstract levels; family, community, environmental, labour management, 
and interstate conflict and conflict management.” Underlying, and giving rise 
to the phenotypic phenomena, are the often invisible genotypic phenomena.  
 
In this thesis a broader definition of conflict is preferred, following especially 
the work of Galtung, who seems to resolve the tensions between the action/ 
perception/ structure aspects of conflict by proposing a triple-component view 
of social conflict as follows: 
 
• The underlying conflict situation,   
• Conflict attitudes and   
• Conflict behaviour. 
 
Such a separation avoids conceptual confusion when attempting to explain 
concepts such as latent conflict and has allowed Galtung to develop the 
concept of "structural violence", that has been extremely influential in the 
study of social conflict (Galtung, J, 1996, Mitchell, C., 1981: 17 - 32, Deutsch, 
M., 1973: 14). Similarly, in many cases, conflicts might be said to exist even 
though no conflict- related actions have taken place. According to Mitchell 
(1981), it is important to separate the existence of conflict from its behavioural 
manifestations. Bercovitch also reflects this broader view of conflict when he 
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writes that: "The range of conflict phenomena is, however, much wider than 
that implied by its physical connotation. It is used to describe inconsistencies 
as well as the process of trying to solve them; it has physical and moral 
implications; it embraces opinions as well as situations and a wide range of 
behaviour (1984: 3)”.16 
 
The threefold nature of conflict is often illustrated in the literature through the 
medium of the so-called ABC triangle of conflict depicted in Figure 3.2  below: 
 
Figure 3.2: The ABC triangle 
 
 
Adapted from Mitchell, (1981: 18) 
 
Accepting the explanatory framework of Galtung, Mitchell and Bercovitch 
implies the acceptance of a broader definition of conflict, and concomitantly, 
the impossibility of conflict prevention.  Though we may prevent conflict 
behaviour, we have to accept that preventing conflict attitudes is more difficult, 
                                                 
 
16 See additionally Fink,C. (1968: 431 – 456) for an examination of the arguments for and against a  broader conception 
of social conflict. 
Attitudes 
Conditions Behaviour 
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and that the prevention of conflict situations is at least utopian, if not 
impossible. Conflict behaviour may be managed, or controlled, but 
background conditions for conflict and the attitudes associated with it are a 
part of the human condition. 
 
Much social science has been focused upon the study of conflict, as one of 
the more pressing issues in human behaviour. The study of history has, for 
instance, often been focused on wars among nations. Psychology has studied 
the causes of human conflictual behaviour. The study of politics is largely the 
study of clashes between political forces and ideas. Sociology has been 
concerned with the conflicts among the larger groupings in society, and social 
psychology, concerned with conflicts among smaller groups and individuals. 
   
Each discipline brings its own set of theories and concerns to the study of 
social conflict, as well as its own set of prejudices, or "blinders" to use the 
phraseology of Isard (1990:5). It is interesting and also important for our 
understanding of this multi-faceted concept, to note the multitude of differing 
interpretations given to the conflict phenomenon in the social sciences. At first 
glance many of these seem mutually exclusive or incompatible. However, if 
we proceed as does this thesis, from the premise that conflict is a highly 
complex social phenomenon, and that as such it is of necessity studied from a 
multi-disciplinary perspective, then our understanding of social conflict and its 
analysis will be enhanced, to make its management more efficient and 
effective17. We will also illustrate a more recent convergence of approaches 
as the field grows to maturity.  
 
Especially since the Second World War, there has been a growing 
"coalescing" of work on social conflict. There is much borrowing of ideas 
across disciplinary boundaries, a broader consciousness among scholars of 
each others' work, and a growing literature of interdisciplinary collaborative 
work. Scholars in the field write of a science of peace and conflict, peace 
                                                 
 
17 In this regard see also Clinton Fink’s article “Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict” in The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Vol xii, No. 4 pp 412 – 460. 
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studies, conflict studies, polemolegie, or conflict resolution. The different terms 
indicate different strands within the emerging multidisciplinary field, which 
continues to produce multi-authored handbooks18, research centres, and 
university programmes19. We examine some of the more important theoretical 
perspectives below. 
 
3.5 The Study of Conflict in the Social Sciences 
Normally, one might include a section on the theory of the field, but in the 
case of social conflict there is as yet no widely accepted general theory of 
conflict.20 There are instead, a number of competing theoretical perspectives, 
each with its own valuable insights and its own shortcomings. Because the 
field is what Kenneth Boulding (1979: xiii), writing in the early days of its 
emergence has termed an “interdiscipline", rather than a discipline, it has 
become the focus of not only most of the social sciences, but many other 
theoretical pursuits as well. Therefore, according to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf:  
“No single general theory of conflict and war exists that is acceptable to social 
scientists in their respective disciplines, or to authorities in other fields from 
which social scientists borrow insights. If a comprehensive theory is ever to be 
developed it will probably require inputs from biology, psychology, social 
psychology, anthropology, history, political science, economics, geography, 
theories of communications, organization, games, decision-making, military 
strategy, functional integration, and systems as well as philosophy, theology 
and religion” (1990: 187). 
 
                                                 
18 Good examples of which include Sandole, J.D., and Sandole-Staroste, I.,  (1987), Conflict Management: Elements of 
Generic Theory and Process,  Burton (1990 a,b,c,d) The Conflict Series, Deutsch, M. and Coleman, P., (2000), The 
Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, and Cheldelin, S., Druckman, D., and Fast, L., (2003), Conflict: 
from Analysis to Intervention. 
 
19 For an account of the development of the emerging field of conflict resolution, a number of works, including those of  
Isard (1992), Schellenberg (1996), Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) will prove most instructive. 
 
20 However,  a number of social scientists have made elaborate attempts to develop general theory. Two notable 
examples would be those of Blalock, in his 1989 work, Power and Conflict: Towards a General Theory, and Isard, in his 
1992 work Science of Conflict and Peace. Burton’s work on basic human needs is widely regarded as constituting one of 
the more successful attempts to provide a general theory of social conflict. 
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Such a wide variety of scholarly enterprise has inevitably been accompanied 
by an equally wide variety of premises, methodologies and other concerns. 
However, a number of “islands of theory"21 have coalesced within the conflict 
resolution approach, to form a coherent and complex understanding of 
deep-rooted social conflict. Most approaches are based upon their 
assumptions regarding the causes of conflict, and also reflect the disciplinary 
origins, such as psychology or sociology, as well as the normative 
perspectives of the scholars concerned. 
 
Aside from their different explanations regarding the causes of conflict, the 
major disagreements among the different schools generally centre on a 
number of dichotomous axes that we distinguish as follows: 
 
• Conflict is regarded in either a "narrower" or a "wider" sense, in 
terms of which it is either seen as simply the violent interactions 
among parties, or, alternatively, it focuses additionally upon the 
underlying situations, and the relationship between social systems 
and social conflicts.(Bercovitch, 1984: 4) 22 
• Conflict is perceived to be either a subjective, or an objective 
phenomenon. According to subjective approaches, conflict is 
primarily over values, and values are ultimately dependent on 
parties' perceptions. Standing opposed to the subjective 
perspective, the objective approach maintains that conflicts exist 
whenever an incompatibility of interests exists, irrespective of 
whether parties are even aware of such incompatibilities 
(Bercovitch, 1984: 5). 
• Conflict is also perceived to be either positive and functional, or 
negative and dysfunctional for social systems (Wehr, 1979 - 3 - 5). 
The theorists who support the positive view of conflict also tend to 
believe that conflict cannot be avoided or prevented, while those 
who believe it to be dysfunctional also tend to seek to prevent it. 
                                                 
  
21 The term “islands of theory” has been used by Sandole and Mitchell and Viotti and Kauppi 
22 See also Fink (1968: 412 – 460) for a discussion of wider and narrower perspectives on conflict. 
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• Conflict is additionally often dealt with, either as a procedural 
phenomenon, or as a structural one.23 This reflects the influences of 
early scholars Marx (Structural) and Simmel (procedural) on the 
field."24 
• Scholars also tend to be either “idealist” or “realist” in respect of 
their understanding of social conflict (Sandole, 1993. 3 - 6) 
According to Sandole (1993: 5), the fundamental difference 
between the idealist and the political realist perspectives is simply 
that of “nature versus nurture”; Political realism stresses 
containing, deterring and making the best of the environment, and 
therefore of behaviour. Realism tends to be pessimistic, and 
idealistic, optimistic.  
 
An additional perspective that must be incorporated in this overview is that of 
"level of analysis". Conflict is approached at the level of individuals, that of 
groups, the level of national societies, and finally, at the international, or global 
level. One needs to understand that although the focus or analysis might be at 
the level of individuals, that that in no way necessarily implies a reductionist 
approach 25. 
 
3.5.1 Conflict Typologies 
Most scholars working in the field of conflict and its management present a set 
of various conflict types, characterized by certain distinguishing 
characteristics. There is considerable variation, and disagreement among 
these scholars concerning how to categorise  the various conflict types. As 
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse assert: There are as many typologies as 
there are analysts, and the criteria employed not only vary, but are often 
mutually incompatible.” (1999: 29).  
                                                 
23 See for instance Schellenberg, chapters 4 and 5 for examples of conflict treated as a process or structural issue. 
 
24 For a discussion of the impact of the work of these  two theorists , see Turner, J.H. 1975:” Marx and Simmel 
Revisited : Reassessing the Foundations of Conflict Theory” in Social Forces, Vol, 53, 4 1975. 
 
25 See for instance Kelman  (1965) for a discussion of the application of individual psychology to the study of 
international relations 
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Whereas some authors concentrate on the particular parties in the conflict as 
a means of classifying conflicts, others attach greater significance to the 
issues in dispute, the scale of the conflict, or the means used to pursue the 
conflict and its management. Denis Sandole (1999, 2003) has worked 
extensively on the development of a schema to capture the complexity of 
conflict, and has arrived at what he calls a “three-pillar approach”. Accurate 
classification is important, as a failure to capture the complexity of conflict 
invariably results in “…well-intentioned but nevertheless one-dimensional, 
simplistic efforts to do something about them [that] may only make matters 
worse.” (Ibid., 52). We present Sandole’s typology as Table 3.1 below: 
 
Table 3.1  A Three-Pillar Typology of Social Conflict 
 
Pillar 2 Pillar 1 Pillar 3 
Conflict causes and 
conditions 
Conflict 
Latent, Manifest, and 
Aggressive Manifest 
Conflict Intervention 
Third-party objectives 
Individual level 
 
Societal level 
 
International level 
 
Global/ecological level 
Parties (Violent) 
 
Issues 
 
Objectives 
 
Means 
 
Conflict-handling 
Orientations 
 
Conflict 
Environment 
Conflict prevention 
Conflict management 
Conflict settlement 
Conflict resolution 
Conflict transformation 
Conflict provention 
 
Third –party approaches
Competitive and/or 
cooperative processes 
Negative and/or positive 
peace orientations 
Track-1 and/or Track-2 
actors and processes 
 
 
This author has developed a useful schema that includes the bases, or 
sources of conflict, on the one hand, with the conflict domain on the other, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.3 below. 
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Fig 3.3 Typology based on conflict bases and conflict domains 
 
 
 
An attempt to provide an exhaustive list of scholars and their work would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Only those who have been most influential in 
their respective fields, and their main ideas have therefore been included 
here. 
 
We will present the various approaches, in order, from micro-level approaches 
through to macro-approaches. The conflict resolution school will be presented 
last. Please note that the various aspects of John Burton's work will be 
featured in three phases. Firstly, we will present his work in the development 
of basic human needs theory as it pertains to social conflict. Secondly, at the 
international level, we will present his development of the "World Society" 
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approach. Finally, his work with his colleagues in the Centre for the Analysis 
of Conflict in the development of the conflict resolution approach will be 
presented in greater detail in the following chapter.  
 
Table 3.2 provides a schematic view of the variety of approaches to the study 
of social conflict, indicating the levels at which they operate, their disciplinary 
domains, and the main contributors to each approach. 
 
3.5.2       Psychological Approaches  
There are a number of approaches to the understanding of conflict that may 
be included under the broad umbrella of psychological approaches. In general 
these may be said to be understandings that draw mainly on the idea that 
conflict is associated with aggression, and aggression is either seen as an 
innate part of human behaviour, independent of background conditions, or as 
a learned response or the product of some frustrated drive. In some works 
they form part of what is termed a micro-cosmic 26 approach to conflict. Some 
of these approaches are not strictly psychological, but draw equally on 
deeper, biological explanations of conflict. They generally operate at the level 
of explaining individual human behaviour. We include some of the most 
influential perspectives below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
26 See for instance Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1981, chapter 7, dealing with microcosmic theories of conflict. 
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Table 3.2 A TYPOLOGY OF 
THEORIES OF SOCIAL 
CONFLICT 
  
Micro  Macro  
Pre-psychological Psychological Sociological/Anthropolog
ical 
International 
Studies of the brain 
MacLean 
Koestler 
 
Studies of Mind 
Freud: Psychoanalysis 
Freud: Authoritarian 
personality 
Structural Theories 
Marx, Dharendorf, 
Weber 
 
Functionalism: 
Simmel, Coser 
Idealism 
Realpolitik 
Pluralism/World society 
Globalism/ Structuralist 
Ethology: 
Lorenz, Ardrey, Morris 
Frustration-
Aggrresssion: Dollard 
and Doob 
Social learning Theory: 
Bandura 
Dissonance: Festinger 
Misperception, 
miscalculation 
Basic Human Needs: 
Davies, Sites, Burton 
Social Process: 
 
Pruitt & Rubin 
Krieberg 
Conflict Resolution: 
Burton 
Mitchell 
Sandole 
Azar 
Fisher 
Evolutionary Genetics 
Shaw and Wong 
 Cultural: 
Avruch 
Ross 
Peace Studies: 
Galtung 
  Structurationism 
Jabbri, Fetherston 
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3.5.2.1 Social conflict is an expression of the innate  
                      Aggressiveness of Mankind 
One explanation of social conflict, emanating from the biological and 
psychological fields, is based on theories of human aggressiveness, largely 
independent of environmental conditions. 
 
There is a body of scholarship that seeks explanations for social conflict 
among humans deep in the biological structures, and neurological wiring of 
the human organism itself. So, within the conflict literature, there are those 
authors who stress the importance of the functioning of the brain as a source 
of aggression and conflict behaviour. Among others, Denis Sandole (1990) 
has discussed the structures of the human brain, placing responsibility for 
aggression in the amygdala and hypothalamus, the primitive reptilian 
structures inherited from the very early evolutionary development of the 
human species.27 Stimulation of, and damage to these brain structures is 
associated with aggressive acts in humans and animals. According to some of 
these arguments, not only is individual aggression the product of individual 
development, it may also be genetically transmitted  (See for instance Salla, 
2000)28. Although popularised in the Sixties by authors such as Robert Ardrey 
(1966, 1967) and Desmond Morris, this approach lost ground to the 
proponents of social learning theory, and the more macrolevel theories. There 
has, as has been mentioned elsewhere, been an aversion among social 
scientists to the idea that conflict behaviour is "hardwired into the human 
organism".29 
                                                 
 
27 See also, for instance Chap 7 “ Biopolitics: The Human Brain” in R. Pettman (1975), Human Behaviour and World Politics: A 
transdisciplinery Introduction, for a discussion of the work by Koestler, Maclean and others on the effects of brain structure on 
behaviour. 
 
28 According to this version, the very cells of and individual will carry within them the memory of conflict experiences and 
traumas, and these cellular memories may well be transmitted from one generation to the next. See his article “ confict 
Resolution, Genetics and alchemy- The Evolution of Conflict transmutation” in Online Journal for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 
Fall, 2000. 
 
29 This is reflected, for instance in Unesco's 1986 Seville Statement, denying any biological grounds for warfare. See 
Suter, (2004: 175,176) for a discussion of the Seville Statement. That the ideas of the biological approaches have 
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Though we have moved on, so to speak, in respect of especially our cultural 
and technological development, in the view of the theorists on aggression, the 
primitive structures of the brain have not kept pace, leaving us with the 
potential for aggressive behaviour. The role of the endocrine system, 
especially the effect of hormones such as testosterone is included as an 
explanation for much human aggression. Even these primal drives seem to be 
mediated by environmental factors, however. For instance, in experimental 
stimulation of the hypothalamus of a male rhesus monkey, the resulting 
aggressive behaviour was found to be directed only against other male 
monkeys, indicating the importance of environmental context in the production 
of aggression (Schellenberg, 1996: 45 - 48). 
 
According to Corning, the inner principles by which human life are organised 
cannot be understood without an understanding of the evolutionary and 
genetic aspects of behaviour (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1990: 275). 
Emanating from the field of ethology 30, or the study of animal behaviour, 
psychology and behavioural physiology, there are numerous variations on the 
theme of human aggressiveness (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1990: 276 - 281, 
Wehr, 1979: 1,2). Lorenz and Ardrey are two prominent scholars in this 
particular school. According to Lorenz, man does not learn aggression; his 
aggression is an inborn mechanism for ensuring the survival of his species 
(du Pisani, 1988-13, 14). For Lorenz, intra-specific aggression generally has 
survival value in the animal world, in that it prevents overcrowding of specific 
species, it plays a significant role in the survival of the strongest through rival 
fights and "has a useful role in defence of the young" (Pettman, R, 1975: 189, 
190). He cautions that in humans, however, their technological development 
and cultural evolution has outstripped their natural aggression inhibitors, such 
as appeasement gestures and related behaviour to be found in animals such 
                                                                                                                                            
explanatory value, however is borne out by their durability, as they are still being used at the time of writing (Salla,  2000) 
and their incorporation in other approaches such as the human needs theory. 
 
30 According to Pettman (1975:178), discussing ethology, “The label itself has two obsolete meanings, one being the 
science of ethics, and the other the 'portrayal of character by mimicry', It is from the latter usage that the contemporary 
term seems to have been drawn". 
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as wolves (see, for instance Sandole, 1993: 8). Although it is a widely 
supported approach, there has also been much scholarly criticism of this view, 
particularly that emanating from Fromm, based on his interpretation of the 
work of anthropologists Benedict and Mead (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1990: 
281 -282). Wehr also presents the arguments of another anthropologist, 
Leakey, to suggest that primitive man was, on the whole a peaceful being 
(Wehr, 1979: 2).31 
 
The balance of the arguments presented in the literature suggest that while 
conflict cannot simply be laid at the door of instinctive human aggression, the 
existence of such aggressive instincts in humans can equally not simply be 
discounted as one of the causal factors of social conflict.  
 
Another individual level perspective, the psychotherapy approach to conflict 
also traces the sources of conflict to within man, but postulates that conflict is 
the result of a particular configuration of biological, social and psychological 
elements (du Pisani, 1988:15). One of the most important contributions to this 
approach is that of Freud, whose work presents human destructiveness as a 
result of a dialectical struggle between two conflicting forces; a life force, and 
a death instinct. When the destructive urge, or "death instinct"32 prevails, 
aggression is directed inwardly. This energy is always present and seeking 
release, and when directed away from the self, it may result in the secondary 
phenomena of aggression and conflict with others (du Pisani, 16 – 19, Freud, 
1922, 1959, 1961).33 
 
                                                 
 
31 Pettman (1975) for instances also provides additional criticism, to the effect that Lorenz uses selective examples to argue for 
innate aggression. 
 
32 That Freud referred to as "Thanatos" 
 
33 According to Freud, all our instincts are aimed at the "reduction or elimination" of tension, stimulation or excitation. In 
this account, pleasure seeking behaviour is undertaken to achieve an "unstimulated condition", "a sort of Oriental 
Nirvana or absences of all desire". Because death entails the elimination of all excitement or stimulation, all living beings 
aspire to 'the quiescence of the inorganic world". See Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, (1981: 256 - 258). 
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The Contributions of Freud also include his work on the development of the 
superego, which, according to him is the result of learning from parents and 
others during the early years of development. Freud believed that the 
pressures on developing personalities to be conformist, and respectable led to 
the development of the authoritarian personality. These ideas were eventually 
taken further by Adorno and others, in attempts to explain what they saw as 
the slavish mentality that made the German Nazi phenomenon possible 
(Schellenberg,1996: 48,49,50). 
 
According to Fromm, man instinctively protects himself against threats to his 
survival. Aggression that results from such protection, though instinctual, is 
purely reactive, and instrumental-, it is therefore also innate. According to 
Fromm, this form is benign, and positively functional (du Pisani, 1988: 19). It is 
a form of aggression that man shares with the other animals. Fromm does 
also distinguish a second type of "uninstinctual" aggression, which he views 
as malignant, or destructive, and biologically maladaptive. This is associated 
with wanton cruelty, bloodlust and the need for control,  that he views as a 
uniquely human quality. This behaviour he ascribes to a flawed human 
character, shaped by the pressures exerted by social institutions over time. 
The remedy is to restructure modern society to allow man more freedom to 
assert himself (du Pisani, p 20). Fromm's work presages that of the human 
needs school, in that he tries to show that  "...destructiveness is one of the 
possible answers to psychic needs that are rooted in the existence of man, 
and that its generation results... from the interaction of various social 
conditions with man's existential needs." (Fromm, 1973: 294).34  Fromm is, 
however optimistic about the human ability to reform its social conditions, and 
so overcome its tendency towards aggression. 
 
                                                 
34 Fromm distinguishes the following needs: The need for a Frame of Orientation and Devotion, the need for 
Rootedness, the need for Unity, the need for Effectiveness, the need for Excitation and Stimulation, the related need 
to avoid Boredom or Chronic Depression, and the need for a Character Structure. According to Fromm, the 
satisfaction of the needs can take place in different ways. For instance: "the need for an object of devotion can be 
answered by devotion to God, love and truth - or by idolatry of destructive idols. The need for relatedness can be 
answered by love and kindness - or by dependence, sadism, masochism destructiveness."(1973:294 - 358). For an 
excellent account of Fromm's approach, see also the working paper of Zlatko Isokovic: Erich Fromm's Concept of 
Aggression and the 'Missing Element' of Ethno-Political Mobilisation in the Second Yugoslavia. 
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3.5.2.2 Frustration-aggression Theory 
Another psychological approach is that which traces the origins of aggression 
to some or other form of frustration. The most notable work in this area was 
carried out by Dollard and his colleagues (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and 
Sears) at Yale University in 1939. In its original formulation, the frustration-
aggression hypothesis declared that "the occurrence of aggressive behaviour 
always presupposes the existence of frustration, and contrariwise, that the 
existence of frustration leads to some form of aggression" (Van der Dennen, 
J.M.G.). 
 
These scholars found that individuals did indeed become aggressive if some 
goal-directed behaviour was interfered with. The tendency would be for the 
person interfered with to want to attack whoever was perceived to be the 
barrier to the desired behaviour. It was soon recognized that the original 
formulation of the Dollard- Doob hypothesis, as it was also known, was far too 
general, and as such it attracted much criticism. This led to a great deal of 
research activity; some of which attempted to refine and develop the theory, 
and some of which attempted to refute it. The hypothesis was, for instance 
soon reformulated by one of its original proponents, Neal Miller. According to 
this revised 1941 proposition: 
"a) frustration instigates behaviour that may or may not be hostile or                  
aggressive, and 
b) any hostile or aggressive behavior that occurs is caused by       
frustration." (Von der Dennen: 2) 
 
It was found, in the elaboration of the original hypothesis, that inhibitors of 
aggression, such as the expectation of punishment might prevent the 
aggressive response, but they would be experienced as further instances of 
frustration, which would have the effect of building the pressure for eventual 
aggression (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1990: 282 - 284). This brings into focus 
the vexatious question of the temporal relationship between frustration and 
aggression, and the difficulty of being able to predict a given episode of 
aggression, or of associating any such aggressive behaviour with a specific, 
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prior incidence of frustrated behaviour. It also provides the implication of a 
"drive" towards aggression that might be the result of many instances of 
frustrated goals in particular individuals. 
 
There is also much evidence to show that aggression is not always simply 
directed towards the object of frustration. There are many intervening factors, 
such as the displacement of aggression, or the disguise thereof, which have 
to be taken into account (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1990, 284). One of the 
original embellishments of frustration-aggression theory is thus the assertion 
that aggression, even when displaced, produces catharsis - a relief of the 
tension caused by frustration. A difficulty with this proposition is that there is 
no way of knowing who the object of displaced aggression might be, except 
for the general proposition that the closer the target to the original object of 
frustration, the more effective would the cathartic effect be. 
 
The actual evidence concerning catharsis has been found to be confusing, as 
aggressive episodes, rather than always leading to catharsis, can also be 
shown to lead to further aggressive behaviour (See for instance Schellenberg, 
1996:52). 
 
Similarly, frustration-aggression theory, or the "Dollard - Doob hypothesis" has 
attempted to project the insights developed about individual behaviour onto 
collective social behaviour, using it to explain racial conflict in the American 
South, as well as to imply that it is the frustration-aggression principle which 
underpins the Marxist theory of class-struggle. Critics maintain, however that 
individual psychological processes cannot be writ large upon society. The role 
of social learning in selecting targets for aggression also cannot be explained 
by the frustration-aggression theory (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1990:286). 
 
Although many feel that the approach has utility, and recognize that it is 
supported by a large body of experimental evidence, they believe that there is 
a danger of viewing conflict too simply as a purely stimulus-response 
phenomenon. 
 
 49
The theory has had an enormous impact on the field however. In the words of 
Van der Dennen writing in the 1939 Dollard, Doob, et.al. publication: "It 
appears to have influenced current Western thinking on aggression more 
profoundly than any other publication" (Van der Dennen:1). The influence of 
frustration-aggression thinking can, for instance be traced through to the work 
of T.R. Gurr and others on relative deprivation (in his book Why Men Rebel), 
and can also be discerned in the Basic Human Needs approach of John 
Burton and others35. Du Pisani, drawing on Zimmerman, (1977: 19-22) 
supports this when he writes that: 
"The frustration-aggression approach to conflict constitutes 'a major and 
useful perspective on conflict', especially because it has influenced other 
approaches such as learning theory" (du Pisani, 1988:23) 
 
3.5.2.3       The Social Learning Perspective 
There was, by the nineteen-sixties, in the psychological literature on 
aggression, a reaction against the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Mostly, 
the scholars rejected the notion of an unadulterated stimulus-response 
approach, which took insufficient account of social learning to explain human 
aggression. Many also rejected the assumptions of much of the earlier work, 
to the effect that man was innately aggressive, or driven to aggress. The 
approach is sometimes referred to as the "hydraulic model" in a reference to 
its crudely mechanistic assumptions. 
 
Albert Bandura, probably the foremost pioneering scholar in this tradition, 
while noting the work of the instinct, and frustration-aggression theorists, 
produces evidence to show that "...aggression is generally better explained in 
terms of its rewarding consequences, than on the basis of frustrative 
conditions and the punishment it incurs."(1973:29). Quite importantly he also 
                                                 
 
35 For detailed accounts of frustration-aggression, including the further development of the theory, its detractors, and its 
influence on subsequent theorizing, see Van tier Dennen, J.M.G., Frustration and Aggression Theory 
See also James Schellenberg, 1996 Conflict Resolution: Theory Research and Practise (:51, 52), and du Pisani, 1988 A 
Critical Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Tea Techniques From Problem Solving Workshops to Theory (Doctoral Thesis), 
pp 21-23. A comprehensive discussion, including its fundamental variables, such as the variation of the strength of 
instigation to aggression of the Frustration-Aggression hypothesis can also be found in chapter three entitled "Frustration 
and Aggression", of Aubrey Yates' 1962 publication, Frustration and Conflict. 
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explicitly maintains that “ ... social learning theory holds a more optimistic view 
of man's capacity to reduce the level of human destructiveness." (Bandura, 
1973: 59). 
 
Social learning theory also proved more useful than Frustration-Aggression 
theory in that it provided a better understanding of who the likely targets of 
aggression might be, from whom aggressive behaviour might be modelled, 
and the power of the media to provide examples of aggressive behaviour. 
 
Bandura (1973-.29, 30) makes his point as follows: "The social learning theory 
of human aggression adopts the position that man is endowed with 
neurophysiological mechanisms that enable him to behave aggressively, but 
the activation of these mechanisms depends on upon appropriate stimulation 
and is subject to critical control. Therefore the specific forms that aggressive 
behaviour takes, the frequency with which it is expressed, the situations in 
which it is displayed, and the specific targets selected for attack are largely 
determined by social experience." 
 
According to this perspective, aggressive behaviour is encouraged to the 
extent that it is observed to be successful, or to produce desired results. 
Bandura presents many examples of how parents, often inadvertently, by 
encouraging their offspring to "stand up for themselves" "teach" aggression. 
Similarly, peers encourage aggressive behaviour, as youths often gain social 
acceptance into sub-cultures through aggressive acts. 36 
 
According to this perspective, conflict is best managed by carefully managing 
the socialization and educational processes. Aggression-building processes, 
such as military training, and the rewarding of aggressive processes should 
be discouraged or avoided, and media images of aggressive behaviour, 
should not be seen to be rewarded. Positive, peaceful education would be 
highly recommended. 
                                                 
 
36 Some criminal gangs, for instance, require new members to commit a crime, even commit murder, in order to prove 
their commitment to the group. 
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Other approaches related to the social learning approach, are those 
associated with Kenneth Boulding, and Festinger. The latter worked in the 
area of cognitive dissonance. According to this theory "...the normal tendency 
of the individual [is] to reduce inconsistencies which may arise in his 
knowledge concerning his values, his environment and his behaviour." 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1981: 284,285) 
 
This tendency gives rise to an intolerance of ambiguity. Especially when this 
operates in the minds of key decision-makers, working under intense time and 
emotional pressures it may work to produce aggressive or potentially 
escalatory decisions. The work of Allison, studying decision-making during the 
Cuban missile crisis is instructive here (Allison, 1987:282-331). 
 
Kenneth Boulding, justifiably regarded by many as one of the pioneers of the 
conflict resolution field (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse,1999: 42), 
believed in the positive power of learning, which in the long run would lead to 
ever improved and peaceful relationships among nations. For instance, in his 
1962 attempt at developing a theory of social conflict, "Conflict and Defence: 
A General Theory" he echoes Bandura when he writes: "Where learning is 
associated with rewards rather than punishment, the personality integrates 
around the idea of continued learning rather than around a core of received 
truth, and the reconciling personality develops." 
 
In a later work, he re-emphasises the importance of learning as he states: 
"...each party in a relationship tends to create the self-image of the other in a 
very complex, mutual learning process. To a distressing extent each party in a 
conflictual relationship is a creation of its enemies" (1978: 17). He also 
stresses the need for the teaching of non-violence and peace studies as an 
approach to conflict management (ibid: 115). 
 
 52
3.5.2.4 Conflict as the Result of Misperception and Miscalculation 
Many scholars attribute the occurrence of social conflict to poor 
communication, miscalculation, or misperception among the parties involved. 
There is much literature, for instance, at the level of international conflict, 
particularly that dealing with international crises, that gives prominent attention 
to the decision-making processes of elites under pressure. The Cuban missile 
crisis is one example that has enjoyed a great deal of attention. The Cold War 
in general, between the United States and the Soviet Union, has often also 
been the subject of this mode of analysis. (Holsti, O.R., 1987: 244 281, 
Allison, G.T., 1971). According to these authors, decision-making within such 
elites under pressure is hardly a rational process. Individuals succumb to 
"groupthink", limiting themselves to the ideas of the group, and not generating 
alternative explanations of the actions of their opponents. Under these 
circumstances, any actions by the opponent are automatically interpreted as 
hostile. 
 
According to other theorists, groups in conflict, even under non-crisis 
conditions, harbour negative images of each other, which upon close 
examination, turn out to be mirror images. The human drive for consistency 
will generally ensure that only information that reinforces the negative image 
of the enemy will be assimilated. 37 
 
According to Burton: “There are many features of our psychological makeup 
which distort our thinking and observations. Some people do tend to have 
favourable images of others. More frequently this is not so” (Burton, 1972: 76). 
 
The result is that opposing parties generally end up having very similar, 
equally negative images of each other. Any action by one party then is 
immediately interpreted in terms of its aggressive intent towards one's own 
                                                 
 
37 See also Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf (290 - 207), for a discussion of the work of Boulding (1959), Gladstone (1959) and 
Bronfenbrenner (1967), on enemies' images of each other. 
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party. The conflict-generating potential of such a process should be 
immediately evident. 
 
3.5.2.5        Basic Human Needs Theory 
Basic Human Needs Theory, which has many non-psychological components, 
is ultimately an approach which originates within the psychological group of 
approaches, and has some similarities with the frustration/aggression theory. 
This branch of theory is especially significant, in that it has been most 
influential in the development of the conflict resolution field, and informs the 
analysis of this thesis. It will only be treated very briefly here, however, as it 
will be given  more comprehensive treatment in the following chapter. 
 
According to John Burton, the prime architect and organizer of the needs 
approach to the study of social conflict, this is a "...theory of behaviours that 
challenges the widely accepted assumption that human behaviours are wholly 
malleable" (Burton, 1995-120). 
 
Burton and his followers are not convinced by what he calls "conventional'' 
explanations for conflict behaviour, especially with regard to long-standing, 
seemingly intractable conflicts, where scholars tend to base their explanations 
on various social values. He illustrates the point by indicating how futile the 
debates of his day are, as they are often simply assertions of different, 
competing values. In his thinking, they are more ideological than scientific in 
nature. In his search for a more scientific foundation of such seemingly 
"irrational" conflict behaviour, human needs are postulated as a universal 
standard - a "scientific navigation point" (Burton, 1988: 40 - 43). 
 
Burton is concerned that the prevailing assumptions at both international and 
societal levels seem to be fundamentally flawed. He maintains that at the 
domestic level notions of legitimate authority (even democratic legitimate 
authority) are seen to be breaking down. This is even more obvious at the 
international level, where conflicts such as those concerning Vietnam and 
Korea challenged the basic foundations of power politics. Burton (1995-117) 
puts it as follows: "The causes of crime, aggression and violence in 
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relationships at all levels are up for exploration. The separation of that which 
is domestic from that which is international on law and order grounds is no 
longer tenable, for deterrence has not been seen reliably to deter at either 
level." 
 
Essentially, the proponents of the basic human needs approach to social 
conflict, following the ideas of Maslow 38, postulate the existence of psycho-
biological needs as a universal human characteristic (Sandole, 1990: 60 -89). 
These scholars assert the existence of a drive to human needs satisfaction as 
a key determinant of human behaviour. 39 
 
Frustrations of attempts to satisfy these basic human needs are seen by this 
school of thought as being central to the explanation of the contentious 
behaviour that exemplifies much deep-rooted social conflict. These scholars 
have developed a theoretical framework for the explanation of deep-rooted 
social conflict and a particular theory of practice for resolving it, which will be 
dealt with in much greater detail below. 
 
3.5.3           Sociological Approaches 
du Pisani (1988: 41) sums up the important contributions of sociology to our 
understanding of social conflict as follows: "Sociologists have contributed 
greatly to conflict research, in the sense that a sub-field called 'Conflict 
sociology' emerged within sociological discourse. The contributions of noted 
sociologists such as Marx, Dahrendorf, Simmel and Coser, and that of other 
                                                 
38 According to Maslow (following the work of psychologists William James, William Mc 
Dougall, and Henry Alexander Murray), human beings are driven to satisfy certain needs. 
Five categories of needs are identified. They are the physical, security, social-affectional, 
self-esteem and self-actualization needs. In Maslow's postulation, the needs are prioritized 
into a hierarchic sequence. Humans act to satisfy needs in a certain order, with the most 
basic needs being satisfied first, and the higher needs then only being attended to. It was 
dear to Maslow that much of humanity remained preoccupied with the more fundamental 
needs, never moving beyond these to the level of higher needs satisfactions. 
 
39 The concept of needs in the sense used in this approach, is best defined by Masini in 
Sites (1990:10) as follows:"Needs can be understood abstractly to refer to those human 
requirements calling for a response that makes human survival and development possible In 
a given society" 
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scholars, notably Neil Smelser and William Kornhauser in the area of 
collective behaviour, have been of lasting importance to conflict studies". 
 
We will review a number of the most influential of these contributions of 
sociology, especially to the extent that they have contributed towards the 
development of conflict resolution literature. We will focus on those who see 
conflict as the product of social structure, those who viewed conflict as 
dysfunctional, and more recently, those who see conflict as a social process. 
We will additionally engage with the post-modernist "structurationist" 
approach. 
 
3.5.3.1 Social Conflict is the Product of Social Structure 
Many theorists believe that social conflict is the product of the way that society 
is ordered. The Marxists, for instance see social conflict as the product of the 
class structure of society. The contradictions produced by a particular division 
of labour fuel a dialectical struggle 40. Marx's "scientific socialism" focuses on 
the class struggle of his time; the contest between the forces of capitalism, 
and those of the proletariat or working class. He rejects the notion of the 
individual as the fundamental unit of analysis (Schellenberg, 1982: 61). The 
relations of production inherent in the system indicate that capitalists will 
become fewer and wealthier and the proletariat will become poorer and more 
numerous. The theory predicts that this contradiction will become ever more 
difficult to sustain, and will finally lead to the overthrow of the system in a 
revolution, that will result in a proletarian-led socialist society that will 
gradually be transformed into a true communist society, devoid of the class 
distinctions of the past, and characterized by complete equality. 
 
                                                 
 
40 See, for instance, Schellenberg's account of the Marxian approach to conflict. Schellenberg 
sees Marx as a conflict theorist of a threefold kind. He writes "His analysis of contemporary society 
was grounded in the study of economic forces. His philosophy of history was grounded in a 
peculiar mental set (dialectic) which affirmed conflict as a basic law of life. And his political stance 
as a revolutionary led him not only to analyze social conflict but to agitate actively for it" (1982: 
61,62) 
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Writers belonging to this school believe that a relatively peaceful, consensual 
society may emerge only after revolutionary conflict has occurred. In this 
sense, conflict is regarded positively by Marxists, because it is the engine that 
gives rise to their desired end-state the classless society. Other social 
theorists, such as Max Weber 41 and Dahrendorf, though still structuralist 
however, see conflict as centring around access to authority, as opposed to 
property (Wehr, 1979: 3). The ideas of Marx and those who based their ideas 
on his work were extremely influential, impacting not only on political 
revolutionaries such as Lenin and Guevara, but also on scholars such as 
Fromm and Marcuse. 
 
3.5.3.2 Conflict is a Dysfunctional Process in Social Systems 
As has already been mentioned, many people see conflict as an aberration in 
social systems. Some social theorists, although only a minority, also reflect 
this view. Foremost among this school of thought must be the functionalist 
sociologist Talcott Parsons 42. The functionalists emphasised the following 
three elements of social systems: 
 
• The general interrelatedness, or interdependence, of the system's parts 
• The existence of a normal state of affairs, or state of equilibrium, 
comparable to the normal or healthy state of an organism 
                                                 
41 According to James Duke, as cited in Schellenberg, Weber's conflict theory also reflects 
Dahrendorfs position, and can be summarized as follows: 
"1 Conflicts of interest are endemic in social life. 
2 Power is differentially distributed among groups and individualsin any society. 3 Social order is 
achieved in any society through rules and commands issued by more powerful persons to ess 
powerful persons and enforced through sanctions. 4 Both the social structure and the normative 
systems of a society are more extensively influenced by powerful persons (true by definition), and 
come to represent the interests of these more powerful persons. 
5 Social changes are often more disruptive to powerful persons than to less powerful persons. 
Powerful persons therefore generally favour the status quo and oppose changes that would 
reduce their power. 
6 However, changes in a society occur as the result of actions by persons who stand to benefit 
from these changes and who accumulate power to bring them to pass." 
 
42 The criticism of Parsons presented above is not intended to detract from the enormous contributions that 
Parsons would make to the development of sociology as a discipline. His building of grand theory, including 
the systems level approach, theory of action, and pattern variables, within the field is unparalleled. Parsons' 
approach emphasized continuity and the integration of society at the expense of conflict, its other constant, 
however. 
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• The way that all the parts of the system organize to bring things back to 
normal (Wallace and Wolfe, 1999:8). 
 
These perspectives open Parsons and his colleagues up to particular criticism 
from the theorists of conflict.  According to Coser, Parsons views conflict 
much as a medical doctor views disease. He writes that: "Parsons was led to 
view conflict as having primarily disruptive, dissociating and destructive 
consequences" (Coser, 1956: 21). This approach sees cooperation as the 
normal form of social intercourse, and its supporters find it difficult to deal with 
processes of conflict and change in societal context. It emphasizes social 
adjustment and system maintenance, and is "... more interested in social 
order than social change" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf,1981: 302). Wallace and 
Wolfe (1999: 44) develop this position further as follows: "Parsons treated 
deviance in a way that implies disapproval, saying very little about its origins 
or justification but discussing it as a source of disequillibrium to which 
negative sanctions are appropriately applied," 
 
Those who criticize Parsons, especially those from the "Conflict" perspective 
of social analysis contend that "...his approach implies approval of the status 
quo at the expense of discounting the conflicts of interest, inequalities, or 
outright oppression that a social system may incorporate" (Wallace and Wolfe, 
1999:45). 
 
The functionalist scholars also take a narrow view of conflict, which is seen by 
them as essentially only a form of behaviour, and so misses out on the 
multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon (Wehr, 1979: 3). 
 
3.5.3.3 Conflict is Positively Functional for Social Systems 
Many theorists, and this seems to be an increasing proportion, support the 
opposite view to those mentioned above. Coser is widely regarded as the 
chief standard-bearer of those who see conflict as primarily a functionally 
positive force in the development of society (see for instance Wehr, 1979: 5, 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1990: 311, 312). However, George Simmel, who 
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wrote an extremely influential essay entitled "Der Streit" 43 in 1908, largely 
anticipates the later work of Coser, with his allowance for the positive aspects 
of conflict. Sometimes labelled the Conflict Approach, these theorists are also 
associated with Marx and Dahrendorf. 
 
According to Simmel's analysis, conflict has positive, as well as negative 
aspects, which are so closely related that they can be separated conceptually, 
but not empirically (du Pisani, 1988: 39). According to Schellenberg (1996:65) 
and du Pisani (1988, 39,40), Simmel saw discord and divergence as being 
factors instrumental in maintaining the unity of groups: "A certain amount of 
discord, inner divergence and outer controversy is organically tied to up with 
the very elements that ultimately hold the group together..." (As quoted in 
Schellenberg, 1996: 65). He maintained the impossibility of the existence of a 
group that was totally harmonious. He goes further to maintain that such a 
group could in fact "...show no real life process" (du Pisani(1988:40).44 
 
According to Fisher (1971:192):"In his discussion of conflict, however' 
Simmel's intention appears ... to expound his conviction that human life is 
inextricably enmeshed in a basic dualism. Thus, without denying the 
destructive potential of conflict, Simmel calls attention to an essentially 
integrative function that it performs. In his view life oscillates constantly 
between such opposing tendencies as love-hate, cooperation-competition, 
harmony-discord, and the like. If the whole is to have any shape, if it is 'to 
really be the whole'. Simmel insists, then each element in the contrasting pair 
must be present to some degree, and therefore each is to be viewed as 
making a positive contribution toward sustaining group relations, always 
providing that violence is subjected to at least some restrictions. Otherwise, 
warns Simmel, (citing Kant), open conflict would become a war of 
                                                 
43 This was later translated into English, entitled "Conflict" 
 
44 This assertion is echoed much later by Lee(1964), as quoted in the work of conflict resolution theorist 
Chris Mitchell, when he states :" ... Social conflict is a likely guest wherever human beings set up forms of 
social organization. It would be difficult to conceive of an ongoing society where social conflict is absent. 
The society without conflict is a dead Society...". 
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extermination. He comments in particular upon the need to refrain 'at least 
from assassination, breach of word, and instigation to treason.' 
 
The tension between discord and harmony, and their interdependence, is 
further developed by Simmel into the proposition that external "...war 
promotes internal cohesion [in groups], yet internal political centralization 
increases the probability that external release of tensions will be sought 
through war." (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1981:304), and also “ ... war with the 
outside is sometimes the last chance for a state ridden with inner antagonisms 
to overcome these antagonisms, or else to break up indefinitely." (ibid: 304). 
This assertion has been one of the major avenues of scholarly inquiry into 
social conflict in the Twentieth Century. 
 
Simmel's work is also important in that he gave attention to the issue of 
conflict resolution. He recognized that the "...transition from conflict to peace 
is more problematic than that from peace to conflict... and... The termination of 
conflict is therefore a distinctive activity, and it, deserves special sociological 
attention" (quoted in Schellenberg, 1996: 66). 
 
Simmel goes on to identify five main types of patterns in the termination of 
conflict 
 
1. The disappearance of the object of conflict, 
2. Victory for one of the parties, 
3. Compromise, 
4. Conciliation and 
5. Irreconcilability (Schellenberg, 1996:66) 
 
Early sociological work in this genre, was that of Robert Park and Ernest 
Burgess, who in their influential 1921 work "An Introduction to the Science of 
Sociology", distinguished between conflict and competition. They viewed 
competition as not requiring direct confrontation; it is the underlying struggle, 
which will only be considered conflict, once it becomes conscious and direct. 
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45 In this view, competition is the broader concept, of which conflict is simply a 
special case (Schmidt, S.M. and Kochan, T.A, 1972 360 – 361).  
 
Park and Burgess explain how conflict and competition may be resolved into 
accommodation or assimilation, with the latter involving the complete 
"overcoming" of differences, while the former merely entails making 
adjustments to competition or conflict (Schellenberg, 1996: 65).46 
 
Lewis Coser, in his work on social conflict, distinguishes between two 
functions of social conflict - "integration" and "coercion". In this, he echoes the 
ideas of Simmel alluded to above. 
 
More than any other scholar, however, Coser has become associated with 
what he calls the "positive" or integrative functions of conflict (du Pisani, 1988: 
32 - 34). 
 
In his seminal work; The Functions of Social Conflict, (1956) Coser argues at 
length and demonstrates how conflict performs several of what he regards as 
extremely valuable social functions of group binding and group preserving, 
and how it even binds antagonists together in a relationship - how it 
establishes and maintains balances of power, and how it creates associations 
and coalitions (Coser, 1956). 
 
Schellenberg presents in summary form the following list of Coser's central 
propositions: 
 
• Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary 
lines of societies and groups 
                                                 
45 This assertion is echoed much later by Lee (1964), as quoted in the work of conflict resolution theorist 
Chris Mitchell, when he states: " ... Social conflict is a likely guest wherever human beings set up forms of 
social organization. It would be difficult to conceive of an ongoing society where social conflict is absent. 
The society without conflict is a dead Society...” 
 
46 Again this distinction between accommodation and assimilation neatly foreshadows John Burton's later 
distinction between the "settlement' and "resolution" of conflict 
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• Conflict is not always dysfunctional for the relationship within which it 
occurs; often conflict is necessary to maintain such a relationship. 
• Antagonism is usually involved as an element in intimate relationships. 
• A conflict is more passionate and more radical when it arises out of 
close relationships. 
• Conflict with another group leads to the mobilization of the energies of 
group members and hence to increased cohesion of the group. 
• Groups engaged in continued struggle with the outside intend to be 
intolerant within 
• Conflict rather than being disruptive and dissociating, may indeed be a 
means of balancing and hence maintaining a society as a going 
concern" (1996:65,66). 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Coser's work is that it managed to 
refocus the attention of American sociology onto social conflict, at a time when 
it was not getting the attention that it deserved. 
 
3.5.3.4 Conflict Theory, and the Sociology of Conflicts. 
To avoid conceptual confusion, it is important to note that apart from their 
acknowledgements to the founding fathers, there tends to be a divorce 
between general sociological theory, and the contemporary work on conflict 
and its resolution - even that which takes place within a sociological tradition. 
This is especially true when conflict theory is observed. For instance, though 
Kriesberg, a prominent and well-published scholar within the "sociology of 
conflict" tradition is an often-used source in the "sociology of conflict" field, 
Randall Collins, who is the prominent contemporary figure in "conflict 
sociology" is almost ignored. On the other hand, Kriesberg's work on conflict 
is almost ignored by the general, introductory sociology works. This 
discontinuity indicates the emergence of a separate sub-discipline that' while 
acknowledging its roots, particularly the earlier scholars, interacts less with 
mainstream Sociology47. 
                                                 
47 In this regard, the critiques by Jabri of Burton's work, in a sense represent the larger discipline in dialogue 
with the conflict resolution school. 
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The explanation for this may be that conflict sociology is a particularly bleak 
perspective of society, that is relatively unconcerned with addressing conflict 
through any form of intervention and is perhaps even normatively opposed to 
it. This is opposed to the overtly interventionist views of the sociologists of 
conflict, such as the social process theorists. 
 
3.5.3.5 Social Process Theorists 
The social process perspectives, as the title implies, are concerned with the 
process of conflict. How conflict emerges, escalates, de-escalates and 
terminates, is the subject of their focus. In this, they are interested in the 
changes that groups and individuals in conflict undergo. Power differentials, 
the modes of conflict (persuasion, coercion and reward), and the outcomes 
that result from these (withdrawal, imposition, compromise and conversion) 
are all highlighted, as is the role of third parties. This work is largely an applied 
approach that is interested in the management of conflict. The understandings 
that these scholars generate are consciously developed to assist mediation 
and other forms of conflict intervention. Prominent social process theorists 
would include the likes of Pruitt and Rubin, and Louis Kriesberg. Kriesberg, in 
his Sociology of Social Conflicts concentrates on the emergence of conflict, 
from the background, objective condition, to become manifest. Only once 
parties, or "conflict units" as he calls them, become aware of their 
incompatible goals, experience dissatisfaction with these, and finally believe 
that they can reduce that dissatisfaction through some form of action 
(Kriesberg, 1973). Even a cursory reading of this work would highlight the 
extent to which it is informed by the earlier work of Simmel and Coser. Some 
of Kriesberg and his colleague's work also indicates a similar concern as 
Burton and others have with the deep-rootedness of certain social conflicts 48. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
48 See for instance, Kriesberg, L., Northrup, T. and Thorson, S.J., 1979, Intractable Conflicts and their 
Transformation 
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3.5.3.6 Social Identity and Conflict 
Related to Social Process theories, but deserving separate mention due to its 
high profile, and a clear link to the analytical conflict resolution school, is the 
field of social identity and conflict.  According to Staub, invoking Tajfel (1982), 
Turner (1987), and Myers (1999), “Social identity theory has focused on how 
people categorize themselves (and others) as members of groups, how they 
identify themselves with certain groups, and the tendency they have to 
enhance themselves by comparing themselves favourably with other groups” 
(Staub, 2003: 164). Black relates the notion of social identity to conflict when 
he writes that (2003: 121) “Groups formed on the basis of social identity, 
which we may reasonably call identity groups are always and everywhere the 
main constituents of political struggle.” 
 
There is  voluminous literature on the role of social identity in relation to social 
conflict and its management. Ashmore, Jussim and Wilder (2003: 3) claim that 
“…social and behavioural scientists have increasingly emphasized the role of 
self and identity in the causes and consequences of intergroup hostility and 
harm-doing.” Much of the work is coupled to various discourses on conflict 
dynamics. Coy and Woehrle (2000: 7 -10), for instance explain how social 
identity interacts with conflict activity, to produce both escalation and de-
escalation of conflict. There is a tendency to link social identity to human 
needs in the context of conflict. Coy and Woehrle  assert that though social 
identity is a manifestation of basic human needs as Burton proposes, it is not 
as static as Burton seems to suggest, but is a dynamic phenomenon, that 
impacts on conflict, but is in turn, also constituted by it. It is therefore a 
potential source of influence for those who seek to manage or resolve social 
conflict, stating that: “Moving or blurring social boundaries then may hold 
some promise for creating a shift in seemingly intractable conflicts.”(2000:14). 
 
Kriesberg (2003), Coy and Woehrle, (2000: 14), and Kelman (2003: 210, 211), 
all stress the link between social identity, and protractedness in social conflict. 
One of the major issues confronting the scholars of social identity as it 
pertains to conflict, is the conditions under which identities promote 
destructive social conflict. For Black (2003: 121), it is the process by which 
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“specific public dimensions” [of identity] can come to engulf the self, swamping 
all other dimensions and thereby becoming a “total social identity”, that is of 
interest. Maalouf provides us with a clue to those conditions as follows:  
 
“People often see themselves in terms of whichever one  of their allegiances 
is most under attack. And sometimes, when a person doesn’t have the 
strength to defend that allegiance, he hides it. Then it remains buried deep 
down in the dark, awaiting its revenge. But whether he accepts or conceals it 
proclaims it discreetly or flaunts it, it is with that allegiance that the person 
concerned identifies.  And then whether it relates to colour, religion, language  
or class, it invades the person’s whole identity.” (2003: 26).  
 
3.5.3.7            Structuration Theory 
In seeking to overcome the gap between the two, seemingly mutually 
exclusive approaches of individualism and structuralism, prominent 
sociologist, Anthony Giddens, has postulated that the best way to explain the 
sources of human behaviour, lies in the interaction between human beings 
and their environment. In other words, the sources of behaviour are to be 
found, not within the human agent himself, or in the institutions and structures 
within which he operates, but in the interface between agent and environment. 
Whereas the environment will, to some extent determine behaviour, the fact is 
moreover that human action also determines the environment.49 This is 
nowhere more important than in the case of communicative action, in terms of 
which communication constitutes the environment. Humans and their 
environment are therefore said to be "mutually constitutive". 
 
Although Giddens himself has not specifically contributed to the conflict 
literature, these ideas have been used by others, including some, such as 
                                                 
49 Citing his earlier work, Giddens (1995a:72) explains his approach as follows: "According to the Theory 
of structuration, all social action consists of social practices, situated in time-space, and organized in a skilled 
and knowledgeable fashion by human agents. But human knowledgeability is always "bounded" - by 
unacknowledged conditions of action on the one side, and unintended consequences of action on the other. A 
crucial move in this theory is an attempt to transcend the opposition between "action" theories and 
"institutional" theories..." See also Giddens (1995b: 335 - 343), and Wallace and Wolfe (1999:180 - 183) for 
further discussion of the structurationist approach. 
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Jabri, in the conflict resolution arena, to develop their explanation of the 
causes of social conflict.50 
 
3.5.4         International Relations 
The field of International Relations has long studied, as one of its main focus 
areas, the nature and causes of warfare. The field of deep-rooted social 
conflict, dealing as it does with civil wars, or cases of internal warfare, as they 
are being called51, therefore intersects with the domain of international 
relations. Both fields deal with warfare and its origins. International Relations 
is the older of the two disciplines, and has provided many of the scholars of 
the conflict resolution field, such as John Groom, Michael Banks, Chris 
Mitchell, Johan Galtung, and John Burton, to name but a few of its more 
prominent members. To some extent, the growth of the Conflict Resolution 
field is a reaction or response to the dominance of International Relations in 
the study of warfare. The intersection of the two fields, and the tensions 
between them have become more evident in the Post Cold-War era, with the 
increasing frequency of incidences of Internal warfare' and a decline - in fact a 
near disappearance - in the number of conventional incidents of interstate 
warfare. 
 
There are a large number of writers who operate almost exclusively in the field 
of international conflict. They draw on their own sets of assumptions, and a 
body of historical knowledge and principles that are quite distinct from the 
other social science disciplines. We will mention only some of the more 
important approaches below, although each approach contains a number of 
groupings, concentrating on various international phenomena. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
50 See for instance the references to Vivienne Jabri elsewhere in the chapter. 
 
51 See, in this regard, the work of Snow, (1996), chapters 2,3,4 for a discussion of "internal warfare" 
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3.5.4.1     Conflict is the Natural Result of Competing Sovereignties 
At the level of conflict among nations, it has been the dominant view, since the 
subject was first written about, that states, as sovereign entities, are 
perpetually engaged in struggles to expand their power. 
 
This school of thought, personified by writers such as Hans Morgenthau and 
E.H. Carr, and commonly known as "Realism", or the "Power Politics"52 
school, sees this situation as natural, inevitable and even, in some cases, as 
desirable. Although applied only to the level of state-actors, it has much in 
common with the instinct theories of aggression applied to individuals 
(Sandole, 1993:), and is influenced by Hobbes's view of the state of nature 
being a state of war of everyone against everyone else. It traces its roots back 
all the way to the Greek historian, Thucydidies, and numbers Machiavelli and 
Von Clausewitz among its early exponents. It was given a renewed impetus 
by E.H. Carr in the interwar years, which persists to this day (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1987-34, 35). 
 
The Realist school builds its theories from five core assumptions, which we list 
below: 
 
• States are the only important actors in world politics. All other 
organisations that are active at this level, such as multinational 
corporations and intergovernmental organisations, are subservient to, 
or the instruments of, states. 
• States are unitary actors. They speak with a single voice, and there is 
no sense in which states may consist of different agencies (such as 
Military and Diplomatic departments, or pressure groups), which reflect 
different, often competing images to the world. 
• States are rational actors. Because states are seen as being unitary, 
they are also regarded as rational, and coherent actors. 
 
                                                 
52 Scholars variously use the terms “realism”, “classical realism”  “political realism”, “realpolitik”, 
“macht politik” , and “power politics” to denote this approach. 
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• The international system is anarchic. This reflects the situation that 
states, being sovereign, recognise no superior power. There can 
therefore be no international keeper of order, and therefore, 
• States are forced to rely on their own power to protect themselves, 
which implies that they continually expand their military potential53. 
 
According to the realist view, the best means of limiting the destructiveness of 
international conflict is for the competing states to amass sufficient power to 
deter possible attacks by one another (Taylor, 1978: 122 - 140).  
 
This perspective sees a distinct separation between the domain of domestic 
politics and that of international relations. There is a clear dividing line, and 
the two worlds hardly intersect. It has been called the billiard-ball approach54, 
as the image conveys nicely the behaviour of states conceived as entities that 
display "hard boundaries" that do not relate to each other's cores, but only 
impact on each others boundaries and that only in a temporary fashion. 
 
The fundamental concept for the realist scholars, is power, generally 
conceived in terms of military might. Typically, realists concern themselves 
with the structure of power in the international system, and debates in the field 
typically centre around whether bi-polar or multi-polar models, are the most 
suitable bases for stable, versus unstable international systems". 55 
 
This school has only recently come up against widespread criticism within the 
field of International Relations. Many feel, quite justifiably, that the realist 
formula encourages arms races and aggressive policies and that it is 
essentially a self-fulfilling prophecy that destabilizes the world order. 
According to Vasquez, for instance:  “Power politics behaviour is a series of 
                                                 
 
53 See for instance, Viotti and Kauppi,(1993) Chapter two for an in-depth discussion of the realist 
approach to international relations 
 
54 See for instance, Heywood (1997:144) for a reference to John Burton's coining of the "billiard 
ball" term for the realist perspective, in his work on "World Society". 
 
55 See for instance Kenneth Walz "The structure of international power" 
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steps to war, not to peace. It is one of the great contradictions of the history of 
the modern global system that while the theory of power politics has been 
offered as the only realistic path to attain and secure peace, the practices of 
power politics have been associated with the outbreak of war.” (1993:86). 
Realism remains the most influential approach to international relations, 
however, providing large numbers of political advisors and senior diplomats 
from its ranks. 56 
 
3.5.4.2 Structuralism or Globalism 
The structuralist approach is another non state-centric approach to world 
politics. It views the fundamental conflicts as being economically-based, and 
between the capitalist, wealthy North, and the poorer, non-capitalist South. 
According to this view, the capitalist class continues to extract wealth from the 
poorer classes, mainly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This 
Marxist-influenced set of approaches had its origins in the work of Lenin and 
Hobson, and was taken further by Latin American (dependencia) scholars in 
the Sixties and Seventies. 
 
The main assumptions of the approach are: 
 
• It is necessary to understand the global context, or system within which 
states and other entities interact. 
• In comprehending the global system, historical analysis assumes key 
importance, especially insofar as the understanding of capitalism is 
concerned. 
• Mechanisms of domination sustain uneven development, keeping Third 
World states from developing. 
• Economic factors are the main impetus driving the world capitalist 
system 
 
                                                 
 
56 For instance, Henry Kissinger, Jean Kirkpatrick, and Condoleeza Rice, to name but a few 
prominent realists in the United States' security and foreign relations establishment. See also 
Sandole, (1999: 7 – 9) for a discussion of the dominance of realism in international relations.  
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This approach has received perhaps its most complete treatment in the work 
of Emmanuel Wallerstein, who has distinguished two main world regions - the 
centre, and the periphery.57 The centre is portrayed as largely capitalist, high 
value producing, and exploiting, situated in the states of the North-principally 
the United States, and Europe. The centre is distinguished from the periphery, 
which is comprised of the largely poverty-stricken, low-value, commodity 
exporting, classes of the global South, situated largely in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America (Wallerstein, 1987: 507 - 518). 
 
The relationship between, Centre and Periphery is viewed as essentially 
exploitative, with the Centre extracting value from the periphery, which 
becomes poorer, to the extent that the centre becomes more wealthy. The 
situation is complicated, however, by capitalists within the periphery, who act 
as agents of the centre, facilitating the wealth extraction process from centre 
to periphery. These are known as the semi-periphery. 
 
3.5.4.3            The World –Society Approach  
The Pluralist group of approaches, within which "World Society is located, 
displays the following characteristics Non-state actors are important entities in 
world politics. They are more than simple frameworks within which states 
operate. Pluralists do not see the state as a unitary actor. States are 
comprised of competing individuals, interest groups and bureaucracies. 
Therefore, the state cannot be viewed as a rational actor. The clashes of 
interest underpinning decision-making, and the compromises that are struck 
can lead to irrational decision-making. 
 
The pluralists, while accepting the importance of national security concerns, 
postulate a much more extensive agenda for international politics, with many 
economic, social and ecological issues arising from the growth of 
interdependence among states and peoples in the post-war world. 
 
                                                 
 
57 This approach has much in common with the work of Andre Gunder Frank, who also 
distinguishes two world regions which he calls Metropole and Satellite. 
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The "world-society" school of thought within the international field draws upon 
the insights of the psychological and sociological approaches mentioned 
above, and attributes inter-state conflict to decision-making processes, or the 
flawed domestic arrangements within states, which flow over into the 
international sphere (Burton, 1984, Burton, 1987). According to John Burton, 
who is most closely associated with the perspective, we should rather, 
therefore speak of "world society", than international relations, which is a 
misleading term. There are many transactions in addition to those between 
governments that cut right across state boundaries. Indeed, state boundaries 
themselves are no longer the only significant boundaries. Burton speaks of 
scientific ideas, and administrative and cultural practices that all transcend 
state boundaries. Maps of the world with their emphasis on geographical state 
borders can be very misleading, and we need to think globally, rather than 
nationally if we are to capture the nuances of world society. 
 
Certainly, the distinction between international and domestic politics is false 
and misleading. According to Burton "...these state studies cannot tell us 
much about the nature of conflict among communities that originates within 
states and spills over into world society" (1993: 376). 
 
Most of the World Society theorists certainly view the occurrence of violent 
interstate conflict, or war, as dysfunctional and avoidable. Indeed, they are 
extremely critical of the Realist school, which they accuse of promoting a self-
fulfilling prophecy of constant violent conflict within the area of interstate 
relations (Burton, 1984: 3 -24, Viotti and Kauppi, 1987: 61, Banks' 1989: 374). 
 
Burton explicitly rejects the "billiard-ball" model of international relations that 
he attributes to Realists such as Kaplan and Waltz, and opts instead for a 
"cobweb image" of world society. In respect of international conflict, Burton 
maintains that: 
"An image of world society that comprises separate state entities, each 
potentially hostile to others, leads understandably to defensive policies. Is the 
image a realistic one, or are the conflicts that occur and seem to validate the 
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image merely the consequences of our having this image?" (Burton, 1993: 
384). 
 
3.5.4.4           Peace Research 
Another important group of scholars, operating mainly, but not exclusively 
within the area of international conflict, and closely related to the "world 
society" writers, is the peace studies group' with Johan Galtung as the most 
influential scholar in this school. The Journal of Conflict Resolution and the 
Journal of Peace Research are the two most important journals, which reflect 
the debates in this field (Dunn, 1978:257-279). 
 
Although starting out as a focus on the study of international conflict, it is 
important to note that the peace-studies initiative has increasingly focused on 
the underlying conditions for conflict, and as such has become increasingly 
multi-disciplinary (Dunn, 1978: 257 -279). There has therefore been an 
emphasis throughout on the need to reform the structures and institutions of 
international society as a means of dealing with destructive conflict. 
 
Johan Galtung's ideas, such as the development of the concept of "structural 
violence", and the threefold model of social conflict presented above, have 
been of central importance to the general field of Conflict Resolution. 
 
Galtung writes of a tripartite division of Peace Studies. In the first place, 
Empirical peace studies, based on the systematic comparison of theories with 
empirical reality, revising the theories if they do not agree with the data - data 
being stronger than theory58. 
 
In the second place, critical peace studies which are the systematic 
comparison of empirical reality (data' with values, trying... to change reality if it 
does not agree with the values - values being stronger than data. 
 
                                                 
58 This study could be said to belong to Galtung’s first category, as it compares theory to the South 
African case. 
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Thirdly Constructive peace studies, which are the systematic comparison of 
theories with values, trying to adjust theories to values, producing visions of a 
new reality - values being stronger than theory. 
 
Values, particularly the value of treating conflict is entirely compatible with 
Peace Research. Therefore, Galtung supports a tripartite approach to Peace 
Studies - that of diagnosis, prognosis and therapy. For him, the parallel is not 
with engineers or architects, but rather with physicians (1996: pp 10, 11). 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Conflict is a ubiquitous and inevitable fact of social existence. It has both 
negative and positive consequences, and visible and invisible manifestations. 
There are a wide variety of perspectives in the explanation of social conflict.  
Although some scholars point to a measure of conceptual confusion in the field, 
different theorists are often only explaining selected aspects of the 
phenomenon - they do not necessarily contradict each other. In this regard, we 
can agree with the editors of the Journal of Conflict Resolution who write in their 
evaluation of a colloquium held at Northwestern University in 1956, on the 
Approaches to the Study of Social Conflict, when they write: '"It is noteworthy 
that , despite the apparent differences in conceptualization [of conflict], there 
is no necessary underlying irreconcilability" (Vol 1 no 2: 110). 
 
Various elements of individual personality and behaviour combine with 
individual and group interaction and interactions with the broader 
environment including institutions and states to produce conflict. We can 
therefore agree with Holsti when he asserts that  ”Studies linking variables 
from different levels…are few,…Any model of explanation that emphasizes 
dynamics and the interplay of variables at different…levels over time is a 
distinct step forward” (Sandole 1999:12). 
 
See Figure 3.4 for a diagrammatic explanation of how social conflict is 
produced.
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Figure 3.4 The production of social conflict: an interdisciplinary approach 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A THEORY OF DEEP ROOTED CONFLICT 
AND ITS MANAGEMENT 
 
“Conflict, like sex, is an essential creative element in human relationships. 
It is the means to change, the means by which  
our social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities  
for personal development can be achieved…conflict  like sex 
 is to be enjoyed.” (Burton, 1972: 137 – 138) 
 
“…only when the whole person  and the total environment  
in which the person lives become the focus of analysis can  
there be an identification of the real problems that lead to  
social conflicts, and, therefore, to the resolution of conflicts  
between societies and their members, and amongst their  
members.” (Burton, 1998: 1) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the specific theoretical framework that informs this 
thesis. That is the school of thought exemplified by the work of John Burton, and 
a number of scholars associated with him, including Edward Azar,  Denis 
Sandole, Herbert Kelman, Christopher Mitchell, Michael Banks and Ronald 
Fisher. This school of thought is often referred to as the analytical conflict 
resolution school, to distinguish it from other approaches to managing conflict, or 
the human needs school, based on its explanation of the origins of deep-rooted 
social conflict. It refers to a group of scholars who have rejected the explanations 
of political realism, in favour of the “world society” view, who reject what they 
regard as the false distinction between domestic and international politics, who 
take basic human needs as their explanatory point of departure, and who have 
developed a theory of practice organized around longer-term conflict resolution, 
based on problem solving workshops, or similar interventions. All of these 
aspects will be dealt with in greater detail below.  
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We will focus on the life and works of John Burton, the concept of deep-rooted 
social conflict, the basic human needs theory of conflict, and the theory and 
practice of conflict resolution, including analytical problem-solving workshops. 
We will additionally discuss the critiques of analytical conflict resolution that 
emanate from the cultural, international relations and structurationist scholars. 
 
John Burton’s work will generally be cited as the exemplar of this body of work. 
His writing is regarded as being of central importance by his followers and critics 
alike. According to Mitchell, for instance, Burton was one of a generation of 
scholars, including the likes of Kenneth Boulding, Morton Deutsch and Johan 
Galtung, “who worked to make the field [of conflict analysis and resolution] not 
only accepted, but rigorous, relevant and challenging”. This sentiment is echoed 
by Väyrynen, who calls him a “man ahead of his time”, and goes on to write that 
“His influence on the Anglo-American conflict analysis tradition is comparable 
with Johan Galtung’s  influence on the Scandinavian peace research.”59 
 
4.2 John Burton’s life and contribution to the field 
The central figure of the Analytical Conflict Resolution approach, John Burton is 
also regarded as a ‘founder figure’ more generally of the whole conflict and 
peace research movement, along with Kenneth Boulding, and Johan Galtung 
(Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2000:45 – 47). The three individuals were 
all prolific authors, and institution-builders of the broader conflict and peace 
research field in the post-second world war era.  Born in Australia in 1915, Burton 
obtained a doctorate in Psychology in 1942, from the LSE. He served in the 
Australian Foreign Service, where he became its youngest ever director to that 
date, from 1945 – 1950. He was a delegate to the founding charter conference of 
the United Nations in 1945 and the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. Burton was 
subsequently appointed to a post at University College, London, in 1963. He 
became the first Honorary Secretary of the Conflict Research Society in London. 
In 1966, he contributed to de Reuck and Knight (eds) Conflict in Society, drawing 
                                                 
59 See Väyrynen, 1998: p 1 
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together insights for the study of international conflict from a broader, 
multidisciplinary field. Burton organized a number of meetings which were to 
result in the use of what became known firstly, as “controlled communication”, 
and later, the problem-solving approach60. These initiatives received support 
from the Provost of the University College of London, and the British Social 
Science Research Council. In 1966, the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict (CAC) 
was formed under Burton’s Directorship, based at University College, London. 
The core group associated with University College London, which included 
Michael Banks, Christopher Mitchell, Anthony de Reuck and John Groom also 
collaborated more widely with scholars in the United States, including Edward 
Azar at the University of Maryland, where Burton was influential in setting up the 
Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, and where they 
both worked on the concept of protracted social conflict. Burton ended his formal 
academic career at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at 
George Mason University in Virginia, and as a Fellow of the United States 
Institute of Peace in the late 1980’s. Trained in both Psychology and International 
Relations, Burton was explicitly interdisciplinary in his approach. Confronted by 
the shortcomings of international relations theory and practice, Burton drew on 
insights of game theory, industrial relations and basic human needs theory. 
Using the abductive reasoning of philosopher Charles Peirce, he drew these 
threads together to form a theory of deep-rooted conflict and its resolution. See 
figure 4.1 below for an explanation of the influences on John Burton’s intellectual 
development. He produced the four-volume Conflict Series (1990) which was an 
attempt to definitively capture his intellectual contribution to the field during this 
period (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2000: 45 – 47). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
60 These will be dealt with in greater detail in section 4.4.1 below 
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4.3   Deep-rooted, or protracted social conflict 
The analytical conflict resolution school focuses on a series of long-standing 
conflicts around the world, that have proved resistant to resolution by traditional, 
or conventional approaches over a long period of time. Perennial examples of 
such conflicts, often cited in the literature, are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Sri 
Lanka, Northern Ireland, and South Africa,  among others. Edward Azar (1990) 
has provided the best description of such conflicts, which he has called 
"Protracted Social Conflict". These conflicts are sometimes called "internal wars" 
(as they are not typically conflicts between states) or otherwise "contemporary 
conflicts” 61 as they are often also called, display the following characteristics: 
 
• They have a strong communal element, which is often the result of a 
colonial inheritance, and an historical configuration of enmity and 
competition among identity groups.  
• They display an element of human needs frustration, in which human 
needs are not "evenly or justly" met. Identity, security and other 
"developmental" needs are regarded as particularly important.  
• They entail "distorted" modes of governance, in which the authorities 
serve the interests of dominant communal groups, limiting the access to 
resources of other groups.  
• They develop international ramifications, associated with economic 
dependency and political and military client relationships with foreign 
countries.62 
                                                 
 
61 See, for instance the work of Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2000), and Lederach (1997) for use of this 
terminology. 
 
62 See for instance, Azar, 1990, pp 2 - 12 for a discussion of the genesis of protracted social conflict. The strength of 
Azar’s model is that he goes further than Burton, by examining the development and "process dynamics" of the 
conflicts, whereas Burton focuses more on the causes of the conflicts. Azar also makes a very explicit connection 
between underdevelopment and deep-rooted social conflict, and his conception of basic human needs is closer to the 
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It is important to bear in mind that it is not conflict in general that is being 
discussed by the "analytical conflict resolution" school, but this special type, 
which is, in Burton's scholarship, to be distinguished from simple "disputes." 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
"development" theorists understanding of needs, and has more of an inclination towards the physical needs although 
it does not exclude psychological needs. 
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FIGURE 4.1   THE SOURCES OF THE  ANALYTICAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION SCHOOL 
 
 
Field:   Game theory                  Philosphy                    Industrial Relations                   Needs Theory 
                   of Science 
 
        Schelling             Charles Peirce                     Follett                 Maslow 
         Rappoport                         Walton & McKersie                                      Sites 
               Davies 
  
 
 
            Analytical Conflict Resolution School 
                                              (Individuals and some of their major works) 
 
John Burton -      Conflict & Communication (1969),  Deviance Terrorism and War (1979),  Global Conflict (1984), The Conflict Series  
                            (1990), Conflict Explained (1997) 
Edward Azar -     International Conflict Resolution (with John Burton, 1986), The  Management of Protracted Social Conflict (1990) 
Chris Mitchell -    The Structure of International Conflict (1981), Classifying Conflicts (1991), Handbook of Conflict Resolution (with Banks, 
1996) 
Herb Kelman -    The Problem-Solving Workshop:a social-psychological contribution to the resolution of international conflicts (Journal of  
                            Peace Research (13,2) 
Denis Sandole -  Conflict Management and Problem-Solving ( With Sandole-Staroste, 1987), Capturing the Complexity of Conflict (1999) 
John Groom    -    Practitioners and Academics (1984), Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict (with Webb, 1987) 
Ronald Fisher -   Third Party Consultation, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16, 1 (1972), Interactive Conflict Resolution (1997) 
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4.3.1 Basic Human Needs 
Central to the analytical conflict resolution approach, is the concept of basic 
human needs. We therefore discuss the concept as used by the analytical 
conflict resolution school below. 
 
An overview of general theories of conflict in the post Second World War era 
suggests that they came in two forms. These two schools of thought could be 
called conservative personalism (in which human beings are seen to be driven 
by sinfulness, innate aggressiveness or a lust for power, to engage in conflict) 
and liberal situationalism (which emphasizes the importance of social 
determinants)63.  According to Rubenstein, both schools of thought assumed 
that governing elites could control their subjects by punishments and rewards, 
with the emphasis in both traditions falling on the side of force, as the 
“persuader of last resort”.  Both these conservative personalists and liberal 
utilitarians demonstrate in common the essence of ‘Political Realism’ – the 
perspective that views political actors both as “…aggressive power seekers 
and as rational calculators of individual and group interests.” (Rubenstein, 
2001: 2). Rubenstein points out further that Burton and  other like-minded 
scholars saw the need for an alternative theory that would fundamentally 
challenge both these approaches. (2001: 3) Burton and his colleagues felt that 
existing theories of human behaviour were too partial to solve the problem of 
conflict. He states:  “Our separate academic disciplines have not tackled this 
question. Each has had its own human construct designed to fit into the 
system. There has been, for example, ‘economic man’ and a conforming 
‘sociological man’.  These convenient inventions have led thought away from 
human behaviour, and, therefore, from a holistic approach to problems. The 
focus has been on some aspects of these - economic, institutional, legal, 
social, or political. It has been as though solving an artificially constructed part 
of a problem could lead to its total solution.” (Burton, 2001b) The alternative 
they eventually presented, in an attempt to provide the approach with 
scientific rigour was to be basic human needs theory. According to Tidwell 
(1998: 41) the basic human needs theory of conflict falls into neither the 
                                                 
63 See for instance Rubenstein, (2001:2). Elsewhere (Tidwell, 1997), these perspectives are called inherency and  contingency 
perspectives  and   it is proposed that Burton’s work represents a third, interactionist perspective.  
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conservative personalist, nor the liberal situationist group of theories. It is 
rather based on an interactionist perspective, in which behaviour is seen as 
being based upon both inherent and contingent factors. 
 
The notion of basic human needs has a long history in the explanation of 
human behaviour. Early references can, for instance be found in the work of 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas who each proposed their own elaborate 
systems of human needs (Gillwald, 1990: 115). References to human needs 
have also been made by Karl Marx in his critique of Hegel.64 In more recent 
scholarship, Kurt Lewin also made the connection between human behaviour 
in society and the satisfaction of their needs explicit (Tidwell, 1998: 66).  
 
John Burton, drawing on the work of needs theorists Maslow, Davies and 
Sites, postulates the existence of certain basic human needs that all humans 
pursue. He maintains that understanding these needs as a key determinant of 
human behaviour is also instrumental in explaining deep-rooted social conflict.  
The argument proceeds that there are drives and motivations that are based 
on universal and genetically-derived65 needs such as those for identity, 
development and meaning. Although these needs might have cultural 
expressions, they are not fundamentally determined by culture (Väyrynen, 
1998: 2). 
 
The basic human needs stimulus-response model operates according to the 
notion that physiological needs interact with environmental stimuli. These 
induce the neurophysiological, or activating stimuli which react to the source 
of the original stimulus and lead the individual to pursue a need (Fromm, 
1973: 239 – 240). 
 
                                                 
 
64 See Rubenstein (2001: 1) 
 
65 Burton has elsewhere (Burton and Sandole, 1987:97)  conceded, after a critique by Avruch and Black, and modified his 
position to proposing a  “…theory which is generic and relates ontologically and perhaps genetically to the human person.”, 
thereby softening his insistence on the genetic element. 
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According to Davies (1970: 615 – 617), however, not all stimuli originate in the 
environment, as individuals experience substantive, as well as instrumental 
(including control, security and knowledge) drives. Heller (1980: 220) has 
proposed an holistic model, including both the articulation and satisfaction of 
needs, which includes the individual’s need awareness, his consideration of 
alternative need satisfiers and his actions in pursuit of needs satisfaction. 
 
4.3.1.1  The number and nature of basic human needs 
There is no universal agreement among the needs theorists as to the precise 
number and nature of the needs that they propose. Such imprecision is often 
the case with phenomena that are not directly observable. For instance, 
Sandole (1990: 61) quoting Lederer, asserts that needs are “...theoretical 
constructions ... [i.e.] the existence of an individual's needs, or, stronger, the 
'truth' of those needs, cannot be proven in a direct physical way.” 
 
Although the needs are not directly observable, there is sufficient evidence, 
resulting from the observation of human behaviour, to indicate that they do, in 
fact exist. Burton (1988 and 1984), and Davies (1988), both set out to 
demonstrate the existence of basic human needs. 
 
Although there is some disagreement as to exactly what these specific needs 
are, they are generally asserted to include the need for identity, the need for 
security, a need for control and a need to be perceived as rational (Burton, 
1984). 
 
Prominent needs theorist, Davies66 (1988:26) presents the following four 
categories of needs: 
 
• The physical needs 
• The social-affectional needs 
• The self-esteem, dignity or equality needs 
• The self actualisation needs 
                                                 
66 John Burton and his followers frequently cite the work of Davies, as well as of Paul Sites as influential in their thinking. 
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Burton himself (1970:72,73), following Paul Sites (1973:9), initially identifies 
eight needs - being:  
• a need for response and consistency in response;  
• a need for stimulation, required for learning,  
• a need for security,  
• a need for recognition,  
• a need for distributive justice,  
• a need to appear rational and develop rationality.  
• a need for meaning,  
• a need for a sense of control.  
 
Burton subsequently adds a need for “role defence” as his ninth human 
need.67 Additionally, and crucially, Burton in his later work includes references 
to a special need for valued relationships,  that provides the key to 
understanding the conditions under which human beings will indefinitely 
control their drive to satisfy basic needs at all costs (1987: 256). 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Priorities of needs 
Differences of opinion exist among the needs theorists regarding the relative 
importance of needs and their satisfactions.  For instance, Davies proceeds to 
show that, although there is a priority underlying needs fulfilment, in that 
human beings will normally satisfy the physical needs before being able to 
satisfy the others, sometimes this order may be reversed, as in the case of a 
martyr who forfeits security and other needs in the course of fulfilling self-
actualisation needs (1988: 30). In this sense the later needs theorists have 
rejected the notion of an inflexible hierarchy of needs as originally proposed 
by Maslow.  That is not to say that all needs are seen as being equally 
powerful, or important in an explanatory sense, however. A distinction is 
sometimes made between primary and secondary needs. 
 
                                                 
67 See Burton 1988, pp 34 - 57, for his understanding of the role of basic human needs.  
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So, for instance, some of the needs postulated by some scholars are rejected 
by others as not being primary human needs. They may be secondary needs, 
derived by the urge to satisfy the primary needs. In this way, Davies, for 
instance, distinguishes between substantive needs and instrumental needs 
(Davies: 1988: 26). Paul Sites also warns against confusing needs with 
"necessary conditions for the gratification of needs" (1990, 24). 68  There is a 
concern that if we allow a proliferation of all sorts of needs, the essence of the 
term will be diluted to the extent that we might as well conflate needs with 
“wants”, and that its explanatory power would thereby be compromised. 
 
In this basic human needs or analytical conflict resolution school,  especially 
in the work of Burton, influenced by Davies, the notion of 
frustration-aggression is further developed. Only in this formulation, the 
vague, catch-all concept of ‘goal-seeking behaviour’ used by the frustration-
aggression school has been replaced by the more focused notion of human 
needs satisfaction.69 The Basic Human Needs scholars proceed to postulate 
that social conflict (as distinct from disputes) is normally the result of frustrated 
human needs, as human beings have no choice but to pursue the fulfilment of 
their needs in the long term. In the interaction of the individual with his 
institutional environment, it is the individual that should take precedence. 
When social institutions frustrate the individual's attempts at fulfilling his 
needs, it is those institutions that need to be transformed, because the 
individual will continue to pursue his needs regardless. Burton, discussing this 
relationship between societal norms and human needs, writes: 
“...but if the norms of society inhibit and frustrate to the degree that he [the 
individual] decides they are no longer useful, then subject to values he 
attaches to social relationships, he will employ methods outside the norms, 
outside the codes he would in other circumstances wish to apply to his 
behaviour” (Burton, 1988: 53). 
                                                 
 
68 Sites, for instance makes the point that though some see freedom as an important human need, it is not really 
a need per se. Freedom is simply a 'necessary condition' for the satisfaction of human needs. 
 
69 See, for instance the work of Sandole (1999) who also stresses the role of Davies, in linking the Frustration 
aggression hypothesis with Maslow’s human needs concept.  
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and 
 
“Threat of punishment, punishment itself, isolation from society will not control 
his behaviour: already there has been a loss of identity, of a sense of control 
and of other needs that led to the deviance and further loss will not constrain” 
(Burton, 1988: 53). 
 
This view of "Necessitous Man" 70 explains much of the seemingly irrational 
behaviour of people in conflict situations. Their actions, that to the outside 
observer may seem self-destructive, such as those of the suicide bomber for 
instance, are driven reactions, in the service of needs that have been long 
frustrated.  As Paul Sites (1990: 27) cogently asserts: “The difficulty of 
resolving conflict in all this becomes evident….People are driven by emotions 
which are tied to needs. Because of this, appeals to reason are not likely to be 
effective. To ask persons with great power to share this power is to ask them 
to give up the possibility of gratifying needs as they see them from their 
immediate perspective.” 
 
The theory also holds that there is one constraint that prevents human beings 
from blindly satisfying their needs to the point of anarchy and social 
destruction. That is the constraining factor of our need for valued 
relationships.  In the words of Burton: “The only constraint on this seemingly 
anarchic behaviour is that the individual and group have needs for valued 
relationships with others, for it is through these that security, identity and 
recognition ultimately are required. Social conformity or socialization is limited 
to that which contributes to valued relationships.” 
 
It is important to make the point here that it is not necessarily the needs of 
people themselves that are seen to be in conflict, but rather the attempts of 
individuals and groups to satisfy their needs that can be incompatible71.It is 
                                                 
 
70 This term, alluding to the notion that the essential nature of mankind is to seek needs satisfaction – hence 
“necessitous “ -  is developed by Christopher Mitchell (1990:149 – 176) 
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therefore the satisfiers of needs that are sometimes in short supply, or 
perceived to be at the heart of conflicts. 
 
This approach views conflict as having both objective and subjective 
dimensions. Chris Mitchell (1973:128) explains the relationship between the 
subjective and objective elements as follows: 
 
“While a conflict may be objective at a particular point in time, changes in the 
parties’ objectives, preferences, evaluations, and calculations that occur over 
a period of time render it a changeable and hence an intensely subjective 
phenomenon. Conflict may be described as subjective, then, in the sense that 
changes occur within the parties themselves (and their orientations to the 
dispute forming part of their environment), rather than in the  ‘objective’ 
situation external to them from which the originally mutually incompatible 
goals arose”.  
 
The approach also takes a "wider", rather than a "narrower" view of conflict, it 
attempts to transcend system levels, as well as disciplinary boundaries 
(Burton, 1995: 121). Most seriously for conflict management, it implies that 
conscious agreements arrived at through processes of negotiation will 
continue to break down if they continually impede the satisfaction of basic 
human needs. 
 
For Rubenstein (2001: 3), basic human needs theory offers four important 
advantages to theorists and practitioners. Firstly, the theory allows conflict 
specialists to make a justifiable distinction between conflicts that can be dealt 
with by employing the “conventional trinity of force, law, and/or power based 
negotiation”, and those whose resolution requires other means. Secondly, the 
human needs framework can assist conflict resolvers and analysts to 
understand the inconsistencies intrinsic to general notions like ‘negotiation’ 
                                                                                                                                            
71 For instance, in Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution (1986), Burton and Sandole write that 
conflict may be the result of  culturally determined ways in which needs are expressed, rather than a clash of 
basic needs as such (333 – 344) 
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and ‘dispute resolution’, and the need to tailor conflict resolution processes 
that closely relate to a conflict’s generic sources. Thirdly, the needs-based 
approach undermines conventional understandings of conflict causation, in 
particular the view that destructive social conflicts are produced 
“…instrumentally by a few manipulative leaders, or expressively by the sheer 
existence of cultural or ideological differences”. Finally, according to 
Rubenstein, needs theory offers a framework for linking conflict analysis with 
conflict resolution (2000: 3). It is to the application of the theory through 
analytical conflict resolution that we now turn. 
 
4.4 Analytical Conflict Resolution 
The terminology of conflict resolution is used in a very specific way by the 
analytical conflict resolution school. This clarification of their specific view of 
conflict resolution will serve as the basis for judgments concerning the South 
African conflict transformation process examined in Chapter nine below. 
 
We use the term “analytical conflict resolution school”  (which will be 
abbreviated to ACRS) in the narrow sense here, to refer to the specific 
approaches of the basic human needs/conflict resolution school, in the same 
way that its members do72. In this sense, analytical conflict resolution 
represents a theory of practice, applied to deep-rooted or protracted social 
conflict that is based upon a human needs understanding of the conflict, within 
a world-society, rather than a “realpolitik” or power-centric framework. 
Although we include conflict resolution towards the macro end of the spectrum 
of conflict theories, it straddles the divide between domestic and international 
frameworks, in that it explicitly links the two conflict domains as being 
"mutually constitutive" 73 In the words of Azar in this regard: "Many conflicts 
                                                 
72 See the discussion of conflict resolution under critiques below. 
 
73 Azar (1990:n5, 6) has, for instance, discussed a number of scholars who have examined the linkages 
between "external conflict behaviour", and its domestic sources which include institutional structures, internal 
conflicts and population pressures, and includes the following: Kissinger, (1969), Rosenau (1966), Rummel 
(1963, 1973), Wilkenfeld (1973), Choucri and North (1975), Pirages (1978). Alternatively, he also notes that other 
scholars have pointed to the causal relationships between "external-systemic" conditions and domestic conflicts, 
and here he includes Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973), Paige (1978) and Skocpol (1979). At a minimum, we could 
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currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterized by 
a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors" 
(1990: 6). Azar’s words ring even more true in the years since the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
4.4.1 Dispute settlement and conflict resolution 
Burton himself has very little indeed to say to this issue. There are, however, a 
number of discernable threads running though the body of his work, and that 
of his colleagues, that enable us to make some inferences regarding the 
nature of resolution. There is, for instance a central thread running throughout 
his work, concerning the critical difference between the resolution and 
settlement of deep-rooted conflicts. The distinction has been made elsewhere 
(in our theory Chapter three above) between the two processes – the 
settlement and resolution of conflicts which feature prominently in Burton’s 
writing. This distinction mirrors the differences that others highlight, between, 
for instance “accommodation”, and “assimilation” (Schellenberg, 1982: 65)74 
as outcomes of conflict.  One of the things that the analytical conflict 
resolution literature has failed to accomplish, though, is to speak in terms 
other than the very general, about these “higher”, and “lower” order levels of 
conflict regulation. For instance, nowhere does Burton fully operationalize his 
notion of conflict resolution, though he clearly distinguishes it from conflict 
settlement, as a cornerstone of the corpus of his work. At a general level 
however, he makes it clear that a resolved conflict would be one in which the 
level of needs satisfactions of all the people is met by social institutions at a 
                                                                                                                                            
also include Burton (1984), and his book Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis to this list of early 
contributors. 
 
74 Park and Burgess make this particular distinction, in which “accommodation” involves persons making 
adjustments to situations of conflict and competition, but without resolving fundamental issues. However, they 
write of “assimilation” when they wish to indicate a situation where parties completely overcome their differences. 
In this regard, Esterhuyse (2004: 191) makes the distinction between first-order and second-order change. First 
order change is change within a system, which may also be referred to as adaptation, renovation, incremental 
change or adjustment. It attempts to change behaviour  “…within a prevailing system without affecting its culture, 
structure and defining values.” In contrast, however, the primary objective of second-order change is “…not to 
intervene in the operations of an institution, but to transform its structure, culture, defining values and overall 
form.” (ibid.) 
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tolerable level (Burton, 1997). It is especially the satisfaction of identity needs 
that received much emphasis in his work, and it is additionally noteworthy that 
a need for distributive justice is also included among Burton’s needs.75   
 
Burton and his colleagues in the Analytical Conflict Resolution school draw a 
distinction, between conflict settlement and the resolution that gives the 
school its name. There are, for Burton, two different forms of conflict. The first 
form, which is based mainly on interests, and a second form, which is based 
largely on frustrated human needs, and the values associated with these. The 
first form, he believes is more properly termed a "dispute", while the latter is 
much more intractable, and is quite properly referred to as "conflict"76. Dispute 
settlement refers merely to the, usually temporary, ending of hostilities 
between parties in conflict. It is a temporary cessation of aggressive 
behaviour, or a cease-fire. In Burton's own words, the dustbins of history are 
full of short-lived, or failed settlements77. If the needs elements of a conflict 
are not addressed, the conflict will continually reassert itself in behavioural 
manifestations. Resolution, on the other hand seeks a more durable solution, 
based on the elimination of needs frustrations underpinning the conflict.  
 
The problem with conventional approaches to conflict management according 
to Burton is that they are very often power-based, seeking to coerce the 
                                                 
 
75 As has  been mentioned in our chapter four above, Burton  identifies eight needs - being: a need for response 
and consistency in response; stimulation, required for learning, a need for security, a need for recognition, a need 
for distributive justice, a need to appear rational and develop rationality. There is a need for meaning, and there is 
a need for a sense of control. Burton adds a need for “role defence” as his ninth human need. 
 
 
76 Burton (1995, 120:121), writes that it was "...now clearly necessary to make a distinction between "disputes" 
and "conflicts", that is situations that could be dealt with by coercion, or by negotiation and compromise, on the 
one hand, and those in which there could not be compromised and that had to be treated as a problem to be 
resolved to the total satisfaction of all the parties concerned". And elsewhere, he accuses arch-realist, Hans 
Morgenthau of omitting "...a human element that defeats his description.”  He did not recognize any difference 
between "disputes" (Over physical resources) and "conflicts" (over human needs and aspirations) when he set 
out his version of realist theory (1997:19). 
 
77 Personal communication with John Burton, 1990 
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parties into agreements78. Burton is at pains to demonstrate the futility of such 
power in the face of human needs-based motivations. Traditional forms of 
negotiation and mediated negotiation are actually futile, when used against 
deep-rooted social conflict, as they encourage compromises that may, if they 
continue to frustrate the parties' needs satisfaction, be doomed from the 
outset, as human needs cannot in this view be indefinitely frustrated. Human 
needs cannot be “traded”, according to Burton. In this regard, distributive 
negotiation is especially problematic, in that it tends to take a zero-sum79 view 
of conflict. Whereas interests may be treated in a distributive way, needs 
satisfaction does not obey this logic at all.80 Similarly, the exercise of threats 
or coercion as a form of conflict management are unlikely to prove successful. 
This contention is supported as follows by Azar who writes: "In the long term, 
unmet psycho-political and socio-economic needs lead to dysfunctional 
cognitive and behavioural patterns that are not easily remedied by ordinary 
methods of diplomacy or the use of force" (1990:2), and later he asserts that 
"It is naive to assume that protracted social conflicts can be managed by 
military or balance of power means. It is possible to contain violence for a 
short while through the application of these techniques, but political and 
economic development which will reduce the insecurity of individuals and 
communities is crucial to the process of conflict management" (1990:2). 
 
Note also that this approach goes some way towards squaring the circle of the 
"level of analysis" problem, in that it links the issue of individual behaviour 
closely to societal-level and international-level conflict, through Burton's discourse 
                                                 
 
78 Burton writes for instance: "Within the traditional power politics [realist] frame in which social behaviours take 
place and are reported and analysed, human motivations and needs are not relevant" and "There is the 
traditional and consensus view that there are those who have a right to govern, and those who have an obligation 
to obey. The reserve powers are threat, coercion and punishment"(1997:19) 
 
79 The term “zero-sum” is used in Game Theory, to denote games in which one party’s gain is absolutely proportional to the 
others’ loss. The more one party wins, the more the other party loses. 
 
80 Burton has pointed out that human needs satisfaction operates according to a different logic from interest-based 
forms of conflict. In Dear Survivors (1982: 132), Burton writes: “Human societal needs, being non-material, are increased 
by consumption.” The satisfaction of one party's need for security is not frustrated by the satisfaction of the other party's 
similar need. In fact, more security for party A in all probability will result in more security for Party B as well. 
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on individual versus societal needs (Burton, 1988: 35 – 56, Coate and Rosati, 
1988 : 10).81 
4.4.2 The procedural element of conflict resolution 
The procedural element of conflict resolution is described by another 
analytical  conflict resolution scholar, Christopher Mitchell, who maintains that 
resolution “…involves a contention that an acceptable and durable solution to 
the issues in a particular conflict between adversaries has been discovered – 
or mutually created - by the parties themselves, possibly with outside 
assistance from other ‘third’ parties, or possibly through their own efforts and 
sometimes with local assistance from ‘insider partials’.” Most importantly 
though, he stresses that the conclusive ‘resolution’ of any given  conflict in no 
way implies a future without conflict, especially where parties involved have a 
long history of hostility, fear or mistrust (2002: 2). 
 
Within the literature of the conflict resolution school, perhaps one of the  most 
helpful discussions of the school’s conception of resolution is provided by 
Michael Banks (1987: 259 - 272), who sets out and evaluates four competing 
conceptions of peace. He firstly writes on peace as a life of harmony, from 
which conflict itself has been banished. Banks secondly discusses peace as 
order. He views this as a “… conception of peace as stability; life made 
predictable and relatively safe by a minimum of political order.”(1987: 261). 
The third conception of peace, is the view that peace consists of justice. 
Finally, and this is the view of peace that he clearly favours, Banks writes 
about peace as [ongoing] conflict management. In this conception, peace is 
                                                 
 
81 For instance, Burton makes the statement: "Recognition, control and security are human needs in the sense that 
individuals require them; but no less do small and large groups. In these cases the display of these needs are described 
as independence struggles,', 'nationalism' and 'freedom'. In this sense human needs are the navigation or reference 
points, not only for psychologists, but no less for sociologists, and students of politics and international politics" 
(1988:42). Sites (1990:13) also links individual and societal aspects together as follows: “Just as individuals attempt to 
control the physical world to gratify their biological needs, they attempt to control others, either alone or in coalition(s) to 
gratify needs related to the self.” And later takes it further: “Coalitions attempt control to further their own interests 
(interpreted here as largely the gratification of needs), and this is true largely of individuals as well. If one accepts the 
former, one should also accept the latter.” (Ibid., 15) 
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not so much a condition, as a process: “…a dynamic state of affairs in which 
the essential properties arise from how we do things, not what we do.”(Ibid: 
269). In this view, Banks argues that the point of departure must be on the 
“…needs and values of ordinary people. What they require of society for 
physical survival and self-fulfillment, what possessions they aspire to own, 
what activities they enjoy, what groups they belong to and which relationships 
they cherish. These things give people their identity; with them they will be 
able to live in some contentment, without them, they will be spoiling for a 
fight.”(Ibid.: 269). In this fourth conception of peace, Banks captures Burton’s 
notion of “provention” or ongoing, needs satisfying conflict management which 
we will deal with in Section 4.4.3 below. 
 
Having rejected the power-based models of negotiation and international 
mediation, and in the absence of tried and trusted models of intervention into 
deep-rooted social conflict, Burton and his colleagues of the Centre for the 
Analysis of Conflict developed, over a number of decades the form of 
intervention that they called the problem-solving workshop. Two of Burton's 
colleagues, Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks discuss the perspectives 
of the CAC, in the preface to their Handbook of Conflict Resolution as 
follows:"...its (CAC’s) members were all social scientists but trained  in 
different disciplines. We shared a conviction that prevailing views of conflict in 
international relations were inadequate, and within this general framework we 
attempted to promote three objectives. First we sought to improve our 
understanding of conflict, and in particular the politics of conflict. Second, we 
set out to develop contacts between academics and political decision-makers, 
so that our theories could reflect real world experience. And third, we hoped to 
create stronger ties between theory and practice, so that the ideas of social 
science could become relevant and usable” (1996: vii). 
 
4.4.3 Constitutional safeguards 
Burton has also explicitly written that proper resolution of conflict will include 
the provision of special constitutional or institutional arrangements, to 
represent the interests of minority groups in deep-rooted social conflicts (1990 
c, 22-46, 1997: 38, 75). For instance he (Burton, 2001 a) writes that “It was 
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absurd to take punitive action against the Government of South Africa, when 
what was required is some innovative means by which a minority can maintain 
its autonomy within a wider political system without the unrepresentative 
implications of one-man-one-vote.” Elsewhere (1998), in the same vein, 
Burton has written that “The widely held concept of democracy is defined as 
government by the people through their elected representatives. It assumes 
many unstated conditions that have far-reaching behavioural implications, for 
example, relative ethnic homogeneity, classlessness and equality. Democracy 
of this order is a system that could possibly exist in a unified society. It has no 
prospect of achievement in a society that contains major income differences, 
and in which minorities are unrepresented but must observe the norms of a 
majority.” One would therefore expect to see aspects of special minority 
safeguards and representation in a conflict “resolved” according to the 
analytical conflict resolution school. 
 
4.4.4 Restored relationships 
Another important aspect, in the unpackaging of the notion of resolution, is the 
extent to which resolution in a deep-rooted conflict could be said to accord 
with the idea of restored relationships,  that the writers on reconciliation point 
to. And it seems that there is such a connection, explicit in the analytical 
conflict resolution school, especially in Burton’s notion of the need for valued 
relationships (1990: 47)82.  The following statement gives us an indication of 
what a resolved conflict looks like for Burton: "We deduce that while the 
pursuit of human needs cannot be contained over the long term by external 
coercive sanctions, that while there are limits to socialization processes, the 
human need for valued relationships,  and their preservation may be a 
controlling influence. In other words, while traditionally we have looked to 
social control as the means to social harmony, a more effective approach may 
                                                 
82 Burton also makes this quite explicit elsewhere (1990:153) as follows: "But the theory of conflict, its provention 
and resolution argues that included in human needs is a particular need for valued relationships. This acts as a 
self-restraining influence on human behavior. In the absence of valued relationships there are no self-imposed 
restraints. Where valued relationships are absent, it is not through their arbitrary rejection. They are constantly 
and persistently sought." 
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be to provide those conditions that generate valued relationships, and 
therefore, self-imposed controls." (1990:153).  
 
Burton’s notion of valued relationships is a very important idea that has not 
enjoyed the same kind of attention as some of his other constructs, such as 
“conflict provention” or the distinction between conflicts and disputes, for 
instance. It is in this notion, that the need for valued relationships emerges as 
the key need, which when satisfied, is capable of balancing  other frustrated 
needs. 
 
John Paul Lederach (1997: 24), another conflict resolution scholar, supports 
this argument in favour of restored relationships and stresses the need to 
move away from "...the traditional framework and activities that make up 
statist diplomacy." and proposes that a new approach should therefore 
"...address and engage the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central 
component of peacebuilding" (ibid: 24) 83.  
 
4.4.5 Conflict Provention: 
In Burton’s later work, the needs approach explicitly calls for a new social 
order that takes human needs more seriously in the establishment of 
institutional relationships. It is applied far more broadly than the notion of 
conflict resolution; on the one hand, it is applied to the society/state 
relationship in all (even democratic) states, and on the other, it is also applied 
to international relations, and combined by Burton with his "world society" 
approach, where it forms the basis of the Conflict Resolution approach to 
"deep-rooted", or "protracted" social conflict (Burton, 1995, 1997). Here, the 
approach assumes the mantle of a political philosophy, based on universal 
                                                 
83 Lederach states that “First and foremost is the perhaps self-evident but oft-neglected notion that relationship is the basis 
of both the conflict and its long-term solution.” He points to the fact that this was well articulated by Harold Saunders and 
Randa Slim, who presented relationships as the focal point for sustained dialogue within protracted conflict settings. He 
continues  “Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ 
affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans in relationship.” 
And later he defends this perspective when he states that, in the natural sciences, increasingly relationships form the centre-
piece for the understanding of systems. 
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use of problem-solving techniques, and conflict provention; taking the 
resolution process further, and institutionalising it. Burton and his colleagues 
speak of going “beyond resolution”, and argue that "...the removal of causal 
conditions, and the positive promotion of environments conducive to 
collaborative relationships - extends the scope of our concerns beyond the 
narrow area of conflict resolution." (Burton, 1990: 18). 
 
Drawing on the work of system theorists, such as Anatol Rapoport, who 
asserted the necessity of the integration of second order learning84 in social 
systems for transforming conflict to co-operation, Burton and Dukes (1990), 
propose the problem solving approach as the best means of overcoming 
societal blockages to second order learning, and underpinning their construct 
of provention (Miall, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000: 48).     It involves, 
according to Miall, et al, (2000:48) “…a proactive ability within societies to 
predict and avoid destructive conflict by the spread of the problem-solving 
method and philosophy throughout all relevant institutions and practices.” With 
provention, the analytical conflict resolution approach has moved beyond 
discreet intervention episodes, to the institutionalization of intervention on a 
permanent basis. An important implication of this development is that though 
liberal democracy is a necessary condition for a resolved conflict, it is not in 
and of itself a sufficient condition. 
 
In summary, then, and based on the exposition of the ideas of the analytical 
conflict resolution school presented above, successful conflict resolution would at 
least include the following: 
 
• Firstly, there is a procedural element, in terms of which the 
conflict is resolved according to a certain, highly prescriptive 
process: the facilitated analytical problem-solving workshop. 
                                                 
84 Miall et al (2000: 48) discuss the development of Burton’s thinking towards provention, using the ideas of 
Rapoport and others .  The roots of Burton’s  thinking in this area are also provided in Volume 3 of The Conflict 
Series, entitled “Readings in Management and Resolution”. 
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• Secondly, a resolved conflict would present evidence of restored 
relationships, and be characterized by the presence of Burton’s 
notion of “valued relationships”. 
• Thirdly, a high level of identity, and related needs satisfaction, 
through maximization of autonomy and self-determination of 
groups would be evident. 
• Fourthly, there would be a high degree of distributive justice 
characterized by increasing equality and decreasing poverty. 
• Fifthly, ongoing analytical “provention” problem-solving 
processes, designed to bring about basic human needs 
satisfaction through the continual adjustment of social institutions 
to meet the needs of individuals and groups, would continue. 
• Related to the above, but deserving special mention, Burton has 
indicated that special constitutional provisions should be provided 
for minority groups in deep-rooted conflict. 
• A resolved conflict does not imply a future without any form of 
conflict 
 
We next examine in greater detail the method of intervention into deep-rooted or 
protracted social conflict proposed by the analytical conflict resolution school. 
 
4.5      Analytical Conflict Resolution Intervention 
Because of its central place in the armoury of the conflict resolution school, we 
will   give attention to the development and format of the problem-solving 
workshop below.  
  
4.5.1   An Historical Background to Analytical Problem-Solving Workshops 
For Burton the Australian diplomat, who had been at the forefront of the practical 
management of international conflict, it had become clear that the traditional 
methods of statecraft were not effective in resolving conflicts. After a number of 
disputes with international relations colleagues at the University of London, who 
operated in the realist, power politics framework, Burton took up the challenge 
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from these colleagues, of demonstrating that his new, pluralist approach to 
international politics was indeed valid. Burton used his diplomatic networks to 
arrange an intervention, in December 1965, into a conflict between Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore, that was occupying the United Nation’s attention at the 
time, but for which the principle of state sovereignty was frustrating a traditional 
form of  intervention. With encouragement from then British Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson, who had already unsuccessfully tried to mediate the conflict, 
Burton, eschewing the standard diplomatic stock in trade of mediation and 
conciliation, invited two nominees from each country to participate in a problem-
solving session, along with a facilitating panel of social scientists. 
 
Following the formula that was eventually to become known as the analytical 
problem solving workshop, the first session was deemed to have been 
instrumental to the re-establishment of diplomatic contact among the conflicting 
governments shortly after the return of their delegates. The parties expressed 
their satisfaction with the process, and engaged in five further, shorter meetings 
over the following six months (Fisher, 1997:23). 
 
Although it is impossible to gauge the exact impact of the Malaysia/Indonesia 
workshops, the conflict researchers were “…ecstatic and enthusiastic about 
building on their success to further the development of their new-found 
methodology.”, and established the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict (CAC) for 
this purpose (Fisher, 1997: 24). In October,1966, the CAC group facilitated a 
meeting between the leaders of the two conflicting communities on Cyprus, held 
in London. Although not as spectacularly successful as the Indonesian/Malaysian 
intervention, nevertheless, according to Mitchell, (cited in Fisher 1997:26) 
“…some of the insights gained at the London meeting were communicated to the 
decision-making elites of the two communities and had significantly assisted in 
the resumption of mediation.” 
 
A number of similar initiatives were carried out in various conflict zones over the 
next few years. Among these, Leonard Doob famously intervened in a 
Kenya/Somali border conflict in the Fermeda workshop of 1969, with mixed 
results, using the T-group approach, and later, in 1972, in the Northern Ireland 
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conflict at Stirling University, Scotland, with some apparent positive effects, but 
which received intense criticism from some of Doob’s own colleagues, due to 
poor communication and organization. Doob called his approach  “human 
relations workshops”. 
 
Another well-known proponent of the technique is Herb Kelman, who participated 
in Burton’s Cyprus intervention, and has also since organised numerous 
workshops on the Middle East conflict, with increasingly influential participants. 
Kelman, a social psychologist, is convinced that the satisfaction of basic human 
needs “…as articulated through identity groups is the ultimate criterion of a 
satisfactory resolution.” (Fisher, 1997:62).  
 
4.5.2    An analytical conflict resolution critique of traditional intervention 
We have already mentioned that Burton and his colleagues rejected what they 
call the traditional approaches to intervention in deep-rooted social conflicts. It is 
important therefore that we briefly indicate the nature of these traditional 
approaches and the critiques that the analytical conflict resolution approach level 
at them. Historically such interventions have taken place among state actors, 
which function according to the international law tenets of sovereign equality and 
independence, and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of such 
states. Implicit in all of this is the notion of total separation of the international and 
domestic domains.  The main forms of conflict management in question are 
negotiation and mediation. 
 
Negotiation is the technique of choice in political conflict, as the process that 
most parties use to settle their own conflicts. Negotiation may be defined as a 
voluntary communication process, intended to resolve conflicts among two or 
more parties through a process of give and take, or problem-solving 
(Bradshaw,1999, Kremenyuk, 22). According to Pienaar and Spoelstra (1991: 3) 
“Negotiation is a process of interaction between parties directed at reaching 
some form of agreement that will hold and is based upon common interests…” 
Negotiation is a preferred option in traditional international relations because it 
reflects the interlocution of equals (independent sovereigns) solving their own 
differences. Invariably, however, negotiation involves some compromise (In 
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theory though, human needs cannot be compromised), and the nature of that 
compromise will invariably reflect the power balance between the parties 
concerned. Much negotiation leans towards the distributive end of the spectrum, 
which encourages exaggerated claims, use of power tactics and dishonesty, 
which all run counter to the norms of analytical conflict resolution 85. 
 
Mediation, on the other hand involves a third party assisting the negotiating 
parties in a conflict (Moore, 1986, Cheldelin, 2003). According to Crawley and 
Graham (2002: 3) “Mediation is a process by which an impartial third party 
assists people in a dispute to explore and understand their differences, and if 
possible, settle them” The process still involves the compromises necessary for 
negotiation, and additionally, as it is manifested in politics and international 
relations, involves the exercise of power by mediators typically representing 
powerful interests in world affairs. The history of US presidential interventions in 
the Middle Eastern conflict is a special illustrative case in point. More recently, 
South African President Mbeki has intervened in conflict in Ivory Coast. Being 
president of one of Africa’s strongest states imbues Mbeki with great power, as a 
mediator.  John Burton and his colleagues, stand highly critical of the use of 
mediation in deep-rooted social conflict, as they reject the way that power is 
exercised in this approach. Burton is particularly critical of standard mediation 
elements, such as caucusing, which he believes will undermine the trust in the 
process that is required to achieve a durable outcome. Another problematic 
element of mediation is the attempts that mediators will often make to empower 
weaker parties, in order to ensure that the parties are able to interact on an equal 
footing (Groom and Webb, 1987:264 – 267). Such action may undermine the 
ability of the third party to intervene successfully, as it might affect the trust which 
one of the parties has in the mediator (Groom and Webb: 1987: 273 – 275).  
 
Not only do traditional methods not succeed in resolving deep-rooted conflicts, 
they are actually rendered protracted by these methods (Fisher, 1997: 31, 32). It 
                                                 
85 Burton (1990: 16) writes that “…we are treating bargaining and negotiation as a separate field, our interest 
being problem-solving in cases in which there are needs to be satisfied without compromise, making bargaining 
and negotiation irrelevant.” 
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is the view of Burton and his colleagues that negotiation and mediation deal 
mainly with surface interests, and fail to address underlying needs and values. 
Alluding to principled negotiation, Ronald Fisher (1997: 32) states that “Attempts 
to translate needs into interests simply to fit the method of intervention make the 
situation worse.”. 
 
According to Bercovitch (1984:120), third party interventions can take one of two 
forms; either an instrumental intervention, or a process intervention. In the case 
of instrumental intervention, the third party focuses on achieving a specific 
outcome to a given dispute. The intervening party enjoys a large measure of 
power over the conflicting parties, and seeks an outcome that will meet its own 
interests in addition to some of the interests held by the parties. Analytical conflict 
resolution scholars see such an approach as leading to short-term settlements 
that focus only on the behavioural aspects of the conflict, and which require 
compromises on the part of the parties in conflict. 
 
On the other hand, the proponents of the process approach, believe that a well-
conceived process will lead to outcomes which are both legitimate and self-
sustaining. According to Bercovitch (1984:121), the process approach is both 
inclusive and extensive. Inclusivity refers to the involvement of all of the parties 
relevant to the resolution of the conflict in the process of arriving at a mutually 
beneficial outcome.  The extensiveness variable refers to addressing all the 
issues that characterise the specific conflict. Problem solving workshops tend 
towards the “process” end of the spectrum. Both inclusivity and extensiveness of 
the intervention are of vital importance for Burton 86. 
 
4.5.3   Analytical Problem-Solving Workshops  
It was vital to the conflict resolution school to avoid a power-centric approach, 
because of all its perceived failures mentioned above. Therefore, negotiation, 
and mediated negotiation of human-needs based conflict were rejected outright 
                                                 
86 For instance, in Conflict Provention as a Political System, (2001) Burton writes that: “The total social-political-economic-legal 
system must be the frame in which an analysis is made of the source of the problem and its remedies.” See also Tidwell, 
(1998: “ 
163, )who writes “…Burton holds that problem-solving must focus on the entirety of human relationships. 
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as appropriate conflict intervention strategies87. The idea of workshops was not 
entirely new to conflict management, having been used in small group contexts 
and in industrial relations, but was an innovation when applied to deep-rooted 
social conflicts. Burton and his colleagues, Doob and his Yale colleagues, and 
Kelman and Cohen all began using the technique at much the same time. These 
workshops, although substantively similar, were not identical, and we will point to 
some of those areas where prominent practitioners depart from Burton’s model. 
The workshops will be discussed in respect of their structure, facilitation and 
participants. 
 
4.5.3.1   Workshop structure 
Workshops last from the course of a weekend (Kelman and Cohen, Tessendorf 
and Bradshaw) to one to two weeks (Burton and Doob) (Tessendorf, H.R., 
1993: 136). The first two days of a week-long workshop agenda were devoted 
to introductions, and the presentation of parties’ perceptions of the conflict (Hill, 
1982: 121). On the third day, the panel would present lectures on the nature of 
conflict and its processes in order to facilitate analysis. Panellists would also 
feed the participants’ statements from the first part of the workshop back to 
them, in order to clarify their understandings (Fisher, 1972:70). The last two 
days of the workshop would focus on the discovery of a common frame of 
reference, allowing for the creation of perceptions of interdependence in the 
participants. This encouraged the surfacing of a problem-solving phase in 
which the parties investigated non-violent alternatives to their conflict behaviour 
(De Reuck, 1974: 76; Hill, 1982:121). The design of Doob’s workshops included 
skills development elements and the T-Group process (Doob and Foltz, 1973: 
496). Burton’s workshops were generally preceded by a pre-workshop seminar 
of the facilitating panellists and interested academics to test propositions 
generated by the panel (Du Pisani: 1988:187). Burton is adamant that the 
venue for the workshops should be neutral; preferably in a third country; and in 
                                                 
 
87 For Burton, Negotiation implicitly included making compromises on some of the issues in conflict. If these 
included needs based issues then clearly compromise would be impossible, given the inflexible nature of needs.  
Mediation, as an extension of negotiation was seen as equally problematic, if not more so, as mediators might 
manipulate parties, and encourage exactly the sort of compromises that would most unlikely prove durable, and 
lead to breakdowns of agreements.  
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a pleasant setting, thereby allowing participants to think laterally, 
unencumbered by day to day events of the conflict at home. He strongly 
opposes the use of strategies such as caucus, or any other that might give the 
parties reason to suspect the impartiality of the facilitators. Also, there should 
be no observers outside of the panel, and publicity, if at all necessary, should 
be kept to a minimum. The process is essentially a confidential one, so that no 
outside pressures may be brought to bear on the parties (Burton, 1987: 50 – 
55, Tidwell, 1998: 162). Everything possible is done to avoid the power 
framework that characterizes most conflict management. Parties are in a face 
to face, but non-bargaining situation. Facilitation only assists the 
communication and analytical processes taking place (Burton: 1987). Generally 
the workshop process is kept quite informal, though parties are not allowed to 
meet outside of the facilitated sessions. In order to keep the process from re-
entering a “power” framework Burton is at pains to stress the importance of 
exactly following his rules for problem-solving. His Resolving Deep-Rooted 
Conflict (1987) prescribes no fewer than fifty-six different rules to govern the 
process. 
 
4.5.3.2   Workshop facilitation 
Their explicit rejection of the power framework also meant that high-profile 
mediators, representing authority (whether the authority of government, or the 
authority of a regional, or superpower) would not be regarded as acceptable 
intervention for the analytical conflict resolution school. In terms of intervention, 
the workshop model which Burton proposes, therefore calls for low-profile 
individuals not representing any powerful interest. Burton states that the process 
is essentially "...a costing process. It enables the parties to a conflict to perceive 
more accurately the issues that are usually hidden in a power bargaining 
situation" (Burton, 1997:122)88. 
 
                                                 
 
88 Burton later states that "This costing element eliminates the power factor in the conflict resolution process. 
Parties, powerful and relatively weak, are able to reassess their policies in the light of new 
information"(1997:123). 
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According to Burton and his colleagues, the best approach to dealing with deep- 
rooted social conflict, would be one that helped the parties to analyse their 
conflict. In the words of Fisher (1997: 33) “The role of the third party in problem-
solving conflict resolution is to place the parties in direct analytical dialogue, to 
facilitate the clarification of interests, values, needs, goals, and tactics, and to 
help deduce possible outcomes on the basis of this analysis.” 
 
What was necessary was to have the conflict analysis sessions facilitated, in a 
non-power-centric framework, by social science scholars who best fit all the 
requirements, so that goals and tactics, interests, values and needs, could be 
clarified. Later, the facilitators would help deduce possible outcomes on the basis 
of the analysis made. The idea of the scholar practitioner in conflict resolution 
was given a place in the literature.89 The facilitators should be drawn from 
several key disciplines, be knowledgeable in theories of conflict, and have 
experience in facilitation processes.  It is important that the facilitators have 
balanced viewpoints, including those of gender, class and ethnicity (Burton, 
1987: 43, 44).  Quite controversially, Burton is also firm on the fact that the panel 
“…should not include persons who have made a speciality of the particular 
dispute being analysed…” (ibid. 44, Fisher,1997: 33 - 35).  Too great a familiarity 
with the specific conflict would, in Burton’s view, in all probability introduce an 
element of bias, or cause suspicion in the parties, who should remain free to 
arrive at their own analytical insights.  
 
Mitchell (2003:250 – 251) lists the following important aspects of the facilitator’s 
role: 
 
                                                 
 
89 According to Burton (1984:148), "the third party in a resolution process is not an individual experienced in 
diplomacy or a professional lawyer, but must be a group of professionally qualified and experienced facilitators. 
But even this is not sufficient. Such a group needs to be in touch with a community of political and social 
scientists of all kinds to ensure that they can make available to the parties all relevant information.", and later, on 
the same subject, he mentions that "It is preferable that those who comprise the facilitating party do not have a 
specialised knowledge of the area or of the parties involved in the dispute... a regional specialist is likely to have 
his own preconceived ideas about the dispute." And, " Second, facilitators need to have the capacity to identify 
with all parties on a non-judgemental basis, regardless of the apparent 'morality' and values of the parties" 
(148,149) These issues are also dealt with in Burton (1987b: 41 - 47) 
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• Facilitators should provide a role model for behaviour that is non-
judgemental, analytical, and questioning but supportive. 
• The facilitating panel provides a sympathetic audience for participants 
who invariably find it necessary to “vent” feelings about the wrongs 
committed by the other side during the course of the conflict, without 
allowing themselves to be put in position of a judge. They should also be 
able to assume the position of an outside innocent; enabling them to ask 
pertinent questions of the participants, forcing them to into deeper 
analysis of their conflicts. 
• By introducing analytical concepts into the communication process, the 
facilitators should provide  neutral, non-accusatory and non-offensive 
language in which the participants can discuss the conflict. 
• Facilitators should also provide novel analytical insights, relevant 
theoretical explanations, and new ideas about the development of specific 
conflicts, as well as possible future options. This role would be enhanced 
by facilitators having a wide knowledge of a range of conflict situations, 
and an ability to convince participants that such insights are. 
• Finally, the facilitator plays the role of “reality checker” towards the end of 
the process, reminding participants of the importance of checking the 
acceptability of the options they generate to the leadership of the parties 
they represent, or there will be very little possibility of transference of their 
new insights. 
 
4.5.3.3   Workshop participants 
Where the workshop participants were concerned, Burton and his colleagues 
sought representatives of conflicting parties, that were not directly, or formally 
linked to political leadership. Individuals who are in leadership positions are not 
prepared, and indeed, generally not permitted, to operate in a non-power 
framework.  Fisher (1997: 89) lists the advantages of “influential nondecision 
makers” as follows: “They can more likely break away from the bargaining mode, 
including previous positions, and do not risk any political capital by interacting 
with the enemy. In practical terms, nondecision makers generally have more 
flexible schedules, can avoid publicity, and can have their participation officially 
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disavowed in case of failure. Although the ideal participants have connections 
with decision makers, others who do not, such as scholars, journalists, and 
intellectuals, can be useful participants, for they have influence through writing 
and commentary on both decision making and public opinion.” The conflict 
resolution school therefore invites as participants, influential actors that are more 
loosely associated with the party leadership. It is easier for them to participate, 
as they have less formal responsibility to political constituencies. It is intended 
that this "second track"90 process should carry-over learning to the first, or 
diplomatic track, formal political actors and thereby impact indirectly on the 
conflict situation91.  
 
Kelman (1990: 287) accurately reflects Burton’s process when he writes that 
“We look for participants who are as close as possible to the centre of the 
political spectrum, while at the same time being interested in negotiations and 
open to the workshop process. As a result, workshop participants so far have 
tended to be on the dovish (‘moderate’ or pro-negotiation) side of the centre.” 
This is somewhat in tension with the goal that the participants should represent 
as wide a range of views within their parties as possible (Burton, 1987, 
Bercovitch 1984:30). Clearly dovish participants only form one section of the 
parties in conflict. De Reuck (1974: 66) departs from the norm of analytical 
conflict resolution when he suggests that participants should actually be the 
decision-makers themselves. 
 
Despite their general rejection of the traditional methods of conflict 
management, the problem-solving workshop is not viewed by its proponents as 
                                                 
 
90 Fisher (1997: 9) describes second track diplomacy as follows: "Track Two diplomacy denotes various 
informal, unofficial forms of interaction between members of adversary parties that attempt to influence public 
opinion, develop strategies, or organize resources toward the resolution of the conflict." According to Lumsden 
and Wolfe (1996:41) "The Track II approach permits the parties to make contact before they are ready to formally 
accept each other's legitimacy. This step is a fundamental one if any progress is to be achieved in conflict 
resolution." 
 
91 This carrying over process is generally referred to as “transfer effect” in the literature. 
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a simple alternative to negotiation and mediation processes 92. Rather it is seen 
as a prelude to negotiation; a procedure for dealing with the deep-rooted 
aspects of protracted conflict, which would ultimately prepare the way for more 
traditional methods that would then deal with the interest-based aspects of the 
conflict. 
 
In summary, problem solving workshops are different from more conventional 
approaches on a number of counts. Tidwell (1998:162, 163) lists four such 
characteristics raised by Burton:   
 
• The problem solving workshop is not driven by the aim of obtaining a 
terminal solution, but rather its object is to bring about a new set of 
relationships between the parties. 
• Problem solving often requires new syntheses of knowledge, and 
changes in the way that problems are conceptualised. Creative solutions 
may be obtained through challenging explanations of behaviour. 
• According to Burton, problem-solving should focus on the totality of 
human relationships. The conflict cannot be separated from its social 
setting. 
• Problem-solving should go  to the “sources and origins” of the conflict, if 
it is to prove effective. 
 
Burton has provided, in tabular form, a summary comparison of the 
assumptions of traditional conflict management, and those of the resolution 
approach, which we reproduce below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
92 Indeed, Chris Mitchell (1973: 124) has written ”…controlled communication is a preliminary to direct, two-party 
negotiations, and not a substitute for them.” 
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Table: 4.1 Assumptions of the traditional approach and problem solving 
workshops compared 
 
Traditional Approach Problem-solving Workshop 
• Mediation is an art: there are ‘born’ mediators who 
cannot pass on their techniques; success is measured 
by the reputation of the mediator & not by his 
performance, for this is determined by the complexity of 
the situation 
• Mediation is a learned technique and 
performance is measured by success and failure 
• The personality of the mediator is the important 
consideration. 
• Temperament is relevant to all occupations, but 
the presence or absence of learned techniques is 
the important consideration 
• The mediator requires power support from an 
international institution, powerful states or financial 
institutions. 
• There is a difference between enforced 
settlement & resolution of conflict.  The latter is 
accomplished without support except respect for 
the professional knowledge & status of the 
mediator; authority is derived from the parties,  
not from external institutions. 
• It is part of the role of the mediator to suggest solutions • Only the parties can arrive at solutions. The 
mediator should never prejudice his position by 
suggesting them. 
• The mediator’s genius is in suggesting reasonable & 
workable compromises. 
• No party should  be asked to accept a 
compromise & the mediation exercise is to arrive 
at alternative goals or means that do not require 
compromises. 
• The interest of greater powers and world society as a 
whole must sometimes be placed before the interests 
of the parties. 
• The relations of the parties most directly 
concerned take precedence and are then 
subjected to the resolution of any conflict they 
have with interests at other levels. 
• Relations between states are relations between 
authorities within them & mediation must be between 
authorities involved in conflict. 
• World society is not comprised of states as 
separate entities, but of transactions of all kinds 
that cut across state boundaries; mediation must 
be at different levels involving & different issues, 
sometimes parties within parties & not only legal 
authorities. 
• International conflict is separate from domestic conflict • International conflict is usually a spill-over from 
domestic conflict where parties seek foreign 
assistance. Mediation must involve domestic 
consideration of ethnic &  other groups – not be 
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confined to international conflict. 
• Parties “should” accept processes of arbitration and 
mediation. 
• No party can be expected to submit to processes 
which place it in a position of having to accept a 
consensus view. 
• Some decision makers behave ‘irrationally’.                      • Parties respond in the ways that appear most 
beneficial to them in the light of knowledge they 
have of others’ motivations and available options 
• No fixed procedures are possible • A disciplined adherence to rules of procedure is 
desirable once they have been tested. 
• The mediator should be one person • The mediator needs to be a panel of specialists 
in the field of conflict. 
 
Adapted from Burton (1972: 6-9). 
 
4.6   Critiques of Conflict Resolution 
The conflict resolution approach is as yet an unfinished project. It is of 
comparatively recent vintage, and in a state of continual development93. It is 
also not a unified theory; it represents an intellectual stream, with many internal 
tributaries 94. As with any theory of social behaviour, the analytical conflict 
resolution approach has attracted some criticism - some of it from within its own 
                                                 
 
93 See for instance figure on the development of Burton’s work, P 
 
94 There are a number of variants in the conflict resolution school. At the center of the school, are those, 
following John Burton, who have developed their ideas around the Human needs concept, focusing on deep-
rooted social conflict, and who seek more durable "resolution", above mere short-term "settlement". With the 
passage of time, this particular project has become more developed, moving towards and increasingly mooting 
the idea of conflict transformation. These are the scholars that we mean by the term "Analytical Conflict 
Resolution School". Additionally, however, negotiation scholarship is sometimes included under the general rubric 
of "conflict resolution", as is the literature on international peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or peacemaking, 
although it does not display the central concern of conflict resolution with the futility of working within power 
frameworks, and the attempts to separate domestic from international conflict domains. See for instance Mitchell 
(2002), where he states that the term conflict transformation was coined because of the inaccurate usage of conflict 
resolution . There are also a number of variations on the theme of problem-solving workshops. These have been 
discussed and compared most notably by scholars such as Ronald Fisher (1989,1997) and Barbara Hill(1982). 
Terms applied to these include problem solving workshops (Burton, Kelman, Azar, Lederach), problem solving 
forums (Azar), Interactive problem solving (Kelman) Human Relations Workshops (Doob) Intercommunal 
Dialogue (Saunders). Most of these interventions are very similar, and are collectively termed "Interactive Conflict 
Resolution" by Fisher (1997). 
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ranks. This criticism takes certain forms. Much of it is directed at certain 
tributaries of the stream of Western conflict management only, which are not 
necessarily representative of analytical conflict resolution itself. Some criticism 
is fundamental, concerning the very appropriateness of the notion of conflict 
resolution itself, some has to do with a perceived Western cultural bias of the 
field, some is spurious, targeting for instance aspects of negotiation (which is 
explicitly not conflict resolution, and is rejected outright by the analytical conflict 
resolution approach). We will deal with some of the most important issues 
below. 
 
The most prominent critique of the conflict resolution school has come in the 
mid-Nineties. Criticism has been aimed at a number of levels. Essentially some 
of the criticism has been aimed at the very fundamentals of the field itself. The 
question is sometimes asked whether there should even be an attempt at 
resolving conflict?  Conflicts might be better left to run their courses. Conflict 
plays a useful role in society, and interference with conflict can sometimes 
therefore do more harm than good. According to this view, propounded, among 
others by anthropologists working in the conflict resolution field, such as Kevin 
Avruch and Paul Salem, conflict resolution is the product of Western liberals, 
who view conflict and the pain that it brings, as a negative phenomenon, to be 
eliminated. This, they say is the result of the Christian tradition, and Western 
philosophical streams of thought such as utilitarianism, the psychological 
tradition, post-modernism, etc.  Conflict resolution also reflects a certain 
relationship to power. It has been said that empires typically use force, and 
violent conflict behaviour to establish themselves, but that once established, 
empires generally disapprove of conflict - they then seek to resolve it, as peace 
is important to those benefiting from the status quo. However, struggle, or as 
Salem puts it, "battling", may be much more acceptable to those suffering under 
an oppressive status quo (Salem, 1993: 361 – 366)95. 
 
                                                 
95 In fairness, Salem is criticizing the whole conflict management field, though he (incorrectly) labels it “conflict 
resolution”. Nowhere is Burton or basic human needs actually singled out.  
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Conflict Resolution, in this sense is therefore not necessarily acceptable to non-
Westerners, who are generally in the underdog position. To these critics, 
therefore, conflict resolution may be the tool of the dominant, used to maintain 
situations of injustice. 
 
At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, since the analytical conflict 
resolution approach has always sought to avoid the use of force in the 
termination of conflict, it has also come in for criticism from the conservative, 
political realist position, which sees coercion as the "... ultimate currency in the 
power struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable groups which make up 
international politics." (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999: 221). 
Somewhat ironically, many in this tradition also believe that conflicts should 
simply be allowed to follow their course. 
 
Related to the above, fundamental issue of whether any interventions into 
conflict are appropriate, are other problems, relating more generally to the 
acceptability of Western conflict resolution to other cultures. Whereas the 
conflict resolution movement is largely informed by theories of individual 
behaviour, many anthropologists assert that conflict is a cultural phenomenon.96 
According to them, there can be no proper theory of conflict and its resolution 
that does not take culture into account.97 In summary, then, this critique asserts 
that methods of conflict resolution therefore also have a cultural bias that, 
although presented as a universal panacea, is often not acceptable to non-
Westerners. 
 
In his critique of conflict resolution, Avruch (1991: 5), quoting Kochman on 
some of the requirements for negotiation, writes as follows: "The requirement to 
                                                 
 
96 It is interesting to note that since his earliest forays into the conflict resolution field, and even before his 
articulation of the basic human needs theory of conflict, Burton has come under fire from those, such as Nader 
(1972: 55) who believe that “…he has not adequately considered culture as a variable to be considered...”. 
 
97 Both Burton and Azar (1990: 9) are, however, quite specific about the important role that culture plays in both 
conflict and the management of conflict. 
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behave calmly, rationally, unemotionally, and logically when negotiating is 
looked upon by blacks as a political requirement - and to accede to it in 
advance is considered a political defeat”. 
 
An immediate response to this particular criticism, here, is that the focus of 
this critique is on negotiation, which for a "Conflict Resolutionist" such as John 
Burton, is not even deemed a part of conflict resolution proper. Burton, for 
instance rejects negotiation, for reasons very similar to those of Avruch and 
the others mentioned above (1987b: 41). It is too bound up in the power-
relationships of the very conflicts that it is trying to resolve. This particular 
critique is therefore indicative of a lack of proper knowledge concerning the 
essentials of conflict resolution and is therefore not fair criticism in the view of 
this author. 
 
There is also a strand of criticism that originates from the international 
relations arena, exemplified by Cot (1972), and Yalem (1971), that reflects the 
lack of common ground between standard international relations and the 
conflict resolution school. Both authors stress the fact that Burton’s approach 
assumes the subjective nature of conflict, ignoring the very possibility of 
objective conflict. To a large extent, this was valid critique, and true of 
Burton’s early work, before he introduced the human needs element into his 
approach, and he has admitted as much98 (Burton, 1996). The introduction of 
human needs frustration to the core of the Burtonian approach makes it very 
clear that deep-rooted conflict is about much more than simple 
misunderstanding, however.  
 
At the opposite end of the value spectrum, sociologist and conflict resolution 
specialist Vivienne Jabri views violent conflict as a "... social product and 
militarism as a deeply embedded continuity reinforced through dominant 
discursive and institutional frameworks" (quoted by Miall, et al, 1999: 58). The 
problem for Jabri, and others such as Hoffman, and Fetherston, as presented 
                                                 
98 For instance, Burton has written (2006) that only in writing Deviance, Terrorism and War, in 1979  “… that I seem to have 
broken away finally from power as an explanatory frame, even from misperceptions as an adequate explanation of conflict. 
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by Miall et all , (1999: 59), is that conflict resolution, by reproducing the 
hegemonic discourses which "...seek to subsume subjectivity and its multiple 
forms of representation into a single entity involved in a confrontational 
interaction." may "...merely reproduce the exclusionist, violent discourses and 
practices which perpetuate it". According to this school of thought, following the 
critical theory tradition, existing discourses need to be replaced by anti--
hegemonic, counter-hegemonic and post-hegemonic peacebuilding projects 
(following the ideas of Habermas, Gramsci and Foucault). Following Habermas’  
idea of "communicative action", the solution lies in a "discourse of peace" in 
what she calls an "emancipatory politics" of dominance free politics and 
difference (Miall,et. al., 1999: 59). 
 
Yet this criticism is also largely unfounded. The very basis of conflict resolution 
as propounded by Burton, and supported by many others, is that it should be 
based on the satisfaction of basic human needs, which should take precedence 
over the satisfaction of institutional needs. This implies a definite favouring of 
changes to existing dysfunctional institutional arrangements, which the critique 
of Jabri and her colleagues does not seem to recognize. A closer examination 
of that critique also sees it focused more on the peace-keeping tradition, which 
is indeed embedded in the existing, realist-dominated, state-centric and even 
militaristic analyses of international relations scholarship and practice,  that 
Burton explicitly rejects. 
 
As has already been mentioned, the analytical conflict resolution approach is 
work in progress. It is continually evolving. An examination of Burton’s corpus 
of writing will show that it begins with an assumption that conflict is largely 
subjective, and therefore susceptible to “controlled communication”. It later 
takes on its human needs behavioural theory, and postulates analytical 
problem-solving as its intervention of choice. Still later, Burton (1995, 
1996,1997, 2001) makes explicit the need for provention, the 
institutionalization of a philosophy of needs-based conflict resolution, if even 
democratic states are to successfully overcome the problems that they face. 
Sandole, (1993, 1998, 1999, 2001) has incorporated Burton’s thinking in his 
theory-building attempts, to capture the complexity of conflict. 
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The primary proponents of analytical conflict resolution have responded to 
criticism by explaining their understanding of culture. Contrary to its being an 
example of Western chauvinism, insensitive to cultural difference, Burton's 
colleagues explain that their approach runs counter to traditional Western 
methods of conflict management (Sandole, 1998,1999, 2001, Mitchell, 2002, 
Rubenstein, 2001). Burton himself has addressed the issue, stating that parties 
to conflict resolution interventions will be invited to enter a new cultural context, 
or "transcultural island"; that of the problem solving workshop (Fisher, 
1997:262). 
 
The later conflict resolution scholars have also taken up the challenges of 
dealing with oppressive structural contexts and taking cultural difference more 
seriously. They tend to speak more of conflict transformation, than resolution, 
reflecting the fundamental importance of addressing inequality and changing 
relationships and the structural basis of conflict. Mitchell addresses the 
perceived divergence between the transformation and resolution strands, by 
putting to rest the notion that “conflict resolution” proposes a final ending of 
particular conflicts. He also correctly asserts that the notion of “conflict 
transformation” has emerged to some extent due to the “corruption” of the 
notion of “resolution”, because of the tendency to use “resolution” in ways that 
would previously have been more properly termed “management” or 
“settlement” (2002:1). For Sandole (1998:14) Burton’s notion of provention is 
conceptually consistent with the conflict transformation approach. Scholars 
such as John-Paul Lederach99 have also explicitly stressed the need for what 
he calls "elicitive" processes,  that draw out the culturally relevant skills and 
insights in the affected parties. Mitchell concludes his discussion on the 
distinction, if any, between transformation and resolution by stating: “I would 
hope that it [conflict resolution] would occupy its old position on the side of 
                                                 
 
99 See for instance, Lederach, J-P. , 1997, Building Peace: Sustainable Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies, 
Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press. 
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major political and socio-economic changes when these are clearly 
necessary.”(2002:16). 
 
The growth of the approach, and the evolution of the thinking behind it can be 
illustrated through the development of John Burton’s work over four decades 
in tabular form, in table  4.2  below. 
 
Table 4.2:   The development of Burton’s conflict resolution ideas 
 
Year Field Representative
Work 
Assumption Management 
Techniques 
1965 International 
Relations 
International 
Relations: A 
General Theory 
Power works Conventional 
diplomacy & 
Warfare 
1969 International 
Relations/ 
Conflict 
Management 
Conflict and 
Communication 
Conflict is the 
result of 
misperception 
Controlled 
Communication 
1972 International 
Relations 
World Society States & Power 
are too narrow 
a basis for 
under- 
standing IR 
Conflict 
Rejecting the 
“realist” 
assumptions of 
international 
relations  
1990 Conflict 
Resolution 
Conflict: Human 
Needs Theory  
Conflict is the 
result of 
frustrated 
human needs 
Analytical 
Problem-solving 
workshops 
1997 Conflict 
Resolution 
Violence 
Explained 
Conflict is the 
result of  
inappropriate 
management 
assumptions 
“Provention” – 
institutionalisation 
& integration of 
human needs 
thinking 
 
 
4.6.1 A rejoinder to the "culture"  critique of the conflict resolution    
           school 
Given the importance and long-standing nature of the critique of the analytical 
conflict resolution approach presented by the anthropological school, it 
behoves us to address this issue separately here. 
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Note that the cultural relativists criticize Burton because of his omissions in 
respect of the role of culture in conflict. It is true that Burton does not say 
much about culture, but there is, implicit in his theoretical perspective, a good 
reason for this. Burton recognizes that in the international realm, where he 
developed basic human needs theory, conflicts are generally between parties 
representing different cultures, or value systems, who, because of the near 
impossibility of settling these value and cultural differences, need a common 
perspective; one that delves beneath the cultural differences, searching for 
the common well-springs of culture, that will therefore allow a true co-
structuring of new realities to take place. In his own words, Burton (1990 b: 
211, 212) puts it as follows: “Culture, either as a satisfier or as a means of 
dealing with conflicts, should not influence the problem-solving process, a 
process that must be capable of cutting across cultures.” In this quest, Burton 
postulates human needs, common to all human beings as the "source" of 
culture. In the language of post-modern, structurationism, Burton is using the 
construct of human needs as a standpoint to mediate between two or more 
subjective realities. This approach is diagrammatically portrayed in figure 4.2 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communal 
Group A 
Communal 
Group B CONFLICT 
Cultural frame 
A satisfies 
identity, 
security, 
control needs 
Cultural frame 
B satisfies 
identity, 
security, 
control needs 
BHN as foundation, or common 
to both A & B 
Traditional conflict 
settlement intervention 
operates here 
ACR operates 
here 
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Fig 4.2 Diagrammatic Depiction of Burton's facilitative approach 
 
4.7   Summary and Conclusions: 
Burton and the Human needs school provide a mid-range theory applicable 
to societal and certain group-based conflict (Sandole, 1999: 109 -133). It is 
internally consistent, and explains the social conflict and conflict behaviour 
of its chosen domain very eloquently and powerfully. Without explicitly 
engaging with the founding fathers of the social sciences' perspectives on 
conflict, it nevertheless draws on the insights of scholars such as Simmel, 
Dahrendorf, Freud, Dollard and Doob, Coser and Maslow.  
 
The approach has several shortcomings , including the following: 
 
Because of its radical critique of conventional theories of politics and 
international politics, this approach does not fully engage with current debate 
on social theory100. 
 
The approach exaggerates its rejection of power in the understanding of 
conflict, in favour of the empowering function of human needs. This 
perspective is ultimately a rejection of the power-politics (political realism) 
school's approach to international relations conflict, with all its inherent 
limitations. In this regard, it is possibly an over-reaction, and seems to 
somewhat undervalue the role of power. Indeed, the point has been made by 
some of the needs theorists, that parties will seek power, in order to satisfy 
their needs. This is after all the very basis of Sites’ work on control theory 
(Sites, 1990: 7 - 33). 
 
There is in Burton’s work, and that of some of his colleagues, a general 
inability, or unwillingness to speak the language of post-modernist 
scholarship, and these scholars have therefore not adequately defended 
                                                 
100 According to Burton (1984 x,xi) "...the contemporary scholarly literature has not been found useful, except as 
a chopping block from time to time. Previous books have dealt with this literature. The study is concerned with an 
emerging empirical and philosophical paradigm shift. Its validity is in its predictive capacity, its relevance to 
experience in contemporary world society and its internal logic." 
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themselves, nor engaged sufficiently with some of their critics, even where 
the criticism has been spurious or faulty. 
 
The analytical conflict resolution/human needs school is often overly critical 
of negotiations and mediation, not recognizing that these forms of 
intervention have, in the best examples of their practice, already reacted to 
many of these and other criticisms, to reform themselves to some degree. 
Much of the literature on mediation is for instance quite self conscious of 
the traps of inappropriate use of power, and warns its practitioners to avoid 
these. Additionally, as integrative negotiation has evolved, it has also 
downplayed the need to compromise to find an agreement. 
 
As articulated in Burton's own language, this approach sometimes makes 
exaggerated claims concerning its ability to prevent conflict. In this regard, 
for instance, his use of the term "provention" though he has been at pains 
to explain it101, still conjures up images of conflict avoidance and prevention 
– elements of the “settlement” approach that he seeks to avoid. 
 
The approach also undervalues (though it does not ignore) the importance 
of objective conflicts of interest in the social conflicts that it examines. The 
aspect of the relationship between objective and subjective elements of 
conflicts, as discussed by Mitchell (1973: 128) therefore needs further 
clarification and elaboration. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the theory would be greatly 
improved by a further elaboration of the linkages between basic human 
needs and their “real world” satisfiers. There is a need to establish some 
                                                 
 
101 Burton explains "Provention" as follows: "The term provention has been introduced to signify taking steps to 
remove sources of conflict, and more positively to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued 
relationships control behaviours.” (1990:v) 
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consensus around what the indicators of needs satisfactions would be, so 
that these could be measured, and resolution properly evaluated. Working 
towards consensus around the number and priority of human needs would 
also take the approach further. For instance, though Burton includes 
references to identity needs in almost all of his works since the mid 
eighties, identity needs are not mentioned in his original nine human needs 
discussed under 4.3.1.1 above. 
 
Its shortcomings notwithstanding, this theoretical perspective offers 
profound insights into the origins of a form of conflict that has become 
almost endemic in certain parts of the world, and a coherent theory of 
practice in respect of its management. Even Joseph Scimecca, a critic of 
Burton’s maintains “…nevertheless, I still believe that this human needs 
theory represents the most sophisticated and fully developed theory of 
conflict resolution available…” (1990:207). As such it deserves further 
research in respect of both its foundational underpinnings (basic human 
needs), and its theory of practice (problem solving workshops). It is 
anticipated that this thesis, by reflecting on the South African conflict 
management processes, through a conflict resolution framework will 
contribute in a small way towards its further elaboration. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN SETTLEMENT 
  
 
Until the beginning of the transition period, marked by the 
lifting of bans on the African National Congress (ANC) 
and other political movements in February 1990, conflict 
in South Africa was probably easier to simplify than 
anywhere else. The central theme of conflict in South 
Africa has been white minority rule, with all the exclusions 
and deprivations it has directly and indirectly created for 
the black majority.  
(Johnston, 200: 46) 
 
Apartheid is one of the last moral issues to be regarded 
as simple in a world otherwise determined to find 
complexity. Yet apartheid is complicated and will not be 
understood unless this is realized.  
 
(Brewer, 1986: 407). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Social conflict in South Africa is one of the most extensively-quoted examples 
of class-conflict, of racial conflict, and of various species of ethnic conflicts in 
the political and political-sociology literature, and a well- developed debate 
has taken place in recent years between those scholars who have adopted 
Marxist perspectives and those who have used liberal analytical 
frameworks102. The former have emphasised the impact of economic forces 
and class relationships, while the latter have emphasised the political goals of 
the various racial components in the country. Typically, however the conflict 
literature will refer briefly to South Africa as an example of one or other aspect 
of social conflict, while extensive conflict analyses of South Africa as a case 
study are much rarer in this literature. 
                                                 
102 See for instance du Toit, 2001, chapter 1 for a discussion of the major approaches 
 120
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the South African conflict, 
and analyse it in terms of Azar's model of protracted social conflict, and to 
demonstrate how it is in accordance with the main principles of that model. It 
is also our aim to indicate how the previously - mentioned facets of conflict do, 
in fact coincide to produce highly intractable conflict in this country.  
 
It goes without saying, that for any analyst to come to grips with complex 
social conflict, it must be necessary to understand its historical origin, and so 
we will begin with an extremely brief historical background  to the dominant 
social conflict in South Africa.  It is our intention to draw the reader's attention 
to only the most important aspects of that history, pertaining to our 
understanding of the conflict.  An analysis, or mapping of the conflict at the 
negotiation process, including a breakdown of parties, their interests and the 
dynamics of the conflict will also be presented. 
 
5.2 History  
The history of South Africa is largely the history of clashes among the different 
social formations that constitute this country.  Initially, clashes took place 
between the early European settlers and the aboriginal inhabitants; the Khoi 
and San peoples. Later, violent conflict took place among the different settler 
groups, as well as between the settlers and the Xhosa people living on the 
Eastern frontier of the Cape Colony. 
 
Conflict between the earlier Dutch settlers and their subsequent English 
conquerors, finally led to the Great Trek migration of the former into the 
interior of the territory, where further conquests of indigenous Bantu peoples 
took place, in what was to become the province of Natal and the Boer 
republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State 103 .  Perhaps less well-
known, but at least as important as these conflicts, was the Difaqane, or 
Mfecane, a period of intense and violent conflict among the African tribal 
                                                 
103 See Davenport,(1977: 97 – 119)for an account of the settlement and the struggle between the races for 
land.  
 121
entities of South Africa, largely as a result of the consolidation and 
expansionism of the Zulu nation in the period 1815 -1830, which established 
many of the tribal settlement patterns in the country 104.  
 
After the discovery of gold and diamonds towards the end of the nineteenth 
century in South Africa, warfare broke out once more between the Boers and 
the English peoples.  After the victory of the British and the consolidation of 
the four territories into a single geographical entity, the inter-group conflicts 
persisted.  The constitution of the Union of South Africa laid the foundations 
for continued conflict between the indigenous South Africans and the more 
recent European arrivals, by maintaining the largely disenfranchised condition 
of the former. The process of disempowerment of black South Africans by 
whites continued, particularly through the agency of a plethora of 
discriminatory legislation, including the 1913 Land Act, 1923 Urban Areas Act 
which confined black South Africans to segregated townships, the 1927 
Immorality Act which forbade extra-marital sex between Africans and whites, 
and the 1936 Native Trust and Land Bill, among others105. The response of 
Black South Africans to the politics of exclusion was the formation of the 
African National Congress in 1912, with its largely gradualist and non-violent 
protest actions, aiming to persuade the Christian conscience of the white 
establishment of the error of their bigoted ways, and urging them to 
reincorporate the excluded groups into the mainstream of South African 
society (Pampallis,1991: 67, 68, Lodge, 1987: 2-30, Thompson and Prior, 
1982: 184 – 185, Stadler, 1987: 150).  
 
The more dramatic manifestations of conflict during this era undoubtedly took 
place among the different factions of European South Africans.  Unresolved 
resentment at the continued domination of Britain periodically spilled over into 
violent conflict; for instance in the 1914 Rebellion and again later over South 
                                                 
 
104 See Davenport, (1977: 10 – 17) for an account of the Difaqane. 
 
105 See for instance Merle Lipton’s (1985) account of the foundations of Apartheid, pp. 17 – 20. 
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Africa's participation in the Second World War. Class conflict within the 
dominant white group also manifested itself in the 1922 Revolt on the mines of 
the Witwatersrand (Stadler, 1987).  It should be noted, however that the Rand 
Revolt was not simply an instance of class conflict. It also contained an 
important strand of republicanism, resisting the perceived domination by 
English interests of the Smuts government (Davenport, 1977 :192 – 198).  All 
other instances of conflict aside, we can agree with Schlemmer (1978: 161), 
when he writes that “The fundamental conflict relates, of course to the issue of 
political rights for black people, all of whom are currently excluded from the 
parliamentary franchise.” 
 
The non-violent black protests against their exclusion from the political system 
continued all the while, and gained momentum after the Second World War, 
first with the ‘Programme of Action’ and then with the Defiance Campaigns of 
the African National congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, during which 
large-scale civil disobedience took place (Stadler, 1987:150 -151, Lodge, 
1987: 42 - 45). Factors encouraging this development were undoubtedly the 
boost given to the ideas, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, of human rights 
and liberal democracy by the victory of the Allied powers over the racist-
oriented and fascist Axis powers, as well as shifting economic conditions in 
South Africa, and the rise to prominence of new, younger leaders within the 
ANC106 (Lodge, 1987: 22-28) Additionally, many African South Africans fought 
for their country in the Second World War, which was a war against the forces 
of racism and authoritarian rule (Johnson, 2005: 133).   The contradictions 
were becoming increasingly apparent, and expectations were heightened. 
 
The other signal event which intensified the struggle for inclusion by black 
South Africans was undoubtedly the 1948 victory at the polls of the National 
Party, which had, as an important component of its policy platform, the 
extension of racial separation in South Africa, and the ending of what limited 
                                                 
 
106 For instance, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu all came through the ANC Youth League 
at this time. 
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civil rights existed for the majority of the South African population107. Racialist 
politics was, for instance, entrenched after 1948 by the 1950 Population 
Registration Act, which classified the entire South African population 
according to race, based on appearance, descent and ‘general acceptance’, 
as well as by the eventual removal of the Coloured People from the common 
voters roll in 1955 (Lipton, 1985: 23, Brooks, 1968: 116 - 126). Influx control 
was stepped up, and “The influx control laws were wielded particularly 
ruthlessly against Africans suspected of political agitation” (Posel, 1991: 123). 
 
As tensions between the races grew, inevitably, violence broke out, most 
notably at Sharpeville, in 1960, and widespread unrest followed (Lipton, 1985: 
29).  Under pressure, the government proscribed the PAC and the ANC and 
large numbers of their leadership were arrested.  The South African 
Communist Party had been banned earlier, in terms of the Suppression of 
Communism Act, in 1950 (Pampallis, 1991: 181). Under these circumstances, 
the leaders of the black struggle perceived little option, but to take their 
resistance underground, and to use violent methods in view of the lack of 
success of their non-violent struggle. The military wing of the ANC, Umkonto 
We Sizwe was born, as was Poqo, the military arm of the PAC.  The African 
Resistance Movement, consisting mainly of young, white radicals, also took 
up the violent struggle.   
 
These organisations began to attack targets within South Africa, but were 
unable to have any notable effect on the white state, except to strengthen its 
resolve to break the resistance; which it did, by large-scale arrests of the 
leadership, most of whom were incarcerated after trial, for treason and 
sabotage. The state also responded by legislating a battery of "security" laws 
                                                 
 
107 See Lodge, (1987: 67 ) for an account of the increasing pressures being brought to bear on black South 
Africans in the years following the 1948 election. Just some of the developments were that urban influx control 
was tightened, fresh restrictions were brought in to curb the activity of African trade unions, the resettlement of 
Africans away from inner city areas, to remote locations, an ethnically discriminatory educational curriculum 
was implemented. Africans were excluded from commerce and ownership of property more stringently than 
before, and the Criminal Law Amendment Act imposed severe penalties for any civil disobedience.  
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which made a mockery of liberal principles such as habeus corpus and 
freedoms of association, speech, the press, etc 108. The escalating tension of 
the South African conflict is nicely captured as follows by Stadler (1987: 77)  
“The massacre at Sharpeville, the banning of the ANC, and the PAC, and the 
emergence of militant resistance in the form of the African Resistance 
Movement, Poqo and Umkonto We Sizwe, were indications that  henceforth 
the significant political confrontations were going to concern the survival of the 
political order itself.”. 
 
The racial state was increasingly becoming a police, and military state as well.  
Initially, the repression was successful.  That leadership of the liberation 
movements which did manage to escape prison, fled into exile to receive 
training, and to prepare for an armed struggle.  A period of quiessence 
followed, in the period between the mid-sixties and the mid-seventies. 
According to Johnson (1977:23), “By the later 1960s the forces of the South 
African revolution had become almost wholly a movement in exile.”  
Eventually, however, protest emerged again, in new guises and using new 
channels.  Increasingly, black labour began to organise against racial 
inequalities in the workplace. A series of widely-publicised strikes109, including 
the PUTCO bus strike of 1972, and the Durban strikes of 1973 brought the 
issue of the legalisation of African trade unions into prominence.  Among the 
ranks of black students, a new movement, known as Black Consciousness 
arose, attacking white domination and urging greater black assertiveness.  
Steve Biko was the most important leader of this movement (Price, 1994: 19 – 
                                                 
 
108 See, for instance chapter entitled: “Measures relating to security and the control of persons, organizations 
and media of communications”, in Horrell, M.,  (1978: 412 – 479), for an account of the plethora of security 
legislation, proclamations  etc aimed at restricting free political activity in South Africa before the reforms of the 
early Nineteen-Eighties.  
 
109 According to Johnson (1977: 187),by the end of 1974 there had been “…over 300 illegal strikes since the 
start of the wave in 1972.” According to the 1981 report of the Study Commission on US Foreign Policy 
Toward Southern Africa, “…as many as 75 000 African workers staged general strikes in the industrial areas 
around Durban. Sporadic strikes in other urban centres ensued.” 
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29). Increasing militancy among school children finally broke out into open 
hostility in SOWETO, in 1976, when students protesting against the use of 
Afrikaans in their schools drew an armed and violent response from the 
police.  The Soweto riots, as they became known, spread around the country, 
leaving more than seven hundred dead and many injured over a period of 
sixteen months.  
 
The South African government reacted this time, by not simply clamping down 
in the usual fashion, but by also beginning to examine the possibilities of 
limited reform, to defuse the pressures being brought to bear upon it; both 
internally and externally, as the international community of states began to 
apply economic and cultural isolationist policies against South Africa. A more 
enlightened labour dispensation, recognising the rights of black workers to 
organise, was implemented.  In the political arena, it was believed that the 
previously excluded Coloured and Indian population groups should be 
incorporated into the state in such a way as not to threaten the whites' hold on 
power 110.  As an answer to this need, the Tricameral constitution was 
designed, and eventually implemented in 1984.  Almost unbelievably, in terms 
of the new constitution, which gave  political rights to Coloured and Indian 
South Africans through separate legislatures, the black majority of the 
population was still excluded from the political process, although limited forms 
of participation at local government level were encouraged.  It was still 
believed that blacks should exercise their political rights as citizens of the 
homelands; not of South Africa as a whole. According to Boulle, (1984: 223) 
“That the government has indulged in consociational engineering on a limited 
and selective basis is evidence of its incompatibility with the government’s 
constitutional policies and political strategies. Even within the limited scope of 
the 1982 constitution the government was unable to accept the constitutional 
implications of the system”.  
 
                                                 
110 These trends resulted in the  establishment of the Theron, Rieckert and Wiehahn commissions, 
which were tasked, in the mid-seventies, to examine and make recommendations on possible reform 
with respect to the political status of the Coloured people, urbanization of the African population and 
the labour relations dispensation (Scrire, 1991: 31) 
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The implementation of the Tricameral system, and proposals for new black 
local authorities by the government proved to be another factor galvanising 
black resistance.  According to Welsh (1994:183): “There can be no doubt that 
the constitution exacerbated the conflict and destabilised the society, but 
these consequences of its blatant exclusion of Africans forced the issue of 
African political incorporation to the top of South Africa’s political agenda.” It 
led directly to the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the 
umbrella body which united many different organisations including labour 
unions, civic organisations, professional organisations, student bodies, 
churches and human rights organisations against the government. In its 
normal style, the government responded by arresting, confronting, and in 
some cases by shooting protestors.  
 
Brewer (1986: 422, 423) has perceptively claimed that the Soweto revolt 
represented something of a watershed in the struggle against apartheid in 
South Africa. It created a unity among the different forces within the 
disenfranchised majority which had previously been absent. Brewer also 
notes that the episode brought about a change in their attitude towards 
negotiation; a strategy they had rejected outright before, but one which was 
now acceptable under the right conditions. In Brewer’s own words: “…the 
uprising helped initiate a series of liberalizations which have implications far 
beyond those which the government intended. Secondly, the uprising has 
helped to bring about a vociferous period of protest and resistance. The 
implication of this opposition is that African protest and resistance have 
themselves been changed in such a way as to strengthen it.” (Brewer,1986: 
407, 408, Johnston, 1995:48). 
 
In other ways, the Soweto uprising had an impact on South African politics. 
The military were used in a more central role, not only to maintain "law and 
order" in black townships, but also to act pro-actively to counter the "total 
onslaught" at home, and across South Africa's borders, which the government 
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perceived itself to be facing111. The resistance to apartheid had attracted 
much sympathy and some support from western states, and more from the 
eastern bloc countries.  Limited economic sanctions had been implemented 
and South Africa was being isolated internationally in cultural and sporting 
fields.  These developments led to the ruling elite, much influenced by military 
strategy since the rise to power of (former Defence Minister) P.W. Botha, 
describing their situation in increasingly existentialist, survivalist terms.  
 
The 1983 constitution, presented by the National Party government, while 
indicating that the government was prepared to seek political solutions to 
mounting pressure, was essentially a corporatist proposal, that incorporated 
Coloured and Indian segments at the expense of the exclusion of the African 
majority. It gave rise to renewed protest actions, by an increasingly unified 
resistance, under the banner of the United Democratic Front.  
 
The resistance which took place in the middle-eighties was the most 
widespread, and varied that had yet taken place in South Africa.  It included 
consumer-boycotts of white businesses, and attempts at making the black 
townships ungovernable. Mayors, municipal councillors, police and other 
“system” officials were the chief targets of the resistance. Many people were 
killed 112. The resistance was highly organised into area and street 
committees, which managed to survive the state's clampdown for a long 
period of time. 
 
A state of emergency in the affected areas was declared by the government in 
July 1985, which was followed by a national state of emergency on 12 June 
                                                 
111 See, for instance Davies and O’meara ( 1985),  “Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South 
African Regional Policy since 1978” for an account of South Africa’s dual strategy of internal reform and 
repression, and its external policy of pressure and alliance formation.   
  
112 See Schrire (1992: 79, 80) for an account of the revolt. 
 
 128
1986 which was extended until 1990. Thousands of activists were detained, 
mostly from the UDF and Azapo.113  
 
Most of the militant activists were extremely young, and discipline was often 
maintained by particularly violent methods, such as burning by the notorious 
tyre "necklace" method. Eventually, however, by 1988, the superior force of 
the state had prevailed; the UDF and seventeen other anti-apartheid 
organisations were banned by the government on February 24 of that year 
(Schrire, 1992: 230).     
 
As was the case after the 1976 revolt, the government again reacted with 
more than simple oppression.  There was still a reformist track to the National 
Party's strategy.  According to Lipton (1986 :378): “As after Sharpeville and 
Soweto, the interaction of external and internal pressures generated a 
complex chain-reaction of effects, intensifying both reformist and authoritarian 
pressures, and raising the political temperature and the level of violence – by 
blacks, by the police, and by the SA army in the region.”  
 
During the middle Eighties however, it was becoming increasingly apparent to 
the state that it could not survive the different pressures which were being 
brought to bear upon it, and retain apartheid intact.  The government 
expressed its readiness to negotiate with any black leaders, as long as they 
rejected violence.  The main liberation movements; the ANC, PAC, SACP and 
AZAPO, all of whom maintained military wings, were in this way excluded114.  
It was the government's intention thereby simply to negotiate, or more 
accurately, to consult with its own appointed black leaders; to arrange some 
form of power-sharing, leaving whites in control of their own affairs, and 
therefore also in control of the bulk of the wealth of the country.  In this regard, 
                                                 
113 According to Pampallis (1991: 288), by June 1988, more than 30 000 people had been detained. More 
than a thousand were detained for more than two years. See also Schrire, 1982 (77 – 105) for comment on 
this period. 
 
114 Van Zyl Slabbert (1985: 160), writing at the time captured the mood of black South Africans after the 
implementation of the 1983 constitution as follows: “…not one black leader, spokesman or editor of any standing, 
whether moderate or radical is prepared to give even a qualified endorsement to the tri-cameral system.” 
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one of the key leaders with which the government wished to "negotiate" was 
Chief Minister Buthelezi of the Kwa Zulu homeland. 
 
Buthelezi, nevertheless, insisted on the release of the jailed African leadership 
as a condition for his own participation in any such negotiation. It was clear, 
however, that the international community was standing firm on its conditions 
for the lifting of sanctions, including the scrapping of all apartheid legislation, 
the release of political prisoners, the unbanning of the liberation movements 
and commitment to negotiations leading to full democracy115.  These 
conditions reflected the liberation movements' own demands of the South 
African government to a large extent. A number of other factors also 
encouraged the government to move more rapidly away from its traditionally 
repressive response to pressure:  
 
International economic and other sanctions were beginning to exert pressure.  
By the early nineteen-nineties, Geldenhuys was able to write that: “By the end 
of Mr Botha’s presidency in 1989, South Africa was undoubtedly one of the 
most isolated states in the world.” (1990: 8)116. 
 
Elsewhere,(1989: 281-286) Geldenhuys has documented the extent of that 
isolation, distinguishing the diplomatic, cultural, military and economic 
isolation of South Africa. Internationally, the crisis in communism in Eastern 
Europe, particularly the crisis in the Soviet Union, had major repercussions 
around the world, including Southern Africa. The Soviet Union was 
disengaging from its clients around the world, and becoming less belligerent in 
its relations with the United States.  These events signalled the end of the 
Cold war.  From this time on, the South African government knew that it could 
                                                 
 
115 See for instance Fraser et al, 1986, for an account of the demands placed on the South African 
government. 
 
116 Geldenhuys bases his statement on, among other things, South Africa’s paucity of diplomatic links, its low 
incidence of membership of international organizations, its low frequency of international treaties, comparatively few 
visits abroad  by the leadership, the high number of condemnatory resolutions by the UN and other organizations, the 
arms embargo after 1977, and cultural and sporting embargoes, all of which exceeded the isolation of the other so-
called “pariah” states. 
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no longer justify itself to the West, simply in Cold War terms.  To say that it 
was anti-Communist in a world in which communism was becoming 
increasingly less of a factor, and in which the Soviet Union, the major 
communist power had given up on communism, and was itself in the process 
of disintegration, held very little credibility. The South African government's 
experience of negotiation with the Soviets in the Namibian independence 
process also persuaded the South African leadership that the Soviet Union 
could be trusted.  The peaceful transition in that country, along with 
comparative moderation of SWAPO leadership117 also played an important 
role in undermining the prior belief which the South African government had in 
the motives and tendencies within the African liberation movements. 
Furthermore, the South African government was growing in confidence in its 
ability to counter the communist aspects of the policies of the South African 
liberation movements. 
 
It was also going to be easier for the government  to deal with its right-wing 
critics, who would normally have used the communist threat as one of their 
most important arguments against dealing with the liberation movements. In 
the post-cold-war era, negotiation was increasingly the only option facing the 
government.   
 
Equally, on their parts, the liberation movements were becoming aware that 
they would not be able to rely on the sponsorship of their armed struggle by 
their erstwhile Eastern bloc allies, even in the medium term. Internally, the 
government's constituency had shifted quite significantly since the late 
seventies.  The first experiments with limited power-sharing with coloureds 
and Indians in the Tricameral parliament were unacceptable to many of its 
traditional Afrikaner support base, who felt threatened by the changes.  
These, old-style nationalists established the Conservative Party under A.P. 
Treurnicht as a response.   The threat and reality of economic sanctions and 
                                                 
 
117 See for instance Crocker, (1992 ) High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood, and 
Jabri, (1990), Mediating Conflict: Decision-Making and Western Intervention in Namibia, for accounts of the 
experiences of the South African government in the negotiations leading up to the independence process in Namibia. 
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other forms of external pressure, on the other hand, had served to unite many 
of the government's erstwhile English- speaking critics behind the National 
Party, especially after Prime Minister Botha at the Carlton and Good Hope 
conferences convinced business interests of his intention to liberalise the 
South African economy.  The nett effect was that the  government's 
constituency had shifted significantly, and was increasingly  one which would, 
in the interests of an improved economy, support an increased pace of 
democratic reform.  Brewer, following the findings of polls by Schlemmer and 
Welsh, points out that as many as seventy five percent of white South 
Africans would, after that realignment, support “…constitutional possibilities 
which moved away from traditional apartheid…” (1986: 408, Schlemmer, 
Stack and Berkow, 1991: 164). 
 
Against this background, and somewhat against expectations, F.W. de Klerk, 
a conservative in the Botha cabinet, rose to the leadership of the National 
Party after the ill-health of P.W, Botha led to his decision to separate the post 
of State President from the position of leader of the National Party. High on de 
Klerk's list of priorities was the restoration of civil rule, which he began by 
reigning in the "securocrats" of the state security council and the joint 
management committees that had become prominent under Botha (Schrire, 
1991:131).  As will also be shown in the next chapter, however, F.W. de Klerk 
had, after becoming State President, to adapt to the news, previously 
unbeknown to him, that a secret dialogue had opened up between elements in 
the intelligence community, certain cabinet colleagues, Nelson Mandela and 
the ANC leadership in exile118. In his first opening of parliament speech, on 
the 2nd of  February, 1990, he announced his intention of liberalizing, 
democratising and negotiating the future of a new South Africa - a programme 
which was then put into effect, and which changed the face of South African 
politics forever.  
 
                                                 
 
118 It could be interpreted that part of de Klerk’s reigning in of the Security apparatus involved his bringing the 
process that they had clandestinely embarked upon years previously, into the public domain. 
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When we speak of conflict in South Africa, it is important to note that that 
conflict is not simply a racial confrontation between  blacks and whites 
contending for power within the country.  The long history of conflict, and 
indeed the history of the physical repression of that conflict has led to a 
proliferation of parties and issues.  Conflict has also "spilled over" from 
national levels to local levels and vice-versa.  It has been displaced from 
overtly political theatres to the workplace and elsewhere. 
  
5.3 Mapping the South African Conflict 
Against the above,  briefly-sketched background to the current position in 
South Africa, the application of an analytical tool is appropriate.  According to 
Wehr (1979), a map of the conflict provides clearer insight regarding the "...  
understanding of the origins, dynamics, and possibilities for resolution of the 
conflict".  Wehr goes on to recommend the inclusion of the following 
information in a conflict map: Summary description, conflict history, conflict 
context, conflict parties, issues, dynamics, alternative routes to the solution of 
problems, and the conflict regulation potential.  
 
Due to Its protracted nature, the macro-level socio-political conflict in South 
Africa produced a proliferation of parties over the years. If one accepts the 
fact the conflict was primarily a communal one, among the racial/ethnic 
groupings as Giliomee and his supporters propose, then it must also be 
unambiguously stated that each of the main communal actors was certainly 
not monolithic and that each could be sub-divided into a number of parties119, 
most of which have significantly different strategies as well as end-goals. 
Rhoodie (1991: 21) captures this complexity as follows: “Socio-political conflict 
in South Africa can be traced to the competitive interactions between two 
clusters of interest groups, the one consisting mainly of people who broadly 
define themselves as black, and the other comprising mainly people who 
broadly define themselves as white. Historically these racial categories 
                                                 
 
119 Schlemmer had stated, as early as 1978, that the dominant conflict apart, “Sub conflicts abound both within and 
between the white and black political positions.” (1978: 161) 
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coincided roughly with the economic, sociocultural and ethnic cleavages that 
would become the basis of white racism.” 
 
5.3.1 The Ruling Communal Group 
On the side of the ruling communal group, there were a number of formal 
political parties, as well as a number of pressure groups, which generally 
aligned themselves with these. We discuss these briefly below.  
 
 
5.3.1.1 The National Party 
Firstly, and most significantly among the ruling communal group there was the 
National Party, which formed the government of the country. It was, until 
shortly before the negotiation, and arguably into the negotiation phase, 
wedded to the concept of white domination through political control of the 
state and the promotion of the economic interests; initially of the Afrikaner, 
and subsequently, of the white inhabitants of the state. Before the advent of 
negotiations as has been spelt out above, the leadership of this party shifted 
their position, favouring a free-market economic system, which would serve 
the interests of the business sector, by liberalizing South African society and 
providing a more inclusive democracy, though still restricting the political 
rights of the African majority, while protecting the "rights" of the minority 
through constitutional safeguards and the privatization of the economy. Some 
commentators have correctly maintained that the National Party only finally 
promoted a liberal, free-enterprise model when they realised that they would 
invariably forfeit their control of the country via co-optative, corporatist 
approaches. De Klerk’s own position was summarised by his brother as 
follows: Ï don’t expect him… to make a leap of faith, away from the ideal of 
racial groups…F.W. de Klerk is too strongly convinced that racial grouping is 
the only truth, way and life.”  (Schrire, 1992:126) 
 
5.3.1.2 Conservative Party 
Secondly, there was the Conservative Party, the major white right-wing party 
which remained wedded to the concept of "separate development" or Grand 
Apartheid, with different ethnic groups living in their own areas, under 
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independent governments. Increasingly this was taking the form of proposals 
for a separate “Volkstaat”. Since the advent of a pre-negotiation phase in 
South Africa, the Conservative Party, which had only recently before 
expressed a willingness to negotiate, and which had a limited vision regarding 
what it was prepared to negotiate, experienced a split as certain of its leaders 
opted for a greater commitment towards negotiation.  
 
5.3.1.3 Democratic Party 
Somewhat to the "left" of the National Party, was the Democratic Party, whose 
policies differed only slightly from those of the National Party. Traditionally, the 
party had fought for the liberalization and democratization of South Africa. The 
DP supported a free-market economy, and claimed to be the only party which 
could be trusted to protect the fundamentals of liberal democracy. It was the 
one party that had always stood for a negotiated settlement of the South 
African conflict. 
 
5.3.1.4 Black “System” Parties 
During the last stages of apartheid, various leaders of the disenfranchised, 
black groups were co-opted by the National Party to provide a form of 
legitimacy for its policies internally, and to convince the international 
community that the NP was reforming in a democratic direction. Examples of 
parties which fell into this category were the Labour Party in the Coloured 
House of Representatives and the Solidarity and National People's Parties in 
the "Indian" House of Delegates.  Although critical of the system, these parties 
had participated and developed a stake in it. 
 
Since 1991, as the Labour Party increasingly identified itself with the struggle 
against the National Party, there was a drift of its Members of Parliament 
towards the NP, which eventually saw the governing party representing the 
majority in the House of Representatives. The Inkatha Freedom Party 
developed out of Inkatha Yenkululeko yeSizwe, a cultural revitalization 
organisation resuscitated by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1975 (Kotze, 
1978: 128). The organisation overwhelmingly drew its membership from the 
people of KwaZulu.  Although critical of the governments’ policies, Buthelezi 
 135
accepted self-government for KwaZulu, and came in for much criticism from 
the liberation movements, who saw him as a collaborator with apartheid. 
There was also much criticism of Inkatha for using heavy-handed tactics in 
recruiting its members.  Although Buthelezi fought strongly for the release of 
Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC (Kane-Berman, 1991:86), he became 
extremely critical of the ANC and its associated organisations, which he 
sometimes referred to as the "Ungodly Alliance".  An important point of 
difference was the IFP's preference for free market economics, opposed to 
the mixed economy, with a redistribution of wealth, which the ANC supported, 
and an opposition to the application of economic sanctions or the waging of 
armed struggle against South Africa (Johnston, 1995: 53, 54).  Buthelezi also 
campaigned extensively in opposition to the imposition of economic sanctions 
against South Africa.  During the eighties, Inkatha was instrumental in 
promoting an investigation into a separate constitutional option for 
KwaZulu/Natal (Mc Caul, 1988: 156, 157).  
 
Particularly since the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson 
Mandela, however, tensions grew between Inkatha, which subsequently 
organised itself as a political party in preparation for non-racial elections, and 
the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance.  Natal was riven by extreme levels of 
violence, associated, among other things, with a turf war between the two 
organisations.  The IFP was continually associated with the heavy-handed 
KwaZulu police, "warlordism" and the use of force. It was determined to work 
within the framework of the homeland system, which brought it into frequent 
conflict with the alliance tactics of consumer and school boycotts, and worker 
stay-aways (Johnston, 1995: 53).   It boasted a handful of white Members of 
Parliament, who had left their homes in the Conservative Party, National 
Party, and the Democratic Party, for the IFP (Welsh, 1994: 44).  
 
5.3.1.5 Business 
Business interests must be regarded as an important interest group in South 
Africa.  For many years business interests were extremely critical of the 
National Party's policies, although there were many analysts who would show 
how they benefited from them.  Business began to apply more pressure on 
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the government as South Africa became more isolated internationally, 
however. Government became more sensitive to business calls to liberalise 
and democratise the state, and Prime Minister P.W. Botha went to great 
lengths to meet business interests, and to implement his reform program.  
Business interests then largely swung around to back the government, 
especially after the split between the National Party and the Conservative 
Party.  Business also took the lead in meeting with the exiled ANC leadership, 
and were sharply criticised for this by the government at the time120.  Because 
of its support for a smooth, negotiated transition to democracy, business was 
crucially instrumental in much of the prenegotiation process, as well as in the 
National Peace Accord, as will be shown in the following two chapters. 
 
5.3.1.6 Parties on the Far Right 
On the very far right of the political spectrum, a group of organisations sprung 
up, vigorously opposed to the idea of the abolition of apartheid.  Foremost 
among these organisations was the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging,  which 
was intent upon continuing the struggle of the Afrikaner by military means, 
should the parliamentary and negotiation tracks fail.  These bodies were 
based upon military forms of organisation, and in some cases pursued their 
goals by force. A particularly violent group was the "Wit Wolwe" which claimed 
responsibility for a number of killings. 
 
5.3.2 The Resistance 
In the period leading up to the negotiations, the African National Congress, 
the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade 
                                                 
 
120 Government arranged  two summit meetings, seeking the support of business,  known as the Carlton and 
Good Hope conferences, where it promised to embark on a policy of strengthening the free-enterprise 
system.. According to Mann (1988: 60) : “In November, 1979, at the Carlton Conference in Johannesburg, the 
inauguration of a new epoch of formal co-operation between the government and business was solemnized. It 
was also business leadership under Gavin Relly, for instance, that took the early lead with regard to meeting 
the ANC leadership in exile in Zambia. The Consultative Business Movement also did important work 
facilitating the pacting and negotiating processes in the country, and it was Business among others that 
worked to finally bring Buthelezi into the election process. 
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Unions coalesced for the purposes of forming a broad electoral front,  known 
as the Tripartite Alliance.   
 
5.3.2.1 The African National Congress 
The senior partner was the ANC, the senior liberation movement in the 
country, dating from 1912.  The ANC, as has already been mentioned above, 
opposed racial exclusion with a number of strategies, ranging from peaceful 
petitioning, through non-violent mass action, to armed struggle  (Lodge, 1983: 
50 – 54). It had always called for negotiations to determine a non-racial 
democracy in South Africa.  Its vision of a future South Africa was an 
inclusionary one, designed to accommodate all South African race groups on 
equal terms. There was a commitment to a mixed economy with redistribution 
of wealth to compensate for the years of apartheid rule.  The main points of 
the ANC negotiating position were: 
• Equal rights for all South Africans, regardless of race, colour or creed. 
• An accountable government, elected periodically by an electorate 
based on universal suffrage and a common voter’s role. 
• Political pluralism, a multi-party state, and freedom of speech and 
assembly. 
• There was a commitment to a mixed economy with redistribution of 
wealth to compensate for the years of apartheid rule. 
• Protection of rights and freedoms through a justiciable Bill of Rights. 
• A separation of powers, including an independent judiciary to uphold 
the rule of law and constitutional principles. 
 
On the eve of the negotiations, the ANC struggled to contain two tendencies; 
a revolutionary tendency, and a negotiation tendency. The negotiation 
tendency held the upper hand, dependent on the ANC being able to 
demonstrate success in the negotiations (Swilling and Rantete, 1991: 210, 
211). 
 
The African National Congress was clearly the political movement (not yet a 
political party) with the most popular support in the country.  That support was, 
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however extremely volatile, in that much of the youth, and radicalised, 
unemployed sections of the society was inclined to view its participation in 
negotiations with the National Party as disloyal to their struggle. 
Simultaneously, there were groups to the left of the ANC, which continually 
attempted to outbid it in this regard.  It would be portrayed as soft with regard 
to the armed struggle, its commitment to redistribution as well as in its 
commitment to the upliftment of  black South Africans. At the end of the 
eighties, the ANC, like its future negotiating party was caught between two 
strategies; in this case, the strategies of negotiating a future for South Africa, 
and achieving its ends by military and popular struggle.  
 
5.3.2.2 The Pan Africanist Congress 
The Pan Africanist Congress was established by a group, under the 
leadership of Robert Sobukwe, who broke away from the ANC in 1958, citing 
the ANC as being too much under the influence of whites and communists, as 
the reason for their secession (Davenport, 1977: 285, 286). As the name 
suggests, the  PAC was greatly under the influence of the ideas of Pan 
Africanism then current in the United States and in liberation movements 
elsewhere in Africa. The PAC accepted the inevitability of negotiations only 
reluctantly. Though it saw negotiations as unavoidable, it believed that 
“…political negotiations will only provide minimum opportunity for the African 
Liberation movement to continue to struggle for true political and economic 
independence.”(Swilling and Rantete: 1991: 218). The period leading up to 
negotiations saw the PAC presenting an incoherent, divided front, and 
apparently losing support to the ANC. It continued to incite violence through 
activities such as chants of “one settler, one bullet”. The PAC was not in 
favour of the negotiation process as it stood, believing that the National Party, 
as government and party simultaneously, was in too favoured a position.   
 
5.3.2.3 The Azanian People’s Organization 
The Azaninan People 's Organisation was founded in October 1979, in 
response to the need for a Black Consciousness organisation to lead the 
struggle for democracy in South Africa in the absence of the Black 
Consciousness movements which had been banned in October 1977.  
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AZAPO was the leading black consciousness organisation, and had a strong 
following among black intellectuals and academics (Lodge, 1987, Friedman, 
1987: 64). Its policies were heavily influenced by Marxist socialist ideology 
and it was strongly anti-collaborationist.  It rejected the Freedom Charter as a 
liberal and reformist document (Hugo and O'Malley, 1989: 159 – 161). 
 
5.3.2.4 The South African National Civics Organisation 
The South African National Civic Organisation was founded in March 1992, as 
an umbrella body, representing the large number of Civic organisations which 
sprang up during the Eighties to organise local politics in mainly black, but 
also in Coloured and Indian areas.   The civic organisations which had united 
to form the UDF in August 1983, were increasingly in crisis after the advent of 
the reform programme of F.W. De Klerk, as political activists were then free to 
join the ANC, Azapo or PAC, in pursuit of their political goals.  It was felt, 
however, that the Civic organisations still had a vital role to play in the area of 
socio-economic development.   
 
5.4 South Africa as an example of Protracted Social Conflict 
In this section we will be drawing on the ideas of Edward Azar, basic human 
needs theorist, and the most notable proponent of the notion of protracted 
social conflict, and attempting to apply this model to the South African 
reality121. In offering a definition of protracted social conflict, Azar (1989:6), 
writes that: “…many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of 
the world are characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and 
external sources and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and 
dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actions and  targets. Finally, these 
conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points.” 
 
Elswhere (1986: 28), Azar makes the following statement, explaining the 
nature of protracted social conflicts: 
                                                 
 
121 Azar is co-author with Burton of a number of works on conflict resolution. He has provided the most 
detailed account of the nature of what he terms protracted social conflict, which is used interchangeably in the 
literature with Burton’s favoured term “Deep rooted social conflict” 
 
 140
“In particular, they [societies experiencing protracted social conflict] have 
enduring features, such as economic and technological underdevelopment, 
and unintegrated social and political systems. They also have other features 
that are subject to change, but only when conditions allow for far-reaching 
political changes. These include features such as distributive injustice which 
require the elimination or substantial modification of economic, social and 
extreme disparities in levels of political privilege and opportunity.” So far, the 
South African case before 1994 shared all these attributes. 
 
In his treatment of the phenomenon, Azar deals with the genesis, dynamics 
and outcome analysis of protracted social conflict. Four “clusters of variables” 
are said to comprise the background conditions of societies beset by this 
species of conflict. These clusters are communal context, human needs, 
authoritarian government and international dependency. We will deal with 
each in turn below, discussing its relevance to the South African situation. 
 
5.4.1 The Communal Content of  Social Conflict in South Africa 
According to Azar, the most significant factor related to a protracted social 
conflict is probably the “communal content” of a society. Where societies are 
characterized by multi-communal composition, Azar believes, protracted 
social conflicts are most likely to arise. Communal in this sense refers to 
politicized ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity groups. In South 
Africa, one might add race as a further distinguishing factor (Azar, 1989: 7,  
Azar, 1986: 31). 
 
There has, however, been a long-standing debate within the scholarly 
community of social scientists regarding whether conflict in South Africa is 
“communal” or not; a debate which is important to the case for protracted 
social conflict in South Africa, and therefore needs to be reflected here.  It has 
in recent times generally not been a fashionable approach to include 
ascriptive attributes such as ethnicity into theories of social behaviour. This 
would explain a general lack of material on ethnicity within the field. According 
to Connor (1990:17), scholars have been slow to [re] discover the importance 
of ethnic nationalism because: 
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• The intellectual is uncomfortable with the nonrational, and is concerned 
with the search for quantifiable and therefore tangible explanations 
• There is a tendency to confuse facts with perceptions of facts. The 
myth of common origin of ethnic groups is socially important regardless 
of the truth of common origin 
 
Horowitz (1991:28) agrees, and adds further arguments to these when he 
writes that: “Western scholarship often sees ethnic affiliations as a mask for 
what are really class affiliations, as diversions from more important forms of 
conflict.”, and later he writes: “The reasons for this bias against ethnicity run 
deep. They relate to the general disfavour in which ascriptive affiliations of all 
kinds are held in the West, and to the growth of materialist explanations for all 
social phenomena.” (1991:29).  The episodic nature of the salience of 
ethnicity in conflict is another reason why it is often ignored by scholars 
(Horowitz, 1985: 13). 
 
As though the above were not sufficient reasons for academics’ avoidance of 
the ethnic factor, Rothschild further supports the argument and adds the 
following additional explanations: 
• The apparent low salience of ethnic affiliations in the nineteenth 
century birthplace of the social sciences 
• The concomitant assumption that the uniethnic nation state is 
the norm 
• The Jacobin political tradition which insists that the state 
imposes cultural homogeneity upon its population 
• A similar tendency in American political science to exaggerate 
the capacity of elites to mold and integrate society 
• The tendency of the structure/functionalist school in 
anthropology and sociology to exaggerate the importance of 
equilibrium and underrate conflict and change 
• The expectation in Communication Theory that greater contact 
among groups tends to lead to greater mutual understanding 
rather than mutual alienation 
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• False expectations, based upon the ability of medieval European 
nations to integrate new groups, under vastly different 
circumstances 
• A probably false belief that the integrations which formed the 
nation-states of Europe are irreversible 
• An exaggeration by the social sciences of material progress to 
erode the concomitant underestimation of ethnic bonds 
• The "end of ideology" assumption which postulates that political 
behaviour is to be informed by pragmatic considerations in the 
wake of the loss of power of ideologies ignores the possibility of 
the rise of ethnic ideologies 
• The "melting-pot” tendency in the united States misled social 
scientists into believing that ethnicity could be as easily eroded 
in all situations 
• The Nazi experience gave ethnic, or nationalist values a sinister 
connotation in the post-World War II years 
• Much social science field-work in the post-war years was done 
during periods of national-liberation struggle, during which ethnic 
tensions were often muted (1981, 20 -24). 
 
This aversion towards the ethnic explanation runs particularly strongly in 
serious analyses of South African politics outside of the intellectual supporters 
of the National Party government. Over and above the reasons cited above, 
this is mainly because of the revulsion at the crude manipulation of ethnicity 
by the South African government and the intellectual apologists of apartheid. 
The importance placed upon the ethnic group to the exclusion of all other 
types of affiliation, as well as the manipulation of ethnicity by the government  
created great suspicion towards the concept and undermined any usefulness 
that it might have had. According to Horowitz, this has produced something 
"close to silence" on ethnicity in the writing on South Africa (1991: 29) 122. 
                                                 
122 This is further echoed by Seidman, writing in 1999 (434), pointing up the irony of the situation as follows: 
“It is ironic that in a situation where racial differences have been so visible – and in a situation where 
complexities of racial identities and racial politics were played out in daily newspapers as individuals 
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There are, however a group of scholars working on conflict in South Africa 
who cannot simply be regarded as apologists for apartheid, and who do 
concentrate on ethno-national interactions. Historically, scholarship on South 
African race relations has led us to believe that simple integration would likely 
prove ineffective in the resolving of the problems of South Africa. In this 
regard, one can cite the concerns of Hoërnle, writing in the 1930’s and 1940’s. 
Though a leading liberal, Hoërnle remained sceptical of the possibility of the 
successful integration of the races in South Africa (Rich,1984). 
 
Perhaps foremost: among these scholars is Giliomee, of whom Connor (1990: 
20) has the following to say. “In the case of South Africa, Hermann Giliomee 
purposefully and wisely eschews the word ethnic in favour of the word 
communal.” Giliomee himself writes that: Ethnic is too narrow a category for it 
refers to a group with a common belief in a shared ancestry and history. This 
would fit Afrikaners, but not the larger white community, or, for that matter, the 
African, or larger black community. (1989: 114). It would seem as though 
Giliomee is grappling with the need for a reference point somewhere between 
race and ethnic group.  Elsewhere, (1989: 114) writing on South Africa, 
Giliomee states: “…the communal conflict is essentially not a disguised class 
struggle. It is between two communities, predominantly Afrikaner and African 
respectively, whose primary aim is control of the State and possession of a 
historic homeland.” The important point for Giliomee is to establish the 
non-class nature of conflict in South Africa, even though he recognises the 
"huge gap in material wealth between whites and Africans" in the country. 
 
The assertion of the, communal nature of conflict in South Africa does not go 
uncontested, however. Adam, another prominent scholar of South African 
politics, is at pains to challenge it. He establishes his argument, firstly on the 
grounds that Afrikanerdom, by denying brown Afrikaners group membership 
while allowing white immigrants generally access to that status, fails to 
                                                                                                                                            
confronted the tensions between rigid racial categories and the more fluid reality of human lives – discussions 
about race have generally been left out of progressive scholarly work.” 
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recognise the kinship basis of ethnonational identity which distinguishes 
communal groups elsewhere. Secondly, conflict in South Africa is not 
comparable to nationalist conflicts in other divided societies as the African 
National Congress does not oppose Afrikaner nationalism with African 
nationalism, but rather with an appeal to a broader civic and territorial 
patriotism. 
 
A further argument proposed by Adam is the fact of one of the sides of the in 
the conflict rejecting its own “supposed group identity". He goes on to say 
that: “the conflict is better conceptualised as the hold-out of a minority against 
the socio-economic implications of majority rule, rather than as a communal 
conflict with equal rights [claimed] on both sides" (1990: 233). There is also an 
ideological element in terms of which racial nationalism is challenged by 
liberalism and a variety of "socialist” visions. 
 
Increasingly, the conflict has become one of cooptation by the Afrikaner 
nationalists of members of other racial groups, which shifts the conflict into 
one between privileged powerholders and excluded subordinates in the same 
state. It is argued further, that increasingly, schisms within the Afrikaner 
grouping assume great importance - for instance the differences between the 
National Party and the group which Adam calls the ultra-right often assume 
greater importance than the inter-communal conflict. On the other side, 
conflict between the supporters of the ANC and those of Inkatha has often 
become violent and led to death and injury. Adam, discussing the pre-
democratic era, maintains that the claims of a white community are therefore 
as questionable as those of a black community in the South African context 
(1990: 235). 
 
When Adam writes of the conflict being better conceptualised as a minority 
holding out against the implications of majority rule, he neglects to mention 
upon what grounds that minority has organised itself. He himself is not 
claiming a class status for that minority. It needs also to be mentioned, that 
although Afrikanerdom was seriously divided against itself, as he correctly 
claims, these serious schisms were of relatively recent vintage at his time of 
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writing, as were the attempts by that group to co-opt individuals from other 
"communal" groups to, ensure their own continued domination. These aspects 
of the South African conflict were attempts to “modernise” apartheid, and were 
not typical of most of the history of the conflict.  
 
It is, of course, not necessary that we define conflict in South Africa as simply 
communal conflict, as though it were not affected by any other socio-political 
or economic variables. It is in this vein that Hanf (1989: 90) poses the 
question: “Why should social conflict be considered in predominantly 
one-dimensional terms - be it horizontal economic conflict between interests 
"above" and "below", or cultural conflict between different vertically juxtaposed 
groups?” 
 
Although the communal aspect is not the only dimension of conflict in South 
Africa, it is undeniably one of the most important elements in the 
multi-dimensional conflict in South Africa. Although inequalities in wealth 
between the parties in conflict in South Africa are vast, it is important to 
realise, as it is so often pointed out, the fact that these differences are largely 
the result of the capture of the apparatus of the South African state by a party 
which identified itself in largely racial, and later in ethno-national, or in the 
language of Giliomee and others, including Azar, “communal” terms . 
 
5.4.2  Human Needs in Social Conflict in South Africa 
The second cluster of variables identified by Azar as a background condition 
of protracted social conflict is the denial of basic human needs. According to 
the needs theorists, the survival of human beings and communities of human 
beings depends on their ability to satisfy their material needs. It is also a fact 
that the satisfaction of these needs rarely takes place in an even or just 
manner. Whereas some individuals or groups might enjoy a surplus of needs 
satisfaction, the needs of others will remain only partially satisfied, or, perhaps 
even totally unsatisfied. Grievances resulting from need deprivation are, 
according to Azar, most often expressed collectively. When authority fails to 
address such grievances, a niche is created for the development of protracted 
social conflict (Azar, 1989:7,8,9).  However the key to the satisfaction of 
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human needs is access to social institutions, or to put it differently, effective 
participation in a political system. In this sense then, there is always a derived 
need for participation, whenever there is a denial of other human needs 
satisfaction. 
 
The deprivation of physical needs and the denial of access to political 
institutions are often rooted in the, "refusal to recognise or accept the 
communal identity of the other groups”. Azar actually uses the South African 
example to illustrate the point. He writes as follows: 
“Blacks are denied access to social institutions precisely on the basis of their 
racial identity. A claim of superior identity (i.e. white supremacy), rather than 
objective conditions (eg. economic or political motives), largely determines the 
nature and scope of the denial of security and identity needs of blacks. Such 
denial fosters greater cohesion within victimized communal groups, and may 
work to promote collective violence and protract the conflict if no other means 
of satisfaction is available.” (Azar, 1989: 9,10). 
 
The oppression of blacks in South Africa was upon the assertion by the white 
minority, of their identity needs. Statements by senior National Party leaders, 
such as Prime Minister Verwoerd bear ample testimony to this fact (1992: 73). 
This then led to the denial of security and other material needs of black South 
Africans to a large extent, but the position regarding their identity needs is an 
interesting case. If anything, the government of South Africa overemphasized 
the cultural particularities of the groups that comprised the majority, and 
abrogated unto itself the right to define these identity needs. In fact, the 
government used the issue of identity; firstly racial identity, and subsequently 
ethnic or cultural identity to deprive the black groups of the same levels of 
physical security as those enjoyed by white South Africans. 
 
The generalization of Azar regarding the communal responses to such denials 
is also borne out by the South African example. The denials of needs 
satisfactions did indeed foster greater cohesion within the frustrated group (as 
could be seen in the united response to the foisting on the country of the 1983 
constitution), although the position is a complex one. As alluded to above (in 
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para 5) , there are great divisions within the ruling group as well as within the 
opposing black formations. Policies among the movements opposed to the 
white-dominated government differ seriously on matters such as the use of 
violence, and the place of whites in a post-apartheid South Africa. And the 
historical process has indeed seen many of the oppressed group seize some 
of the advantages to be had from the system. These individuals, including 
some homeland leaders, local councillors, policemen and soldiers had 
developed powerful vested interests in the apartheid state. So while there was 
an impressive cohesiveness among the victims of the regime, the process has 
certainly not been simply a uni-directional one. 
 
Of course, it almost goes without saying that in the South African case, the 
dominant group decided at an early stage of the conflict; in 1910 (and this 
was again affirmed after 1948) on their blockage of the access of the 
majority, to the political institutions through which the latter might have 
sought redress. The demand for the franchise is probably the most salient 
aspect of the entire black struggle against white domination in South Africa. 
In this regard therefore, the nature of conflict in South Africa very closely 
approximates Azar's model. 
 
Burton, the most prominent of the human needs theorists continually refers 
to South Africa as an example of a "deep-rooted”, needs based social 
conflict. He stresses the need of white South Africans to ensure their basic 
security goals, and sees this as juxtaposed with the denial of black South 
Africans' identity, recognition and security needs (1984. 148, 1990: 17 - 31). 
 
5.4.3 Authoritarian Government in Social Conflict in South Africa 
The third cluster of variables providing the background conditions to 
Protracted Social Conflict are, according to Azar, related to the role of the 
state. He writes that: “... the level of satisfaction or deprivation of basic needs 
is generally influenced by the intervening or mediating role of the state. 
Indeed, an ideal state characterized by a fair and just mode of governance 
should be able to satisfy human needs regardless of communal or identity 
cleavages and provide communal harmony and social stability. In actuality, 
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however, this is rare. Most states which experience protracted social conflict 
tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian 
governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs” (Azar,1989: 10). 
 
The latter state of affairs certainly pertains in the South African example. As 
has been demonstrated above, the dominant communal group managed to 
capture the apparatus of the state and bend it towards its own purposes. This 
has meant the inability of the South African state to provide evenly distributed 
means of satisfaction of the basic human needs of most of its population. This 
situation is protracted by the limitations on access to political institutions in 
South Africa which has already been mentioned in 5.4.2 above. Azar goes on 
to say that “In most protracted social conflict-laden countries, policy capacity 
is limited by a rigid or fragile authority structure which prevents the state from 
responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents (Ibid.1989: 11). 
 
The abovementioned circumstances very accurately encapsulate the 
condition of government in South Africa; poised on the brink of negotiations 
towards a more inclusive, democratic form of government. In its attempts to 
adapt to pressures, the apartheid system had led to the establishment of 
homeland administrative apparatus, as well as legislative tricameralism in the 
common areas, with its triplication of state departments and the difficult 
distinctions between "own,' and "general" affairs. Yet this top-heavy and rigid 
system left a huge number of South Africans stranded in an administrative 
limbo, which was incapable of providing them with the minimum levels of 
human needs satisfaction, even in the period after 2 February 1990, when 
their claims upon such services would have been regarded by the government 
as justified. Most of the structures which had been designed to administer the 
affairs of black South Africans were either, non-elected, or were elected by 
unrepresentative proportions of the population, simply because the underlying 
structure was regarded as unrepresentative. Most of the authorities did not 
behave in an accountable manner. The results were that increasingly, there 
were crises around education, health care, and transportation infrastructure, 
despite spiralling levels of taxation. Levels of corruption throughout the civil 
service were also extremely high, due to the lack of accountability and crisis of 
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legitimacy. On this third measure, South Africa again accords strongly with the 
model of protracted social conflict. 
 
5.4.4      Dependency in South Africa’s Foreign Relations 
Protracted Social Conflict is not simply the result of domestic political 
relationships. The fourth cluster of variables contributing towards the genesis 
of protracted social conflict is associated with the foreign relations of the 
conflict ridden state. According to Azar, one of the contributing factors is to be 
found in foreign relationships characterized by economic dependency and/or 
political or military cliency. According to Azar, economic dependency “... not 
only limits the autonomy of the state, but also distorts the pattern of economic 
development impeding the satisfaction of security needs. Moreover, 
dependency often exacerbates denial of the access needs of communal 
groups, distorting domestic political and economic systems through the 
realignment of subtle coalitions of international capital, domestic capital, and 
the state (Azar, 1989:). 
 
Although South Africa is not an economically poverty-stricken state such is 
typical of many of the Third World states which Azar refers to, it is, 
nevertheless economically dependent in many respects. It is well-known that 
that the South African economy is a particularly open one, in that it is highly 
dependent on imports and exports (Magyar, 1989: 205, 227). Historically, it 
has depended on economic relationships with its colonial power, Great Britain, 
and in more recent times, it has also demonstrated great dependence in its 
need for foreign capital investment. 
 
Typically of many Third World states, South Africa is also heavily dependent 
on its exports of primary products. In this regard, the extraction and export of 
minerals, particularly gold, are extremely important. Exporters of primary 
products are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in market prices, and the 
generally declining terms of trade for such exports. South Africa also falls 
fairly squarely within the category of states known as the semi-periphery 
within the dependency model of Wallerstein (McGowan, 1993). This means 
that while South Africa is largely a part of the poorer periphery, it has 
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elements of the core economy within its borders. The core elements tend to 
economically exploit the periphery, not only within South Africa, but also in the 
surrounding states. 
 
In this sense then, South Africa was a good example of the model which Azar 
has developed, as the dominant white inhabitants, representing domestic 
capital, had clearly aligned themselves with international capital, generally at 
the expense of even economic development within the country. The second 
factor, mentioned by Azar; that of military, or political cliency, has also been of 
importance in the South African context. A version of this facet of protracted 
social conflict has also been recognised by Burton, and is largely the subject 
of his work: Global Conflict; The Domestic Sources of International Crisis 
(1984). According to Azar: “In a client relationship, the patron provides 
protection for the client state in return for the latter's loyalty and obedience 
involves some sacrifice of autonomy and independence, which induces the 
client state to pursue both domestic and foreign policies disjoined from, or 
contrary to the needs of its own public (Ibid., 1989: 11). 
 
The South African case is a special variant of the situation. The South African 
government has, in its foreign relations, traditionally identified with Western 
states. Historically, it has inherited a close relationship with Britain, while it has 
also pursued closer relationships with the United States of America and the 
states of Europe. Especially important to the National Party government were 
two core values. Firstly, they claimed to identify strongly with certain western 
cultural values (Die Westerlike-Christelike beskawingserfinis)123, and secondly 
they supported the anti-communist stance of the western states. This 
orientation led them to continually seek alliances with western states. They 
attempted to join NATO, for instance and upon finding it impossible have 
attempted, on a number of occasions, to form a South Atlantic Treaty 
organisation, opposed to communist expansionism (Geldenhuys, 1977, Vale, 
                                                 
123 Ironically, the Nationalist Government, while continually claiming cultural affinity with these Western 
values, consistently failed to live up to the political values of the postwar Western governments, with regard to 
issues such as human rights and universal adult franchise, etc.   
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1977) 124. Naturally enough, in their turn, disenfranchised black South Africans 
sought assistance from the international community of states in general. The 
communist-bloc states, with their ideological commitment to egalitarianism, 
were forthcoming with assistance in the supply of military equipment and with 
military training. 
 
Understandably, assistance was also given to the South African liberation 
movements by the emerging African states as they achieved their own 
independence. In this way the South African liberation movements managed 
to secure bases ever closer to the borders of South Africa, as Zimbabwe and 
the Portuguese colonies achieved their independence. 
 
It should be mentioned that the South African government was not very 
successful in its aims, in the sense that the West never openly formed an 
alliance with it. The domestic policies of apartheid were too repulsive to 
western states to allow this, and the post-war diplomatic history of South 
African relations with the West is a history of loosening of historical bonds, 
such as the Simonstown agreement.  But their strategic, anti-communist 
interests led to the equivocation of the western states regarding the 
application of international sanctions against South Africa for many years. In 
this regard, it was generally the vetoes of Britain, the United States and 
France in the Security Council of the United Nations, which prevented the 
application of such sanctions. 
 
In this way the Republic of South Africa became the self appointed protector 
of western interests and agent of anti-communism in Southern Africa, and the 
internal opposition to the government was identified with communist 
expansionism.  The idea of the "Total Onslaught" against South Africa was 
born in the minds of its leaders. They perceived a plot, hatched by the Soviet 
Union, and aided and abetted by the states of the West (unaware, one 
                                                 
 
124 The technical requirements for NATO membership include a geographical location North of the Tropic of 
Cancer, which of course immediately excluded South Africa. Attempts to form alliances in the Southern 
hemisphere were focused on Latin American states with right-wing governments. 
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assumes, of their real interests) and Africa, to bring about the destruction of 
South Africa. This attack had to be opposed with a Total National Strategy125 
(Grundy. 1983: 3 -6, Geldenhuys, 1984: 37.38). One of the main goals of the 
South African economy, as it was directed by the government, became to 
serve the military, whose profile in state decision-making loomed ever larger, 
through the agency of the State Security Council, and the National Security 
Management System. 
 
Under the leadership of P.W. Botha, a former Minister of Defence , the military 
establishment became increasingly influential (Grundy, 1983: 12 - 18). South 
Africa became militarily involved in Angola, opposing the Marxist-oriented 
MPLA government. In Mozambique, it supported RENAMO, against the 
Marxist FRELIMO government. South Africa's military involvements did riot 
end here, however. It attacked most of its neighbouring states at one time or 
another (Johnson and Martin, 1986). In this way, the opposing tendencies in 
the South African conflict involved international patrons, even if such patrons 
were sometimes embarrassed by the policies of their clients, and the conflict 
in South Africa acquired an international, Cold-War dimension. Burton, looking 
at the situation from an "outside-in" perspective captures the situation nicely 
when he writes the following: “Our international problems are a spillover of 
domestic problems. Universally, we are fearful of the survival of our political 
systems. Leaders are fearful of their own role survival, privileged groups are 
defensive of their own positions in their types of society. Competing systems, 
alien philosophies, no matter what their attributes, are perceived as a threat to 
each other, not because the authorities in each threaten each other, but 
because each feels threatened by its own failings. This is conspicuously so of 
patently unstable societies such as South Africa, and societies around the 
world which would not survive without external support.” (Burton. 1984: 13). 
 
 
                                                 
 
125 The Term “Total National Strategy” was first mentioned in  the 1977 White Paper on Defence and 
Armaments Supply. See Evans and Philips (1988) and Frankel (984) for a fuller account of the development of 
the “Total National Strategy”. 
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5.4.5  Process Dynamics 
While the simple fact of the existence of the abovementioned preconditions of 
protracted social conflict is a necessary condition of overt conflict behaviour, it 
is not also a sufficient condition. To follow Azar further, the activation of overt 
conflicts is dependent upon three clusters of variables. These are: communal 
actions and strategies, state actions and strategies, and lastly the built-in 
properties of conflict (1989). 
 
5.4.5.1  Communal Actions and Strategies 
According to Azar, the escalation of protracted social conflict might be 
triggered by what seems like a relatively trivial event, but one which becomes 
a turning point, involving the collective recognition of individual victimization. 
Collective recognition will normally result in collective protest. Such collective 
protest is then usually met in turn by some form of repression. As the conflict 
process develops, the communal groups concerned begin to bring their 
members' attention to a much broader range of issues, transcending the 
single, triggering event. At this point then: "The spillover of the event into 
multiple issues increases the momentum for organizing and mobilising 
resources" (Azar, 1989: 12). Victimized groups are then likely to mobilize and 
deploy a number of tactics, which might include "civil disobedience, guerrilla 
warfare or secessionist movements". As the state's power is normally greater 
than that of the suppressed groups, the latter will often seek military and/or 
economic assistance from external sources (Azar, 1989:12). 
 
If one looks at the South African case during the post-second-world war 
period, the parallels between this situation and Azar's model are again quite 
striking. There have been a number of noteworthy escalations of the conflict 
into overt, or manifest conflictual behaviour. The most important of these have 
been the non-violent civil disobedience campaigns of the 1950's and early 
1960's, the 1976 student revolt, and the insurrection of 1984 – 1986. 
 
The 1950 programmes of action were the direct reaction of the oppressed 
people to the clusters of variables dealt with in sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.4 above. 
They were, however escalated by the event, not trivial in this case, of the 
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police shooting of protesters outside a police station at Sharpeville, in 1961.  
In the 1976 revolt, the triggering event was the insensitive handling by the 
state of the language issue at black schools; which some might regard as a 
trivial event. Again the state response was the shooting of youthful protesters, 
which exacerbated the entire situation, becoming a second triggering event. 
Yet again, in 1985, it was the shooting of blacks by police at Langa, which 
triggered mass revolt against the government around the country. The 
strategies of the oppressed have included massive civil disobedience which 
never proved effective  (Daniel, 1978: 62 – 66). They resorted to guerrilla 
warfare after the banning of the SACP, ANC and PAC. They later resorted to 
attempts to make the country ungovernable, setting up alternative government 
structures, imposing their own disciplinary measures on inhabitants of black 
townships, damaging the economy through strike actions and consumer 
boycotts and the appeal to the international community to implement 
economic, sporting and cultural sanctions against the Republic of South 
Africa. 
 
5.4.5.2 State Actions and Strategies 
The second cluster of variables influencing the process dynamics in 
protracted social conflict would be the actions and strategies of the state. 
Although the conflict might be resolved, or simply kept latent by 
accommodationist state strategies, this is not the normal state reaction, 
because any compromise or accommodation might be construed as a sign of 
weakness. According to Azar, the state normally avoids accommodation and 
employs either coercive repression, or instrumental co-option. 
 
States will typically use militant, hard-line strategies, which elicit similar 
responses from the repressed. The cooption of the opponents of the state is a 
much more sophisticated strategy, but because it is so often used at an 
extremely late stage, it is normally transparent and rejected by the groups 
which are the targets of incorporation. Azar perceptively points out that the 
failure of co-option usually results in a return to coercion on the part of the 
state. 
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The state will also typically attempt to contain the conflict within its national 
boundaries, but when it fails to do this, it will attempt to enlist its own external 
assistance. This further protracts the conflict (Azar, 1989:14). Again, even a 
cursory overview of the South African conflict reveals a striking resemblance 
to Azar’s model. The National Party government continually swung between 
oppression, in the form of states of emergency, on the one hand, while trying 
to reform or modernise the system of apartheid in piecemeal fashion, on the 
other. All the while, it sought to enlist the support of the West and certain 
“pariah” states, against its enemies.126  
 
5.4.5.3  Conflict Dynamics 
The third influence upon the process dynamics of protracted social conflict, is 
what Azar calls the “built-in mechanisms of conflict" (Azar. 1989: 15). When 
conflicts are of long duration, the opposing parties begin to view each other in 
a “mirror image” fashion. Because communication is underdeveloped, or 
nearly non-existent between the rival parties, the fears and ideological belief-
systems, as well as a history of conflict behaviours condition them, and lead 
them to attribute the worst possible motives to each other’s actions. The 
negative mirror images which result from the process, help to perpetuate the 
conflict. Parties experiencing the stresses of continual conflict tend to develop 
a form of tunnel-vision, or “groupthink”, and tend to overlook possible 
solutions to their conflict. When proposals for resolution are put forward, all 
parties tend to view them with suspicion as an attempt to undermine their 
own power. Again there is quite a close match between the South African 
situation and the model put forward by Azar, although in this case, it is not at 
all surprising, as this aspect of the model is simply the postulation of a set of 
                                                 
 
126 Peter Vale (1977) considers South Africa’s relations with pariah states, and its own status as a pariah 
state in international relations. According to his definition, the following are the essential features of the pariah 
state:  
• Unremitting  opposition by their regional enemies; 
• growing isolation from the rest of the world; 
• capacity for producing at least a modest number of crude nuclear weapons 
and, following Betts (1977), he includes South Africa, Israel and Taiwan in his list of pariahs. 
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dynamics which are not peculiar to protracted social conflict, but which are 
common to most situations of social conflict. 
 
It is still interesting to note, however, that in the South African case, both the 
ruling minority, and their opposition in South Africa viewed each other as 
anti-democratic and terroristic. Both sides had continually imputed the very 
worst motives to the other. Each has viewed the other as the enemy with 
which the people of South Africa are at war. Each has also regarded the other 
as having very little popular support. Once more the theory is borne out by a 
close examination of the case being studied. 
 
5.4.5.4  Outcome Analysis  
The final aspect of Azar's model of protracted social  conflict concerns 
outcomes. One of the distinguishing factors of protracted social conflict is that 
it gives rise to negative-sum outcomes. Put differently, outcomes are 
lose-lose, as opposed to win-lose, or zero-sum. There are therefore no 
winners, and all parties suffer a degree of loss. Because protracted conflicts 
do not have "clear termination points'', outcomes such as military victories or 
negotiated agreements, insofar as they fail to satisfy basic human needs, 
contain latent conflicts which in turn are the genesis of subsequent cycles of 
manifest conflict. These latter cycles of conflict often involve a shift or spillover 
in issues and actors (Azar, 1989: 15,16). 
 
It is true that in South Africa's case, there have been a number of points in the 
development of the conflict, at which a casual observer might have predicted 
an "end” to the conflict. After the initial white conquest,  after the crushing of 
the structures of protest in the nineteen-sixties, or the end of the rebellion in 
1976, might be construed to have been such moments. Each time, however, 
there has been a resurgence of protest, and a broadening of the base, as well 
as an intensification of the protest behaviour of the majority. 
 
The importance of this aspect of Azar's model, however, is not simply its 
instructiveness in respect of the past. The South African conflict clearly 
reached a critical moment, which many politicians and observers alike  treated 
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as an outcome, even before the event - i.e. all-party negotiations to produce a 
democratic constitution for a "new” South Africa. Issues of human rights 
abuses were dealt with through the TRC process. A sense of “completion”, or 
finality did indeed set in.  In this regard, all would do well to heed Azar's 
warning about the continued protraction of the conflict after this "outcome"; 
albeit with some unexpected “shifts” and “spillovers”. 
 
5.5 Conclusion and Summary 
In this chapter, we have provided a very brief history of the South African 
political conflict. We have mapped out the conflict with regard to the main 
parties and issues.  This examination of the South African socio-political 
conflict conforms to all of the major aspects of protracted, or deep-rooted 
social conflict as set out by its primary proponent, Edward Azar. Most 
obviously, the conflict is protracted in terms of its resistance to resolution over 
a long, historical period. There are numerous points of concurrence in respect 
to the communal content, basic human needs element, skewed governance, 
and internationalization of the conflict. In respect of the process dynamics of 
the conflict, the same is true, with communal actions and strategies, state 
actions and strategies, and conflict dynamics all meeting the expectations of 
the theory. Outcome analysis in respect of protracted social conflict is, by 
definition, never complete however, and we should therefore take Azar, and 
Burton’s warnings seriously in thinking about the future of conflict in South 
Africa.  Because the South African case conforms in a quite comprehensive 
way to the Protracted Social Conflict Model of Azar and the analytical conflict 
resolution school, we would expect that the South African case would 
therefore also conform to the expectations of this group of scholars, to the 
efforts to manage it, and the future development of this conflict.  The situation 
is summarised in tabular form in table 5.1. below. 
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Table 5.1: South Africa as an Example of Protracted Social Conflict  
PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT SOUTH AFRICA 
Communal Content Conforms 
Human Needs Elements Conforms 
Authoritarian Government Conforms 
Foreign relations dependency Conforms 
Communal actions Conforms 
State actions and strategies Conforms 
Outcome Analysis Conforms 
 
 Because of their importance in enabling the negotiation process, and 
because of the significance attached to these resolution attempts, we will next 
examine the informal pre-negotiation activities to move South Africa towards 
negotiation, that took place in South Africa prior to 1990 in our following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  PRE-NEGOTIATION, BACK-CHANNEL 
NEGOTIATIONS AND MEDIATION ATTEMPTS 
 
Once intergroup conflict has escalated to a high intensity,  
it is highly resistant to de-escalation and resolution  
because of solidifying mechanisms such as commitments  
to past actions and structural changes that support co- 
ercive strategies. Thus settlement procedures that work  
with low intensity conflict, such as fact-finding or con-  
ciliation, are impotent in the face of escalated, protracted  
conflict. It is therefore essential that innovative, creative  
means of analysis and resolution be developed and in- 
tegrated in a complementary way with existing methods  
of conflict management. 
Fisher (1997: 7) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on various prenegotiation initiatives in the South African 
conflict management process, which helped prepare the ground for a 
negotiation process that had seemed extremely unlikely only a few short 
months previously. We begin by explaining the concept of pre-negotiation, 
and then to situate various activities that took place within the historical 
context of the South African process. 
 
6.2 Prenegotiation 
Though it is obvious that there is some form of communication in many 
conflict management processes that precedes negotiation, it is not clear 
whether that is a part of the negotiation process, or something which is a 
prelude to, but distinct from negotiation (Zartman, 1989: 1). According to one 
of the leading scholars on the subject,  “…prenegotiation is the span of time 
and activity in which the parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a 
mutual problem to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or joint solutions 
(Zartman, 1989: 4). Zartman asserts further that prenegotiation is essential; it 
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is a “…preparatory phase without which the negotiation would not have taken 
place.”(1989:7).  
 
During the decade of the eighties, there was a flurry of activity attempting to 
break the logjam in South Africa’s conflict. Some of this activity, such as the 
work of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG), was highly public, 
and did not give observers much hope for success. Much of it was also covert, 
however, and was clearly instrumental in opening the way for the eventual 
first-track, substantive negotiations among all of the main parties to the 
conflict. These initiatives include back-channel negotiations with Nelson 
Mandela, the intervention by the Commonwealth EPG, the Idasa-sponsored 
Dakar meeting, businessmen meeting with the ANC in Lusaka, and prominent 
Afrikaners meeting with the ANC leadership in England.  We will examine the 
most important of these initiatives in more detail below. 
 
6.3 Back-channel negotiations: The role of Nelson Mandela 
As the struggle against apartheid proceeded, and  the government of South 
Africa realized the limitations of apartheid, and as they attempted to 
modernize apartheid, they addressed a number of possibilities to escape their 
dilemma. One of their concerns was to find credible black leadership to 
endorse their ideas of reformed apartheid, power sharing, pseudo-corporatist 
solutions to their problem. For some time, they believed that the homeland 
leaders might provide them with credible negotiating partners, particularly the 
Chief Minister of the Kwa Zulu homeland, but even Buthelezi, and other 
“moderate” internal leadership were unwilling to accept a dispensation that 
excluded the participation of the broad-based liberation movements. One of 
the assets that the government believed that it had, was Nelson Mandela. 
They believed that he was a reasonable option for their purposes, and 
considered releasing him, under certain provisos, most importantly, that he 
forswear the use of violent struggle. The government could not get him to 
make such independent concessions, outside of the decision-making context 
of the ANC, however. Of ongoing concern to the government was the 
possibility that the ageing and increasingly fragile Mandela would die in 
prison, providing an iconic martyr for the struggle against apartheid. The 
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government hoped that they could co-opt Mandela and isolate him from the 
more hawkish elements in the ANC and thereby split the organization to their 
own advantage. The prisoner was therefore moved from the Robben Island 
prison, to Pollsmoor prison, as early as March 1982 (Sparks, 1994: 22), and 
later (1984) to a special wing where it would be easier to arrange discussions 
with him without attracting undue attention. From May 1988, a government 
negotiating team held regular meetings with Mandela (Barber, 1999: 265). 
 
Mandela insisted that any discussions with him were purely in his personal 
capacity, and that he could not participate in any formal discussions unless he 
was free, and the leadership of the liberation movement was allowed to 
participate in normal political activity in South Africa. 
 
Periodic discussions took place between Mandela and some of his captors; 
most notably with Kobie Coetsee, the Minister of Justice. Through his 
communications with his lawyer, George Bizos, Mandela also managed to 
remain in contact with the ANC leadership in exile, enabling him to make 
certain that he could follow the party line, and also keep his colleagues 
appraised of the thinking of his gaolers, and assure them that he had not “sold 
out” to the government   (Sparks, 1994: 26 – 33).  
 
The visit of the Commonwealth  EPG, and the realization of the support for a 
negotiated solution, galvanized Mandela into seeking a meeting with the State 
President. He was allowed to meet again with Kobie Coetsee, who set up a 
special committee consisting of himself, Neil Barnard, the Head of the 
National Intelligence Service, and his deputy, Mike Louw, the director of the 
Prisons Department, Fanus van der Merwe, and Commissioner of prisons 
Willemse to broaden the discussions with Mandela. According to Mandela’s 
diary, there were altogether forty-seven such meetings (Sparks, 1994: 36). 
 
In July 1989, Mandela met with President Botha himself at Tuynhuis, the State 
President’s residence. Although mainly a social meeting, Botha wanted 
Mandela to publicly renounce violence in return for his freedom, while 
Mandela requested Botha to release all political prisoners. Neither leader was 
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able to oblige. The meeting which had by Mandela’s own account been very 
cordial, was therefore inconclusive, but was nevertheless of major symbolic 
importance (Barber,1999: 265). As the content of the meetings was reported 
back to the ANC leadership in exile via Bizos, the various meetings with 
Mandela served the important function of  informing that leadership of the real 
interest that the NP Government had in negotiation. 
 
6.4 Mediation in the South African Conflict: The role of the 
Commonwealth EPG 
After the rise in unrest as a result of the UDM’s rejection of the reforms of 
P.W. Botha that led to the establishment of the tricameral parliament, but 
which still excluded African South Africans from the political process, and 
Botha’s “Rubicon” speech, which disappointed all those who had hoped for a 
decisive step by the South African president, the situation in South Africa 
moved up the agendas of a number of countries. It became the subject of 
activity in international organizations, such as the United Nations and the 
Commonwealth, and arguments were made in these forums for increasing 
pressure to be put on the South African government to end apartheid. 
 
At a Commonwealth meeting in Nassau, in the Bahamas, a resolution, “The 
Commonwealth Accord” was taken  on 20 October 1985, to increase pressure 
on the South African government. Two clauses of the Accord established a 
mission; a group of “…eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through 
all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political 
dialogue.” (Fraser et al, 1986: 143, Barber, 1999:250, 251). The EPG is 
interpreted by some as a compromise by the Commonwealth, designed to 
persuade British Prime Minister Thatcher, who was ardently opposed to 
sanctions against South Africa, to support the more stringent elements of the 
Nassau Accord, intended to pressurize the South African government into 
ending apartheid (Sparks, 1994:33). 
 
The Commonwealth EPG made contact with the South African government, 
explaining their mission, and were accordingly invited, by a letter from the 
State President, to the country, on the understanding that the government was 
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supportive of any initiative that would promote a peaceful reform process in 
the country (Botha, 1985). According to Barber (1999: 251), there had been a 
personal appeal from the British Prime Minister to President Botha to accept 
the initiative. 
 
The EPG arrived in South Africa in February 1986, and met with almost all the 
political groupings, inside and outside the country, as well as with the 
churches and the business community. Meetings were also held with Nelson 
Mandela, at that stage, still a political prisoner (Fraser et al 1986).  Essentially, 
they were exploring what it would take to get negotiations among the political 
protagonists off the ground. 
 
What became clear in the course of their visit, was that while there was room 
for genuine dialogue in South Africa, almost all the groups believed that it was 
the South African government that was blocking the way to political 
transformation (Fraser et al, 1986: 79 – 100). While the government blamed 
violence on its political opponents, it seemed blind to the violent nature of 
apartheid and the fact that the violence of its opponents was mostly reactive, 
and a form of self-defence.   
 
In March, 1986, the EPG was “…satisfied that the ground existed on the basis 
of which a negotiated solution to South Africa’s problems could be attempted 
if there was the necessary political will among all concerned.”(Fraser et. al. 
1986: 101). When it put the proposal to the South African government, under 
a covering letter to Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and 
Planning, on 13 March, 1986 of a “possible negotiating concept”, there was no 
immediate response. The concept required the government to: 
• Remove the military from the townships, and provide for freedom of 
assembly and discussion, and suspend detention without trial 
• Release political prisoners and detainees, including Nelson Mandela. 
• Unban the ANC and PAC and permit normal political activity.127 
                                                 
127 The elements of this negotiating concept anticipate a leitmotiv that characterizes much of 
the pre-negotiation activity to follow. These elements, reflecting the whites’ concern with 
violence, and the struggle parties’ need for free political activity, the freeing of jailed leaders, 
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In exchange, it was proposed the ANC and others should enter negotiations 
and suspend violence. It was pointed out by the EPG that the concept was not 
very far removed from the government’s own stated intentions.  
 
The EPG engaged the government and all other parties on the issues in its 
negotiating concept, but found the government sticking on the issue of 
violence – requiring the liberation movements to “renounce” violence, rather 
than “suspend” it, before it would accept the proposal.   
 
The EPG seemed to wish to play a more substantial mediating role in the 
South African problem, as they saw it, and suggested to the government and 
other parties that they were prepared to serve a further purpose in the 
process128. The South African government, through the medium of a letter (24 
April, 1985) from the Foreign Minister, invited the EPG to “exchange views” on 
how to proceed further. 
 
The EPG decided to return to South Africa, to elicit more specific responses 
by the South African parties to its “negotiating concept”.  When it arrived in 
May, there had been an apparent hardening of the position of the South 
African government. The President made a speech to the President’s Council 
on 15 May, in which he warned against interference in the South African 
situation by outside bodies (Fraser, et al 1986: 111). The EPG were again 
allowed to meet with Mandela, who indicated his eagerness to see the end of 
violence, but reiterated the importance of removing military forces from the 
                                                                                                                                            
and the ending of the state of emergency and its implications  are the subject of much of the 
discussion  in Dakar, Mandela’s discussions with his gaolers, the Mells meetings, are 
reflected in the Harare declaration, and are finally addressed at the Constantia and Pretoria 
minutes. 
 
128 On a number of occasions the EPG alludes to a future role that it might play. For instance, 
in a covering letter to their proposal on the “negotiating concept”, dated 13 March 1986,  and 
addressed to Ministers Heunis and Botha, the EPG suggested that “If the Government 
believed that there was some future role for the Group we stood ‘ready to advance the course 
of negotiations’ “(Fraser, et al 1986: 104). See also the letter dated 1 May 1986 from the EPG 
to Foreign Minister Botha (As cited in Fraser et al, 1986: 109) “We are encouraged that the 
South African Government sees constructive possibilities in the negotiating concept which we 
left with you and minister Heunis at the conclusion of our visit to South Africa and by the 
continuing role that we might be able to play in its furtherance.” (My italics) 
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townships, and the establishment of conditions for normal political activity in 
the country.  The group next visited the exiled ANC leadership in Lusaka (17 
May), and internal groups including the UDF and COSATU on 18 May. They 
were scheduled to meet with the Cabinet Constitutional Committee on 19 
May. Immediately before the meeting, the SABC reported raids on ANC bases 
in Harare, Gabarone and Lusaka. These were all Commonwealth countries, 
and the attacks were widely interpreted as a signal to the EPG. At the Cabinet 
Committee meeting, the EPG stressed the fact that they had not yet received 
an answer to their negotiating concept. Finally, on 29 May, after having left 
South Africa, the EPG received a letter from Foreign Minister Botha, asserting 
the problem around the issue of renunciation of violence, and ongoing 
intimidation in the country. It also clearly stated that it was “…not interested in 
negotiation about a transfer of power.”, that any future negotiation would have 
to be about power sharing.”, and the EPG were invited to pursue discussions 
along those lines, which invitation, they felt they had to decline.  The EPG 
then sent a communiqué to all the Heads of Government of the 
Commonwealth, stating that “…further talks would not lead anywhere in the 
current circumstances.” (Fraser, et al 1986: 125). They went on to write: “The 
Nassau Accord asked for the initiation, in the context of a suspension of 
violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and 
religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative 
government. As we have described, there is no such prospect in view.” (Ibid: 
125, Zartman, 1989: 4). 
 
6.4.1 Implications of the EPG 
The EPG mission represents the closest we come in the South African 
transformation, to the role of a mediator. For a while the group conducted 
shuttle diplomacy among the parties to the South African conflict, in the clear 
belief that the prospects for negotiations were good, and that they had a 
continuing role to play in that process.  
 
The EPG did bring the government very close to accepting a negotiating 
process, but it was still insisting on negotiating on its own terms, the sharing of 
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power.  Clearly also, the government was not comfortable with an outside 
party playing a role in the South African conflict.  
 
According to Sparks (1994: 35 – 36), one of the important effects of the EPG 
was to convince Mandela, with whom it met on three separate occasions, that 
there was widespread support for negotiations and that sufficient common 
ground for an agreement was available.  This prompted Mandela to seek a 
meeting with P.W. Botha, and the NIS officials and the Minister of Justice who 
could make that happen. 
 
6.5 Interactive Conflict Resolution in the South African Settlement 
6.5.1 Introduction: 
The weight of critical opinion on the South African Conflict indicated much 
doubt about the possibility of successful negotiations. We have indicated 
above, the extent to which specialists expressed doubt about the possibility of 
negotiation, right up to the time of de Klerk’s announcement indicating the 
government’s intention to release Mandela, end the state of emergency, 
legalize the liberation movements and embark on negotiations. According to 
theorists on conflict resolution, we have already shown how cases of deep-
rooted social conflict are not expected, in terms of the theory to be susceptible 
to standard negotiated outcomes. 
 
Narratives of the South African transition largely reflect the thinking of political 
realist scholars who stress aspects relating to the balance of power, that in 
retrospect are able to show that the parties to the conflict were so evenly 
balanced, that a victory for either side was regarded as extremely unlikely. 
Rational calculations purportedly therefore drew both parties to the 
unavoidable conclusion that negotiation and compromise were the only 
available options.  
 
Fortuitously, South Africa was also blessed with political leadership on both 
sides of the divide,  who were able to make these rational calculations, and 
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also take their constituencies with them. Therein largely lies the explanation 
for the South African miracle, as presented by the proponents of realpolitik 129. 
  
According to the analytical conflict resolution school, there should be no 
successful negotiated resolution without at least some form of specialist 
intervention, what some would term pre-negotiation, or second-track 
processes, in which the conflict is analysed from a human needs perspective, 
and the security and identity needs of all parties addressed through problem-
solving workshops130. The history of the South African transition hardly makes 
mention of any such activity, however. By its very nature, though, these forms 
of intervention into deep-rooted social conflict must take place while parties 
are not ready to formally acknowledge each other, still less, enter into 
negotiation with each other. Therefore, such intervention activities must of 
needs be quite secretive, and that probably explains why history does not 
always accord them their due recognition. 
 
This seems to be the case in South Africa. A number of informal, “track two” 
interventions did in fact take place. Some such as the Dakar meeting, were 
widely reported at the time, and met with largely negative publicity in South 
Africa. The Dakar initiative has subsequently not been accorded the 
recognition that it probably deserves, however. One of the participants, Max 
du Preez (2003: 164) confirms this when he writes that many respected books 
on the South African transition, including Alistair Sparks’ histories, hardly take 
any note of the meeting in Dakar.  However, for reasons that we are yet to 
mention, it was probably quite important in the eventual outcome of the South 
African process. 
 
                                                 
 
129 See for instance Du Toit (1989) in this regard. According to his view, for bargaining about 
bargaining (ie Prenegotiation) to take place, a self-negating prediction had to have taken hold 
among the leadership on both sides. They have to see the conflict in non-zero-sum terms, 
and understand their mutual dependency. Borrowing from Lijphart (1977) he writes as follows: 
“The self-negating prediction involves an awareness the destructive potential of deeply 
divided societies, which motivates elites to cooperate with one another in order to avert such 
conflict.” (212-213). 
 
130 See for instance, the quote by Fisher at the head of this chapter. 
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If the Dakar process was well reported at the time, this was certainly not true 
of the meetings held at Mells, near the city of Bath in the United Kingdom. 
These were highly secretive at the time and have drawn hardly any scholarly 
comment since. Even in the conflict literature, it is only Lieberfeld (2002, 2005) 
and Kruger (1998) who seem to have made a concerted effort to study them. 
In respect of the historical narratives of the South African transition, it is only 
Sparks (1994) who has devoted any real attention to them, although there are 
good reasons for believing that once again, these initiatives might have been 
quite influential in bringing the parties into a first track negotiation process. 
 
The fact that these processes have been afforded such scant attention 
underlines the emphasis that is generally placed on first track events, and 
formal agreements and decisions, almost to the exclusion of other aspects of 
the multi-level, multi-issue process that is South Africa’s political transition. 
 
The number of meetings that might be labeled as pre-negotiation initiatives in 
the South African case is quite large. According to Daniel Lieberfeld, several 
dozen took place between 1985 and 1990. Many of these would not have 
properly qualified as second track, however, as the participants, in some 
cases, were not from adversary groups (for instance, the ANC met with a 
number of supportive organizations) or because specific political solutions 
were not actually debated in those meetings. The South African government’s 
talks with other anti-apartheid organizations also do not merit the definition, as 
these were efforts to bypass its main opponent, the ANC (Lieberfeld, 2002: 
356). 
 
Rather, only three different initiatives properly fall into the category of pre-
negotiation initiatives; these were the 1985 meeting between South African 
business leaders and the ANC in Zambia, the 1987 meeting in Dakar between 
ANC leadership and a number of dissident Afrikaner leaders, and perhaps, 
most importantly, the series of covert meetings in England, between 
prominent Afrikaner intellectuals with strong links to government, and senior 
ANC leadership, which we are calling the Mells meetings. This is not to deny 
 169
the obvious usefulness of the discussions with Mandela and  meetings with 
other prominent figures at the time. 
 
6.5.2 Early Efforts 
There was much activity at the time, aimed at exploring the possibility of 
negotiations between the South African Government and the ANC, as well as 
a number of failed attempts to establish second track diplomatic initiatives, 
that form a backdrop to the more important second track initiatives considered 
in detail here, that deserve some mention. 
 
As unrest levels in South Africa grew, a fortuitous meeting between Piet de 
Lange, then chairman of the secretive and powerful Broederbond, and Thabo 
Mbeki took place on Long Island,  New York, in 1986. Unplanned, the initial 
meeting was followed by a lunch meeting the next day. The two discussed the 
South African situation, and de Lange made it clear that leading Afrikaner 
intellectuals were ready for change, as long as they could be convinced that 
their cultural identity and economic positions would remain secure. Mbeki 
conveyed this message to ANC leader, Oliver Tambo.  De Lange committed 
himself to working towards interracial contact,  that he saw as lacking and 
contributing towards mistrust between the races in South Africa.  He 
demonstrated his commitment, where Mbeki was concerned when, some 
months later, he resigned his position as rector of the Rand Afrikaans 
University, to embark on the promotion of “interracial understanding” (Sparks, 
1994:71 – 75).  De Lange was close to P.W. Botha, and in a position to 
communicate to him, a more favourable image of the ANC leadership. 
 
Certain prominent Afrikaners, with close links to government, including 
Sampie Terreblanche and Willie Esterhuyse, two professors at Stellenbosch 
University, were also approached by H.W. van der Merwe, a Quaker and 
South Africa’s pioneer conflict resolution specialist. Knowledgeable of Burton 
and his work, van der Merwe attempted at the request of ANC leaders, to 
arrange meetings between them and Afrikaner intellectuals, outside of South 
Africa.  These initiatives, viewed explicitly as Second Track diplomacy by van 
der Merwe, were crushed by P.W. Botha, who was informed about them, and 
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forbade them to proceed, stating that he would not allow them to talk to 
“murderers” (van der Merwe, 2000: 143, Sparks, 1994: 76). A group of 
Afrikaner students at Stellenbosch University was also approached in similar 
fashion, at the behest of the ANC, and this time had their passports 
withdrawn, by the state, when news of their planned meeting was splashed in 
the press. Van der Merwe was of the opinion that the state’s reaction against 
the students was instrumental in gaining them sympathy from the general 
white South African public, and that in the long run, this contributed towards a 
growing feeling in support of talks with the ANC. The publicity also led to a 
series of discussions with black student leaders at home, concerning the 
future of South Africa. 
 
As President P.W. Botha’s political reforms drew more concerted resistance 
from the majority, and it became clear that the general political situation in the 
country was deteriorating; that the government’s ability to impose a unilateral 
solutions was as unlikely to succeed as was the likelihood of the ANC to 
overthrow apartheid by force, so the idea of negotiations was mooted by a 
number of different sources in the country, though officially rejected by both 
the main protagonists to the conflict.  
 
After President Botha’s recalcitrant display at the National Party  congress in 
Durban in August 1985 (Zartman, 1989: 4), which became known as the 
“Rubicon” speech, big business became especially concerned about the 
future stability of the country, especially as the popular image of the ANC 
among white South Africans was that it was a communist organization in 
favour of large scale nationalisation of industry. It was in this context that 
groups of individuals began to seek exploratory discussions with the ANC. 
According to van der Merwe, approximately two dozen delegations of 
”…businessmen, academics, church leaders and others met with the ANC in 
Lusaka during this period.” (2000:149). Most prominent among these, was the 
group of business leaders that went to meet the ANC leadership in Lusaka.   
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6.5.3 South African Business Leaders in Lusaka 
As the crisis in South Africa deepened, a meeting was organized between 
business leaders and journalists from South Africa, and five high-ranking ANC 
officials, in Lusaka. Organized by President Kaunda of Zambia and Hugh 
Murrary, editor of Leadership SA, a business magazine.  The meeting took 
place two months after the government’s state of emergency was declared. 
Business was particularly concerned about the consequences to industry of 
the possible cutting off of the foreign capital that funded much of their 
operations. Anglo American in particular, also feared that a future ANC 
government of South Africa might nationalize the mining industry, in line with 
its socialist agenda. 
 
The internal group was led by the chairman of Anglo-American, Gavin Relly. 
Other members of the group included Peter Sorour, chief executive of the 
South Africa Foundation, Zac de Beer, a director of Anglo-American, and 
Tony Bloom, chief executive of Premier Milling.  On the ANC side were Oliver 
Tambo, Chris Hani, James Stuart, Pallo Jordan  and Thabo Mbeki (Lieberfeld, 
2002). 
 
The meeting was chaired by Zambian President Kaunda at his presidential 
lodge. As facilitator, he stressed that it was not possible for decisions to be 
taken at the workshop. The aim of the meeting was rather, to achieve mutual 
learning among the participants. Proceedings were quite informal, with seating 
arrangements, at Tambo’s insistence, intermingled, rather than representing 
oppositional groups (Waldmeir, 1997:73 – 75). 
 
The subjects of discussion included matters of concern to the business 
delegation, such as the issue of possible state control of industry by a future 
ANC government, the commitment of the ANC to its armed struggle, and 
constitutional safeguards for minority groups in a future democracy. Although 
there were differences between the two groups on all of the important issues, 
there were a number of positive outcomes. The South African businessmen 
were surprised at the cordial nature of the exchanges, and expressed their 
belief that the ANC leaders were people with whom negotiation could take 
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place. In the ANC, Mbeki subsequently concentrated on further contacts with 
white South Africans, and along with Pallo Jordan, and James Stuart, who 
were also participants, he formed a subcommittee of the ANC National 
Executive on negotiations and constitutional guidelines. In this way, the talks 
with businessmen therefore resulted in a renewed focus on constitutional 
issues. They also legitimized contact with the ANC, which had been rejected 
by the South African corporate and liberal establishment to that date. 
 
6.5.4 The Meeting in Dakar. 
Against this background, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South 
Africa arranged a meeting between critically-minded Afrikaner South Africans 
and ANC leaders in Dakar, in August,1987131. The stated reason was to 
emphasise the need for “urgent, genuine” negotiations, given “…our own 
ever-deepening concern about the direction South Africa was taking, and in 
particular, the escalation of violence with its long list of victims” (Boraine, 
1987:3). The Afrikaner delegation, which consisted of individuals who were 
generally in favour of negotiations with the ANC, was led by Frederik van Zyl 
Slabbert, consisted of sixty-one participants, and was of three-days duration 
(Sparks, 1994: 86, Lieberfeld, 2002:363). 
 
The Dakar conference was co-chaired by Van Zyl Slabbert and Thabo Mbeki. 
According to Boraine (1987: 3) four principal topics were discussed. These 
were: “Strategies for bringing about fundamental change in South Africa; The 
building of national unity; Perspectives with regard to the structures of the 
government of a free South Africa, and the economy of a liberated South 
Africa”. ANC members at the meeting stressed the common South African 
identity, of blacks and whites, used the Afrikaans language, and knowledge of 
the culture to underline their commitment to the sensitive issue. According to 
Prof Andre Brink, one of the delegates, “Basic to the exchange of ideas was 
the acknowledgement of us all as South Africans”. “There never was a 
sentiment of us and them” (1987:6). A number of the “internal” party were 
                                                 
 
131 This was the first of a number of similar meetings, to discuss burning issues, such as the 
role of law and constitutionalism in a future, democratic South Africa, some of which took 
place in Lusaka, and others in France and West Germany. 
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impressed by the high standard of  debate that took place among the 
delegates, and the broad agreement in favour of universal adult franchise in a 
unitary state (du Plessis, 1987: 8). Andre du Pisani, a political scientist, and 
expert on problem-solving workshops, who accompanied the group concurs, 
stating that for him, the experience “…  undoubtedly served to break the veil 
of ignorance on both sides and broaden understandings” (1987:10). It became 
evident that despite the power of apartheid, rational debate among opponents 
was still possible. The meeting served to clarify positions and dispel 
misperceptions It explored the space for future negotiations and bargaining 
politics” (du Pisani, 1987: 10).  Any belief that the ANC was not prepared to 
negotiate was dispelled, and certain important aspects of the future vision of 
the ANC were explained, namely that South Africa would be a unitary country, 
multiparty elections and a bill of rights would be part of the political landscape, 
a mixed economy was envisaged, and nationalization would only take place 
where it could create wealth and jobs (Mitchell, 1987: 21).  These were all 
positions that served to allay the fears that whites had harbored concerning 
their previously held stereotypical view of the ANC as a communist 
organization. As Schlemmer (1991: 21) put it, the initiative “…weakened the 
stigma of demonic intent in the ANC, which white sentiment and government 
propaganda had created and also helped to establish the idea of negotiation 
with the ANC as normal and necessary.”  
 
Between sessions, relationship-building took place in the social contexts, such 
as at the hotel bar, etc. The participants issued a joint declaration calling for 
negotiation, and identifying the government as the principal obstacle in the 
way of that option. The white delegation ended up supporting many of the 
ANC’s positions, including the call for an unconditional release of political 
prisoners. It was felt that the ANC were better prepared for the exercise than 
the Afrikaner delegation, and, to some extent, capable of bending them to 
their purposes (Lieberfeld, 2002: 364). 
 
6.5.5 The Mells Meetings 
Our next focus is on a series of twelve meetings that was held in the United 
Kingdom, between a group of Elite Afrikaners and ANC leadership in exile. 
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The meetings took place between late 1987, and February 1990, with follow-
up meetings also held thereafter. Although the first meeting was held at a 
hotel in Henley on Thames132, and the second at the Eastwell Manor Hotel in 
Kent, all the subsequent meetings were held at secluded Mells Park House on 
a Consgold Estate in the village of Mells near the city of Bath. 
 
This set of meetings was organized by executives of a British mining 
company; Consolidated Goldfields (Consgold), with major interests in South 
Africa133. As a result of discussions with Oliver Tambo, the president of the 
ANC, who had requested British businessmen to attempt to arrange meetings 
with influential Afrikaner leadership (who they referred to as Broederbonders), 
Michael Young of Consgold approached Fleur de Villiers, a South African 
journalist, who put him in touch with Willie Esterhuyse, a political philosopher 
at the University of Stellenbosch, and Sampie Terreblanche, an economic 
historian at the university. de Villiers, who had previously received some 
conflict resolution training from the Harvard Negotiation Project,  was 
emphatic that any contacts with the ANC be kept secret, to avoid position-
taking, that might affect trust-building between the parties. She also insisted 
that talks not be with liberal opponents of the government, but rather with 
those who had the trust of the inner circle of National Party leadership 
(Lieberfeld, 2005: 4).  
 
Esterhuyse was known to be close to P.W. Botha (to whom he had been 
political advisor), and therefore sufficiently influential to participate in informal 
meetings with the ANC. Among subsequent participants to these meetings 
were Wimpie de Klerk, brother of the cabinet minister and man who would 
become President, and Willie Breytenbach. De Klerk was editor of Die 
                                                 
 
132 This is according to Sparks’ version. Kruger has it as taking place in Marlowe, according to his discussion 
with Esterhuyse. 
 
133 This conforms to a pattern that was established with the role of business (Ford Foundation)  in setting up 
the long island meeting which brought Mbeki and De Lange into contact with each  other, the involvement of 
businessmen in exploratory talks with the ANC in Zambia, and the subsequent involvement of business in 
facilitating the National Peace Accord and the Negotiation Process itself. 
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Transvaler, a National Party supporting newspaper, and Breytenbach had 
worked for the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, and been secretary of the 
state security council (Lieberfeld, 2005: 5). Altogether, approximately twenty 
prominent Afrikaners attended these meetings which were held at four-
monthly intervals. They included, among other participants, Attie du Plessis, 
brother of South African Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, Mof 
Terreblanche, one of P.W. Botha’s closest friends, and Ebbe Domisse, editor 
of Die Burger, the most prominent of the National Party supporting 
newspapers. Dawie de Villiers, Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
attended the final meeting (Sparks, 1994: 80 – 87). 
 
On the ANC side, Thabo Mbeki, Aziz Pahad, Harold Wolpe, Jacob Zuma 
(ANC head of intelligence), Joe Nhlanhla (ANC intelligence) were among the 
regular participants. Lieberfeld correctly makes the point that, given the official 
standing of the ANC participants, these meetings would more accurately be 
termed “track one and a half”, than track two134. The ANC participants did 
stress the fact that they were present in their personal, as opposed to official 
capacities, however. 
 
6.5.5.1 Meeting structure and substance 
The three-day meetings were structured with formal sessions and a set 
agenda on two days – normally the Saturday and Sunday,  that followed an 
evening meal on the Friday evenings. Michael Young chaired these sessions 
which would cover topics such as political developments in South Africa, 
international pressures and sanctions, the South African economy, the 
possible release of Mandela, and how to address the worsening racial conflict 
in the country (Sparks, 1994: ). Initially the ANC delegation was led by Aziz 
Pahad,  but as from the second meeting, Thabo Mbeki assumed leadership.  
 
                                                 
 
134 “Track one” referring to discussions involving actual political representatives, or leaders of 
specific parties; actual decision-makers while “track two” refers to influentials who are able to 
influence those decision-makers. “Track-one-and-a-half” then points to the fact that these 
talks take place between two delegations of differential status. 
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Even before the first meeting, Esterhuyse was approached by the South 
African National Intelligence Service, who requested him to report back to 
them, which he consented to do, provided that he be allowed to inform the 
ANC about these reports. Mbeki and ANC President Tambo actually 
encouraged Esterhuyse’s reports to the NIS, as it provided a direct link to the 
government with which they intended to negotiate (Lieberfeld, 2005:8, 
Waldmeir, 1997: 77). 
 
There was much time between sessions, when the participants would be able 
to exchange views informally, without any facilitation, whether in fireside 
chats, at the bar, or walks in the grounds.  It was often at these times, 
according to Sparks, that some of the very important communication took 
place (1994: 83, Waldmeir, 1997: 79). 
 
The substance of these meetings was different from that at Dakar. As 
opposed to simply dealing with “white fears”, these meetings, from the very 
outset, were focused on seeking ways to satisfy each others’ preconditions for 
official talks, what the agenda for such talks might be, and how much common 
ground could be found for an official agreement (Lieberfeld, 2005: 9). These 
were true “talks about talks” in the proper sense of the phrase.  
 
The participants found themselves discussing ways of giving effect to the 
ANC’s demand for the release of political prisoners.  It was reported to the 
ANC, that the government would begin by releasing Govan Mbeki, as 
something of a test case, but wanted assurances in return that such an action 
would not be devalued by the ANC’s “moving the goal posts” or other negative 
responses. It was communicated that if the release of the elder Mbeki met 
with a positive response from the ANC, the government might agree to the 
release of Mandela and the legalization of the ANC.135 
 
                                                 
 
135 In the event, the government released Govan Mbeki three days after the first meeting in 
England. 
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According to Esterhuyse, a major goal of these prenegotiation meetings was 
for the parties to get clarity on different positions (Lieberfeld, 2005:9).  
The metaphor of being a bridge was used, and Wimpie de Klerk spoke about 
these sessions being “mock negotiations” The participants had been told that 
they were to convey messages to their “constituencies” at home (Sparks, 
1994: 80). 
 
The Afrikaner group asked whether the ANC would suspend its armed 
struggle, and bring an end to its sanctions campaign. What was remarkable, 
was the extent to which the groups discussed so many of the issues that were 
eventually raised at the official negotiations, including the idea of establishing 
a government of national unity. According to Lieberfeld:  “Through semi-official 
talks each side established that its bottom-line prerequisites for official 
negotiation would be met. State leaders required assurance that the 
Afrikaners’ national existence would not be threatened, that their cultural 
rights and economic power would be protected, and that a sufficient degree of 
political control could prospectively be maintained during and after a 
democratic transition. The ANC side needed to be able to credibly declare 
victory through the regime’s releasing of ANC prisoners, granting amnesties, 
legalizing the ANC, ending political executions and the State of Emergency 
legislation, and allowing the ANC to organize and contest elections”( nd: 19). 
 
6.5.5.2 Transfer and Report-Backs  
One of the major concerns in the conflict literature on problem-solving 
workshops is about the so-called transfer process – the transfer of changed 
perceptions from the informal track process to the formal, track one process. 
The critiques of analytical conflict resolution rightly draw attention to the fact 
that when talks involve individuals other than decision-makers, there is no 
guarantee that any learning that takes place, perceptions that are changed, or 
fears allayed in these processes, will indeed be communicated to the 
decision-makers, or even that should such communication take place, that it 
will have the desired impact. What was therefore the situation where the 
South African processes were concerned? 
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According to du Randt (1987:13) “After the Dakar visit, “…the debate on the 
necessity of talks and negotiations with the ANC became the most talked 
about thing in South Africa.”  Many of those delegates who had attended the 
Dakar meeting, were influential in their own right, such as newspaper editors 
and academics. Although they were not mandated to participate in this 
process, they had their own, informal “constituencies” of students, colleagues 
and acquaintances. A number of them went on speaking tours, and answered 
questions about the ANC, mainly attempting to put minds at rest regarding the 
communist leanings of the ANC, and its willingness to accommodate the 
cultural and language concerns of the Afrikaners 136. Given the small size of 
the Afrikaner population, and the fact that these were mostly very influential 
people, it has been stated that almost everyone knew someone who had been 
to Dakar. The impact would therefore have been quite marked.  The 
mainstream media did their best to crucify the Dakar participants, with attacks 
that were probably the most memorable feature of the entire episode 
(Bedford,1987, Brink, 1987, Liebenberg,1987, Van Vuuren, 1987). Ironically 
all that media attention, far from covering up the issue, or forcing it off the 
agenda, opened up a lively, public debate on negotiations with the ANC. 
According to Dakar participant Max du Preez:  "Dakar triggered a new 
consciousness inside South Africa: a realization that we have to find a 
different type of solution than the ones the government had come up with" 
(2003:166). In its own right, the Dakar talks had put the possibility of 
negotiations with the ANC firmly on the agenda. The government had to 
respond, or risk being left out of the process. Even though the Dakar 
delegates were not directly influential with the government, that meeting 
probably played a role in encouraging the Mells prenegotiation meetings. If 
nothing else, the pro-negotiation camp within the ANC were greatly 
encouraged by Dakar, prompting Mbeki and Tambo to initiate their request to 
meet with “Broederbonders”, which ultimately led to the Consgold facilitation.   
Although Esterhuyse and Terreblanche had been forbidden by P.W. Botha to 
meet with the ANC in the process facilitated by H.W. Van der Merwe, only a 
                                                 
 
136 Andre Brink, along with a number of the other Dakar participants has commented on the 
sense of acceptance of the culture of Afrikaners and whites in general by the ANC members 
that they met with (1987:6). 
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few months later, they were both involved in these highly secretive talks, with 
the knowledge of the government’s National Intelligence service, and almost 
undoubtedly with the knowledge of Botha himself (Waldmeir,1997: 79). Many 
of the participants on the government side had ideal second track profiles. 
Given their friendships, and close relationships with those in the government, 
they could hardly have been in a better position to bring influence to bear. The 
presence of the future President’s own brother, and the brother of the minister 
of finance, speaks for itself.  The number of Broederbonders among the 
participants also placed them in a powerful position to bring influence to bear 
very broadly in the ranks of professional Afrikaners through that secretive  and 
powerful organization. Merely the participation of Esterhuyse and Wimpie de 
Klerk alone would have had significant potential transfer effects, as illustrated 
in the diagram below. In order for transfer to take place, there has firstly to be 
opportunity for contact, and secondly, communication of the pro-negotiation 
message. The account shows that both preconditions were present in the 
case of these participants. Wimpie de Klerk, writing in his diary, describes  
himself as an intermediary, carrying messages from the ANC to his brother, 
F.W. de Klerk, as well as in the opposite direction (Sparks, 1994: 83,84).  
Wimpie de Klerk also mentions that he was convinced that the talks between 
the parties at Mells had positive effects on both parties, improving 
understanding, “…and even included the germs of certain transactions “. 
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Fig: 6. 1  Potential Transfer Processes: W. de Klerk and W. Esterhuyse 
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6.5.5.3 Impacts 
The point has been made that the Dakar meeting was a media event, with 
international and local television coverage of the event, and the fallout that 
followed it in South Africa. It led to the establishment of an alternative 
Afrikaans newspaper, Vrye Weekblad, which though small, had an impact 
through setting the agenda for the mainstream press such as Die Beeld and 
Die Burger, which could not afford to ignore what Vrye Weekblad was 
reporting on. 
 
Although it is difficult to assess the extent to which the Dakar meeting 
changed white opinion, an HSRC opinion survey, held prior to the meeting, in 
1985, indicated that only 3.6 percent (Van Vuuren, 1987: 28) of white voters 
favoured negotiating with the ANC. These figures subsequently increased. 
Also, in distinction to the media outcry surrounding the initial Dakar event, 
there was an apparent lack of controversy accompanying subsequent Dakar-
type events arranged later. The implication is that the Dakar event 
“desensitized” white South Africans on the issue of talks with the ANC 
(Lieberfeld, 2002: 367). Some polls were reporting much higher percentages 
in favour of negotiating with the ANC by 1990 (Bradshaw, 1990), with up to 
73% of whites polled in the PWV region supporting negotiation in February 
1990 (Rhoodie,1991:31). There was a definite sense in which the meeting 
polarized white South African opinion, between those who were in favour of 
talks, and those who were against it. This created a growing constituency in 
favour of negotiations among white South Africans.  
 
The unofficial meetings also encouraged the ANC leaders to devote more 
attention to exploiting the split that they perceived among white South 
Africans, between those who opposed negotiations with the ANC, and those 
who were in favour. Those ANC leaders, such as Thabo Mbeki, who were 
leaning towards the diplomatic, or negotiated solution, had their hands 
strengthened by these events, although there was some fallout, and criticism 
from the more militaristically inclined leadership, including Chris Hani, who 
criticized and questioned Mbeki’s role and mandate (ANC).  The process was 
allowed to continue, however, largely through the support that it received from 
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ANC president Oliver Tambo (Pahad, cited in Lieberfeld, 2005: 13). Tambo 
and Mbeki were led to vigorously pursue further contacts with Afrikaners who 
were more influential than those they engaged in Dakar (Lieberfeld, nd : 4). 
 
The meetings influenced the ANC to concretize into practical terms, the 
principles of the Freedom Charter, as they had to answer the questions put to 
them by their track two partners. Most significantly, the meetings prompted the 
ANC to clearly specify its preconditions for negotiations, and according to 
Pahad “…led eventually to what happened in Harare137 and then [in] 1990, 
Groote Schuur…” (Lieberfeld, 2005: 8). 
 
6.6 Track Two Diplomacy in Theoretical Perspective 
A series of meetings that could be categorized as track two meetings 
therefore took place between the leadership of the ANC and various 
groupings at different distances from the National Party government of South 
Africa. From a conflict resolution perspective, there are a number of 
similarities between these particular track two interventions, and the problem-
solving workshops proposed by Burton and his analytical conflict resolution 
colleagues, as we have discussed them in Chapter four above, although they 
also display some important differences as we shall observe. 
 
In the first place, the point has already been made by Lieberfeld that the talks 
would be more accurately termed “track 1½”, as in all cases under review, the 
ANC was directly represented by its own very senior leadership (although they 
insisted that they attended in their personal, as opposed to official capacities). 
Transfer is an important theoretical concern, and a subject of debate in the 
literature on conflict resolution workshops. Related to the issue of transfer 
from “track two” to “track one” processes (in the case of the South African 
government at least), the participants, especially in the case of the Mells 
processes, were ideal from the perspective of conflict resolution theory as 
                                                 
 
137 The 1989 Harare declaration set out the preconditions of the ANC, including lifting the 
state of emergency, ending restrictions on political activity, legalizing all political 
organizations, releasing all political prisoners, and stopping all political executions. 
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articulated by John Burton, in respect of their ability to encourage the National 
Party government to enter first track negotiation processes 138. 
 
Each of the processes was made possible, or at least encouraged by the 
previous ones. As has been mentioned, changes were stimulated in the ANC 
leadership for instance, by the earlier meetings, and the NP had time to 
consider the implications of being “left out” of the communication process 
between important elements of its constituency (organized business), and its  
chief opponent (the ANC),  that was gaining momentum. 
 
6.6.1 Workshop settings  
With respect to the locations of the talks, the settings that were used for the 
meetings, largely fitted the requirements set by the conflict resolution 
scholars. In all cases the meetings were set in third countries, and in luxurious 
and (for the South Africans), exotic settings139. These are said to be 
conducive to creative thinking, as they are far removed from the daily realities 
of the conflict situation. This is all fully in accordance with the requirements of 
the conflict-resolution approach of Burton and his colleagues (Burton, 
1987:52). 
 
6.6.2 Process facilitation 
With regard to facilitation, the first meeting (South African businessmen), was 
facilitated by President Kaunda of Zambia, certainly the wrong sort of 
facilitator from the conflict resolution perspective, as he represented a position 
of power, and was certainly not a scholar-practitioner. Yet he managed to 
keep the talks on track, keeping the participants away from direct bargaining, 
                                                 
 
138 Many of the track two processes that have been documented in the literature have had to 
make do with participants who were very far removed from decision-making indeed. In many 
cases, for instance practitioners have held meetings with students, in the hope that they 
would become influential at a future date. Some of Kelman’s work falls into this category, for 
instance. Here, the participants were influential in their own right, were trusted by, and had 
access to the highest decision-makers, and leant towards a negotiated outcome. 
 
139 For instance, the Lusaka meeting at the President’s lodge was set in a game reserve with 
animals all around. The atmosphere of Dakar was commented upon by most of the 
participants, and the Mells estate provided a secluded and very tranquil setting, which Wimpie 
de Klerk commented upon as being conducive to the process (Sparks, 1994: 83). 
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as conflict resolution theory demands. The Dakar meeting was facilitated 
jointly by the leaders of the two delegations – again, contrary to the processes 
set forth by John Burton, who insisted on a neutral facilitation panel of scholar-
practitioners. Although there was a neutral facilitator in the Mells workshops, 
this was a very different role from that of the panel of scholar-practitioners 
demanded by conflict resolution theory. Michael Young, the facilitator was a 
businessman, who presided over fairly unstructured meetings, and sometimes 
left participants to communicate directly with each other, without supervision, 
on a number of occasions – something expressly prohibited in Burton’s 
problem-solving model 140. Burton set strict guidelines for separation of 
delegations outside of formal meetings, for instance. Young believed his aim 
to be merely: “…to facilitate two sets of people who in the public arena were 
speaking past each other” (Lieberfeld, 2005: 6). 
 
6.6.3 Workshop agendas 
In terms of the substance of the discussions on each of the occasions, Burton 
expressly provides a recipe that makes provision for strict sequencing of 
subject matter, along with a prohibition of explicit bargaining (Burton,1987). 
Although none of the meetings under review included explicit bargaining, and 
in this respect therefore conform with that aspect of the approach, talks were 
far-ranging, and certainly explored the substance of possible agreements, 
without entering all the preliminary steps required by Burton and his 
colleagues – for instance by beginning by analytically comparing values, and 
then moving on to needs and then finding ways of satisfying the needs of both 
parties as required by the theory (Burton, 1987: 57 – 67). There is no mention 
in the literature that needs were ever explicitly discussed, in these pre-
negotiation meetings, and there were at no stages explicit discussion of basic 
                                                 
 
140 According to the rules of the problem solving workshop, Burton insisted that facilitation 
would be carried out by a panel of scholar-practitioners. Also, they would provide a fairly 
structured setting, and participants would always communicate through the panel, and any 
direct discussion, especially discussion of substantive conflict issues was to be expressly 
avoided in the problem-solving workshop. Outside of formal sessions, the participant groups 
were to be kept as separated as possible (See for instance, Burton, 1987: 41,57,) . As the 
meetings under review, focusing on South Africa were in no case presided over by a panel of 
scholar-practitioners, Burton’s elaborate rules for the composition and selection of the panel 
are not applicable here. 
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human needs. However, the big issues concerning roadblocks to negotiation, 
such as the question of strategies of violence on both sides, were raised in all 
cases, as were the issue of future economic models, and minority rights. 
Indirectly, these issues did impinge on the security and identity needs of the 
parties. Fears were put to rest on many of these issues, and this largely 
enabled the move to track one negotiations. 
 
6.6.4 Publicity 
The issue of publicity for the processes is an interesting one. Burton stresses 
the need for strict control over publicity, and leans towards secret meetings, in 
order to keep the situation under control and manage the re-entry of 
participants (1987: 50)141. This is a rule that was followed in the case of the 
Mells meetings which were shrouded in secrecy. In the case of Dakar, 
however, publicity was seemingly uncontrolled, and the initiative became a 
media event, as mentioned above. Although this occasioned serious fallout, 
with negative repercussions for many of the participants, with some losing 
their jobs, others being discredited, and in one instance, an Idasa employee 
even being murdered, the meeting opened an important debate on negotiation 
with the ANC that many believe encouraged the Mells process, and ultimately 
led to the decision to enter “track one” negotiations with the ANC (du Preez, 
2003: 166). 
 
The South African “track two” process was unusual, in the willingness of one 
party to undertake a series of direct talks with non-representative elements 
from the other side – hence the “track one and a half”   appellation given by 
Lieberfeld, as well as his use of the term “semi-official talks”(2005, 
forthcoming).  The leadership of the ANC took great risks, to meet directly with 
its opponents. This was underlined, by Tambo during the meetings with South 
African businessmen142, and evidenced by the fact that the talks attracted 
strong criticism from some of its members. As the Mells talks proceeded, 
                                                 
 
141 Burton states that “The unofficial problem-solving process is understood to be confidential. 
Sometimes not even the existence of discussions is made public.” (1987:50) 
 
142 According to Lieberfeld (2002:360), Tambo had told Relly that he feared that the meeting 
would make the ANC leadership look soft, and therefore hurt its status. 
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Esterhuyse’s role became increasingly that of a go-between, testing certain 
propositions with Mbeki,  that very much became a meeting within a meeting 
(Sparks, 1994: 78, 79).   
 
Another characteristic of the process was the determination of both primary 
South African parties to govern communication between themselves as far as 
possible, without the agency of a third party (Lieberfeld). Although the South 
African Security establishment had been opposed to groups such as the 
businessmen and the Dakar delegation having informal discussions with the 
ANC, by the time of the Mells meetings, only a few months later, Niel Barnard, 
South Africa’s chief of National Security, had asked Esterhuyse to provide 
feedback of the process to the NIS, presumably for communication to 
President Botha, and the Mells process transmuted fairly seamlessly into 
arrangements between the security arms of the South African government 
and the ANC, preparatory to the first direct bargaining between the two sides 
at the Constantia and Pretoria minutes143.  
 
6.7 Conclusion and Summary  
In summary, between 1985 and 1990 and beyond, there were a number of 
meetings between the chief protagonists to the South African struggle, that 
might fit into the broader concept of pre-negotiation, and which fit quite 
accurately, the term “second track diplomacy”. Because Burton has such a 
rigid set of requirements for what he calls problem-solving workshops, 
                                                 
 
143 For instance, Meetings in Lucerne Switzerland, took place on Sept 12 1989, and in Berne 
on Feb 6 1990, between Mike Louw, and Maritz Spaarwater  of the South African intelligence 
community, and Aziz Pahad and Thabo Mbeki,  to investigate the obstacles in the way of 
negotiations;  including the continued bans on the liberation movements, the ANC's alliance 
with the Communist party, and its commitment to guerilla warfare. The Berne meeting had to 
deal with the practical issues of how the exciles were to return safely to South Africa, who 
were political prisoners and how “talks about talks” would take place. The government wanted 
greater discipline in controlling the protest campaigns, and an agreed formula for ending the 
guerilla struggle. (Sparks, 1994:116)  A fortnight later, another meeting took place. This time 
Niel Barnard and Fanie Van der Merwe were with them, and Joseph Nhlanhla  was also there 
for the ANC. The meeting was to make arrangements for the return of the exiles and 
preparing the first meeting between the two parties in SA (Ibid:118)  A fourth Meeting was 
held in Geneva at which a joint steering committee was established to take care of the return 
of the exiles and the first formal meeting between the government and  the ANC on South 
African soil. (Ibid: 119). 
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including sequencing and strict control over the substance of the talks and the 
logistical arrangements such as seating however, these meetings cannot be 
equated with problem-solving workshops. They were surprisingly informal. It is 
almost as though, once the informal meetings were embarked upon, they 
were immediately at a more advanced level than scholars would have 
anticipated. Participants found little difficulty in communicating directly with 
each other. Seating arrangements were “mixed” – the participants were not 
seated according to their party membership. By the stage of the Mells 
meetings, the talks quickly transcended the second track, or the semi-formal 
character, and proceeded to a process of covert negotiations, with Esterhuyse 
acting as intermediary, flying “trial balloons”144 in order to gauge  the 
acceptability of various options with regard to possible negotiation “sticking 
points” with the ANC and the National Party government. While it is important 
to take cognizance of these events, and the impacts which they seem to have 
had, it is equally critical to note that environmental effects, such as the 
international collapse of communism, and the sudden replacement of P.W. 
Botha by F.W. de Klerk as state President of South Africa, also played 
important roles in bringing about the eventual negotiation process in South 
Africa. There is no way of being certain of the exact impact that these 
prenegotiation initiatives had on the process, except to note that the NP 
moved extremely rapidly from a stance more opposed to negotiation in July 
1989, to a stance seriously supportive of the strategy by February 1990. The 
ANC, also, on 21 August, 1989, through the medium of the “Declaration of the 
OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa” 
(Harare Declaration), committed itself to negotiations as a favoured strategy 
for ending apartheid in South Africa (Kruger, 1998: 68,69),a significant 
advance on their 1987 position. Of course the following preconditions for 
negotiation were also presented: 
• The release of all political prisoners 
• The lifting of all bans and restrictions on political activities  
• The removal of all troops from the townships 
                                                 
 
144 The term “trial balloon” is frequently used in the mediation literature and pertains to the 
practice of a mediator suggesting possible solutions to the parties, in order to measure the 
degree of acceptability with which such options are received. 
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• The ending of the state of emergency 
• The ceasing of all political executions 
It redounds to de Klerk’s credit that he made the bridging step of meeting 
these ANC conditions without the prior assurance of a suspension of violence 
from his opponents. According to Kruger (1998: 70), an explanation of the 
rapid move to accept a negotiation process would include the effects of the 
prenegotiation communication against the backdrop of the hurting stalemate 
confronting both parties. 
 
We next examine the South African National Peace Accord, as a pivotal 
element in the South African transition to democracy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL 
PEACE ACCORD 
 
If the Peace Accord did not exist, it would have had to be 
invented. The Accord supplements and is an integral part of the 
process of a negotiated transition to democracy. 
(Camay and Gordon, 2000:36) 
I believe it is an extraordinary offering to the world. Nothing like it 
had ever been tried before, and our achievement has become a 
beacon of hope to troubled communities everywhere. Now the 
international community knows that it is possible for a whole 
society not just to change political structure and leadership but 
also to transform itself in the process. 
 
(Collin Marks, 2000:191) 
7.1 Introduction 
In our first investigation into the attempts to manage the South African conflict, 
we will examine the South African National Peace Accord in the context of the 
South African conflict at the beginning of the nineteen nineties, as one of the 
dedicated conflict management procedures implemented in this country. Our 
goal is to assess the stated intention behind its establishment, the context of 
its establishment, its structure, functions and impact. We begin by examining 
the nature of violence in the country as the momentum of the conflict swung 
towards a negotiated settlement. 
 
When levels of violence in South Africa became so high that it was felt that 
they threatened to jeopardise the national negotiations on an interim 
constitution for the country, the most important parties signed a National 
Peace Accord (NPA) on 14 September 1991.  The signing of the peace 
accord, and the establishment of the various structures to which  it gave rise, 
represents one of the most ambitious domestic conflict resolution endeavours 
of its kind ever attempted.  Despite  its  rather unambitious objectives, as a 
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strategy  for limiting violence in South Africa in order to enable constitutional 
negotiations to take place, the remarkable NPA has been hailed by conflict 
management scholars as one of the singularly most impressive achievements 
of the field to date145.  
 
Among other things, the National Peace Accord could be described as a 
conflict management system. It encompassed all the facets of the threefold 
distinction made by Johan Galtung among others, of peace making, peace 
keeping and peace building. It additionally also seems to fulfill the 
requirements for the definition of the developmental track of community 
conflict intervention proposed by Jim Laue, as well as the notion of conflict 
provention that Burton calls for as an alternative to traditional conflict 
management methods. We will begin by making the case for considering the 
NPA as a conflict management system. 
 
7.2 The South African National Peace Accord as Conflict Management 
System 
 
The NPA represented a comprehensive attempt to manage violent conflict, 
with feedback loops, resource provision, on a semi-permanent basis, involving 
the regular interaction of all the elements of the system.  According to 
Bradshaw (1994: 3, 4) a   conflict management system (CMS) is   “…a 
permanent, rather than a once-off intervention, which is substantially "owned" 
by the parties to the conflict.  It includes structures or institutions, and ongoing 
activities in pursuit of peace.  It should be self-sustaining and accessible to the 
community at the point of need.  Because conflicts shift and change, the CMS 
needs also to change and grow, constantly adapting to the needs of the 
changing conflict.  The system should have built in procedures for accessing 
resources, especially expertise and opportunities for planning.”146 For more on 
conflict management systems,  Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1989) also provide a 
list of principles that they attribute to what they call “dispute resolution 
                                                 
145 Discussion with George McCall 26 August 2005. 
146  
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systems”, primarily intended to address organisational conflicts147. These 
include putting the focus on interests, building “loop-backs” to negotiation, 
providing low-cost rights and power back-ups, building in consultation before, 
and feedback after, arranging procedures in a low- to high-cost sequence, and 
providing the necessary motivation, skills and resources to facilitate the 
system’s functioning.    
 
The South African National Peace Accord reflected many of the attributes of a 
CMS. It included structures at a number of levels, and in decentralised 
locations throughout the country, where it made its presence felt, and its 
services available to the grassroots.  It was, for the most part painfully 
sensitive to the wishes of all of its constituent parties; in this sense, they 
"owned" the NPA.  It was a longer-term intervention into social conflict at a 
number of different levels in the country.  It envisaged three different types of 
conflict limitation activities: peace-keeping, peace-building and peace-making, 
which all according to Anstey (1999: 284, 285) in fact eventuated in the 
course of the life of the NPA.148  In the actual course of events that followed, 
however, most of the emphasis fell on the peace-keeping and peace-making 
functions (Shaer & Nossel, 1992). 149 An emphasis that was initially placed on 
improving socio-economic conditions damaged by the long-standing conflict, 
known in the NPA by the acronym SERD150, also never properly came into its 
own. The NPA’s holistic, self-sustaining, highly representative, ongoing (as 
opposed to once-off) attributes, do qualify the accord as a conflict 
management system, however. The various activity areas of the NPA are 
encapsulated by table 7.1 below. 
 
                                                 
147 Designing Dispute Management Sustems was developed further by Costantino, C., and Merchant, C.S., 
in their 1996, book: Designing conflict Management Systems, San Fransisco, Jossey-Bass 
 
148 See Galtung for a discussion of these different processes. 
 
149 See Bradshaw, 1994 for a discussion on conflict management systems. Ury, Brett and Gold berg also 
discuss dispute resolution systems……… 
  
150 Standing for Socio Economic Reconstruction and Development 
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 Table 7.1 
 
 
 
PEACEKEEPING PEACE MAKING PEACE BUILDING 
Negotiation of: 
• Codes of conduct for 
disputants outlining 
their rights and 
responsibilities 
• Moratoriums on 
statements or actions 
likely to provoke 
violence 
• The Establishment of 
acceptable 
peacekeeping forces 
• Acceptable law 
enforcement 
mechanisms 
• Checks and balances 
on law enforcement 
agencies to ensure 
accountability 
• Removal of conditions 
that promote violence 
eg. Consumption of 
alcohol, carrying of 
weapons 
• Rules and procedures 
for particular events 
eg. Marches 
• Mechanisms for rapid 
communications 
between leaders in 
the event of a crisis 
• Acceptable and 
independent 
investigative 
commissions, should 
a breakdown in 
agreed mechanisms 
occur (to promote 
accountability) 
• The establishment of 
representative 
negotiation forums 
 
• The negotiation of 
acceptable dispute 
resolution 
mechanisms 
• The establishment of 
participative 
mechanisms to 
address root causes 
of violence, eg. 
Social, political and 
economic conditions 
 
• Means to overcome 
unnecessary delay in 
achieving access to 
available resources 
(cutting through red 
tape) 
NPA ACTIVITIES BROKEN DOWN BY GALTUNG’S CATEGORIES 
 193
Adapted from Anstey, 1999: 284, 285 
 
7.3 Background  
During the final years of the nineteen eighties the main parties to the South 
African macro-political conflict were entering a phase that began to resemble 
what conflict theorists have, following Zartmann (1989: 267 – 268, 1995:147), 
come to term a “hurting stalemate”. It had become evident to the leadership of 
the status quo in South Africa that the policy of apartheid was becoming more 
and more difficult to sustain, as the costs of defending apartheid steadily 
escalated. On the other hand, the forces struggling against apartheid were 
equally aware that they were unlikely to be successful in their armed struggle. 
According to Sisk, "By the mid-nineteen-eighties, neither the white minority  
regime, nor the forces of liberation could unilaterally defeat the other, and 
neither could unilaterally succeed in constructing an alternative political order. 
" (1993:79) 
 
Sisk proceeds to mention the "limited reforms" of  President P.W. Botha as 
resulting in an upsurge of resistance, and leading to an "intensified cycle of 
revolt and repression". According to this view, a situation of dual power 
existed in the country that was roughly equal in balance between the ANC and 
the South African Government. The ANC and its allied liberation forces were 
in control of the townships, and had widespread international credibility, 
whereas the government controlled the central state organs, especially the 
security forces and monetary and fiscal policy, and “In the context of this 
relative symmetry of power, these actors and their allies became the two main 
contenders in the South African conflict.” (Sisk, 1993:78). 
 
Although a hurting stalemate is often cited in conflict theory as a pre-disposing  
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factor, or even a pre-condition for the negotiated settlement of a conflict151, 
very few scholars, or observers of the South African political scene predicted 
the move towards a negotiated settlement in South Africa in 1989.152 
So why did talks then begin precisely when they did? Lemarchand (1994”: 
603) presents the same question, attributed to Robert Kaplan, as follows: How 
does one explain South Africa, where a unified and peaceful nation is 
emerging from three hundred years of institutional racism? Obviously, in 
retrospect it is easier to answer such a question, but it remains a difficult one. 
We concur with Sisk, however, when he writes of a "…confluence of 
unforeseeable precipitating events" that took place, driving the South African 
parties towards Negotiation (1993:79). 
 
The combination of a number of socio-economic  and political factors came 
together to unlock the logjam, and transform the ongoing cycle of resistance 
and repression that had long characterised the South African Political scene. 
 
Bethlehem, for instance (1993: 145) stresses the additional role of economic 
factors in bringing about the democratization process in South Africa. It was 
not so much the effects of sanctions, though, but the realization on the part of 
                                                 
 
151 According to Anstey (1991     ) William Zartmann concurs, but adds the additional element to the hurting 
stalemate – that it should be “…associated with a recent or looming catastrophe that acts as a deadline or 
remembered warning and threatens to impose additional and unacceptable costs of a higher magnitude” But 
this in itself is also not necessarily sufficient. The parties need to have a way out. Lieberfeld, in his 1999 article 
“Ripeness Revisited” in Negotiation Journal, Vol. 15 No. 1, provides a critical assessment of Zartmann’s 
ripeness argument, specifically using South Africa and Israel/Palestine as case studies. 
 
152 Note for instance the work of Haas, where a very poor chance of a negotiated settlement is postulated, as 
late as 1990. According to Haas’s model of ripeness, the following four conditions should pertain: A shared 
perception of the desirability of an accord; political leadership should be able to agree to a particular accord; 
there must be sufficient evidence of a compromise on both sides; there must be a mutually acceptable 
approach or process.  Miall, et al (2000: 96) also support the view of the unexpected nature of settlement in 
South Africa, stating that: “ In the late 1980s many were predicting catastrophe for South Africa, while few 
foresaw calamity in Yugoslavia."(96) Lemarchand (1994),  and Camay and Gordon (2000) all support the 
unexpected nature of the peaceful South African transition. Horowitz, in his book: A Democratic South Africa, 
speaks quite pessimistically of the "...the long-shot character of the democratic gamble in South Africa..." 
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the National Party that the economic forces of integration could not be 
resisted that provided the impetus towards settlement.  These points are 
supported by Adam, et al, (2004 : 222 - 223), who also downplay the role of 
economic sanctions, but stress the increasing interdependence of the white 
and black components of South African society, and the realization on the part 
of the ruling party that full segregation was increasingly unattainable. 
 
Sisk also places great emphasis on the emergence of courageous leadership 
in South Africa as the most important contributing factor. He cites Nelson 
Mandela's letter to P.W. Botha (in March, 1989)153, calling for a negotiated 
settlement, and resulting in the 5 July meeting between Mandela and P.W. 
Botha, as evidence of this factor. 
 
The second, related, precipitating event Sisk mentions, is the rise to power of  
South African President F.W. de Klerk, and his choice of a strategy of what is 
called “radical reform” (1993: 79). This aspect is strongly supported by Haas, 
who in the postscript to his book, argues that the steps taken by De Klerk 
provided the “key spark for change” (Haas, 1990: 152), although he was at 
first actually caught off guard by the progress that had already been made in 
contacts between the intelligence community and the ANC (Sparks 1994). 
 
Sisk does not, however, mention the very important seismic shifts taking place 
in international politics in 1989 and 1990, including, particularly, the changes 
that were taking place in the Soviet Union and the demise of communism in 
Eastern Europe.  These were very important events; perhaps the most 
important, in providing the nudge towards negotiations for the South African 
parties. At the international level, the changes in the Soviet Union, the 
subsequent destruction of the Berlin wall, and the disappearance, where the 
South African government was concerned, of the “communist threat” that it 
had used for such a long time as a pretext for its oppression of internal 
opposition, all put pressure on the South African government to seek a 
                                                 
153 See Sparks (1994: 48 - 56) for an account of events leading to the eventual meeting between Mandela 
and P.W.Botha on 5 July, 1989).  
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negotiated agreement to the South African conflict. In a very real sense, the 
credible communist threat to the South African government had disappeared, 
leaving it  feeling more secure. At a different level, the South African 
government could no longer expect the West to provide any further support, 
based on its shared opposition to Soviet-led communism.  In a sense, this 
may have provided the perception of a “way out” against the background of a  
“looming catastrophe”, in terms of Zartmann’s “ripeness” model.154    
 
For the African National Congress the impact was even greater. The 
international developments mentioned above meant that they had lost many 
important sponsors of their armed struggle against apartheid (Lawrence, 
1994: 8), which may have contributed towards a perception of a “looming 
disaster” for their previous strategy of military struggle. They were therefore 
also under pressure to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner. 
 
The experience of the South African Government during its negotiations over 
the settlement of Namibian independence additionally provided an important 
precedent, and an important learning experience in terms of the possibilities 
presented by negotiation. Adam et al, for instance, drawing on South African 
diplomatic sources make the point that the Namibian process was “crucial” for 
the subsequent settlement in South Africa. It convinced the South African 
government that it was possible to talk to “terrorists” and still attain a 
satisfactory agreement (Adam, Adam  and Moodley, (2004: 229).  
 
Lieberfeld supports these arguments, adding that early contacts between the 
National Party leadership, and that of the ANC, including the imprisoned 
Nelson Mandela made negotiations thinkable (1999:63 – 82). Schlemmer 
                                                 
 
154 Zartmann (1985) suggests that conflicts are ripe for resolution in the face of two different types of 
stalemate – plateaus or precipices. The plateau occurs when parties to a conflict realise that they are unable 
to achieve their aims, resolve the problem or win the conflict. It is the prospect of  an extended, uncomfortable 
and costly  standoff  with little prospect of subsequent improvement. Where the precipice is concerned, both 
parties realise that things will deteriorate rapidly should they not negotiate a settlement. 
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(1991:15) makes the point very well, when he states that “Rather than one, 
there are at least one dozen factors which have to be considered in assessing 
the now famous speech of 2 February 1990.” 
 
Against this background, on 2 February 1990,  President F.W. De Klerk made 
his historic announcement concerning the unbanning of the liberation 
movements, the release of Nelson Mandela and his intention to seek a 
negotiated settlement. A series of agreements, or pacts was reached between 
the ANC and the South African government,  that set the stage for a 
negotiated settlement. The Groote Schuur Minute155 was signed on May 14, 
1990, and was followed on 6 August of the same year by the Pretoria 
Minute156.  The National Peace Accord eventually followed. It has to be seen 
against the background of escalating violence in South Africa, which we will 
deal with below. 
  
7.4 Pre – Election Violence in South Africa 
South Africa had been characterised by high levels of political violence during 
the decade of the eighties, as liberation movements sought to mobilise the 
population against the apartheid state, and as the state, in its turn, clamped 
down on their activities.157 
                                                 
155 According to Waldmeir (1997:161), the Groote Schuur Minute was intended simply to clear obstacles to 
negotiation. She goes on: “In reality, Groote Schuur was about bonding, and being seen to bond, in the eyes 
of the nation and the world. Nothing substantive was agreed there – except to keep on talking. But the images 
of Groote Schuur will remain, like postcards, in the national memory. 
 
156 The Pretoria Minute set up a working group to deal with the questions of how to define and release 
political prisoners, and how to grant immunity to exiles and underground activists. The government undertook 
to review security legislation and both parties agreed to take steps to curb violence. In the Pretoria minute, the 
report of the working group was accepted, the ANC announced that it was suspending armed actions, and 
both parties stated that the way was then open to proceed towards constitutional negotiations (See for 
instance, Johnston,  (1993: 3), and  Sparks,  (1994 ). 
 
157 Peter Gastrow, discussing political violence in South Africa, mentions that political violence killed an 
average of  44 persons per month in the mid – 1970’s. Later, in the mid-eighties, the monthly average of 
fatalities had risen to 86. In the 1990’s, however, it had risen to more than 250 per month. An escalatory trend 
is clearly visible, and seemed to accelerate with the onset of pre-negotiation and negotiation proper. 
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Although it might have been reasonably expected that violence might 
decrease after the embarkation on a course of negotiated settlements, the 
levels of political violence actually escalated alarmingly, as can be seen from 
the graph below. The epicentres of the violence were in the Natal Midlands, 
and in the townships of the East Rand. 
 
Many reasons for this development have been forwarded, and most relate to 
the positioning for advantage prior to, and during the negotiation process, by 
the main parties to the conflict. Others prefer to portray the violence as a 
strategy used by those who wished to bring about the collapse of the 
negotiation process158.  
 
Whatever the reason for the increasing levels of violence, it became clear to 
South Africans in the early nineties, that violence posed a very real threat to 
the ultimate success of the negotiation process. It became abundantly clear 
that something had to be done to address the issue159. Figure 7.1 depicts the 
levels of political violence in South Africa in the decade 1985 to 1995. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
158There are a veritable plethora of attempts at explanation of the political violence of the early nineties. Many 
of them are mono-causal explanations, while others seek to explain the phenomenon in respect of more 
complex models. See for instance, Adam, H.,and Moodley, K., The Negotiated Revolution, p 229, where the 
authors discuss various explanations of the violence. Bradshaw, et al, (1991) present a multi-dimensional 
explanatory model of the violence. Morris and Hindson (1992) similarly present a very persuasive, multi-
dimensional explanation of the violence, equating it with the effects of the disintegration of Apartheid and the 
dislocations of rapid urbanisation, superimposed on the power play among the parties contesting for political 
advantage outside of the negotiation process. In this account, the most marginalized communities struggle for 
resources in an authority vacuum, left by illegitimate local authorities, where systems of “warlordist” patronage, 
and “comtsotsis” replace local authorities. Violence had become institutionalised, and socially acceptable as a 
means of achieving goals. The local protagonists in these episodes were frequently linked to the national 
goals and aspirations of parties to the larger political conflict, although they were often beyond the control of 
that national leadership. The boundaries between political and criminal violence were also often quite 
indistinct. See also Davidson, A., and Strand, P., (1993) Chap 6 for a discussion on the development of a 
culture of violence, and the ethnic component of the violence. the article by Guelke (2000) is also very 
informative in this regard. 
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Figure 7.1 
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7.5 The Establishment of the National Peace Accord 
Mandela and De Klerk met to discuss the deteriorating security situation in the 
country on 8 December 1990, and subsequently issued a press statement in 
which they stated that their main concern at that time was the ongoing 
violence in the country (Gastrow, 1995: 13). Despite repeated statements by 
political leadership, condemning the violence, and calls by church leaders for 
an end to the violence, brutal incidents continued, and the conflict seemed to 
escalate. The South African Council of Churches issued a statement, highly 
critical of the inability of political leadership to halt the violence. This signalled 
the beginning of an attempt by the SACC to take the lead in pressuring South 
Africa’s political leadership to address the problem of violence. Despite a 
history of dissension among South African churches, they had managed to 
achieve a degree of unity at a national church conference held at Rustenburg 
                                                                                                                                            
159 Gastrow  (1993) writes that by the end of 1990, it had become clear that political violence was directly 
undermining every relevant political group in South Africa, that it was retarding progress towards negotiations, 
and that the long-term stability of the country was being threatened by the fighting. See also  Bradshaw,  
(1994 ) for a discussion of the  political violence preceding  the establishment of the National Peace Accord. 
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in November 1990, where the Dutch Reformed Church also took the historical 
step of admitting its role in the establishment and support of the policy of  
apartheid. The Rustenburg Declaration called, among other things, for the 
organisation of a peace conference to end the violence (Camay & Gordon, 
2000: 4). 
A committee was established by the conference, headed by Rev Frank 
Chikane, general secretary of the SACC, and Louw Alberts, to give effect to 
the provisions of the Rustenburg declaration. These two individuals, between 
them, had a broad level of acceptability to different groups in South African 
society.  However, despite the great number of Christians in South Africa, the 
Church-inspired initiative was not yet acceptable to the entire spectrum of 
political leadership. The IFP, and its leader Buthelezi were suspicious of the 
SACC, which they viewed as being overly sympathetic to the ANC.  Although 
the SACC offered to call a peace conference, it had to shelve these plans as it 
became clear that the IFP would not participate (Gastrow,1995:17).  
 
One of the principles characterising the settlement process was the frequent 
use of “dual mediator” using representatives, or individuals acceptable to each 
of the important sides, in a joint role. So for instance, Louw Alberts and Frank 
Chikane, Ball and Tutu, and other instances as well. This is important for 
establishing trust under conditions where no individual could be trusted by all 
parties. Another principle embodied in these events is the realization of the 
importance of the “partial insider”, as mediator, rather than the more generally 
accepted “impartial outsider”160. Business and church leaders were not 
impartial outsiders. They were South Africans with their own stakes in the 
conflict.  In the 1990’s the importance of the possible use of “partial insiders” 
began to be stressed in the conflict resolution literature, as for instance by 
Lederach (1997:50). 
 
                                                 
 
160 According to Lederach, (1997:50)  “An insider partial approach involves intermediaries from within the 
conflict setting who as individuals enjoy the trust and confidence of one side in the conflict but who as a team 
provide balance and equity in their mediating work.” He goes on to explain that partiality need not be a 
detriment to intervention, and may, in fact constitute what he calls “a significant resource”. 
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In a letter to the state president on 5 April, 1991, the ANC had indicated that 
the government was not doing all in its power to prevent the violence. It made 
demands, including a demand for the dismissal of Ministers Malan and Vlok, 
(Gastrow, 1995)161 and certain other measures aimed at ending the violence, 
to be met by May 9. De Klerk responded, announcing his intention of 
establishing a special commission of inquiry into the violence, and also the 
calling of a peace conference to discuss the violence, to be held on May 24 
and 25 in Pretoria. The peace conference proposal was endorsed in principal 
by the ANC, but it objected to its being convened unilaterally by the South 
African government, which the ANC saw as partisan, and insufficiently 
independent to legitimately sponsor such a conference (Haysom, 1992:33, 
Gastrow, 1995:19). Business, and more conservative parties supported De 
Klerk’s conference, but the ANC and its allies refused to attend. Amidst 
continuing, escalating violence at the time162, the situation took on crisis 
proportions. Behind the scenes intervention by senior church leaders, meeting 
with De Klerk and Mandela attempted to defuse the crisis. It was feared that 
the forthcoming peace conference might, in the absence of participation by 
the ANC, COSATU and the PAC, actually lead to an escalation of the 
violence. 
 
The reverend Frank Chikane announced that the church leaders were 
planning a national peace conference in the event that all the parties did not 
attend De Klerk’s conference. Mandela welcomed this peace initiative by the 
SACC in an address to South African business leadership on May 16, 
organised by the Consultative Business Movement (CBM). He explained why 
he would not attend the summit, and urged the president not to proceed with 
the meeting. Mandela also urged the businessmen to help end political 
violence (Gastrow, 1995: 20). 
 
                                                 
 
161 Magnus Malan was the minister of Defence and Adrian Vlok the Minister of Police at the time. They were 
regarded as incapable of controlling the violence, and therefore in need of replacement. (improve – check) 
 
162 During the final weekend of April, 1991, 50 people had been reported killed, and 200 wounded in Natal 
and on the Witwatersrand. 
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At an emergency meeting held the next day, the CBM decided that the 
business community should collaborate with the churches to attempt to keep 
the negotiation process on track. The issue was also immediately raised with 
Chikane, who informed CBM national organiser, Colin Coleman that Buthelezi 
was not in favour of the church-sponsored peace conference. It had been 
becoming clearer that in a rapidly polarizing situation, the churches were no 
longer regarded as sufficiently neutral by the more conservative parties, 
including the IFP. They were seen to be too close to the ANC. On the other 
hand, business was actively promoting De Klerk’s peace summit, which was 
being opposed by the ANC and its allies. It was decided that business and the 
church with “…other nonpartisan groups from civil society…” should jointly 
attempt to bring all the parties together (Gastrow, 1995: 21). 
 
What followed was a period of frenetic activity by business leadership, and the 
South African Council of Churches, in an attempt to bring political leadership 
to an effective peace conference.  On the afternoon of 17 May, a meeting was 
held with representatives of the SACC, CBM and SACOB. Jay Naidoo, 
secretary general of COSATU was also asked to attend. In interactions with 
the State President, it was learned that De Klerk still intended to go ahead 
with his summit. He was prepared to concede, however, that this was part of a 
larger process, and that he would be asking a facilitating group to proceed 
with bringing all the parties together for a subsequent conference. This 
response indicated a  recognition on De Klerk’s behalf of the importance of a 
sound intervention process. Thus it was that the danger of establishing an 
exclusive, and in all likelihood, unsuccessful peace process was averted. 
When the government’s meeting was held, government spokesman, Gerrit 
Viljoen stressed in conciliatory tone, that the conference should merely be 
seen as the first in a series of steps  (Gastrow, 1995: 22,23), so avoiding the 
impression that the government was exclusively, putting all its eggs in one 
basket. This helped the Government save face and simultaneously allowed for 
a broader conceptualization of  the peace process.  
 
On the 22nd June 1991, a preparatory meeting for a peace summit was held. 
Closed to the media, it represented about 20 different organisations. It was 
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here that the broader aspects of the future Peace Accord were mapped out, 
after a brainstorming session. It was also decided that the existing facilitating 
committee, with the addition of three representatives each from the 
Government, the ANC and the IFP be requested to handle the preparations 
for a National Peace Convention. Working groups were also established to 
examine the following five specific issues: A code of conduct for political 
parties, a code of conduct for security forces, socio-economic reconstruction 
and development, implementation and monitoring and process, secretariat 
and monitoring. These elements were later integrated into a single text that 
would become the National Peace Accord.  The Consultative Business 
Movement provided administrative support for the entire process, with 
financing coming from the government (Spies, 2000: 4). 
 
7.6 Signing the National Peace Accord 
Finally, on 14 September, 27 parties adopted the Peace Accord, at a Peace 
Convention at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg. It was attended by political 
parties, traditional leaders, trade union leaders and self-governing homeland 
leaders and newspaper editors.  The three rightwing parties declined to 
participate, and the PAC and Azapo refused to sign, on grounds of their 
unwillingness to serve with the government on any structures, although they 
did indicate their support for the Accord.  
 
The leaderships of Bophutatswana, Transkei and Venda homelands also 
refused to sign the Peace Accord. Although Ciskei’s leadership did sign, it 
later also withdrew from the implementation of the accord (Spies 2000: 4).  
 
The Peace Convention was a very significant event, managing to bring 
together political leadership from across a very broad political spectrum, as 
well as important elements of civil society including churches, trade unions, 
business and media. It served to demonstrate that despite their deep-seated 
differences, the parties could manage to cooperate to manage their 
differences (Spies 2000: 4). 
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Figure 7. 2  The Signatories of the NPA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the interesting developments in the South African attempt to deal with 
violence, was the emergence of a form of conflict intervention that was entirely 
internal. It bears closer examination, as a model for other societies in conflict 
– and provides an answer as to how impartial and widely acceptable 
intervention can occur, even in societies that are extremely deeply conflicted, 
or polarised. Even Zartman, (1989 a) for instance, writing on conflict in an 
At the National Peace Convention, the following parties signed up to the 
National Peace Accord: 
• African National Congress 
• Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of South Arica 
• Confederation of Metal and Building Unions 
• Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
• Congress of South African Trade Unions 
• Democratic Party/ Gazankulu Governmnent 
• Dikwankwetla Party/ Qwa Qwa Government 
• Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
• Ximoko Progressive Party 
• Inkatha Freedom Party 
• Intando ye Sizwe party 
• Inyandza National Movement/KaNgwane Government 
• KwaNdebele Government 
• Kwa Zulu Government 
• Labour Party of South Africa 
• Lebowa Government 
• United People’s Front 
• Merit People’s Party 
• National Forum 
• National Party/ Government of South Africa 
• National People’s Party of South Africa 
• Solidarity Party 
• South African Communist Party 
• United Workers’ Union of South Africa 
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African context, takes for granted the role of a conciliator, providing the 
leverage necessary to manage the conflict.  Most sources call for an outside,  
neutral intervenor. Yet one of the principles characterising the settlement 
process was the frequent use of “dual mediator” using representatives, or 
individuals acceptable to each of the important sides, in a joint role. So for 
instance, we have Louw Alberts and Frank Chikane, Ball and Tutu, and other 
instances as well. This is important for establishing trust under conditions 
where no individual could be trusted by all parties. Another principle embodied 
in these events is the realization of the importance of the “partial insider”, as 
mediator, rather than the more generally accepted “impartial outsider” 163. 
Business and church leaders were not impartial outsiders. They were South 
Africans with their own stakes in the conflict. The practice of dual insider-
partial facilitation was further developed in the life of the NPA, where many 
LPCs and RPCs were jointly chaired by business and church representatives. 
 
This development points to the additional importance for conflict management 
of a strong civil society in a deeply conflicted country – a civil society able to 
provide strong, neutral facilitators. It presupposes a ready supply of 
individuals with organisational experience, cross-cultural sensitivity, and 
related acumen and “social capital” that one associates with a relatively 
developed society.  It is noteworthy that so much of the facilitation provided 
during the South African transformation process came from the very well 
developed business sector in the country. 
 
 
7.7 The Structures of the National Peace Accord 
The Peace Accord that was signed on 14 September 1991, was an extensive 
document, containing a set of principles of pluralist democracy, codes of 
conduct for political parties and the security forces, as well as a set of 
structures variously tasked with preventing and managing public violence and 
                                                 
 
163 According to Lederach, (1997:50)  “An insider partial approach involves intermediaries from within the 
conflict setting who as individuals enjoy the trust and confidence of one side in the conflict but who as a team 
provide balance and equity in their mediating work.” He goes on to explain that partiality need not be a 
detriment to intervention, and may, in fact constitute what he calls “a significant resource”. 
 206
intimidation in the country. 164  According to Chris Spies:   “The agreement 
was rooted in a number of basic values. It promoted democratic principles of 
good governance, mutual responsibility and accountability. It explicitly 
recognized the fundamental rights and freedoms of conscience and belief, 
speech and expression and, association, movement, peaceful assembly and 
peaceful political activity. These commitments were especially significant 
given the [South African] history of authoritarianism and political intolerance” 
(Spies, 2002: 4).   Because it was realised that many of the causes of the 
violence were structural, and related to economic deprivation and inequality, 
attention was also given in the document to socio-economic reconstruction 
and development. Chapters additionally included principles for the 
enforcement of the provisions of the accord, and the provision of a witness 
protection programme in respect of evidence concerning incidents of public 
violence and intimidation. Specifically, the NPA required all political parties 
and organisations to publicly condemn violence, and to encourage an 
understanding of democracy and democratic tolerance, to prevent their 
members from killing, injuring, intimidating or threatening violence toward 
others because of their political beliefs, and to assist the police in their 
investigation of violence, and monitor people’s involvement in violence (NPA). 
 
The security forces were required to protect all people from taking sides, to 
act to prevent crimes, using as little force as possible, and to work together 
with communities to combat violence and rebuild trust. No bias should be 
shown towards any political belief, and regular consultation should be 
maintained with the peace committees. Special procedures to investigate 
political violence were to be implemented, and those carrying illegal weapons 
were to be disarmed (NPA: Chap1). 
 
                                                 
 
164 The NPA is included in its entirety as Addendum 3 below 
 
 207
If there was no discernable theory of conflict behind the establishment of the 
NPA, as Gastrow (1995)165 alludes, there was, at least an understanding 
behind the establishment of the National Peace Accord, that the causes of 
conflict in the country were manifold, and indeterminate. It therefore 
subsumed a comprehensive set of approaches, intended to address many 
different possible causes of conflict and conflict escalation. It looked to enable 
improved communication among all the parties, through its committee system. 
It included the means to investigate various occurrences of violent behaviour, 
searching for the causes.  In this regard, it also resembled, or contained 
elements of an early warning system. The conduct of the various security 
forces and political parties, additionally was to be governed by a strict code, 
which they were to monitor, in collaboration with the peace structures. 
According to Lederach, the NPA constituted a process that, although it was 
constituted by top-level leaders, engaged especially the middle levels of 
societal leadership.  He writes that “…the rubric of formal negotiations 
between top-level leaders set in motion a process of transition and socio-
political transformation that specifically contemplated numerous levels of 
activity across  society” (1997:51). The structures of the NPA are represented 
in figure 7.3 below. 
                                                 
165 Gastrow  (1995) maintains that the National Peace Accord was a largely ad hoc response to a crisis 
situation, without any specific theoretical base. 
 208
SOUTH AFRICA’S NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD 
STRUCTURES 
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FIGURE 7.3 
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The structures resulting from the National Peace Accord were as follows: 
 
7.7.1 The National Peace Secretariat (NPS), which had the responsibility of 
administration and coordination of the entire project.  It was to consist of 
no fewer than four members, nominated by the National Peace 
Committee, and one official of the Department of Justice.  A maximum of 
four additional members could also be appointed (N PA:  Chap. 7). In 
practice there were nine members, with the four most important 
signatories at the national level, the ANC, the NP, the IFP and the DP 
being represented.  The NPS fell under the chairpersonship of Dr 
Antonie Gildenhuys, and employed a number of administrative officials, 
many of whom were secondments from the private sector, as well as 
from government departments; particularly the Department of Justice. 
Eight of the nine members were nominated by the National Peace 
Committee, to ensure that a spectrum  of interests were represented, 
and the ninth member was an official from the Department of Justice. 
Members of the National Peace Secretariat were formally appointed by 
the State President, to serve for a period of three years (Gastrow, 1995: 
45). 
 
7.7.2 The National Peace Committee (NPC), which consisted of 
representatives of all the parties signatory to the accord, as well as the 
church and business.  In reality, the full National Peace Committee had 
only met once, at the inception of the National Peace Accord.  
Theoretically, it stood at the apex of a structure of peace committees, 
established at regional and at local levels. The NPC was given the task of 
monitoring the implementation of the National Peace Accord, resolving 
any contraventions of the codes of conduct, and assuming responsibility 
for socio-economic reconstruction and development (NPA, Chapter 8). 
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7.7.3 Regional and Local Dispute Resolution Committees The Peace 
Accord envisaged that the country would be divided  into regions, each of 
which would have its own Regional Dispute Resolution Committee 
(RDRC), established by the National Peace Secretariat. These 
committees were made up of representatives from political organisations, 
the church, trade unions, commerce and industry, and local and tribal 
authorities as well as the police and the defence force, at the regional 
level. They would draw their legitimacy from their representivity. The 
intended function of the RDRCs was to work to prevent violence and 
intimidation at the regional level, and to set up Local Dispute Resolution 
Committees in their regions (Gastrow,1995: 45). Eventually, eleven 
Regional Peace Committees (at first called Regional Dispute Resolution 
Committees) were established, and two hundred and sixty three Local 
Peace Committees were also set up.  The Regional Peace Committees 
were serviced by the National Peace Secretariat at the national level, as 
well as by their regional office staff. See Addendum B for a list of the 
committees eventually established under the auspices of the Peace 
Accord. 
 
The Local Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRC’s) had an important 
peacemaking and peace-building role, dealing with the settling of disputes 
causing public violence or intimidation. According to Gastrow (1995:45), these 
bodies also served a liaison function with local authorities concerning the 
holding of rallies, marches and gatherings of various kinds. An examination of 
the minutes of the Port Elizabeth LDRC (or Peace Committee as it was later 
renamed) supports this assertion and also indicates how multi-party 
discussion of local events and underlying tensions allowed the committee to 
take early preventive action to control the development of conflict (See, for 
Instance, the minutes of meetings of the Port Elizabeth  LPC). 
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7.7.4 The Commission on Public Violence and Intimidation: Predating the 
signing of the National Peace Accord by a few months, this commission 
was merged with the NPA, to become the third leg of the peace structures, 
under the chairpersonship of Justice Richard Goldstone.  Its main 
functions, in terms of its founding legislation, The Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation Act, No 139 of 1991,  were to investigate 
incidents of public violence and intimidation, with a view to uncovering the 
perpetrators of the many incidences of political violence taking place at the 
time, and which were the subject of so many recriminations and 
counter-recriminations, that they bedevilled and often even threatened the 
negotiation process. It was then to bring this information to the attention of 
the Peace Committee. The Commission was to investigate the causes of 
the violence, make recommendations to combat the cycle of violence, 
make recommendations to prevent further violence, establish research 
programmes to provide empirical, scientific data on the violence, and to 
make recommendations concerning the funding of the peace process.  
The Goldstone Commission, as it became known, was also given a 
regional presence through its reporting officers (mainly lawyers) situated in 
the eleven "peace committee" regions of the country. The Commission 
was formally linked to the National Peace Structures through the 
provisions of Chapter 6 of the National Peace Accord. 
 
7.8    Financial Arrangements 
The structures of the National Peace Accord were funded from a number of 
different sources. Initially, in terms of the Accord, the funding of the structures 
would be provided and managed by the Department of Justice.  In 1994 this role 
was transferred to the Department of Home Affairs. The exact levels of funding 
were not specified by the Accord, and were often considered insufficient by the 
National Peace Secretariat.  The South African private sector, and international 
aid agencies, especially the British and Danish, also provided funding, and staff 
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were seconded to the peace structures from local business and organisations of 
South African civil society (Ball, 1997: 5). 
 
The provision of funding from government to the peace structures led to the 
perception by some of its opponents that the structures were under government 
control, and perhaps therefore not sufficiently neutral for the job. From June 
1993, the Secretariat was therefore empowered to administer its own funds, to 
obviate bureaucratic bottlenecks and delays in the payment of the various 
consultants who carried out much of the training and intervention work under its 
auspices (Gastrow,1995: 53) 
 
The budget, which in 1993/4 was just over R 41 million, was generally insufficient 
for its purpose, but this was surmounted by the extensive use of volunteers at 
local levels, where for instance all peace monitors were volunteers (Camay and 
Gordon, 2000: 10). 
 
7.9 Peace Accord Activities 
Within eighteen months of the signing of the Peace Accord, eleven regional 
peace committees, and eighty-five local peace committees were established, and 
many more were in the process of being established (Star, 4.6.93). Eventually, 
more than 260 LPCs were established around the country (Spies, 2002). 
 
The activities of the peace accord were many and varied. A summary of the more 
typical activities which took place under the auspices of the regional and local 
peace committees are therefore summarised and represented in tabular form 
below: 
 
                7.9.1 Committee Activities: Conflict analysis, debate and decision-making 
took place with regard to conflict intervention, peace-building, structural 
development and maintenance, and the organisation of activities such as 
peace-days, marketing and training etc. It was in the committees that people got 
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to know each other in new ways. Susan Collin-Marks, a Western Cape RPC 
member puts it thus:  South Africans had never met one another before like this, 
face-to-face, and over time we learned to turn away from our habit of fearing one 
another and instead began to face our common problems and jointly find 
solutions.” (2000: 16). 
 
7.9.2 Monitoring Activities: Observation and monitoring of Political activity of 
all kinds took place, including the monitoring of protest marches , rallies, funerals 
and other activities such as political meetings and eventually, also the first 
democratic elections, in 1994. This activity involved huge numbers of volunteer 
monitors literally placing their bodies in the line of fire, between the marching 
protesters, and the security forces.  
 
7.9.3 Intervention activities: Mediation and facilitation of all kinds of conflict 
situations, by peace secretariat staff, peace committee members and outside 
experts took place. Local peace agreements were brokered in some of the most 
violence-prone communities in Natal. Elsewhere, facilitation of adjunct 
processes, or extensions of the Accord also took place, for instance the 
formulation of regional or local electoral codes in the lead-up to the election, by 
the parties themselves.166 Disputes with the potential for violence were identified, 
and arrangements were put in place to provide suitable mediation. 
 
7.9.4 Training activities: Training events for team-building, needs 
assessment, training of Peace Committees in conflict handling skills, including 
conflict analysis, mediation, facilitation and negotiation skills, brainstorming and 
strategic planning took place extensively.  Training of monitors in a wide range of 
skills, including radio operation, first aid, basic intervention etc., and the training 
of office staff in administrative skills etc. also took place. Although training began 
                                                 
 
166 See for instance correspondence between Tessendorf and Bradshaw and the Electoral Code formulated by 
parties in the Eastern Cape Region. 
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in an ad hoc fashion, it was eventually coordinated by the national training 
committee, and regional training committees were established to monitor, assess 
and develop training (Minutes, NPS Training sub-committee meetings 21 June 
1993, 26 August 1993, 6 December 1993, 27,28 June 1994, 6 May 2005). Most 
LPCs and all RPCs received some training.  
 
The National Peace Secretariat training subcommittee typically processed 
training matters including: Examining the possibility of producing its own training 
videos, the issuing of training certificates to trainees,  the level of remuneration 
paid to trainers,  the format of training evaluation reports,  the need for joint 
training sessions with the South African Police, training of peace monitors, 
recruitment of trainees, training of election monitors, and the development of 
suitable curricula, coordinating a joint  training programme with Technikon RSA 
for peace marshals, where the following content areas were mooted: human 
rights, dynamics of crowd control, municipal laws, unarmed combat, radio 
communication skills and first aid.  
 
Additionally, training for documentation and information handling in conjunction 
with the Goldstone Commission, was discussed, as was the development of 
funding proposals for monitoring training and marshall training programmes. The 
improvement of coordination of communication on training to the regions from 
national also received attention. Report-backs on numbers trained during the 
period were also tabled (Minutes, NPS Training sub-committee meetings 21 June 
1993, 26 August 1993, 6 December 1993, 27,28 June 1994, 6 May 2005 ). See 
also report on NPS training activities, included as Addendum E hereunder. 
 
7.9.5 SERD Activities: SERD Committees were established to facilitate 
development projects that would help put an end to the violence. Poverty among 
black South Africans was widely recognised as one of the root causes of the 
violence, so the SERD committees attached to the various RPCs were intended 
to work hand in hand with communities at grassroots levels on local development 
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projects that addressed needs that were a source of violent conflict (Collin-Marks, 
2000:19). The facilitation of development - related conflicts, by linking 
communities to service providers, and other resources occurred later in the 
process, and only to a very limited extent. This was one of the more 
disappointing activity areas, and will be discussed below. 
 
7.9.6 Marketing Activities: Media liaison took place, including the, 
organisation of Peace Day activities, distribution of peace T-shirts, buttons, 
stickers, flags and so forth. The peace accord, its structures and the general idea 
of peace and creative conflict management received much positive coverage on 
radio stations and on television. These activities were designed to raise the 
profile of the peace structures in the minds of ordinary South Africans. 
Competitions were widely held, calling for the design of peace posters and the 
composition of peace songs. The T-shirt sporting the peace-dove logo of the 
Peace Accord was a familiar memento of the peace process for many years after 
its termination. 
 
7.9.7 The Goldstone Commission: In line with its mandate, the Goldstone 
Commission issued a number of reports concerning the causes of violence in 
South Africa. It strove to be as objective as possible, and to be perceived  as 
being objective (Camay and Gordon, 15).  It commissioned research into the 
causes of violence by among others, the HSRC. Among its recommendations 
were proposals for urgent measures to govern public gatherings (Business Day 
30.4.1993). For instance, the commission linked train violence to the political 
conflict between the ANC and the IFP and recommended that the parties 
promote political tolerance amongst their supporters (Citizen, 18.5.1993). Other 
matters that the Commission investigated and reported upon, was the high 
incidence of violence in the taxi industry, which was seen as being unrelated to 
political conflict. Violence in and around hostels was another subject of the 
attention of the commission, which was addressed by a number of proposals 
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governing the carrying of weapons, control of rumours, educational programmes 
and more democratic governance of the hostels  ( Star, 31.5.93). 
  
 7.10 Achievements of the Peace Accord 
A number of observers of the South African political scene have made the point 
that the signing of the peace accord, and the setting up of structures in its name 
was not a great success.  They point to the fact that if one examines the statistics 
on violence in the country immediately before the establishment of the accord, 
and compare these with the statistics on the period after the implementation of 
the accord, there is no noticeable decline in the number of deaths and violent 
incidents.  If anything the trend is in the opposite direction.  Unfortunately, in this 
regard, the unsophisticated analysis of statistics can prove to be misleading.  
One needs to take into account the huge number of incidents of public protest, 
relating to the negotiating process then underway, during the period after the 
establishment and during the operation of the Accord, and the degree of public 
disillusionment after the breakdown of Codesa, and in the wake of the 
assassination of Chris Hani. Indeed, given the history of conflict in South Africa, 
the breakdown of relationships and the degree of inequality which existed, certain 
accomplishments do assume the proportions of miracles.167 
 
The point has also been made (McCall, 2000), that the nature of the violence in 
the country changed after the establishment of the National Peace Accord, when 
much of the violence was forced underground, and so-called Third Force Activity 
made an appearance. Violence before and after the establishment of the Accord 
is therefore not directly comparable. 
 
The accomplishment of a peaceful election in April 1994 is simply one of a 
number of achievements which are due in large part to the work of the Peace 
                                                 
 
167 Mark Anstey (1999: 285) supports the view of the NPA being  an effective conflict intervention exercise as 
follows: “Although it was criticized as failing in its intent to bring about an end to violence, it served a valuable role 
in attenuating confrontation and as a reference point for those seeking to mediate a non-violent change process.” 
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Accord, however. The fact that the Codesa negotiations began within just three 
months after the signing of the peace accord indicates that it “…quickly fulfilled its 
primary function” of getting the negotiations on track (Mc Call and Duncan, 2000: 
165, 166).  
 
When the Codesa negotiations broke down in mid-1992, many observers close to 
the process expressed the opinion that the only forum in which the parties 
continued to meet was in the structures of the Peace Accord, and that it was from 
this base that the Multi-Party Negotiating Process which eventually delivered the 
interim constitution was launched.  The occurrence of violence in the aftermath of 
the assassination of Chris Hani was also surprisingly low, considering the mood 
of the people at that time. 
 
It should be stressed as well, that the activities of the Peace structures at the 
local level, often became the main focal point of the community; the only forum 
available to the community, within which a vast range of civic, developmental and 
political problems could be resolved.  In this regard, the local peace committees 
can be thought of as a sort of universal "second track", providing enabling 
conditions for the first track, high-level political negotiations that were taking 
place.168 Also, by controlling the effects of rumours , aggressive language, and 
various protests at local levels, violence was often averted (McCall and Duncan, 
2000: 166). 
 
The National Peace accord and its structures succeeded because it 
accomplished the following: 
 
• It popularised the concept of negotiation, and, in fact institutionalised it where 
it counted - at the grassroots level (Bradshaw, 1994).  On the role of the 
peace committees, they created a “physical and psychological space” where 
                                                 
 
168 See for instance Burton (1984) for a discussion of first and second-track processes. 
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differences could be resolved. They also negotiated disputes and performed 
the role of unbiased third party facilitators, or mediators (Ball and Spies, 1999: 
8). 
• The peace accord made resources, such as the “professional skills, 
experience and reputation for neutrality” of conflict management specialists 
(McCall and Duncan: 169) available; again, this occurred at the grassroots 
level, where they were in shortest supply, and most urgently needed. The 
NPA structures also channelled general management expertise and financial 
assistance from the private sector into the committee system, through 
donations and secondments. 
• Ordinary people, in large numbers, were equipped with conflict resolution 
skills. Local and Regional Peace Committee members were trained in conflict 
analysis, and negotiation, facilitation and mediation skills, by conflict 
resolution-oriented NGOs, academic institutions and foreign experts. Later 
some of these same people, and others were also trained in marshalling of 
political events, and election monitoring (Bradshaw, 1994, National Training 
Committee Minutes, 21/6/93, 26/8/93, 6/12/1993, 6/5/1994). Lederach 
(1997:51) makes a similar point as follows: “Central to the overall functioning 
of the peace process was the development of institutional capacities through 
the training of a broad array of individuals to respond to the volatile period of 
transition”. 
• Problem-solving forums were provided. These were often task-orientated, and 
not mere "talk shops". Potential flash-points were identified, and discussed, 
and options for resolution considered, mainly in non-adversarial manner. For 
instance, peace committees often worked with the organisers of political 
events, such as marches, to avoid potentially dangerous routes, and 
maintaining spaces between political opponent’s meetings and marches. 
They also engaged security forces to provide an “adequate but non-
threatening” presence (Ball and Spies, 1999: 8). 169  
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• The legitimacy of the system. Although there was some criticism that the 
peace structures were imposed from the “top down” (Midgely, 1995), due to 
the fact that the accord was developed and contracted at a national level, the 
structures were not imposed from the top down, but were widely negotiated at 
the local levels in the vast majority of cases, among most or all of the relevant 
parties. This gave rise to the not unusual occurrence of individuals from 
parties that had not even signed the accord, participating actively at the local 
levels.170 In fact, Lederach sees the NPA as a “middle-out” process that 
“…builds  on the idea that middle-range leaders (who are often the heads of, 
or closely connected to, extensive networks that cut across the lines of 
conflict) can be cultivated to play an instrumental role in working through the 
conflicts” (1997: 51). Assessing the NPA from the perspective of conflict 
resolution specialists, McCall and Duncan (2000: 169) ascribe the 
“unprecedented legitimacy” of the NPA, to its inclusivity, and the fact that 
committee decisions were made on the basis of consensus, rather than voting 
which has the potential of being divisive.  
• Relationships were built up over time between erstwhile enemies, at the level 
of grassroots leadership, which consistently provided a conflict management 
resource. According to an article in the Mail and Guardian at the time 
(18.6.93), grassroots meetings between members and supporters of rival 
political organisations under the auspices of the NPA provided the greatest 
                                                                                                                                                 
169 Anstey (1999: 285 - 299, 1993) provides an instructive account of how peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
peacemaking mechanisms were all brought to bear on a conflict episode in the Eastern Cape, from the 
development of rules for the conduct of  political demonstrations, through sensitive policing, to the use of what he 
calls “muscle mediation”. Collectively, the responsibility for non-violent demonstrations lay with what he calls the 
safety triangle, of police, government authorities and the organizers of the protest. (1999: 285). 
 
170 This author, as trainer of conflict handling skills to Local Peace Committee members in the Karoo region 
frequently noted a number of members of the Conservative Party, that had not signed the NPA,  who were actively 
involved in the training process, and who contributed very constructively to the activities of those committees. The 
same was true of members of the PAC in the Port Elizabeth region. This is further supported by McCall and 
Duncan (2000: 166), who write that “…the genius of the NPA lies in its (top-down) creation of the system of 
regional and local committees to eventually engage the grassroots leaders in bringing the spirit of the NPA codes 
alive in localized contexts.” 
 220
hope for peace in South Africa.  Similarly, Lederach sees one of the key roles 
of the NPA as having been the identification of key individuals in critical 
locations to work to build an infrastructure “capable of sustaining the general 
progression towards peace” (1997: 51). 
• As a national organisation, the Peace Secretariat provided a network of 
communications through which learning could be transferred from one context 
to another throughout the country. The interactions which took place between 
various government officials and other stakeholders within the RPC’s and 
LPC’s provided a context for communication and trust-building which had not 
been previously available in the country.171 The government’s Directorate for 
Internal Peace Institutions of the Department of Home Affairs, the key 
government link to the NPA structures, was for instance able to build trust 
with the National Peace Secretariat and the peace committees, as well as 
with the political parties, by demonstrating its commitment to peace through 
entering into dangerous situations, alongside the peace monitors (Camay and 
Gordon, 2002: 19). The LPCs also provided the police with a forum to 
communicate their own concerns and views to the other stakeholders, whilst 
simultaneously providing an opportunity for the monitoring of police activities 
in turn. Given the history of illegitimacy of the South African Police, and its 
poor record of relations with the general South African population, this 
development was very important in improving that relationship with a 
consequential improvement of stability and predictability (Camay and Gordon, 
p 22). The principle of forging links between the police and community 
leadership that took place under the auspices of the NPA promoted the 
concept of community policing in South Africa (Camay & Gordon, p23). 
• The extremely broad range of organisations which were active in the peace 
structures was a considerable source of strength.  Not only were almost all 
the political parties represented on its structures, but so were the police, 
                                                 
 
171 For a discussion of how the NPA structures provided a communications network, see for instance Pirashaw 
Camay and Anne Gordon’s NPA case study (2002: 19) For further support, see also Mc Call and Duncan (2000: 
166). 
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academic institutions, and many non-governmental organisations. Ball 
supports this when she writes that “…RPC members were recruited from a 
wide range of civil society organizations, local and tribal authorities, and the 
security forces” (1997:4). International observers also regularly attended the 
meetings of local and regional peace committees as their chief means of 
remaining abreast of political developments in the country (Tessendorf, 1994, 
Gounden and Solomon, 2001). 
• A culture of peace began to develop, and to replace the culture of violence 
which had dominated South African politics thus far. Peace songs, T-shirts, 
badges, the celebration of peace days, and art competitions, and peace work, 
such as conflict intervention and monitoring provided an alternative identity 
definition for many among the alienated population. In the words of  Gounden 
and Solomon (2001), ”The NPA made provision for the establishment of 
regional and local peace committees in every locality in South Africa. The 
result was the spontaneous development of a national ‘peace culture’ from 
grassroots level to the national political leadership. This ‘culture’ did not end 
the violence but arguably, it did mitigate the violence. It was the buffer that 
insulated the peace process and ensured that, despite the high levels of 
violence in the country, the negotiation process could continue.”  The 
Reverend Peter Woods, erstwhile LPC chairperson sees the standout 
accomplishment of the NPA as providing an exemplary modelling of non-
racial, multi-party decision making for the first time in South Africa (Personal 
Interview: 2005). 
• The nature of the NPA was largely voluntary.172 The point has sometimes 
been made, alluding to a weakness of the NPA, that much of the accord 
lacked any basis in law; that it was a voluntary association, with some of the 
political parties deliberately absenting themselves from its structures. The 
point can be made here, however, that the very voluntary nature of the accord 
constituted a source of strength in terms of conflict management theory, so 
                                                 
 
172 See for instance McCall and Duncan, (2000:168). 
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that those parties that participated did so of their own volition. They take 
ownership of their own conflict, and participate on the basis of free choice. 
They have “bought into” the arrangement and  therefore do have a reason to 
make it work. It is, for instance the very voluntary nature of negotiation that is 
often presented as the source of its effectiveness, and the same can be said 
for the South African NPA. 
 
7.11 Shortcomings of the National Peace Accord 
The Peace Accord had its shortcomings. According to Nossel and Shaer (1992), 
the NPA provided measures to bolster peace, but was not a pro-active body to 
anticipate conflict.  In this regard, it was crisis-driven, rather than strategically 
driven.  Illustrative of this is the fact that local and regional committees were 
initially called dispute resolution committees, which implies something of a 
reactive approach.  Although they were later renamed "peace committees",  their 
approach, according to this view remained essentially reactive.  Finances were 
always available for mediation, for instance, but not necessarily for 
relationship-building and problem-solving exercises which might have addressed 
the deeper aspects of the conflict. 
 
Collin Marks has added that the NPA was too white, with whites occupying many 
of the important positions, and that women were seriously underrepresented 
(2000: 13). 
 
Although the political parties and interest groups concerned with the 
management of the South African conflict were convinced of the need for the 
National Peace Accord, and initially supported it at national level with great 
enthusiasm; once it had been established, they focused their attention back on 
the “first track” process - the national constitutional negotiations.  Even after the 
Codesa talks broke down, and the peace structures provided a second track 
which assisted the parties in reaching the negotiating table for the second time, 
the national leadership of the parties soon left the Peace Accord and its 
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structures to its own devices. In fact, the top level political leadership were remiss 
in their treatment of the accord structures, so that the National Peace Committee 
only ever met once. The result was an appalling lack of vision, and planning for 
the future of the Accord at the very top level. This is a perspective that one 
repeatedly detects in discussions with those involved in the process (Personal 
Interview: Woods, 2005). 
 
In this regard, one of the greatest strengths of the National Peace Accord; the 
representivity of its top structures, including the presence of high-level political 
leadership;  also proved to be one of its greatest undoings, as the political 
leadership always had other roles to play, so that after their initial, supportive 
activity, they were attracted by the perceived greater rewards of involvement in 
the negotiation process and the business of politics.  McCall and Duncan provide 
support for this assertion as they write: “The attention of the political elites was 
deflected from the NPA by their rapid passage to second and third steps in that 
transition, before most of the Accord ever got started” (2000:168).  
 
The Peace Accord needed more than the part time consideration of a few 
otherwise very busy politicians and business leaders in its highest structures.  
There had always been a pressing need for the involvement of conflict resolution 
specialists in the decision-making hierarchy of the national organisation.  The 
greatest failure of the NPA as an effective CMS was its inability to deal with 
change and to adjust its vision to accommodate a democratic, but transitional 
and extremely tense phase of political life in South Africa. 
 
The Peace Accord was established at a time when it seemed that violence in 
South Africa was going to prevent or severely hinder the negotiating process.  
Once that process got off the ground, however, the parties to the negotiations 
lost much of their interest in the Accord and left it to sort out is own problems.  It 
was largely left without a vision for transformation in a post-democratic South 
Africa.  Many of the leaders, including those eventually in the new government, 
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could not be blamed for believing that the new, legitimate government would not 
be faced with high levels of violence, and that a legitimate, post-democratic 
police service would easily be able to act in circumstances of public disorder. 
 
Another very serious shortcoming of the peace accord was its failure to address 
the socio-economic reconstruction and development (SERD) aspect of its brief. 
Although socio-economic reconstruction was an important aspect of the thinking 
behind the accord, the SERD structures were set up quite late, and did not 
become operative in most places (see for instance, McCall and Duncan, 2000). 
There was also a fear that attempts to address development issues would give 
rise to even greater conflict, in that the accord structures would be seen to be 
assisting some at the expense of others (Shaw, 1993: 9). There was a feeling 
that this aspect would make the initiative ultimately unworkable, and place the 
entire accord in jeopardy. From the perspective of conflict resolution, this is quite 
unfortunate, as this was one of the elements of the NPA that was intended to 
address deep-rooted aspects of the conflict.  It was Azar, for instance who 
proposed what he called “development diplomacy” as the intervention strategy to 
be used in situations of protracted social conflict (Azar, 1991).  
 
The point has also been made by some that the NPA was biased towards a 
western concept of conflict management,  that was not fully responsive towards 
some of the challenges of its Third World context. For instance, the importance of 
traditional leadership was undervalued, socioeconomic and linguistic realities 
were ignored, spatial segregation made travel to and from meetings expensive 
and dangerous for some Political intolerance, a culture of violence, two 
contrasting police cultures, and a lack of organizational discipline also posed 
serious obstacles (McCall and Duncan, 2000: 168).  
 
One of the glaring shortcomings of the NPA related to its failure to bring about 
immediate behavioural changes to the South African Police. This has been well-
documented, but Rauch (1992) is representative of the literature that stresses the 
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lack of enforcement measures pertaining to the code of conduct for the police, 
and police perception of the NPA as external meddling in their affairs.  Far more 
important, however, is the longer-term impact of police collaboration in 
committees and joint management centres within the peace structures mentioned 
on pages 216, 217 and 218 above.  
 
7.12 The National Peace Accord as a Missed Opportunity for Building 
Conflict Resolution 
The literature on Conflict Management Systems, Jim Laue’s Community Conflict 
Intervention, and John Burton’s vision of conflict provention as a political system, 
all represent, in slightly different forms, the acme of the conflict regulator’s 
objective - the institutionalization of conflict intervention, on a more or less 
permanent, self-sustaining and inclusive basis. This “Holy Grail” of conflict 
intervention, with its elements of social justice, reform and re-institutionalisation, 
is generally recognised as being an extremely elusive development, never fully 
achieved anywhere, but is also recognized by some as having been fleetingly 
embodied in the South African Peace Accord.173 
 
A number of scholars, interested in the development of the conflict resolution 
field, especially as it pertains to deep-rooted social conflict believed that the 
South African National Peace Accord was an extremely important development 
with great potential for moving conflict management forward to a higher, more 
transformative level. For Bradshaw (1994), the Peace Accord represented an 
opportunity to institutionalise conflict management and resolution as John Burton 
(1992) had called for. Similarly, for McCall and Duncan (2000), the Accord and its 
structures represented an opportunity to achieve the Community Conflict 
Intervention vision of Jim Laue, Burton’s colleague at George Mason University; 
                                                 
 
173 In this regard, see, for instance, Bradshaw, (1994), for parallels with conflict management systems, and 
McCall and Duncan, (2000), where the authors elaborate on the ways in which the NPA resonates with Jim Laue’s 
vision of a developmental track for Community Conflict Intervention. Burton, (1992), in his calls for conflict 
provention seems to suggest the need in deep rooted conflicts for some of the attributes reflected in the NPA. 
 
 226
something that even the mediation movement in the United States had been 
unable to achieve174. 
 
From a Conflict resolution perspective, the National Peace Accord consequently 
represents an important missed opportunity for taking conflict management and 
resolution thinking on to the next plane of implementation, and was therefore 
brought to an untimely end in South Africa. 
 
7.13 After the Peace Accord: 
In the wake of the dissolution of the NPA, the high levels of violence continued, 
and the potential for even higher levels remained. One could point to taxi 
violence, unruly sports crowds, political turf battles, rising expectations and 
tensions over development issues. Tensions between the white right wing and 
the government, and tensions within the Zulu nation, as well as between the IFP 
and the ANC also remained serious, giving rise to violence from time to time. In 
some areas, including the Natal midlands, the peace structures were given a 
slightly extended lease of life as a result.  
 
Camay and Gordon also list a number of challenges facing the fledgling South 
African democracy in the period after the 1994 election, that might have been 
dealt with more effectively by the structures of the National Peace Accord. These 
included a lack of credible and fully legitimate local government authorities as an 
                                                 
174 According to Laue, if the field of Community Conflict Intervention was going to flourish, it would have to enter a 
developmental track, and it would have to meet three distinct criteria: 
• It should focus more on preventive and policy-making functions 
• It should establish cross-level linkages “the linking of community and national peacemaking, with 
international peacemaking, and 
• It should achieve through the formation of an umbrella organization of a “critical mass in conflict 
intervention…” 
McCall and Duncan indicate that to some extent, all of these criteria were met in the South African National Peace 
Accord structures (McCall and Duncan, 2000: 161- 163). 
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agent of community conflict resolution. The related problem of effective 
coordination of the Reconstruction and Development Programme that also failed 
to address the embedded, deep-seated community conflicts created by the 
apartheid state, which ultimately contributed to the eventual demise in 1996 of 
the RDP office ( 2000). 
 
The seemingly uncontrollable crime wave that continued to impact South Africa 
was also met with a largely uncoordinated response. Community Police forums 
were eventually established, largely based on the local peace committee model, 
and often with the assistance of former members of the peace committees. 
Vigilantism to deal with the crime wave had also emerged in places. Lusaka 
(1994) also believes that the NPA structures would have been able to address 
community conflicts, including SDU/SPU conflicts, and faction fighting around the 
country. The Eastern Transvaal, East Rand, West Rand, Eastern Cape, 
Kwazulu/Natal were all affected at the time of his writing. He indicates how the 
peace committee structures could have contributed towards conflict resolution in 
the context of development conflicts, through facilitation and mediation efforts, 
and by playing a role in monitoring the local government elections. Interestingly, 
he additionally identifies a role for the structures in longer term reconciliation 
efforts, and predicts, quite perceptively, that the dialogue around the RDP would 
remain constrained by underlying interests that would inevitably result in “power 
struggle or a conflict over scarce resources”, in the absence of the role that the 
peace structures could play. Camay and Gordon support the view that “Some 
feeling remained that retaining the NPA and its structures would have been more 
effective.” Bradshaw (1994) writes that “The undoubted legitimacy of the new 
democratically-elected government will not enable it to maintain the peace alone.  
A wave of unmet, unrealistic and rising expectations is going to have to be met 
by the new South African Police alone, without the intervention of large numbers 
of experienced, and trained peace workers… [the government] has promised the 
people an RDP, with justification. It believes, again justifiably, that it is legitimate, 
and should therefore have no need for specialised agencies to keep the peace.  
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International funding agencies have, furthermore, switched their funding focus, 
quite understandably, to education and development priorities.” The point is 
made by Bradshaw (1994), however, that money and energy committed to 
education and development projects, desperately necessary though these were, 
was unlikely to deliver the results that the donors would wish for, if there were not 
simultaneously a huge effort put into peace-building initiatives.   
 
Susan Collin Marks reflects the views of many who were involved with the peace 
structures when she makes the point that "Given the extraordinary work of the 
peace committees and peace workers, it was a shock when South Africa's new 
democratic government closed down the Peace Accord structures in December 
1994. Everyone associated with the peace process was outraged. The peace 
committees had understood that after the 1994 election their role would change, 
and they had worked together to propose a trimmed-down, reoriented, realistic 
vision for their future. Instead, within six months, they were disbanded,  despite 
the protests of communities such as Crossroads that depended on the 
committees for their stability." (2000: 192) 
 
There clearly was an expectation in some high places, that the structures had an 
ongoing role to play. The continuation of the structures were, for instance, implied 
by president Nelson Mandela in his 24 May 1994 address to the National 
Assembly as follows: “We have also decided that all relevant ministries should 
engage the structures set up in terms of the National Peace Accord so that these 
can be invigorated to pursue their noble mission in the context of the changed 
circumstances in our country.” 
 
Later, in its own report to Parliament in August 1994, the NPS did, indeed allude 
to the fact that it was to change its focus towards “…long term goals of 
reconstruction, reconciliation and nation-building” while retaining its monitoring 
and conflict resolution functions. DP senator James Selfe, while noting its 
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particular strengths, also advised continued government support for the Peace 
Accord structures (Hansard, 1 November, 1994: 331).  
 
Paul Lusaka (1994a, 1994b), a member of the Peace Secretariat correctly 
maintains that the structures of the Peace Accord were initially established 
“without a time frame”, implying that there had been an assumption in favour of 
their continuation, and that there was only subsequently a “regrettable 
perception” that they had actually been established as a stop-gap measure.  
 
However, after the first democratic general election of 1994, despite the 
protestations of many of its supporters, the National Assembly voted against 
renewing the funding of the NPS and its structures. The continuation of support 
for the Peace structures was debated on 1 November 1994. The issue was 
raised in the financial context of the overspend of the NPS in respect of the 
national elections (Hansard, 1 November 1994: 330). Ironically, the government 
believed that the conflicted RDP structures, themselves doomed to an early 
demise, would be able to deal with South Africa’s remaining conflict management 
issues. The Peace Institutions Act, the NPA’s enabling legislation was also 
repealed, thereby officially signalling the end of the road for the activities and 
structures of the National Peace Accord. 
 
According to Gastrow, there was no definitive reason, given by the government 
for the dissolution of the peace structures, although there were intimations that it 
was to clear the way for the democratic structures to do the work. (Collin Marks, 
2000: 192). Collin Marks correctly indicates that the reason for the termination 
could not have been as a result of financial constraints, given the small size of 
the budget involved, and the additional fact that the structures had managed to 
raise the money for an additional year’s operations. She goes on to claim that it 
could also not have been because the structures were ineffective, or that there 
was no anticipated future need for them. It was because the government wanted 
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control, and to avoid competing with the successful structures of the National 
Peace Accord (Ibid: 192). 
 
It was under these circumstances, that the National Peace Accord was allowed  
to wind down, despite a demonstrable need, and some support for its 
continuation.  We will next turn our attention to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, South Africa’s attempt to deal with the deep-
rootedness of its conflict. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND RESOLUTION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Of all these processes, probably the process of reconciliation 
 is the least understood, partly because very little research has 
 been done on it and partly because of the complexity of the 
symbolic systems that are involved. 
(Boulding, 1962: 311) 
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) represents 
an attempt to do justice restoratively, but an incomplete  
attempt. Only time will tell whether the gaps will be fatal. 
    
(Zehr, 1997: 20) 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as 
an attempt to resolve some of the more deep – rooted aspects of the South 
African conflict.  The focus will only be on the broader aspects of the TRC – 
including its origins, the motivation behind its establishment and the terms of that 
establishment. A critical evaluation of the efficacy of the TRC will be provided, 
within the theoretical framework of the Protracted Social Conflict paradigm of 
Burton, Azar and others, as a part of the larger focus of this thesis. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to provide a definitive and comprehensive study of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in its own right. That work has been done 
elsewhere175. In fact, Verdoolaege and Kerstens (89) state that: “The TRC is one 
of the most studied political phenomena in Africa…”. 
                                                 
 
175 See for instance, Alex Boraine’s study – A Country Unmasked covering the history, accomplishments and 
major issues of the TRC. Jeffery, in her The Truth behind the Truth Commission also provides a comprehensive 
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In particular, there will be an examination of the relationship between peace, 
justice, and truth in the reconciliation process. The critical analysis provided is 
intended to serve a theoretical purpose, and should accordingly be viewed in its 
theoretical context. It is in no way intended to detract from the largely positive 
contributions made to South Africa’s recovery from apartheid by the TRC. 
 
Many processes characterized the democratic transition in South Africa. Most 
obviously, there were the talks about talks that led eventually to the CODESA. 
negotiation process, and then the Multi-Party Negotiations. These were followed 
by the elections themselves, in April 1994, and beyond the elections, the 
hammering out of the final constitution. During this period, the South African 
transition produced two dedicated conflict resolution, or conflict management 
mechanisms, the National Peace Accord (NPA), and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC).176 
 
The National Peace Accord177 proved extremely effective - providing the short-
term conditions for the holding of elections. That is what it was initially designed 
to do. Once the elections were held, there were no further resources made 
available to sustain the NPA, and it was eventually discontinued. The prime 
movers behind the Accord and its structures all found places in the new 
government or in the private sector (Bradshaw, 1999a:4). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysis, as do Coetzee, C., and Nuttal, S. in their book Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South 
Africa. Doxtader, E. and Villa-Vicencio, C. (2004) To Repair the Irreparable: Reparation and Reconstruction in 
South Africa. have also contributed greatly to our understanding of the work of the TRC 
 
176 An account of these processes can be found in Bradshaw, G.J., and Cloete, N. 1999, “Conflict Management in 
Deep-rooted Social Conflict: Lessons learned in South Africa”. 
 
177 The National Peace Accord was specifically intended to deal with the violence that preceded the 1994 
election. See Chapter seven above for a detailed analysis of the NPA. 
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The processes mentioned above, as part of the larger conflict resolving process 
in South Africa, are not extraordinary. They are much as one might have 
expected, and flowed quite naturally from the interactions of the parties 
themselves, muddling their way through the exigencies of conflict and a 
democratic transition, without the assistance of any specific outside 
intervention178. According to the proponents of the deep-rooted conflict theory, 
however, such conventional approaches would have been unlikely to prove 
successful in a situation of protracted conflict. Theoretically, the level of conflict in 
South Africa needed something deeper to deal with the underlying emotions and 
needs. The South African conflict involved myriad instances of violence, at 
multiple levels.  Hamber lists some of the forms of violence as follows: “Pervasive 
structural violence and oppression; extensive state abuses, like torture, 
assassinations and detention without trial; the use of paid vigilantes and third 
force operatives to carry out assassinations and terror attacks; large-scale inter-
community conflict; armed resistance from the so-called liberation forces; and 
abuses committed by the liberation forces against those within its own ranks who 
were suspected of being informers or traitors.” 
(Remembering to Forget: 7) 
 
It is widely accepted that these experiences would leave deep scars – not only on 
the victims, but also on society at large. Such scars would likely get in the way of 
a full resolution of the South African conflict.  It is, for instance, widely accepted 
that children who have been exposed to the violence of abusive parents will in 
turn, themselves have a greater chance of growing up to become abusers. The 
question therefore arises: What about the psychological scarring of the entire 
generation of South African youngsters, fuelled by massive violence in our 
townships, or in campaigns against their compatriots inside and outside of the 
country during military service? What conflict management process could take 
                                                 
178 There were indirect forms of assistance to the process- for instance financial aid to the NPA from overseas 
sources, and assistance in training in respect of conflict management skills etc. on the part of non-South African 
specialists 
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care of these deeper hurts?  Could the simple product of a negotiated settlement 
accommodate that level of feeling?  Certainly, the proponents of the theory of 
Protracted Social Conflict would have us believe that it could not.179    
Clearly, its leadership did realize that South Africa needed an additional process 
to confront the dark deeds of the past. The mechanism decided upon, was a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission similar to the one that had been 
implemented in Chile. Political agreements (negotiated settlements) take place 
behind closed doors and are constructed in an arena which is ‘closed off’ and not 
[always] harmoniously connected to sentiments, reactions, emotions of the 
everyday man on the street. Negotiated settlements by themselves may be the 
blueprint for change and social transformation, but true social transformation can 
only really begin to be measured if people’s lives are transformed as deep rooted 
social conflicts at ‘ground zero’ are addressed and systematically and sincerely 
removed. 
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, unlike the NPA, was not designed to 
put out fires. Its function was to deal with the longer-range issues. Although never 
articulated as such, its job was to deal with the protracted aspects of social 
conflict in South Africa. Leadership had an understanding that the deep-rooted 
conflict could not simply be put aside by a negotiated compromise. The pain of 
the past had to be worked through in a longer-term and more thorough process 
(Asmal, 1996: 6 – 11).  Conflict theorists and social scientists more generally all 
tell us that this is the necessary and difficult path out of deep-rooted social 
conflict. We therefore examine more closely the origins of the TRC and the 
motivations for its establishment. 
 
 
                                                 
179 See for instance the following works of  John Burton:  Deviance Terrorism and War (1979), and  Global 
Conflict: The Domestic Sources if International Disputes (1984), for extensive discussion of  the weaknesses of 
conventional negotiation and mediation in situations of deep-rooted social conflict, and the need for Problem-
Solving Workshops, or similar processes to deal with it. 
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8.2 Origins of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission resulted from the flowing 
together of a number of initiatives in the early 1990’s. According to Alex Boraine, 
the idea of a truth commission emanated from the African National Congress, in 
response to accusations levelled against it of human rights abuses in some of its 
training camps outside of South Africa (2000:11).  
 
Having held its own commissions of inquiry in response to these allegations, and 
to create a more thorough understanding of human rights abuses, it believed that 
there was a need for a process by which all parties to the South African Conflict 
would be held accountable for their past actions.  
 
The chief mandate given by the National Executive Committee of the ANC for the 
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was simply, “…to get to 
the truth” (Asmal, K.,1994). ‘Getting to the truth’ implies a search, a quest, a 
journey, with ‘truth’ being perceived as the ultimate destination. Truth can also be 
considered to be an article of faith, however.4 Louis Kriesberg attempts to answer 
the eternal question of the true nature of truth as he begins constructing his own 
argument in: ‘On advancing Truth and Morality’ with the following statement: 
“Truth, traditionally considered, is the accurate depiction of reality; it is defined as 
the correct understanding of what has happened in the past and what is 
happening now. This assumes that there is a reality that exists independently of 
the observers and is knowable by them. The whole truth may not be known, but 
knowledge is cumulative and seekers can help move forward toward an 
increasingly accurate view of truth.”180  
 
                                                 
180 See Kriesberg’s quote and further exploration of the themes of truth, justice and morality at 
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/Kriesberg61PCS.html 
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Truth (and knowledge for that matter) is based on the building together of 
fragments from the past (and present). Some fragments may be lost in the 
course of time, others may remain only partially or wholly intact, but nonetheless, 
these are all stitched together across time and space – reconstructed in present 
and future social contexts – gazed upon, assessed, discussed, analysed and 
interpreted by others, Including individuals, professional scholars, laymen, 
councils, courts, tribunals and the like, and of course; truth commissions in 
countries like Chile, Argentina, and South Africa. The complex nature of truth in 
the South African political context is admirably illuminated by Posel and Simpson 
(2002). 
 
In this guise, to be juxtaposed and complimentary to the NPA, the TRC would in 
effect; be the instrument through which peace-building could potentially be 
actualised. Peace making is usually the precursor to peace building; contending 
social actors (parties) make an official and sincere commitment to ‘lay down 
arms’ and cease overt conflicts at the level of the surface structure. Peace-
building “cements” the peace process, and sustains it. 
 
Kader Asmal also produced preliminary work towards the preparation of an 
indictment against apartheid that was never completed, due to the historical  
announcements of President F.W. De Klerk on the second of February, 1990 
(Boraine, et.al., 1994: 34), and the events that followed.  Asmal next gave form 
and content to the ANC’s proposal for the establishment of a post – settlement 
truth commission in his inaugural lecture at the University of the Western Cape 
on 25 May, 1992 (Boraine, 1994: ix - xvii).  
 
There were, around 1992, other initiatives as well that would add to the impetus 
for a truth commission. It was while on study visits to Eastern European societies 
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in transitions to democracy, that an IDASA181-sponsored group, including Boraine 
and others, was first drawn to the issue of how societies deal with past human 
rights violations (Boraine, 2000: 14 - 16). 
 
This theme inspired the subsequent organisation of a conference held in 
Somerset West in February 1994,  that included as participants a number of very 
prominent human rights scholars and activists from Latin America, Eastern 
Europe and South Africa, to consider the problem, and shed light on the matter of 
a truth commission for South Africa (Boraine, 1994, ix – xvii).  A number of ideas 
were generated that eventually informed the design of the TRC. A second 
conference, entitled “Truth and Reconciliation”, was held in Cape Town, with a 
more South African focus. The new Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar developed 
the keynote address. This conference further developed the idea of a truth 
commission, which was by now, also being taken forward in government circles. 
 
The ANC had approached Boraine about steps to be taken to translate the ideas 
on a Truth Commission into a plan of action (Boraine, 2001: 30). This eventually 
resulted in Boraine sending Nelson Mandela a draft proposal for such a 
Commission. After the 1994 election, the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar and 
Boraine worked in partnership to bring the TRC design to fruition. 
 
Following much input from civil society, and after extensive hearings, the South 
African Parliament passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
(Act 34 of 1995) in July1995, which was the enabling act for the TRC.182 
 
                                                 
181 IDASA stands for Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa and is an organization responsible for 
organising meetings of prominent Afrikaners with ANC leadership – most notably in Dakar, as discussed in 
Chapter six above – as well as other forms of conflict facilitation. 
 
182 See Alex Boraine’s Book,  A Country Unmasked, for a detailed account, including meetings, hearings and 
submissions, of the process behind  the promulgation of the act. 
 
 238
After a public nomination and selection process, seventeen commissioners were 
appointed, based on their impartiality, because they did not have too prominent a 
political profile, and by reason of the fact that they represented a broad cross-
section of the population. Archbishop Desmond Tutu was appointed to chair the 
commission (Hayner, 2001: 41). 
 
8.3 The Organisational Structure of the TRC: 
The Act made provision for three committees. 
8.3.1  The Committee on Human Rights Violations 
Provided for under section 12 of the promotion of National Unity Act of 1995, this 
committee was responsible for investigating cases of human rights violations 
committed in a political context between 1 March 1960 and 9 May 1994. This 
committee gave people who suffered human rights violations an opportunity to 
tell their stories and to speak of their losses and suffering. It decided whether 
someone was a victim as defined in the law governing the work of the 
Commission. The committee was  assigned the task of investigating these 
violations, finding out who was responsible, how they happened and the holding 
of public hearings. It was tasked with ultimately submitting a comprehensive 
report of its findings and recommendations. 
 
8.3.2 The Committee on Amnesty 
The amnesty committee processed and decided upon individual applications for 
amnesty from people who committed crimes or human rights violations within a 
political context in accordance with strict criteria for amnesty. Although this can 
be somewhat ambiguous, certain standards, known as “Norgaard Principles”183 
were nevertheless utilised to gauge the degree of political intent behind a crime. 
This committee had to facilitate and promote the granting of amnesty to 
perpetrators. The TRC advocated individual application for amnesty, rather than 
                                                 
183 Norgaard Principles see http://www.? 
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blanket amnesty.184 Applicants were required to make full disclosures of offences 
in order to qualify for amnesty and had to appear before the amnesty committee 
in hearings that were open to the public. If someone was given amnesty, the 
people who suffered as a result of their actions could not claim damages or lay 
criminal charges against them. In many instances this aspect proved to be a 
bone of contention. 
 
8.3.3 The Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation  
Provided for under section 23 of the Act, this committee received applications for 
reparations from any person who was of the opinion that they suffered great 
harm, loss and/or suffering as a result of human rights violations. After the 
consideration of each individual application, the committee would determine 
whether the applicant qualified for reparation and rehabilitation and would 
endeavour to restore human dignity in some way. However, the problem which 
persists and which hampered the success of the TRC in this matter was a 
consistent lack of resources and access to funding (Hayner, 2001:41, 42). 
 
At its second, full meeting, the commission also decided to maintain regional 
offices in four centres, being Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban and East 
London (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report: p 24). 
 
8.4 Motivation for the Establishment of the TRC: 
Some of the motivation for the establishment of the Commission has already 
been discussed in the section on its origins. However, if we are to properly 
evaluate the TRC as a conflict management mechanism within a strict context of 
the theory on Protracted Social Conflict, it is important that we know what the 
motivations were of its founders. 
 
                                                 
184 See ‘the case of the ANC 37’ by Lorna McGregor in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 1 
(Jan.,2001), 32-45  
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According to the report of the commission: “The Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act charged the Truth and Reconciliation Commission with 
investigating and documenting gross human rights violations committed within or 
outside South Africa in the period 1960-1994.” (TRC Report, Vol 1 Chap 2 p 1). 
 
As has been mentioned before, the prime motivation was therefore to be the 
uncovering of the truth. Many of the atrocities committed on all sides, were 
committed clandestinely, and were denied by both the apartheid state and its 
challengers. The “common-sense” point has repeatedly been made in the 
literature on the TRC, that, if there was to be any forgiveness to underpin a new, 
democratic society in South Africa, then the victims had to know whom they were 
forgiving, and what they were forgiving them for, at the very least (Hamber, n.d., 
Hayner, 2001, Boraine, 1996). 
 
Beyond this primary motivation, however, are a number of other secondary 
motivations that are extensively articulated in the enabling legislation, the report 
of the TRC and the vast quantity of academic literature that the commission has 
inspired. These motivations are essentially derivative – they spell out the reasons 
“why” the truth is important. 
 
Boraine summarises the following as the aims of the TRC as formulated by the 
Minister of Justice: 
 
• To return to victims their civil and human rights 
• To restore the moral order 
• To grant amnesty to those who qualified for it 
• To create a culture of human rights and respect for the rule of law 
• To prevent the violations of the past from ever happening again 
(Boraine,2000: 47,48) 
 
 241
Omar, quoted by Boraine elsewhere, also describes the aim of the TRC as 
follows: “To facilitate the healing of our deeply divided society on a morally 
acceptable basis” (Boraine, 2000:71). 
 
Indeed, the use of terminology including the healing concept became increasingly 
significant. Andre du Toit, as quoted by Minow (1998: 321) makes the point that 
as various religious leaders became more involved in the work of the 
commission, religious style and symbolism replaced the political and human 
rights concerns. In his opening address of the first meeting of the TRC, the 
Commission’s Chairperson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu stated that: “…we are a 
wounded people…we are all in need of healing” (Wilson, 1996: 15). 
 
The terms healing185, and reconciliation resonate deeply with the language of the 
Basic Human Needs scholars, and their quest for the complete resolution, as 
opposed to the mere settlement, of conflict. It is here that the role of the Truth 
Commission becomes interesting from the perspective of this thesis. The 
relationships between the telling and hearing of the truth, and the process of 
healing and the dispensing of justice are relationships that will be examined in 
greater detail later in this chapter. The transformation from individual healing to 
national reconciliation is also one that bears closer examination. 
 
8.5 The need for healing 
As has already been alluded to, the term “healing” has become one of the oft-
stated purposes of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Allen, 1999: 348). The point has also been abundantly made, that apartheid, and 
the struggle to overthrow it produced extensive violence, that will have 
traumatised many, and left scars on the collective South African psyche. Hamber, 
for instance is of the opinion that “the pervasive nature of the violence has 
                                                 
185 See, for instance Vayranen ( 1998 ) for a discussion of the use of medical metaphors in the work of John 
Burton. 
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undermined the moral, interpersonal and social fabric of the society” (1995:3). 
Kollapen, in the same vein, argues that, given the post-election scenario of 
nation-building and a government of national unity and national reconciliation, the 
focus of any pertinent and efficacious way forward should be on “healing”: “It 
follows therefore that there has to be a diagnosis of what transpired, why it 
transpired and ultimately who was responsible. The history and the interests of all 
South Africans would certainly demand nothing less”  (Kollapen, cited in 
Liebenberg 1996: 127). Otherwise we face an enduring and corrosive silence, 
misled by an unweighted perspective of the past. 
 
Whatever emerges, one of the main objectives of the TRC is that it enables 
South Africans to come to terms with their past (Dullah Omar 1994, in an 
interview cited in Liebenberg 1996: 133). People have been dehumanised, and 
citizens and their rights abused.  Minow (1998, 319), makes a statement 
reflecting a common assumption, and then asks the following important question: 
“…expose the terrible secrets of a sick society and heal that society.   Is this an 
assertion that can be tested, or instead an article of professional, cultural, or 
religious faith? 
 
Numerous scholars assert the importance of a telling of the truth, or the 
accounting of the stories of the victims of human rights abuses, as a very 
important step in the healing process. It is regarded by many as an almost self-
evident tenet of psychology. For instance, Minow, quoting Herman’s work asserts 
that: “The fundamental premise of the psychotherapeutic work is a belief in the 
restorative power of truth-telling”.  
 
Hayner supports this assertion as follows: “There is a multitude of studies 
showing that repressing intense emotional pain leads to psychological trouble. 
Indeed, one of the cornerstones of modern-day psychology is the belief that 
expressing one's feelings, and especially talking out traumatic experiences is 
necessary for recovery and for psychological health - It is often asserted that 
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following a period of massive political violence and enforced silence, simply 
giving victims and witnesses a chance to tell their stories to an official 
commission - especially one that is respectful, nonconfrontational, and interested 
in their stories - can help them regain their dignity and begin to recover” 
(2001:134).  
 
This argument is further supported by other scholars, such as Hamber (1995: 3 - 
5).  It is focused, very specifically, only on the very individuals who suffered gross 
human rights violations. It is a psychologist’s perspective on the healing of 
traumatized individuals. 
 
The critical question that needs to be considered here, is whether the emphasis 
should be on the few individuals who have been specifically victimised, or 
whether the focus should be on the society as a whole? Furthermore, the 
question arises whether the treatment of a group of individuals, in the form of 
Psychotherapy for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder-like symptoms is transferable 
to the nation as a whole? Does that perhaps require something totally different? 
 
8.5.1 Individual, Versus National Healing 
Giliomee has called the activity of the truth commission, the practice of “mass 
psychiatry”. This statement brings into focus one of the tensions in the activity of 
the TRC.  Winslow (1997:24) makes a vital point in this regard: “The ultimate 
objective of the TRC, it would seem, is to heal ’victims’, heal ‘perpetrators’, and 
‘heal’ the nation. But is it possible to heal both individuals and the nation at the 
same time and through the same process?”186  There are different dynamics 
operating within individuals and larger social systems such as families, 
communities and nations. Individuals comprising a social system, have to make 
certain adjustments and surrender a part of their total personalities as soon as 
they become a part of the matrix of the social system – the seething mass 
assumes a different nature and identity to that of a solitary individual.  
                                                 
186  
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As Michael Ignatieff (1996) puts it:  “It is perilous to extrapolate from traumatized 
individuals to whole societies. It is simply an extravagant metaphor to think of 
societies coming awake from nightmare. The only coming awake that makes 
sense to speak of is one by one, individual by individual, in the recesses of their 
own identities. Nations…cannot be reconciled to other nations, only individuals to 
individuals…individuals can be helped to heal and to reconcile by public rituals of 
atonement.”  
 
Winslow, as a trauma counsellor, is most concerned about the experience of the 
individual victims who have testified before the commission. He does go on to 
state that he is of the considered opinion, that the opportunity for healing for 
those individuals giving testimony is very limited, especially due to the fact that 
they do not have the same support available, as is typically afforded to those 
undergoing psychotherapy. He is of the opinion that while the nation may be a 
net beneficiary of this process, the actual victims would likely remain the losers 
(Winslow, 1997: 24 – 28, 40 - 42). 187  
 
This study finds that a highly questionable conclusion on a number of counts. 
Firstly, it is almost impossible to tell what effect the hearings have on the rest of 
society. It is quite likely that although some will be healed, others will be 
frustrated, many will be hurt, and others outraged by them. Secondly, it is 
furthermore difficult to tell the extent to which hearings were available to all and 
sundry through the mass media, as not all South Africans have access to 
television sets.  Thirdly, and more importantly, is the question of whether 
psychotherapy can be conducted at a distance and by proxy. Finally, the deeper, 
less specific hurts; the comprehensive poverty caused by exclusion and 
oppression in general, were also not a subject of the hearings, and these are 
perhaps the most pervasive, structural legacy of apartheid.   
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The structural conflict induced by the policy of social engineering (apartheid) had 
generated a highly stratified, deeply divided country with deep social cleavages 
and imbalances – between rich and poor – black and white and all other colours 
and creeds in between. All of this had created a lasting, enduring legacy of deep 
rooted social problems as part of the mosaic of deep rooted social conflict. These 
included, and still include: crime, poor housing, poor service delivery, 
overcrowding, and the like. These affect life at the basic human needs level, the 
lives of each and every individual in marginalized, crime ridden and poverty 
stricken communities across the country. As Johan Galtung puts it: “Our concern 
is with human needs, and that is meant needs that are located,  if not necessarily 
perceived, in individual human beings. The need-subject is the individual.” 
Galtung (1980:60). 
 
We agree with Ignatieff when he writes: that it is perilous to extrapolate from 
traumatised individuals to whole societies. He does make the point that 
“…individuals can be helped to heal and to reconcile by public rituals of 
atonement.”(1996). Unfortunately, in the South African case, there was very little 
in the way of such public atonement, especially from the former political 
leadership, who largely kept silent on the matter188.  
 
8.6 The value of truth 
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act is based on the principle 
that reconciliation depends on forgiveness, and that forgiveness can only 
materialise if events and admissions are fully disclosed. President Nelson 
Mandela said in 1995 after the signing of the Act that “…only the truth can put the 
past to rest” (Frost, 1998: 140), and as Dirk Coetzee, the self-confessed killer 
responsible for the deaths of  the Cradock Four has suggested, “…you can’t  
forgive and forget the past if you don’t know what it is” (Frost, 1998: 159). 
                                                 
188 There have, however been some very sporadic and belated incidences of forgiveness making; for instance, 
the much-publicised foot washing of the Rev  Frank Chikane, by former Police minister, Adriaan Vlok. 
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According to the then Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, “If we sweep things under 
the carpet, reconciliation will be short-lived” (Newsweek, Nov 13: 1995).189 
 
Regardless of the ability of a truth commission to contribute to national healing, 
or reconciliation, it can at least, through the hearing of victims’ narratives, 
accomplish some very useful goals. The collected information from amnesty 
applicants will help provide a fuller picture of the past, to provide a public record 
of atrocities, so that those atrocities cannot easily be repeated in future. In this 
sense, the truth commission can provide a fuller account of the history of a 
regime, than the more specific information elicited at a trial. It can help the 
survivors of atrocities regain trust in government (Minnow, 1998: 325 - 339).  
Because of the secretive nature of the vast majority of the abuses that have 
taken place in South Africa, one of the great values of the  uncovering of the truth 
is that it will make it impossible for the perpetrators to continue denying the very 
existence of those atrocities. The telling and hearing of the truth will also allow 
the victims to interact with their abusers, in a more assertive way; in a different 
power relationship. Even the usefulness of truth telling and hearing is not entirely 
a simple matter, however, it can be quite problematic. Ignatieff (1996) makes the 
point that: “The idea that reconciliation depends on shared truth presumes that 
shared truth about the past is possible.” But he goes on to explain that truth is 
always related to identity. What we believe to be true depends, to some extent at 
                                                 
189 Of course, the  truth as sufficient condition to put the wrongs of past to rest, is not an easy condition to achieve 
since, as has been stated above, knowledge and truth are available in fragments (journals, documents, diaries, 
oral tradition, only.  Some of these fragments become distorted, damaged (deliberately or otherwise) lost, 
misinterpreted and so forth. Truth is largely then  a matter of perspective, perception, degree of socialization 
etcetera, and differs from culture to culture, person to person, race to class to community. 
Therefore, which ‘truth’ does mister Mandela refer to, since ‘truth’ depends upon facts or data which can be 
distorted, lost, blocked, reconfigured and so on. How can anyone be sure of the truth and use this as the sole 
foundation for healing, healing, reconciliation or  transformation. We need to be more aware of the problems and 
complexities of the truth and look beyond it (though never discard it) bearing in mind its often highly inconsistent 
and fragmented nature. Other resources and needs [fairness, justice, morality, basic human needs] have to be 
considered in conjunction with ‘the truth’ (whatever our interpretation of that concept might be) if healing and 
reconciliation, forgiveness and mercy are to be hoped for and aspired to. 
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least, on who we believe ourselves to be, and that is often defined in terms of 
who we are not. 
 
 
8.7 The amnesty question, and truth versus justice 
As has already been mentioned, the South African TRC drew from the 
experiences of previous truth commissions, such as those of Argentina and 
Chile,  that had to deal with their pasts by means of appointed or commissioned 
bodies. Although the TRC had chosen to draw most heavily on the Chilean 
model, rather than any of the others, it had also tried to avoid the pitfalls of other 
commissions. Whilst attending a discussion of the Argentinean commission, 
Liebenberg has noted that while that commission “ succeeded commendably 
during the ‘truth phase’ in unearthing and exposing the past, it fell short during 
the ‘justice phase’ in dealing with the perpetrators of human rights abuses and 
providing restitution for victims”(Liebenberg, 1996: 140).  
 
Although truth may be a necessary component of the reconciliation process, it is 
certainly not a sufficient component. As conflict resolution scholars Davidson and 
Montville put it “overcoming psychological  barriers does not resolve a conflict” 
(1982:153), and Ignatieff (1996) has written that it is open to doubt whether truth 
actually heals. However, once barriers are removed, there is scope for new social 
possibilities.  
 
The South African Truth Commission was unique among truth commissions, in 
that it had been the only such commission empowered to grant amnesty to 
perpetrators of abuses under the act. It is probably this aspect of the TRC that 
has given rise to the most intense criticism. Most prominently, Amnesty 
International has opposed the South African TRC because of the impunity that it 
allowed human rights abusers (Holkeboer, 2004: 150).190 
                                                 
190 In the pursuit of the truth as one means to healing and reconciliation, the TRC was faced with the following 
dilemma, which dogged it for most of its existence. This dilemma involved or was brought about by the conflict of 
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Barney Desai of the Pan Africanist Congress stated the following concerning the 
Commission: “The cries of torture and abuse still ring in our ears. The Fallen are 
deeply etched in our memory. The millions who were forcibly removed from their 
homes remain bewildered and disorientated. The abused know their abusers and 
they are now the accusers. They seek justice, they seek retribution for the 
atrocities committed against them…[South Africans] would be living in a fool’s 
paradise if we believed that merely telling the truth will end human rights 
abuses…”(quoted in Boraine, Levy and Scheffer 1994:xii – xiii). 
 
H. W. Van der Merwe, one of the foremost South African Scholars working in the 
conflict field more than a decade prior to the establishment of the TRC, wrote at 
length on the relationship between peace and justice in resolving conflict in South 
Africa. He made it abundantly clear that although neither value was perfectly and 
fully available, the idea of peace without justice in the South African context 
would fall far short of the mark (1989:1-3). Although he was writing before the 
South African transition to democracy, about the fact that peace would not be 
attainable without at least a political transformation to a more participative and 
more equal society, the point still holds. There is the important issue of the need 
for justice to be done and for justice to be seen to be done if peace is to have its 
                                                                                                                                                 
data [a critical variable in the pursuit of ‘the truth.’] The latter involves the blocking, removal, and or, the destruction 
of certain vital fragments of information (documents pertaining to orders issued by those higher up in the Apartheid 
Security, Police and Intelligence Services’ chain of command, instructing subordinates to proceed with 
assassinations, intimidation, removal or silencing of subversives, and so on. As Stephen Garret (in Models of 
Transitional Justice) puts it: “As to the former Apartheid regime itself, one issue that dogged the TRC’s 
deliberations was the question of responsibility.  Many lower- ranking police officers offered the predictable 
defence that even if they had done wrong, they had done so at the specific command of their superiors. The farther 
up the chain of command the TRC went, however, the more their difficulties increased. In the last months of the de 
Klerk government, a massive pruning of government documents was undertaken and millions of pieces of 
evidence were either burned or consigned to the paper shredders. This allowed former top figures in the 
government to argue that they had never ordered any atrocities and to challenge the TRC to find actual evidence 
that they ever done so. The lack of a tangible paper trail of responsibility made it easier for critics of the TRC to 
question the commission’s final findings. President de Klerk himself was able to persuade a court to black out a 
part of the final TRC report that implicated him in human rights abuses.” http: //www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/ 
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full meaning. Others have also explored this theme, and state the case for a 
relationship between peace and justice.191 Again, before his death in 2001, Van 
der Merwe expanded on his critique of the TRC from this perspective. Writing on 
the commission, he states: “What I objected to at the time of its establishment 
was the insistence by its proponents, including Justice Minister Omar, that the 
purpose was not to punish, as if punishment were something evil: if any of us had 
such a motive, we should be ashamed of it. Apart from my feeling that this claim 
was not quite honest it also, in my view, contributed to the rejection of the 
Commission by many people who would have supported it had the deep-seated 
need in all of us for some form of punishment been publicly acknowledged” 
(2001:215). 
 
Consideration must be given to the victims. This was one of the reasons why the 
Chilean Commission is generally seen to have been so effective. It kept its 
primary focus on the victims. Desai further advocated that “…the violators be 
named and put on trial. It is imperative that justice is seen to be done” (1994: xiii ) 
(italics mine). This reflects the sentiments of the family members of the victims of 
human rights abuses such as Dr Fumbatha Mxenge, whose brother, Griffiths 
Mxenge, a civil rights lawyer, was killed by hit men under the command of Dirk 
Coetzee. Dr Mxenge has opposed the idea of amnesty, saying that “we will be 
happy when justice is seen to be done” (Frost,1998: 158). This attitude is not 
racially bound, but similarly echoed in the feelings of others who lost family 
members or loved ones, like Chris Ribeiro who stated that “Justice is needed.  By 
justice I mean prosecution” (Financial Mail, May 3 1996).  
 
Even as late as 2005, S'khumbuzo Mthimkulu, son of apartheid activist Siphiwe 
Mthimkulu, slain by Gideon Niewoudt in 1982, said  after Niewoudt's death of 
                                                 
191 John Paul Lederach , conflict resolution scholar-practitioner, for instance, maintains that reconciliation occurs 
in the space occupied by four concepts: truth, mercy, peace and justice that 'stand in paradoxical tension with each 
other'.  Odendaal, following Lederach appeals in an article in Track Two  (1997 Vol 6, nos 3 &4, 4 – 6 ) for the 
balancing of  these four concepts in South Africa. If  true reconciliation is to be achieved, the need for truth will 
have to be tempered with mercy.  
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lung cancer, that he would never forgive Niewoudt. “I would have liked to kill him 
myself. I am still hoping to avenge (my father's death)”  and…"I will get him 
beyond the grave. People like him deserve to go to hell."  Niewoudt had testified 
before the TRC, and had later agreed to meet the family. S'khumbuzo had at that 
time smashed a vase over Niewoudt's head, fracturing his skull as he begged 
forgiveness of the family. S'Khumbuzo had then wanted to kill him saying that if 
he had had a gun he would have. The Mthimkulu family had spent a lot of money 
on psychological assistance after their involvement in the TRC process (Eastern 
Province Herald, 24 August 2005). 
 
The above sentiments are given support by Hayner (2001) in a series of 
anecdotal accounts, but also citing scientific, psychological evidence to the effect 
that a simple telling of the truth is insufficient to lead to a healing process. She 
writes that: “Most studies of healing from political violence measure the positive 
effects of psychological support over a period of time; these studies show that 
when victims are given a safe and supportive environment to talk about their 
suffering, most eventually see positive results. Typical symptoms of repressed 
trauma, such as nightmares, emotional problems, and sleeplessness, often 
recede. Truth commissions, however, do not offer long-term therapy; They offer 
survivors a one-time opportunity to tell their story, usually to a stranger whom 
they will likely never see again. Some anecdotes of the effects on victims giving 
testimony to truth commissions are very positive; others are very worrisome. 
There has been no study to date of the psychological impact of truth 
commissions on survivors, but the evidence that is available is enough to raise 
some serious questions (2001:135)192. 
 
In fact, there is much evidence to suggest that the truth-exposing process may 
indeed do further harm to the victims. Some of those who give testimony before 
truth commissions can be re-traumatized, according to psychologists. Witnesses 
                                                 
192 Ignatieff (1996), in his article Articles of Faith explains the process of individual healing that takes place, 
placing due emphasis on its stage by stage , time consuming  nature. 
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upon embarking on the process may display the set of symptoms known as 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including confusion, nightmares, 
exhaustion, loss of appetite or sleeplessness (Hayner, 2001:141). 
 
In this vein, Michael Lapsley, a priest who was badly injured by a parcel bomb, 
sent by the apartheid-era South African Security forces, and who has 
subsequently worked to assist the victims of human rights abuses, has stated the 
following: “If you have a physical wound, you take off the bandage, clean the 
wound, and rebandage it. But people take their clothes off in front of the truth 
commission and don’t get an adequate opportunity to put their clothes back 
on…It is naïve to think that it takes five minutes to heal. We’ll spend the next 
hundred years trying to heal from our history” (Hayner, 2001: 141 – 143). 
 
While there is a resistance to facing up to painful truths operating at an individual 
level, there is some evidence to show that there may be a similar effect at 
national levels as well. Thus certain countries such as Mozambique and 
Cambodia, that have suffered extensively from extremely violent internal conflict, 
have, while seeking reconciliation, deliberately avoided the route of a truth 
commission, believing that to open the wounds of the past conflict, would be 
counterproductive (Hayner, 2001:185 – 200). 
 
In 1978, in the Washington Star, an American-educated Palestinian scholar, 
Fawaz Turki, offered an interpretation of his people’s wounds and anger: “A 
people who are having their minimal demands for justice rejected will predictably 
brood on themes of despair, or be motivated by new political impulses of 
defiance and avowed struggle” (cited in Davidson and Montville, 1982: 152). 
 
What this demonstrates is that there needs to be a sense of truth and confession 
about the past before, or in order to, be able to continue with the issues of the 
present; before planning a future committed to unity and justice. 
 
 252
 
 
8.8 The question of prosecution 
There are many who believe that since the perpetrators of heinous crimes 
against humanity have now been exposed, they should be punished. But in 
South Africa, that will occur only in exceptional circumstances. The price to be 
paid for truth in the South African case is amnesty for the perpetrators. Van der 
Merwe makes a very strong argument for punishment and an associated criticism 
of the commission, as follows: “Although retribution is popularly seen as primitive 
emotionalism, a form of pointless revenge, it actually constitutes a firm principle 
in most legal systems as well as in certain strands of theological thought. It is a 
basic principle of justice that a wrong should be righted – that the offender 
deserves punishment. Punishment as retribution is the paying of a debt to one’s 
fellow citizens. It is true that there was an element of punishment in the sessions 
of the Human Rights Violations Committee where perpetrators were exposed and 
publicly humiliated. For some this amounted to severe punishment, because acts 
that they committed during the apartheid regime which brought them honour and 
promotion were revealed as atrocities and violations of human rights, now 
punishable by law. But, by and large, the Commission failed to achieve 
reconciliation in the larger society by denying the role of punishment as a form of 
redress in the healing process” (2000:215). 
 
For those who support the idea of the fulfilment of justice and who see the 
necessity of prosecution, there must also be prosecution of some perpetrators so 
as to reinforce and re-establish faith in the rule of law. “truth telling alone without 
any form of justice to victims of abuses will not suffice” (Onyegbula, 1998). Garret 
affirms these quotes with (t)his closing argument: “Yet a transitional justice policy 
that combines both pragmatic and ethical concerns is surely not beyond reach. 
This would involve at a minimum an avowed programme of truth-telling, at least 
some (perhaps) symbolic retributive measures against the worst of past 
offenders, and a programme of compensation and rehabilitation to the victims. In 
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this way transitional societies can move toward democratic stability, social and 
economic progress and a civic culture without ignoring the perennial injunction 
that in all human affairs the past is prologue.” (Garrett, 2000: 10). 
 
Many South Africans feel that insufficient prosecutions have materialised, or that 
investigations have not been thorough enough. – especially in the cases of key 
individuals such as Winnie Madikizela – Mandela and former State President, 
P.W. Botha.193  
 
The reason for the necessity of prosecution is that it sends the signal that 
impunity will not be tolerated. There are important questions to be asked here, 
concerning whether the dramatic rise in lawlessness in South Africa has not been 
at least partially fuelled by a relativist approach to justice in such a high-profile 
organisation as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission? This is obviously not 
the TRC’s fault, but the way in which justice is portrayed and utilised sets a 
precedent and will impact on other aspects of society in the future. 
 
Related criticism that could be brought to bear on the lack of punishment being 
meted out, is based on the belief that a new democratic system should be seen 
to be based on the rule of law. No one should be beyond the scope of justice. 
Huntington writing on transitions to democracy thus draws our attention to the 
argument that perpetrators of crime should be prosecuted because of a moral 
obligation to victims and families. Prosecution is also necessary to deter future 
violations and to assert the supremacy of democratic values, encouraging the 
public to believe in them (1991:213). 
 
The supporters of the search for truth in exchange for amnesty make very strong 
arguments in its favour. Most telling, is the fait accompli argument, that points to 
the South African Constitutional requirement, that perpetrators of gross human 
                                                 
193 See the TRC Report: the section on mister Botha’s refusal to appear before the Commission 
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rights abuses be granted amnesty in exchange for a full account of their 
involvement in  activities “associated with political objectives and committed in 
the course of the conflicts of the past” (Minow, 1998:320). In terms of this 
argument, there is no other option available for the TRC. Those who support the 
particular constitutional requirement argue that it was the only way to achieve a 
constitutional settlement in South Africa. In its absence, they argue, the 
perpetrators of abuses would never have accepted a settlement, and would have 
been in a position to destabilise any political processes. They argue that it has to 
be seen in the light of the fact that the South African transition was based, not on 
the defeat of either side, but rather by a joint decision to end hostilities. 
 
Others support the route taken by the TRC, as, in all respects, a more suitable 
option than that of pursuing prosecutions. Minow (1998:324), for instance 
maintains that “Litigation is not an ideal form of social action”. Victims and 
witnesses suffer ordeals of testifying, and cross-examination, without being 
afforded the prospect of directly narrating their experiences. Prosecution, and the 
evidence given at trials will similarly not permit the production of a complex 
narrative about the trauma of the entire nation. Hayner also points to the fact that 
prosecutions may not be possible in many cases due to conditions in traumatised 
societies including:  
 
The fact that there may be a poorly functioning judicial system, characterized by 
corrupt or compromised officials, or there may be a lack of concrete evidence for 
the kinds of deeds perpetrated by highly secretive organizations. Also, cash-
strapped judicial systems194 have little or no witness protection programmes, 
police and public prosecutors may lack the skills to investigate and present 
strong cases. Very often, judges and public prosecutors are underpaid, courts 
operate with inadequate physical and financial resources, and without basic 
                                                 
194 See again the TRC Report – comparison with Nuremburg Trials and an explanation as to why the official legal-
rational channels were not followed in the end. 
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administrative support, and blanket amnesties have been passed by previous 
regimes. Sometimes there is a lack of political will to tackle "difficult" cases. 
Judges have also been killed in some cases (2001: 89). 
 
In the South African case, two particular prosecutions, including the much 
publicized trial of former Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, are used to support 
this argument. In this case the standard of the evidence brought against the 
accused was simply inadequate to the task. It is felt that these accused might 
have contributed more to national reconciliation by a process of confession and 
amnesty within the TRC (Hayner, 2001). 
Strong arguments are additionally made in favour of the TRC process – against 
those who argue against the principle of amnesty in exchange for the truth. 
Supporters of the South African TRC process argue that it is infinitely preferable 
to a blanket amnesty, which is often the solution in these cases. The point is 
made that in the South African case, amnesty is never granted willy-nilly. In terms 
of the legislation, it would only be granted under certain circumstances, including 
if the deeds were committed out of political conviction, or on the instruction of 
superiors. The amnesty granted was additionally, never a blanket amnesty – it 
was always only granted on an individual basis, and only in exchange for the full, 
corroborated truth. There was no condition of an expression of contrition required 
of the confessors. It is also often stated that the perpetrators of abuses never got 
off scot-free. They were additionally, publicly embarrassed by the process and 
publicly exposed for what they really were. That is regarded as some form of 
punishment. 
 
Among the supporters of the TRC, a plea has been made for a broader view of 
justice to be taken. Some scholars argue for a distinction to be made between 
two types of justice – namely retributive justice and restorative justice (Zehr, 
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1997: 20).195 Whereas, in the retributive view, justice demands the punishment, 
or prosecution of offenders, the restorative view seeks a restoration of 
relationships, and assistance of some or other kind to the victims, to heal wounds 
and mend damage. It is argued, that the latter route is a more constructive one 
for societies recovering from violent conflict. Seen in this light, there is no denial 
of justice by the TRC to victims of abuse in South Africa. 
 
8.9 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Reparations 
8.9.1 The Nature of Reparation 
Reparatory measures cannot bring back the dead or adequately compensate for 
pain or suffering, but they can improve the quality of life for victims of gross 
human rights violations and/or their dependants. Victims involved in the South 
African TRC process did regularly request, and expect financial compensation, 
however (Burton, 2004: 31). While these measures might include money, 
financial payment is not the only form of reparation and rehabilitation that the 
Committee recommends.  
 
8.9.2 The Importance of Reparation 
Victims of human rights abuses have the right to reparation because of the 
losses that they might have suffered; be they physical, financial, emotional or 
psychological. Victims particularly need to be compensated in some way 
because the amnesty process means that they lose the right to claim damages 
from perpetrators who are given amnesty. According to The Promotion of 
National Unity Act 34 of 1995, the President and the Ministers of Justice and 
                                                 
195 In their review essay on truth and reconciliation commissions (2002:39), Avruch  and Vejarano aver that no 
other concern has demanded discussion as much as the issue of justice has. But because TRCs cannot deliver a 
standard conception of justice, they correctly maintain that  "...a significant part of the literature is devoted to the 
delineation (and defence) of quasi-justice forms and entities, among them 'transitional justice', ‘restorative justice', 
'retroactive justice', most of which aim to, in the end, to move away from criminal verdicts - 'retributive justice-  and 
towards 'truth-seeking' and reconciliation." 
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Finance are required to establish a President’s Fund, from which reparations 
might be paid.  
 
Examples of reparations that might be granted are  
 
1. Individual reparation grants: (IRG’s) which might entail meeting needs such as 
medical, educational or housing needs. 
2. Symbolic reparation:    Legal and administrative measures might also be 
granted such as the issuing of death certificates, exhumation, reburials, 
clearing of criminal records or the issuing of headstones and tombstones. 
3. Community Benefits:  include the renaming of streets and facilities, culturally 
appropriate ceremonies or memorials and monuments. 
4. National Benefits:  include the renaming of public facilities, a day of 
remembrance and reconciliation as well as the founding of monuments and 
memorials. 
5. Community Rehabilitation:  which include the initiation of health care and 
mental health care programmes or facilities, housing projects, and special 
attention to educational needs and infrastructure.  
 
The need for reparation obviously takes on great importance when the dominant 
perspective is one that is based on a restorative, rather than a retributive view of 
justice. In the final analysis, by 2004, urgent interim reparation of between R2000 
and R3000 had been paid to about 17 000 applicants, with amounts of R30 000 
to be paid to each of the victims “…as soon as the legal procedures had been put 
in place” (Burton, 2004: 41).  
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8.10 A Critique of the TRC196 
The TRC has come in for much criticism. We can differentiate among criticism on 
a number of different grounds.  
8.10.1 Bias 
In the main, the chief public criticism of the TRC has been concerning a 
perceived lack of even-handedness, or the extent of bias displayed by the 
commission. There was early criticism concerning the composition of the 
Commission, and once the report appeared it was condemned for being biased 
against some of the parties.  It is noteworthy that some of the most telling 
criticism on that score has emanated from two of the main parties to the South 
African conflict, namely, the African National Congress, and the National Party. 
Some have stated that this two – sided critique seems to suggest that the TRC 
must have been quite impartial in its attempts to get at the truth, as it offended 
both antagonists equally. 
 
There have, however been some quite serious criticisms on this same count of a 
lack of impartiality from the highly regarded South African Institute of Race 
Relations. In her critical work on the TRC, Jeffery writes that the TRC failed to 
provide explanations for thousands of killings in Natal and on the East Rand in 
the years between 1989 and 1994. This lacuna creates a seriously one – sided 
report, according to her (Financial Mail, 30 July, 1999:34, 35). 
 
It seems that, no matter how much effort is put into impartiality on the part of a 
body such as the TRC, given the deep-rooted and long-standing nature of the 
conflict in which they have been engaged, there are bound to be those who feel 
that they have somehow been disadvantaged in the process. It is difficult to 
envisage how the TRC might have been constituted in a way that was more 
                                                 
196  See also Tristan Anne Borer – Reconciliation in South Africa: Defining Success March 2001 – Joan B Kroc 
Institute for International Peace Studies – for a critical assessment of the TRC, description of its mandate, and the 
four tasks associated with it. 
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consultative, or more representative of the broad spectrum of values and 
interests that comprise South African society. 
 
8.10.2 The TRC Process 
What is of greater interest to this thesis, however, is the actual nature of the 
process, and whether that was appropriate to the purpose of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 
8.10.2.1 The TRC, Protracted Social Conflict, and Conflict    
        Resolution 
What has been very evident to this author, in an examination of the literature on 
the TRC, has been the decided lack of a conflict resolution, or conflict 
management perspective. There has been an almost total lack of a theorising of 
the TRC process within a theory of social conflict, and none at all, in terms of 
theories of deep-rooted social conflict.  The vast majority of the scholarly output 
takes a legalistic point of departure, a psychological perspective, or a religious 
view of the subject. There seems to be very little social-scientific theoretical 
consideration of what is required to manage, or resolve a deep-rooted social 
conflict of many decades standing.  
 
Much of the commentary on the TRC process has evaluated it from a 
psychological point of view (Hamber, 1995,  Hayner,2001,  Minow, 1998,  
Herman, 1992). In this regard, as has already been mentioned, the “treatment” of 
truth-telling, is regarded as akin to that of PTSD197. It is taken quite simplistically, 
that what is good for a traumatised individual, will also be good for a traumatised 
nation of individuals. If the goal is the healing of social conflict, however, it must 
be understood that society is a collective, in which each will hear and react to the 
narrative in different ways. If the goal is the healing of specific victims only, then 
the telling of their truths may be more helpful, provided that the environment of 
                                                 
197 Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
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the telling is sufficiently receptive and sympathetic (Hayner, 2001: 141).  There 
seems to be a dearth of scholarly literature on the social psychology of national 
healing processes, and only a very tenuous link can be demonstrated between 
individual processes and social ones, as the article by Ignatieff attests. There is 
additionally, an admonition among those, representing the psychological 
perspective, as to the ability of the TRC to effectively counsel individual victims, 
and bring about real healing, even at that level.198 
 
The TRC was, from the outset tasked to be victim-oriented. The definition of 
victim was highly specific, and included only those who specifically suffered 
human rights abuses. The TRC heard testimony from approximately 20 000 
victims. In this sense, where those specific individuals are concerned it may have 
been successful to an extent, notwithstanding the critique of the scholars of 
psychology listed above. Unfortunately in respect of the larger social conflict, the 
TRC has not addressed the wounds of the millions of those devastated by the 
policy of apartheid. 
 
The TRC exercise is clearly a very useful one from the perspective of uncovering 
the truth of specific incidences of human rights abuses. In this sense, as has 
been mentioned above, it can make the repetition of such abuses in future, very 
difficult. According to Ignatieff  (1996): “All that a truth commission can achieve is 
to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public 
discourse.” This the South African TRC accomplished successfully. It also 
                                                 
198 In this regard, Lapsley, Hamber, Herman, Winslow and Hayner all repeatedly caution with regard to the 
dangers of incomplete counselling, or a lack of psychological support, or a need for further psychological support 
for victims. The danger of initiating renewed PTSD  on the part of the victims, as a result of their evidence giving is 
also warned against. Most of these scholars are concerned for the need for more to be done for individual victims 
of  apartheid. 
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contributed information towards the development of a new narrative of the South 
African conflict – one that differs from the official, apartheid-based account.199   
 
However, the evaluation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission from this perspective also provides a mixed picture, as a result of 
the large number of abuses that were never examined by the TRC (Jeffery, 
1999), and also the fact that the structural issues, the more generalised system 
of apartheid itself, the systematised oppression did not fall within the scope of the 
TRC’s activities200.  
 
We have already covered the issue of justice.  We have addressed the issue of 
whether or not justice has been done; of what kind of justice has been dispensed, 
and what is appropriate to the South African reality. There are numerous 
definitions of peace, and certainly most experts will affirm that peace is more than 
                                                 
199 The end results of the TRC’s decisions, acts and initiatives serve as good indicators of what goals and goal 
driven actions dominated its processes. It served as a vessel or conduit for the uncovering of the truth (in the form 
of facts from the past and testimony from the present) as one key trace element in the actualisation of healing, 
restoration (of civil, human rights and the moral order) and reconciliation (of one South African to another). The act 
of having to disclose one’s past heinous, violent and criminal actions (truth telling in a public forum) brings about a 
degree of embarrassment to the perpetrator and his family. To anyone watching, listening to the radio or reading 
about the TRC and its activities (the hearings) this would have the effect of serving as a deterrent to perpetrators, 
their families and friends, and even strangers to the above, pre-empting any potential future mimicking of these 
extreme and violent actions. The following quote from Morton Deutsch (in Justice and Conflict – Chapter 2) may 
serve to capture the essence of the above: “A number of means are employed to support and re-establish the 
;validity of moral rules once they are violated. They generally call for one or a combination of these actions on the 
part of the violator: full confession, sincere apology, contrition, restitution, compensation, self abasement or self 
reform…these actions may be addressed not just to the violator but also to others related to the violator, such as 
his children, family, or ethnic group.” Deutsch (2004?:48) 
 
200 Although hearings were held on the role of business, and the press as institutions which contributed towards 
the oppression of the masses. It seems quite selective, and not altogether honest to select these social institutions, 
that, though they may have been instrumental in oppression in some of their actions, were unquestionably also 
instrumental in the demise of the apartheid system at other levels. The pressure placed by business on the 
government to change, its role in breaking the logjam by visiting the ANC, and the years of unrelenting criticism of 
political apartheid by the press seems largely to have been ignored. The question needs to be asked why perhaps 
the teachers, who taught the values of apartheid were not more taken to task, or the judiciary that applied the laws 
of apartheid, for that matter. 
 262
a simple absence of violence. It is certainly not an absence of conflict. Many 
definitions of peace include a reference to a state of justice.  Perhaps this is one 
of the reasons why the TRC seems to leave so many people on all sides 
essentially dissatisfied. Has it managed to capture adequately, the essence of 
the delivery of justice for the people of South Africa?  H.W. Van der Merwe, who 
can be regarded as the father of the conflict resolution school in South Africa, 
certainly believed that it did not.  
 
8.10.2.2 A lack of sufficient reparation: 
One of the most broadly-held views in the literature on the South African TRC, is 
that the issue of reparations has not been adequately addressed201. Although the 
President’s fund was set up for this purpose, criticism has been that enough 
resources have not been put aside, and that the process of disbursement has 
taken far too long. According to Daye (2004: 168), the reparations component of 
the TRC has been a great disappointment. He goes on to state that "...the 
unwillingness to grant the commission the powers and resources necessary to 
implement a full reparations program and the hesitance of the ANC government 
to implement the measures recommended by the Committee on Reparations 
appear to be the main causes of its being a failure to date."  This sentiment is 
further supported by Gibson and Gouws (1999: 513) as they write: "Especially as 
it becomes clear to all that reparations will be pitifully small, the truth and 
reconciliation process promises to be a continuing source of dissatisfaction with 
the regime."   
                                                 
 
201 Hayner refers to the fact that, although an initial sum of US$ 600 million towards reparations was provisionally 
agreed upon by the South African government, and a reparations policy of providing each victim an amount of   $ 
3500.00 per year for six years, only  $16million was eventually set aside, as late as 1998. There was great 
frustration well into the year 2000, as additional allocations for reparations were not yet forthcoming. Zehr, in his 
1997 article also accuses the TRC of addressing the reparations issue “belatedly and incompletely”. Botman, 
reaffirms the importance of ample reparations, when he states that “The victims have an undeniable right to claim 
economic restoration from the perpetrators as well as the state”(1997:38). Mary Burton (2004), a TRC 
commissioner, has added her voice to this chorus as well, highlighting the ongoing delays in the disbursing of the 
reparations, and the decreasing amounts involved.  
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This is clearly not the fault of the Commission, but rather that of the government 
for failing to implement the TRC recommendations. More recently, Villa Vicencio 
(2006) has written that “…the Commission recommended individual and 
communal reparations to acknowledge victims’ losses and to contribute to the 
restoration of their human dignity. After a five-year delay, the government made a 
reduced reparation payment of R30 000 to each victim named by the TRC.” More 
importantly for Villa Vicencio, though, is the fact that community reparations have 
hardly been pursued.  
 
Although material development is a crucial and indispensable part of community 
healing,  he is of the opinion that more is required, however.  Oral histories, 
community projects and ritual cleansings need to be undertaken. Such initiatives 
would not involve huge sums of money – and government department budgets 
for community reparations remain underutilised. The expenditure of limited and 
well-focused government and private funding for community projects through 
schools, community organisations and faith communities could reap benefits that 
reach well beyond those who continue to bear the brunt of the nation’s past.  The 
Commission further proposed the promotion of remembrance and 
memorialisation initiatives designed to raise consciousness and ‘promote public 
responsibility’ with regards to the nation’s past. 
 
Although government has indicated that all South Africans should also contribute 
towards the reparations process (Burton, 2004: 41), according to Daye,  a failure 
of the TRC “…relates to the fact that the organisations like business and 
churches have not been drawn into the reparations process" (2004:168). 
 
The issue of reparations is particularly important because of the fact that the TRC 
operates within a restorative justice paradigm, and because retributive justice has 
not been available. According to Minow, “Only if the recommendations for 
reparations are followed with concrete actions, though, will these aims (of the 
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TRC) promise to bear fruit” (1998: 323).  As recently as 2004, Mary Burton (29 – 
43) has leant her voice to the issue of the poor handling of reparations. She has 
criticized the level of reparations and the delays in their payment, and indicated 
that it will reflect negatively on the South African transition and the TRC as 
follows: “The TRC has been widely praised as South Africa’s special way of 
facilitating transition. It has been fairly successful in exposing much of what has 
happened, and in using the amnesty mechanism to deal with some of the 
perpetrators. But it will be seen to have failed if thousands of people continue to 
have a sense of grievance and injustice” (Ibid: 43).  
 
James L. Gibson, in ‘Theories of Justice and Reactions to Amnesty’, reinforces 
the above argument  by stating that: “Those who designed the amnesty process 
placed a great deal of emphasis on compensating the victims of apartheid for 
their losses…the TRC Final Report asserts: “…reparation is essential to 
counterbalance amnesty.” Gibson (2002:542). Looking at the two cardinal points 
or poles (amnesty versus reparation as a part of the victim / perpetrator dynamic) 
Gibson continues: “The granting of amnesty denies victims the rights to institute 
civil claims against perpetrators…most expected that monetary reparations would 
be paid by the government. Though the government has provided limited 
reparations, by 2001, criticism of the government for failure to provide 
compensation became increasingly widespread, even virulent. The most obvious 
justice hypothesis is therefore that compensation can correct for amnesty: If 
those who were victimized receive some form of reparations, then perhaps 
people will judge the truth and reconciliation process to have been fair. Gibson 
(2002:542).202 
                                                 
202 On the balance of probabilities, both victims and perpetrators had an opportunity for self disclosure in a public 
forum. This would only be a once off chance and in no way compares with ongoing psychotherapy, treatment and 
counselling (as echoed by some scholars like Minnow and others.) The TRC process allowed perpetrators (albeit 
under the strict criteria as laid out in the Norgaard Principles) to obtain amnesty. Many did not, but still others 
received amnesty. Only a limited number and limited amounts were set aside for [financial compensation] but this 
resource dried up quickly, leaving many victims little to no better off financially than before or during the TRC’s 
hearings and rulings. The victims seemed to have gained only scant rewards (emotionally, psychologically or 
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Llewelyn and Howse (1999: 388) reinforce this point as they write that: 
“Removing reparation from the amnesty process seriously limits the connection 
between amnesty and restoring the victim. It restricts this connection solely to 
that restoration achieved through hearing and knowing the truth of the past. 
Practically, the victim sees the offender go free and still receives no direct 
reparations until the government considers proposals for reparation at some later 
date.” 
 
8.10.2.3 A lack of sufficient truth 
It has been stated above, that the TRC process has uncovered only a small 
proportion of the atrocities and abuses of the apartheid era, and the fact that not 
all South Africans had the opportunity to witness this truth-telling process. 
Indeed, especially the poorer segments of the society will have had less access 
to the television coverage of the hearings. This shortcoming has been greatly 
exacerbated by the fact that the report of the TRC has not been made widely 
available, nor have the archives of the hearings. Villa Vicencio laments this 
shortcoming thus: “…the TRC called for the release of its own archive, which 
includes the testimony of victims of gross violations of human rights, 
investigations into the activities of apartheid security forces and those of the 
liberation movements, as well as the transcripts of the amnesty committee. The 
technology is in place and funding available for these to be digitised and made 
available to every library, school and community centre in the country. Sadly this 
has not happened.“  Piers Pigou, (Sunday Independent, 23 April 2006) director of 
the South African History Archive concurs with these sentiments and, directs a 
hard-hitting critique at the government’s lack of implementation on the TRC 
recommendations in this regard. He maintains that the most frequent request of 
                                                                                                                                                 
financially in terms of closure from the past and many would in all likelihood, feel as if their angst (trauma) had 
been downplayed. In all likelihood, a strong sense of disillusionment would be more prevalent in victims than either 
perpetrators or the nation as a whole. Picking up the pieces of a broken life and past and closure would be more 
difficult perhaps for victims as opposed to perpetrators and the social system of the nation entire. 
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the 21 000 survivors who submitted statements, was to know what   "had 
transpired" ,  and the TRC had been unequivocal in the need for further efforts to 
uncover secure justice and accountability.  He complains that the TRC report, 
costing more than R1 500.00 to buy remains "...inaccessible to all but a few."  
There are seemingly no apparent plans to rectify the situation. Elsewhere, Pigou 
(2006b: 3) writes that: "The reactions of South Africa's political leaders to the 
TRC's findings and their selective engagement with ongoing issues of unfinished 
business tell us more about their own priorities, and clearly demonstrate that 
there is little or no desire to meaningfully engage with the specific needs of 
victims, survivors and their families and related opportunities to do so."  
 
8.11 Conclusion 
A thorough review of the literature on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
indicates that this initiative was not conceived of explicitly within the theoretical 
framework of protracted social conflict. Indeed, very little of the literature seems 
to have been inspired at all by the general “conflict resolution” area of studies.203 
Most of the ideas that underpin the TRC are gleaned from the fields of the 
psychology of trauma and the healing of trauma, the legal debate around 
prosecution and human rights abuse, and religious themes of forgiveness and 
redemption. 
 
The main impulse of the TRC was to glean as much information about the 
atrocities of the apartheid past, to expose the abuses, and to help the victims to 
come to terms with these. 
 
In terms of its achievements, the messages emanating from the scholarly debate 
surrounding the TRC are mixed indeed. There is no doubt that truth has been 
uncovered and widely publicized. There are debates that rage, however, and 
                                                 
203 Odendaal’s 1997 article in Track Two magazine, and Hamber and Kibble’s article in this regard, are         
two notable exceptions. 
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challenges that are issued, about the extent of that truth, and its quality, and most 
recently, its availability to public scrutiny. It has certainly not been a complete 
process. 
 
There is also no doubt that there has been a public grieving process. Whereas 
some conflict management scholars see this as a necessary and important 
aspect of national reconciliation, there are questions asked by many, that deliver 
no satisfactory answers, such as “Will the victims not be re-traumatized by their 
giving of evidence before the TRC?, and the weight of the argument seems to be 
that no doubt, under the process of the TRC, because of a lack of adequate 
psychological counseling, they probably will be. 
 
Then there is the question surrounding whether the individual truth recounting 
can be translated into a national healing process, and on this, the jury is still out. 
Certainly, no truth commission elsewhere has received quite as much public 
media coverage as the TRC. The nagging question still remains, however, about 
how the truth was received and by whom, and whether or not attitudes have been 
transformed.  It is quite correct, as Hayner states, that there are now very few 
South Africans who would openly admit to ever having supported the apartheid 
system; implying that the TRC process was responsible for exposing the heinous 
deeds of the past, and moving them “beyond the pale” of acceptable human 
behaviour. While the TRC may well have had such an impact, it is impossible to 
prove, as there were very few South Africans who would have been prepared to 
admit their support of the previous system, even before the activities of the TRC 
got underway in 1996. Indeed, many National Party supporters denied that they 
supported apartheid long before de Klerk’s 2 February 1994 declarations.  
Garrett (2000: 10) highlights the hypocrisy of many involved in political 
transformations such  as that in South Africa as follows: “One is struck by the fact 
that a population that may have been relatively passive in the face of a past 
dictatorship’s misdeeds sometimes are particularly forceful in their demands for 
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retributive action. One can wash away a sense of guilt at not standing up to evil 
by now – in safer circumstances - rediscovering a taste for justice.204  
 
Every commentator on the TRC and its activities has been at pains to point out 
that success of the restorative role of the Commission is going to be largely 
dependent on the South African government taking the recommendations of the 
TRC concerning  the making of reparations, seriously; which to date,  has not 
transpired to any meaningful extent. 
 
Finally, the only way to judge the TRC’s impact in the area of national 
reconciliation, will be though the mechanism of social research. It will be 
necessary to revisit those polled by the Markinor survey of 1998 205, to establish 
whether the individuals concerned have subsequently experienced any healing, 
and whether or not the general public feel positive about the future, and the role 
that the TRC has played in its delivery. 
 
In conclusion, in our attempts to asses the role of the TRC, it would seem as 
though, as in so much else pertaining to South Africa’s transition to democracy, 
that this aspect of the miracle has been at least partially successful, by just 
muddling through; by somehow arriving at processes that have contributed 
greatly towards building peace in the country in an effective, if somewhat 
confused, and perhaps only temporary fashion. 
 
We should not simply accept, however, that the TRC has been the final 
contribution towards a stable and peaceful society. Practically all scholars 
consulted have been at great pains to stress the fact that the TRC can only be a 
part of the larger process. Reparation will have to follow, economic justice must 
be achieved, back-up counseling for victims of abuse is necessary, etc. etc.. 
There is a long term process that must not be relinquished. Furthermore, the high 
                                                 
 
205  
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incidence of violent crime, and rampant corruption, and an inability to achieve 
anything even resembling a social consensus on damaging public issues, such 
as the economy, and a coherent HIV/Aids policy, perhaps point to the fact that 
many important issues have been avoided, or imperfectly engaged by the TRC, 
and that the government has so far failed in its delivery with respect to policies 
with restorative potential. 
 
There is, explicit in the analytical conflict resolution approach to conflict 
management of Burton and his colleagues, the imperative of satisfying basic 
human needs in any serious attempt at long-term conflict resolution. Among 
these basic human needs, quite importantly for the case of the TRC, are the all-
important need for valued relationships, and a need for justice. Lambourne 
(2004:8), for instance, argues that "When people have been wronged they 
express a desire for justice, which can be interpreted as a human need to feel a 
sense of justice. But what type of justice is necessary varies with individual 
circumstances and predispositions, the type of wrong and the local context."  
 
It is true, that among the goals of the TRC was an attempt to restore relationships 
in South Africa. It is not clear, however, as our Chapter Nine below will show, 
through reference to various survey materials, whether that has been 
satisfactorily accomplished in the South African case. It would seem, however, 
that a need for justice; particularly distributive justice, has not been met by this 
process. This is not the fault of the TRC, but, rather of the government, for failing 
to implement its recommendations. It is interesting to note that both the NPA’s 
SERD initiative and the TRC’s reparations programme were designed to tackle 
similar issues; the material results of apartheid oppression. In both cases, these 
initiatives were undervalued by decision makers. In both cases, resources were 
not forthcoming. 
 
Lambourne raises the concerns of the conflict resolution community as follows: 
”Consistent with conflict resolution theory’s emphasis  on the need to address 
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underlying basic human needs, international interveners need to address the 
underlying causes, as well as the effects of, the broken relationships manifested 
in violent conflicts.” (2004: 21) She goes on to insist on responding to people’s 
“expressed needs in relation to justice and reconciliation” in order to contribute to 
the long-term success of peacebuilding. 
 
We next move on to examine the state of social cohesion and conflict resolution 
in the post-conflict South Africa at the time of writing. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
The deceptively simple question then of how  
to decide when conflict resolution is effective  
is often not one that can be answered easily. 
(Ross, 2004: 2) 
 
However, the most challenging part of our journey  
on the road to transformation, particularly the  
building of a workable moral consensus, will be  
reconciling the expectations of the historically dis- 
advantaged with the vested interests (and rights!)  
of the historically privileged class. 
     (Esterhuyse, 2004:192, 193) 
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we examine the situation concerning the levels and nature of 
social conflict in South Africa at the time of writing. What do conditions tell us of 
the state of conflict? Do they indicate that successful conflict resolution has taken 
place? There has been great euphoria, especially internationally, over the 
bloodless election of 1994, the promulgation of a progressive constitution, and 
relative political and economic stability in a country that had only recently been at 
war with itself. Indeed, this has commonly been referred to as the miracle that 
South Africa achieved.  
 
There are, however, also rumblings within the country, and fault lines that 
threaten that stability. How should we interpret the state of South African society 
at this time? Are these tensions normal, to be expected given the country’s past, 
or should they have been prevented by the conflict management processes 
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leading to 1994, and beyond? 206 To this end we will examine the state of conflict 
resolution in the country. We will be examining the vexing question of what 
conflict resolution “looks like”. We will be exploring the ideas of a number of 
leading conflict resolution scholars,  including John Burton (1979, 1984, 1988 a, 
1990 a, 1990 b, 1990 c, 1997), Mitchell (1981, 2002) Lederach (1997), Deutsch 
(1973) and others, as well as work by sociological scholars, such as Peter Berger 
(1998), writing on social cohesion, which also provides pointers to the nature of 
conflict resolution,  and the application of those ideas to South Africa. In the 
main, however, we will be drawing on the ideas of the analytical conflict 
resolution scholars. 
 
We will follow this by drawing on a wide selection of source material, to indicate 
the state of resolution or otherwise of the South African conflict. Similarly drawing 
on a number of recent opinion surveys, including those of Lombard, (2004 a and 
2004 b), Hofmeyer (2005), and South African Institute of Race Relations surveys 
that have been carried out to gauge the state of “reconciliation” in South Africa as 
well as drawing extensively on news reports of events in the country at the time 
of writing207. We will be searching especially for additional signs of the resolution 
                                                 
206 For instance, even stable Western democracies experience unrest from time to time. As an example, France 
has experiences widespread violent protest during 2005. 
 
207 Two substantive research projects have investigated the state of reconciliation in South Africa in the very 
recent past. The first that we examine is the most recent publication of the ongoing, biannual survey into 
reconciliation of the Institute for Reconciliation and Justice, where we draw on the two most recent reports 
(Lombard, 2004, and Hofmeyer, 2005), and the second is the body of work by Gibson and Gouws; most notably 
the book of Gibson (2004), addressing truth and reconciliation in South Africa. 
In her report on the state of reconciliation in South Africa, Lombard deploys a conceptualization of reconciliation 
constructed upon human security, political culture, the extent of cross-cutting political relationships, the extent of 
dialogue, the ability to confront the past, and the extent of positive perceptions of racially different co-South 
Africans. Indicators of each measure are accordingly mobilized (2004: 7 – 10).  The hypotheses presented are 
that: 
1 If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled      
   with each other and the larger system 
2 If citizens view the institutions, structures and values of the new                 
   system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to    
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of conflict, as the scholars of analytical conflict resolution would understand the 
word, or for their absence. Finally, we will attempt to construct a scorecard 
matrix, indicating the extent to which resolution has taken place in South Africa. 
 
Firstly, however, we need to examine the conflict literature, particularly the 
literature within the conflict resolution approach, in order to determine whether 
the theoretical requirements for conflict resolution have been met. 
 
9.2 The nature of conflict resolution 
What do we mean by conflict resolution? Just how much social cohesion is 
necessary before we can say that a conflict is truly resolved? This is a question 
that must be asked and answered before one can adequately grapple with the 
more specific question of whether resolution has in fact occurred in South Africa. 
 
Taking a broader view of the literature at the outset, and central to the focus of 
this chapter is the issue of the degree of social cohesion that is necessary in 
order for us to be able to speak of conflict resolution having taken place.  This 
matter is touched upon by Peter Berger (1998: 353) when he states that the 
degree of normative consensus that is necessary for social order is a disputed 
point of sociological interpretation. According to Berger, “…a central school of 
thought in sociology, most cogently represented by Emile Durkheim and his 
disciples, has always maintained that any society will fall apart that does not have 
a ‘collective conscience’ - that is, a common body of norms adhered to by most of 
                                                                                                                                                 
    progress.  
3 If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross  
   divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance 
4 If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely     
   to be advanced. 
5 If citizens  are able to confront and address issues from the past, they  
   are more likely to move forward and be reconciled. 
6 If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each  
   other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will  
   advance reconciliation. 
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its people.” (ibid.). This position that we will call the “consensualist view” is 
echoed by Davidson and Rees-Mogg who write that societies tend to experience 
the most successful periods in their history when the collective social morality is 
shared. They go on to write that “Such morality not only performs specific 
functions such as reducing crime, and helping to support family and social 
structure, but gives citizens a sense of purpose and direction.”(1997: 359).  
Supporting this view, Esterhuyse writes that “What is needed is a national 
consensus on, and commitment to, a set of legitimizing values that will underpin 
the process of transformation.” (2004:194). 
 
This “consensualist” view is offset in the literature by an opposing position, 
however, that argues that “… a modern society cannot aspire to such normative 
unity and can function well without it, as long as there is agreement on a set of 
procedures by which conflicting interests and ideologies can be adjudicated.”208 
In fact, pluralist theorists of politics regard diverse norms and values positively, 
as a source of societal strength, as long as these take the form of “cross-cutting 
social cleavages” (Apter, 1977: 302)209. Reflecting upon such a context, Berger 
(1998: 353, 354) writes of an alternative, ‘traffic-system’ model of social order, 
where citizens adhere to the procedures which adjust the competing norms and 
values.210 
 
                                                 
208 When Berger writes of adjudicating procedures, he writes of a broader notion of adjudication than that 
normally used in the conflict literature. He is writing of the roles that political institutions (such as elections and 
legislatures) and leaders play, on a continuing basis, balancing and mediating the competing values and interests 
of the plural society. 
 
209 See also Dahl (1993: 706) who summarizes the strengths of political pluralism, arguing that competing groups 
in society have “...served to educate citizens in political life, strengthened them in their relations with the state, 
helped to ensure that no single interest would regularly prevail on all important decisions, and, by providing 
information, discussion, negotiation and compromise, even helped to make public decisions more rational and 
acceptable.” 
 
210 The analytical conflict resolution school tends to share this second view – and consequently have proposed 
the provention concept to deal with it. 
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In this sense there is a normality which is an aspiration, and which may be 
realized while the society is economically prosperous and its political stability 
remains relatively unthreatened. However, ‘normality’ is unfortunately rarely a 
permanent state of affairs. When it becomes threatened, for whatever reasons, 
the question of shared norms quickly attains a new urgency. When members of a 
society are required to make sacrifices for the society as a whole, their 
willingness to do so will depend on a degree of value consensus that underpins 
the legitimacy of the political system (ibid.354). 
 
As will be made explicit below, there are those who are concerned about a lack 
of shared norms in South Africa, and again, there are those for whom the country 
should be able to sustain tolerable levels of social conflict, so long as the 
institutional “traffic system” works. We next move on to discuss the nature of 
conflict resolution as it appears in the work of the analytical conflict resolution 
scholars. 
 
The analytical conflict resolution literature, in common with much of the literature 
on social conflict in general, devotes a great deal of attention to aspects such as 
the causes of conflict, the nature of conflict, its processes, and ways of resolving 
it. Comparatively little attention is given to the end-state of conflict resolution, 
however. How do we know when conflict is resolved? Some of the lack of clarity 
on the nature of resolution has to do with the fact that, according to Ross 
(2004:7), it is useful to distinguish between the “internal” criteria for successful 
resolution (how their actions affect the people with whom they work) and the 
“external” (how they will impact the wider conflict) criteria of conflict resolution. 
Most resolution practitioners are far better able to spell out their internal criteria 
for success than they are able to explain their external ones. And yet, the whole 
point of conflict resolution revolves around bringing about these “external” 
changes. Discussing the views of the analytical conflict resolution approach, 
Rubenstein and Blechman (1999: 3) reflect this situation when they point out that 
“…no particular vision of the Good Society compels the practitioners…”. 
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We have, in our Chapter four above, however, closely examined the corpus of 
literature of the analytical conflict resolution school, in an attempt to extract from 
that body of literature the various elements that these scholar-practitioners 
present as the necessary conditions of conflict resolution. Some of these 
elements relate to structural conditions, such as the importance of restored 
relationships. Others relate to the procedural elements, such as specific problem-
solving processes that must be applied if conflict resolution is to eventuate, and 
that should be sustained, and institutionalized if conflict provention is to occur.  A 
third category relates to the importance of structural transformation, 
encompassed in constitutional arrangements, and democratic governance. Yet 
another category relates to the presence of distributive justice in the post-conflict 
society. 
 
In summary then, we reproduce the seven key propositions about the nature of a 
resolved conflict that we established in our chapter four above. We list them as 
follows: 
 
• Firstly, there is a procedural element, in terms of which the conflict is 
resolved according to a certain, highly prescriptive process: the facilitated 
analytical problem-solving workshop. 
• Secondly, a resolved conflict would present evidence of restored 
relationships, and also be characterized by the presence of Burton’s 
notion of “valued relationships”. 
• Thirdly, a high level of identity, and related needs satisfaction, through 
maximization of autonomy and self-determination of groups would be 
evident. 
• Fourthly, there would be a high degree of distributive justice characterized 
by increasing equality and decreasing poverty. 
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• Fifthly, ongoing analytical “provention” problem-solving processes, 
designed to bring about basic human needs satisfaction through the 
continual adjustment of social institutions to meet the needs of individuals 
and groups, would continue. 
• Related to the above, but deserving special mention, Burton has indicated 
that special constitutional provisions should be provided for minority 
groups in deep-rooted conflict. 
• A resolved conflict does not imply a future without any form of conflict 
 
There is, upon examination of the list above, implicit in the work of the analytical 
conflict resolution school, two levels of conflict resolution. The first level is the 
hoped for results of the pre-negotiation interventions; the classical problem-
solving workshops, that will enable a negotiated settlement to take place. This 
first level is the result of episodic problem-solving intervention. Beyond this, 
however, is the second level; the level of conflict transformed in the long term; 
the result of ongoing, institutionalized problem-solving, with the presence of 
restored and valued relationships. 
 
We will next be examining the literature on the present state of South African 
society for evidence of the above aspects of resolved conflict in the post 1994 
social context. 
 
9.3 Social Cohesion and Conflict in Contemporary South Africa 
South Africa has clearly made remarkable strides, in its accommodation of socio-
political conflict, as mentioned at the very beginning of the chapter. A liberal 
democracy, based on one of the world’s most progressive constitutions has been 
established, which is committed to the protection of human rights. The 
constitution protects the status of eleven official languages. Elections have been 
held, and a high degree of political stability has been maintained. Economic 
policy is well managed within the limitations of market orthodoxy, and a low level 
of economic growth has been maintained.   
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However, a number of observers point to issues that continue to threaten South 
Africa’s stability and impede conflict management. Aspects of a lack of social 
cohesion, and a lack of reconciliation and resolution of conflict in South Africa 
remain, that provide much cause for concern. We will enumerate a number of 
these below.  
 
The society has changed markedly since 1990, and to some extent, one can 
agree with Ann Bernstein, when she writes of post-apartheid South Africa, that 
“...many of the issues that confront South Africans now sound like those of other 
countries and are not all derived solely from questions of race”(1998: 198).  A 
number of challenges rooted in our history are still facing the new South Africa, 
however, and we can identify a series of problems that, if not resolved, are likely 
to affect the state of social cohesion in the country. These are important and bear 
a detailed examination below, as they point towards a number of aspects of 
South African society that are highlighted as fault lines in the sections below. 
 
There is, for instance, the tension between democracy and delivery. There is an 
enormous development challenge that faces the government, with high levels of 
poverty, a continuing lack of access to clean water, electricity and housing. 
Bernstein writes for instance that the “major crisis lies in unemployment” 
(1998:199). The government has also inherited a civil service that is demoralized 
and without the skills necessary to build a productive nation. Simultaneously the 
government is committed to introduce some form of reasonably rapid affirmative 
action to ensure a civil service whose composition is more closely aligned with 
the country’s democratic profile. In this context, Bernstein presciently asks 
whether race will be allowed to re-emerge in the country as the critical selector of 
jobs and opportunities. Is it possible to build a nonracial state based on a 
nonracial constitution and have special privileges for some people based purely 
on their race? Second, will the state allow independent organizations that criticize 
its policies to continue to operate?” (Bernstein, 1998:199) 
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Bernstein maintains that there are five other factors working to undermine some 
of the most basic rules that hold a society together. The first factor is the state of 
the South African criminal justice system. It is, according to her, under-policed 
and under-resourced, and largely ineffective in keeping the crime wave in the 
country under control. Prisons are over full, to the extent that prisoners are 
periodically released to make room for newly convicted criminals. Crime, as it 
impinges on security is regarded as important by a number of commentators on 
reconciliation, and has negative implications for the satisfaction of the human 
need for security. 
 
We will comment on the current state of crime and its combating in section 9.3.5 
below. 
 
Bernstein lists, as her second factor, the continuation of lack of payment for 
services of all kinds continues to remain a problem. This relates to the 
government’s neo-liberalist policies and the frustration of the need for distributive 
justice. 
 
The third factor she mentions is the general level of corruption in and around the 
state, but also more broadly, in society as a whole. As an example, here, one can 
point to the arms deal struck by the government, in terms of which a number of 
politicians have taken advantage of inducements in respect of their procurement 
choices211. Counter-trade spin-offs of the arms deal have also resulted in 
accusations of dishonest gain through favoritism in the allocation of development 
tenders in, for instance the Coega IDZ project.212 
  
                                                 
211 See for instance newspaper source on Shaik trial 
 
212 See for instance Bradshaw and Burger (2005) for an account of the rubric around the public scoping 
processes relating to the Coega IDZ project. 
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The following represent a number of fault lines, that indicate a lack of true 
resolution in the South African case, and that deserve the concerned attention of 
political leaders if the South African miracle is to be sustained. The reason that 
we have selected these specific fault lines, or issues, is that each reflects directly 
on elements of the analytical conflict resolution school’s notion of conflict 
resolution. Although the following will be dealt with as separate issues, the reality 
is that they often overlap, and reinforce each other in various ways.213 
 
9.3.1 Lack of Service Delivery and Public Protest 
The protests concerning poor service delivery taking place around the country 
from the middle of 2005, through into 2006, bear out Bernstein’s 1998 prediction 
that: “The big normative test will come when, at the micro level, the government 
gets tired of the trade-off between endless consultation with “the community” and 
actually getting projects off the ground, and at the macro level, government finds 
it harder to deliver on  a massive scale than it originally thought and pressures 
rise for less-than-democratic measures to quell popular discontent.” (1998: 199). 
 
There have been extensive protests around the issue of lack of delivery of 
essential services and housing at the local government level, since the 1994 
election (Cull, 2006: 9). These protests have recently gained momentum, and the 
year 2005 saw protest action around the country, with violence sometimes 
occurring, and the police often standing accused of overly harsh retaliation 
against the protestors. This comes as no surprise. Nicol and Africa (2005: 86) 
write that “When one examines the depth and breadth of poverty in South Africa 
and the backlogs in basic municipal service provision, the surprising feature is 
that open conflict is not more widespread.”  
 
The focus of the protest activity is the ANC government that is criticized for being 
unable to provide an acceptable level of services. Though not necessarily 
                                                 
213 For instance, the economic policies pursued by the government, unemployment and crime  are all closely 
related to one other. 
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problematic in and of themselves, it is noteworthy that these protests too often 
did turn violent, and the government’s reactions to the protests are also 
interesting. The ANC, instead of responding by investigating the nature of 
delivery failure and attempting to remedy the problem, has sometimes reacted 
very heavy-handedly; actually in quite similar fashion to the actions of the NP 
governments of the past. It has used “heavy” policing tactics with tear-gas and 
rubber bullets, and has threatened to launch an investigation into the possible 
agency of a third force provoking political unrest214.  The protest action, and the 
violence that accompanies it continues well into 2006.  
 
The Satawu strike, and mass action by security guards in early 2006 led to the 
deaths of some sixty people215. For some critics to the left of government, the 
situation has become serious in the extreme. According to Patrick Bond (2005: 
306) for instance, state repression and judicial harassment of social movements 
was occurring, and increasing in 2004, and he quotes Naomi Klein, who wrote: 
“There is a huge amount of struggle going on in this country. There are 
movements exploding. They are resisting privatization of water and electricity, 
resisting eviction and demanding land reform. They are reacting against all the 
broken promises of the ANC. This is a security state. It spends three times as 
much on private security as it does on affordable housing – just to keep the rich 
from the poor.” 
 
Though these sentiments may be something of an overstatement of the situation, 
reflecting the ongoing conflicts that characterize many states, there is some 
cause for concern, given the deep-rooted nature of the conflict in South Africa, 
and the high levels of violence that do occur.  
 
                                                 
214 For an account of a typical episode, see for instance the article by Matyu, J. concerning the demolition of 
shacks by municipal officials, the resultant  protest action, stoning of cars and use of teargas by the police (Herald, 
16 March 2006, :2). See also the article by Nicol and Africa, (2005), for a general account of the unrest. 
 
215 Newspaper source 
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In the context of the unrest, Nicol and Africa (2005: 86-96) have pointed to the 
need for local government to develop best practice in conflict management 
processes, to deal with the “…rising wave of popular protest.” This underlines the 
fact that government is not in touch with the needs of its constituents, and that 
communications have broken down. In the period immediately following  the 1994 
election, various development forums were opened up to promote dialogue 
around issues of delivery, but with the passage of time these have largely been 
rejected as ineffectual, compared to the politics of street protest and 
confrontation. The structures of the NPA that continued to function into 1995 
were also able, at the beginning of the period, to address localized protests and 
channel them into constructive discussion. These structures were closed down in 
that year, however, as was mentioned in our Chapter 5 above.  Additionally, the 
new government’s original emphasis on community policing gave way in 1997 to 
a “law and order” model, which is more reactive than preventive. 
 
These developments indicate an inability on the part of government to provide 
services, its tendency to control protest in forceful ways, the failure of discussion 
and negotiation as means of conflict management, and by implication, from the 
analytical conflict resolution perspective, indicate the absence of “proventive” 
measures of conflict management in the society. 
 
9.3.2 Fault Lines of Race and Identity 
Perhaps most importantly for the future of the country, many of the instances of 
conflict that occur in South Africa, still take place along the fault lines of race and 
social identity that were constructed during the apartheid era. While one would 
not expect the issues around race, racial prejudice and inequality to disappear 
overnight, Claude-Helene Mayer in her investigation of the continuing role of 
identity in conflict in South Africa in the post apartheid era, (2004: 349) states in 
her conclusion that:  "…experiences from the apartheid-past determine especially 
‘intercultural’ conflict experiences”. According to her, this shows up in the 
repeatedly surfacing themes of racial belonging, status, and feelings of 
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inferiority/superiority. And it has come as a surprise to Mayer, that ten years after 
the end of apartheid, the issue of race remains of such penetrating importance in 
the “…construction of perceptions, identity and conscience in everyday 
conflicts.".  She proceeds also to write that her data leads her to the conclusion 
that the terminology and contents of race affiliation are continuously 
reconstructed and perpetuated, as they are continually passed on through 
various forms of socialization.” (Ibid. : 349). 
 
Mayer finds the remarkably high number of conflicts caused by self and other 
images noteworthy, and goes on to write that “These constructs strongly affect 
perceptions, potential expressions, and interpretations of everyday situations and 
thus conflict experience” (2004: 355). Her data also reveal thinking in racial 
categories, and feelings of inferiority and superiority “…which are to be 
interpreted as consequences of ‘inner apartheid’ and intra psychological identity 
conflicts.” (Ibid 355).  
 
This perception is echoed by President Mbeki, who, in his final weekly newsletter 
for the year 2005, also raised the issue of white and black South Africans 
“marching in different directions” (SABC News, 16 December 2005). This 
evidence all points towards a lack of resolution of the conflict, especially insofar 
as people continue to think in terms of racial identity group categories, define 
themselves accordingly, and continue to act in terms of their group memberships. 
These findings are additionally, largely borne out by the work of Lombard (2004a, 
2004b), Hofmeyer (2005) and Gibson (2004), examining indicators of 
reconciliation below. The racial divides contribute towards a high degree of social 
distance – especially between white South Africans and members of other race 
groups in the country, that will be dealt with under the heading of a lack of 
interracial contact in section 9.3.3 below. One of the implications of this situation 
is the tenuous and difficult nature of relationships across racial divides that is 
borne out by the lack of trust towards the government and other racial groupings 
displayed by white South Africans. For instance, less than thirty percent of white 
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South Africans believe that government leaders can be trusted to do what is right, 
that parliament will treat its citizens equally, or that parliament can be trusted to 
do what is right for the country as a whole (Hofmeyer, 2005: 25 -27). 
 
9.3.3 Lack of Interracial Contact 
As far as cross-racial contact is concerned, there is a large percentage of South 
Africans who report never talking to their compatriots of other races, and more 
than half of all South Africans never socialize with people who do not belong to 
the same group as themselves, and this percentage is on the increase in 
longitudinal studies. Additionally, approximately 60% of South Africans 
“…continue to struggle to understand their fellow South Africans from other racial 
backgrounds.” (Lombard, 2004: 50, Hofmeyer, 2005: 51). Again, this is supported 
by the findings of Gibson, who writes that “…if reconciliation requires interracial 
understanding, then a majority of South Africans are not reconciled.” (2004: 122).  
 
 
9.3.4 Neo-liberal macro-economic policies 
 
During the process of pre-negotiation, leading up to the formal negotiation 
process in South Africa, the ANC gave assurances to the effect that it would not 
apply nationalization, or other socialist policies that would threaten business 
interests in South Africa, should it become the government of a democratic South 
Africa. This was one of the key issues which were established in the pre-
negotiation processes216 that ultimately made it possible for South African 
business leadership to back a negotiated settlement, and for the National Party to 
enter negotiations.217 It came as a surprise, however, as the ANC had 
understandably always subscribed to policies that would equalize, democratize 
                                                 
 
216 Mentioned in chapter five above 
 
217 These groups had always based their criticism of the ANC on their perception that the ANC was essentially a 
socialist, or communist party. 
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and redistribute the wealth in South Africa218. Since coming to power in 1994, 
however the ANC has steered a path that is extremely business friendly and neo-
liberal in its economic policies. The Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), embodying a more distributionist ethic, though given an initial priority 
within the ANC’s policy framework, soon gave way to the neo-liberal GEAR 
strategy.219  
 
The emphasis of government economic policy has been on building a black 
business class, rather than on uplifting the poverty-stricken masses. The result is 
that inequality, as indicated by the Gini coefficient, has remained extremely high 
in the first ten years of democracy. Recent survey findings, for instance, indicate 
that only ten percent of black South Africans have forty-three percent of black 
buying power in the country220, and the South African Institute of Race Relations’ 
South Africa Survey of 2006 shows that the Gini coefficient has increased, 
especially among black South Africans 221. Unemployment remains at extremely 
high levels222, and macro-economic policies are not being adjusted to address 
the problem. 
                                                 
218 For instance, as late as 1989, Slabbert (2006:32) tells of the last meeting that Idasa arranged between  people 
inside South Africa and the ANC in exile in Paris on economic policy, where a "...passionate White trade unionist" 
got to his feet and shouted: "When we take over there will be no private property, industry will be fully nationalised 
and the state will be the only real instrument for economic development." The trade unionist in question was Alec 
Erwin who later became Minister of Trade and Industry and subsequently Minister of Public Enterprise, who now 
defends free trade and a market economy with “ equal passion" 
 
219 See for instance Bond, 2005, and Hirsch, 2005 for contrasting versions of this development. 
 
220 See report in The Herald 16 March p 4 
 
221 See report in The Herald, 6 April 2006: 10 
 
222 According to a 2006 poll of Research Surveys, reported in the Herald (16 March 2006), at the time of writing, 
40% of black South Africans remained unemployed. The South African Institute of Race Relations South Africa 
Survey supports these findings, with head researcher Jane Tempest saying "While growing inequality is in part an 
indication of the growth of the black middle class...it is of concern that such growth has been accompanied by an 
increase in poverty among the lowest income groups.", and 
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The apparent commitment of the South African government to neo-liberal 
principles that privilege the interests of big business against the interests of the 
poor majority in South Africa is a matter of concern, especially in the context of 
the incomplete transformation processes applied in the country223.  
 
The point has been made elsewhere, that the conflict transformation instruments 
applied in South Africa, such as the TRC, might have proved more satisfactory if 
reparations had been made, and if government exemplified a reconciliatory policy 
vis-à-vis those who suffered most at the hands of the apartheid regime. The 
problem with the current government strategy is that ten years on, it is not 
following such a line, especially with regard to material reparations (Burton, M., 
2004: 29-43). It has been pointed out above, that in the view of the analytical 
conflict resolution school, one of the indicators of successful conflict resolution, 
would be a high level of distributive justice. From this perspective then, the 
current situation is particularly worrying, and not encouraging for the prospects of  
longer term conflict resolution 224.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
figures published in the Survey showed that the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day - the measure of 
absolute poverty - had more than doubled since 1994." 
 
223 There are, of course those, such as Bernstein (1998) and Sunter  (2004 ) for whom the market represents an 
important agent in preventing or limiting conflict. However, from a conflict resolution perspective, the  widespread 
frustration of the need for distributive justice which neo-liberalism brings into effect in the short to medium term is 
likely to prove destabilizing in the long term.  It should be borne in mind that both the National Peace Accord, and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission stood accused by critics of not following through on those aspects of the 
conflict that called for reparations (TRC) or development assistance (NPA). 
 
224 Foster (2005: 339) concurs, writing that victims of human rights abuses in the TRC process frequently 
stressed their desire for reparation, indicating that restorative justice is the “kernel of reconciliation…” It followed 
therefore that  “In terms of economic disparities and inequalities, we are still an afflicted land; there is still a long 
way to go." 
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9.3.5 High Levels of Crime 
Bernstein (1998) has correctly mentioned as one of the challenges that face the 
country that one of the legacies of apartheid is the extent to which people 
continue to evade laws which they might regard as unjust, just as they evaded 
unjust apartheid laws in the past. One can go much further than Bernstein in this 
respect, and point to rampant corruption, including government’s stealing from 
the poorest of the poor 225, which cannot simply be equated with the continuation 
of the evasion of unjust apartheid laws. 
 
At the time of writing, in late 2006, levels of crime remained extremely high in 
South Africa. Despite the government’s numerous campaigns to deal with crime, 
there has been little or no abatement. After twelve years of democracy, the crime 
wave is clearly more than a transitional phenomenon, and the public outcry over 
crime is growing (Spies, D. and Sonjica, N., 2006: 1, The Herald, 17 April, 
2006)226.  
 
One of the worst aspects of the crime wave is its violent nature. It is particularly 
murder and rape, and violent assaults accompanying theft of various kinds,  that 
seem to be impervious to the attempts to control them. Clearly much crime is 
related to the high levels of poverty and unemployment in the country, but the 
high levels of violence have more to do with ruptured relationships and 
unresolved hostility that point to an incomplete resolution of conflict in the 
country. Pierre du Toit (2001: 127) has made a similar point as follows: “…mere 
                                                 
225 See article in The Herald, 22 December 2006, for an account of  wholescale corruption surrounding the school 
feeding scheme in the province.  
 
226 The article mentions reports in Rapport newspaper, cited by the DA opposition, that violent crime was 
extremely high in SA. Figures reported were 52 people being killed daily, or 1 466 per month, or 18 793 per year. 
"According to the newspaper, the SA Human Rights Commission was of the opinion that the country's Constitution 
was in danger of becoming meaningless as an individual's right to life was not being respected. The articles quote 
Jankielsohn - spokesman of the DA as  saying that "...what was disturbing was that police were afraid of these 
criminals." 
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materialist interpretations of the roots of public violence are inadequate, that the 
social-psychological dimension needs to be considered as well, and that the 
roots of such violent actions need to be traced to the structure of the overt 
political conflict preceding the inauguration of democracy and the nature of the 
transition from that conflict.” One particularly worrying manifestation in this 
regard, is the increasing incidence of violence in schools, which has seen a 
number of violent episodes resulting in the deaths of pupils in some cases, and 
reports that schools are unsafe environments for young people (Kollapen, 2006). 
The current violence in schools augurs very badly for the future of security in the 
country as a whole 227.  
  
Analysing the results of her (2004) survey, Lombard reports that South Africans 
feel threatened by high crime levels. Forty-three percent believe that crime is one 
of the most important problems for the government to address, with eighty-one 
percent believing that crime is a serious threat to democracy. Although the 2004 
survey does indicate a slight improvement from previous years, the improvement 
is statistically insignificant. Of note, also is the fact that the races in South Africa 
differ in terms of whether they are optimistic or not concerning future decreases 
in crime levels, with whites being least optimistic, and blacks showing the most 
marked increase in expecting an improvement in this area. Again, there are 
human needs implications here. High levels of violent crime frustrate the basic 
human need for security. There is also evidence to suggest that much of the 
                                                 
227 For instance, The Cape Argus of September 2006 reported that a Gauteng youth died in a fight and a school 
pupil was paralysed in incidents of gang-related violence near two Blue Downs schools. “The upsurge of violence 
in South Africa is fuelled by the fact that teachers and  pupils have accepted it as a normal way of conflict 
resolution" said Craig Arendse, a conflict management consultant  at a seminar in Port Elizabeth" (The Herald , 16 
October 2006). The Herald (29 September, 2006) also quotes the National Professional Teachers' Organisation of 
South Africa as saying that the right to human dignity was being infringed. “The slightest provocation leads one 
pupil to assault a fellow pupil...Pupils are often accosted on their way to school by criminals loitering. Pupils are 
robbed of jewellery,  cellphones and taxi fare.". 
According to an article in The Herald (11/12/2006),the link is made by Jody Kollapen of the Human Rights 
Commission, between school violence and the survival of South Africa’s “very fragile democracy”. 
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schools violence is related to gang activity 228. According to Lucas (2003), citing 
Andy Dawes, “The vast majority of those who fought the township and rural wars 
of the early 1990s were drawn from very poor, violent communities… And after 
the conflict terminated, there was no political role for the majority… The limited 
evidence available suggests that many felt abandoned by those for whom they 
had fought.” Again there is evidence of alienation, and a lack of belonging that 
feeds the growth of gang-related activity. To the analytical conflict resolution 
scholars this feeling of alienation indicates frustrated identity needs, or needs for 
valued relationships on the part of the youth concerned 229. 
 
 
9.3.6 Intolerance 
 
Gibson and Gouws have in their work, targeted political tolerance levels as an 
important indicator of reconciliation in the country. They make the point  that: 
"Tolerance is more indispensable in heterogeneous societies than in 
homogeneous societies because in societies with deep divisions, the potential for 
conflict is so much greater." (2003: 24). Linking this to South Africa, they state 
that “In South Africa, the potential for conflict is embedded in the political culture, 
in that racial and ethnic groups were artificially separated from one another, 
leading to misunderstandings based on a lack of interaction with one another and 
a lack of knowledge of political differences connected to ethnicity. Under such 
conditions, tolerance is necessary to foster peaceful coexistence.” (2003: 24). 
According to Gibson (2004: 208), however, “South Africans are deeply intolerant 
of political differences, and many “…have not accepted the virtues of the liberal 
half of the liberal democracy equation (majority rule plus minority rights)”. For 
Gibson, though, it remains surprising that the rule of law is associated in South 
                                                 
228 According to a community police forum chairperson, Melville De Bruin after the murder of a pupil near a Blue 
Downs School in September 2006: "The causes of this violence at and near schools appears to have gang 
undertones. We really want to help the youth to deal with crime issues and settle arguments in a non-violent way." 
Reported in  Cape Argus,  15 September 2006. 
 
229 Burton (1990b,154), supports this line of reasoning when he maintains that:  “The typical street gang member 
is seeking out valued relationships among his colleagues within the gang.” 
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Africa with minoritarianism. His findings indicate that “…it seems that intolerance, 
strong majoritarianism, and disregard for the rule of law go together in the minds 
of many South Africans...”, and he draws the logical conclusion that this is not a 
formula for the successful consolidation of democracy and the protection of 
human rights in the country (2004: 209).  
 
This bears out the earlier findings of Gibson and Gouws (2003) that: "Certain 
contextual factors paint a bleak picture for political tolerance in South Africa.230 
They go on to posit that on the basis of their survey, (2003: 56) " The data in the 
table are unambiguous: South Africans tend to be quite intolerant. About two 
thirds of the respondents would ban their most disliked group and nearly three 
fourths would [prevent them] from demonstrating." and later, "South Africans who 
are tolerant are in a distinct minority."  In comparative terms, they write that: 
"...South Africans are indeed intolerant, but they are far from being the most 
intolerant people imaginable." (ibid: 57) 
 
Gibson and Gouws maintain that the particular danger of South African 
intolerance is that it is not confined to the extremes of the South African political 
spectrum, as it often seems to be in other countries. (ibid: 62). The implications 
for all this are that a concerted effort has to be made on the part of the South 
                                                 
230 Among the factors that they regard as important contributors to intolerance in South Africa, Gibson and Gouws 
include the following, largely historical features : 
* High levels of political violence in the past on the part of the state and among opposing     
  groups through which enemies were clearly and rigidly defined 
*High levels of threat from the political environment 
*The  undemocratic and intolerant practice of creating no-go zones to limit political  
  competition 
*Impediments to tolerance, as in social learning that legitimizes undemocratic political  
  norms (such as liberating intolerance) coupled with a breakdown of conventional agents  
  of social learning about democracy, such as schools. 
* New political institutions, of contested legitimacy and effectiveness 
* A mass  public that played a major role in the transition and that         
   resists demobilization. 
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African political leadership, to project tolerance by their own actions, and to act in 
ways that will unite, rather than divide the different segments of South African 
society. Although then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech 
of 9 May 1996 propounded an inclusive national identity, his more recent 
statements have been quite divisive. Van Zyl Slabbert (2006 2, 3) discusses 
Mbeki's drift away from his inclusive definition of Africanness, towards a less 
inclusive approach a decade later. In Slabbert’s own words: “Unfortunately 
Mbeki's first inclusive and generous definition of Africanness, almost ten years 
later, has been ideologically mangled and historically appropriated beyond 
recognition. The new historiography, often more by implication than by being 
explicit makes it quite clear that a Coloured, Indian or White can never be an 
African. In the South African context, an African, for purposes of policy, is a 
'Black of a special kind'. 
 
Recent political developments in South Africa witness a number of attempts on 
the part of government to limit freedoms associated with a culture of human 
rights and due democratic process. During 2006, for instance, we see attacks on 
the freedom of information and the independent status of the judiciary, as well as 
an attempt to negate the power of the opposition in local government where it 
has managed to replace the governing party.  
 
Since the 2005 local government elections in Cape Town, and the victory of the 
DA in those elections, giving it the right to appoint the mayor of the city, there has 
been ongoing strife in the management of the city, with firstly, informal efforts to 
unseat the DA majority through alliance formation with the Independent 
Democrats, but much more seriously, once this proved unfeasible, there has 
been a concerted attempt on the part of the ANC to change the system of 
representation currently functioning in the city, with one which removes power 
from the executive mayor, Helen Zille. The MEC for local government of the 
Western Cape, Richard Dyantyi has cited as his motivation for going ahead with 
the proposed changes, the need for “...inclusive political processes” in the city 
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ahead of the 2010 Soccer World Cup competition to be hosted in South Africa. 
The current system is, however, regarded as acceptable in all the other major 
urban centres, where the ANC enjoys a majority, and so this argument does not 
hold. Critics hold the view that the move is simply a refusal on the part of the 
ANC to accept an oppositional role, rather than a governmental one231. These 
moves on the part of the ANC indicate that it is serious about manipulating the 
forms and processes of government in order to dominate all aspects of the 
political scene in the country, and this does not inspire confidence in a future, 
human needs-driven governance of South Africa. 
 
An additional development, pointing in the direction of the centralization of power, 
and emerging authoritarianism, is the recent revelation in respect of control of the 
South African Broadcasting Corporation.  The public broadcaster is publicly 
committed to giving a voice to civil society, yet it has recently emerged that the 
corporation has maintained a blacklist with regard to certain commentators that it 
will not allow to comment on current affairs, for political reasons. The blacklist 
has been confirmed by a commission that the SABC established to investigate 
allegations on the matter232. The corporation has thus far refused to comply with 
the findings of its own commission, however, by not publishing it, as required, 
and the board have declared their confidence in their news and current affairs 
managing director, Snuki Zikalala, who issued the blacklisting directives. This is 
another disturbing development, threatening the freedom of information in the 
country, which is guaranteed by the constitution.   Simultaneously, the 
government is surreptitiously promoting a piece of legislation; the Films and 
Publications Amendment Bill, through the legislature, which would forbid the free 
                                                 
231 See relevant reports in The Herald (October 11, 2006, 20 September, 2006) 
 
232 The SABC management set up a commission, under former SABC head Zwelakhe Sisulu and advocate 
Gilbert Marcus SC after complaints about a ruling, allegedly by news head Snuki Zikalala, that certain 
commentators and analysts not be used because they were critical of President Thabo Mbeki (The Herald, 13 
October, 2003: 5, Mail and Guardian, 13 – 19 October, 2006: 4,5). 
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distribution of news and analysis about sexual activity, propaganda for war, the 
incitement of violence and hate speech233. This legislation, which is quite 
sweeping in respect of the powers that it gives to censorship, is being very quietly 
advanced, without much evidence of consultation, or public discussion. This 
development is another indication of a shift away from tolerance, and towards the 
centralization of control in the governing party. 
 
Several contentious bills are additionally being slowly shepherded through 
parliament by Justice Minister Mabandla, which seek to substantially amend the 
judicial system. Two of the most contentious of the pieces of legislation are the 
Constitution 14th Amendment Bill and the Superior Courts Bill. The major cause 
of concern is that these Bills collectively provide for the Minister of Justice to 
exercise authority over the administration and the budgets of all courts, 
something which was previously under the control of the courts themselves. 
Former Chief Justice Chaskalson, who opposes the proposed legislation, has 
said: “In a constitutional state the executive should not have control over the way 
the court functions. It can have a say but not control” (Laurence, 2006: 19). 
George Bizos, a prominent anti-apartheid lawyer has added his voice to the 
criticism of the legislation, and Chief Justice Pius Langa has specifically focused 
his criticism on the proposal to amend section 165 of the Constitution, which 
prohibits interference with the functioning of the courts by any organ of the state. 
The Chief Justice states that: “The proposed change (is) a retrogressive step. It 
halts….the natural development of the concepts of the independence of the 
judiciary and the courts and the application of the doctrine of separation of 
                                                 
233 See, for instance, article by Boyle (Sunday Times, 8 October 2006)  where the claim is made that "If adopted, 
the Bill would forbid the free distribution of news and analysis about sexual activity, propaganda for war, the 
incitement of violence and hate speech. Instead, three person teams of censors paid by the government will have 
the right to judge what should be banned outright, what should be approved for limited circulation and what can be 
freely published. Even art and scientific papers could be restricted to over 18’s or ordered sold only in licensed 
premises like sex shops." The report alludes to “diversion tactics” on the part  of government, as it focuses debate 
on the legislation concerning gay marriage as a smokescreen to avoid debate on the media censorship front. 
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powers.” (Laurence, 2006:20) The concern of the legal fraternity is that the 
changes will allow the executive to influence the selection of judges to hear 
specific cases, and/or appoint acting judges to sensitive cases. (Ibid.). The 
International Bar Association, speaking through Michael Corbett, another former 
South African Chief Justice, has warned that the impending legislation, if passed, 
would encroach “impermissibly” on the independence of the judiciary (ibid. 21). 
Prominent Judge Johan Kriegler, who presided over the administration of South 
Africa’s first  democratic general election, referring to this development stated 
that “The separation of powers, of which the independence of the judiciary is an 
essential component, is the only protection against the abuse of power” 
(Laurence, 2006: 21). Judge Richard Goldstone, co-chair of the IBA’s Human 
Rights Institute, has also joined his voice to the criticism – raising the view that 
this might be the beginnings of “…a slippery slope - taking away other areas of 
judicial  independence…”234.  Additionally, the unilateral implementation of a new 
set of guidelines  to prosecute apartheid-era perpetrators who did not avail 
themselves of the TRC’s truth process, has raised the anger of a number of 
victims groups and non-governmental organizations, with the government.235 
Political Commentator Sipho Seepe, has also pointed to the tendency of many in 
South African political debates, including those in parliament, to shout each other 
down, rather than engage in critical debate, as a display of political intolerance 
(2006). 
 
The rolling back of freedoms, though as yet barely perceptible, besides being 
inimical to liberal democracy, and the separation of powers, also signifies a shift 
away from an analytical, problem-solving mentality, as promoted by Burton (2001 
b ), towards a deterrence, or power-political framework.  
 
 
                                                 
234 See article in the Sunday Times, 23/04/2006: 19 
 
235 See the Sunday Independent, report by Terreblanche 22/1/2006 
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9.3.7 Reconciliation and the TRC 
The TRC continues to demonstrate a capacity to stir strong feelings, and even 
fan the flames of conflict, long after its termination. Ten years after its inception, 
and long after its formal dissolution, a conflict continues between those in the 
liberation movements and the apartheid security forces on one side, and the 
organs of civil society on the other, over the question of prosecutions of apartheid 
– era atrocities. As cases of liberation movement atrocities were being prepared 
for prosecution, the process was initially halted by the government236.  There has 
also been an intervention by ex-President F.W. de Klerk, in the interest of ex-
security force personnel, and a document has subsequently been drafted, setting 
out discretionary powers for the National Prosecuting Authority – in effect giving 
them the same powers as those initially given to the TRC, but in this case, to be 
exercised outside of the glare of public scrutiny which accompanied the TRC 
process.  A number of NGO’s, including human rights pressure groups have 
organised to challenge this development, as there is a fear that further amnesties 
will be granted, undermining the important work of the TRC itself, and divesting 
the amnesty process of the veneer of legitimacy that had been bestowed by 
perpetrator admissions. This NGO opposition also includes a number of 
individuals formerly associated with the TRC, such as Yasmin Sooka (ex-
commissioner), and Howard Varney (legal counsel to the TRC), with ex - deputy 
chair Boraine also supporting the challenge.  The ex-chair of the TRC, Bishop 
Desmond Tutu has expressed his reservations about the ability of successful 
prosecutions237 after a lapse of so many years, with documents continuously 
being lost, and other sources of evidence receding. To some extent, the fears of 
those human rights-based critics of the TRC238 have been vindicated, as it seems 
                                                 
 
236 See the following reports by Terreblanche, (Sunday Independent, 28 November 2004), (Sunday Independent,  
5 December 2004), and (Business Report 27 November 2005) 
 
237 See report by Christelle Terreblanche in Sunday Independent (23/4/2006) 
 
238 Critics such as Wilson (2001), cited in chapter seven above. 
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that the state is beginning to continue along the path of least resistance – the 
avoidance of prosecution of abuses, which continues and extends the earlier 
tradition of the TRC. This should be seen against the background of the recent 
critique of reforms to the South African legal system by the International Bar 
Association, particularly from judge Richard Goldstone, a co-chairman of its 
Human Rights Institute, who has warned that the South African legal system risks 
losing its reputation as one of the world’s shining examples, saying that the 
proposed legislation would impact on the democratic pedigree of the new South 
Africa 239. 
 
Other ongoing matters causing unhappiness with the reconciliation process – 
especially so-called ‘unfinished business’, include the persistent lack of attention 
to reparations issues, as well as the lack of access to the TRC report by the 
general public 240. There is an admission that the TRC only uncovered a small 
proportion of the truth of apartheid era abuses. That shortcoming is now being 
compounded by the inaccessibility of its report. In this regard, the government is 
coming in for strong criticism from a number of quarters, as it is being blamed for 
not bringing satisfactory closure to the whole TRC process241. 
 
Much of the literature on the TRC reflects great confusion about exactly what the 
TRC was attempting to accomplish. Most recently an examination of Villa-
Vicencio’s writing illustrates this exactly (2006 a and 2006 b). On the one hand 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
239 See  article by Carmel Rickard in Sunday Times “Global legal body slams plans for SA judiciary (23 April 
2004) 
 
240 Pigou, director of the South African History Archive has stated (Sunday Independent, (23/5/06), for instance, 
that “…the vast majority of South Africans, including those who directly engaged  the commission, have therefore 
never seen what the commission actually found and why.”, and Varney has described the TRC report as “…one of 
the least read reports of its kind in the world.”, citing the situation as a disgrace. 
 
241 See for instance the articles by Villa-Vicencio, “Our past is still with us” (Sunday Times, 23/4/2006, p 19), and 
“Call for redress: TRC work still not completed”  (The Herald, 26/9/2006, p. 4). 
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there is the call to bring closure to the issue of the past. On the other hand, there 
is the warning that white South Africans have not yet come up with the requisite 
contrition for their role in history242.  There is disagreement among former 
commissioners on whether prosecutions should take place, or whether the 
attempt to bring these about would simply be technically unfeasible from a legal 
perspective.  
 
The opinion has been expressed by influential participants, including archbishop 
Tutu, that whites have not internalized the reconciliation process, that insufficient 
recognition has been shown of the suffering of black South Africans, as well as 
the complicity of whites in that suffering. Others, mainly white South Africans 
continually call for the closing of the door on the past, and moving on. 
 
There is a sense of great frustration in the plethora of newspaper and magazine 
articles that have appeared on the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the 
TRC. This reflects, in the opinion of this writer, the lack of a coherent theoretical 
base for the establishment of the Commission in the first place, as mentioned in 
Chapter seven above. The movers behind the TRC’s establishment and its 
operations did not proceed from a clear theoretical perspective. The Commission 
was founded on a set of mixed religious, legal and pseudo-psychological 
assumptions, that presented no clear goals, or quantifiable success criteria. 
 
 
9.3.8 Land Reform 
 
The iniquitous, racially biased imbalance in South African land ownership due to 
apartheid, has led to efforts to restore land to those black South Africans who 
were dispossessed or unfairly removed from their land. The policy has initially 
                                                 
242 See article by Boyle (Sunday Times, 23 April, 2006: 1), Many statements by Bishop Tutu reflect this ambiguity, 
Tutu is one of those least interested in following the path of prosecution, seeming to suggest a ‘forgive and forget’ 
approach, and yet also continually commenting on the need for especially white South Africans to demonstrate a 
greater spirit of contrition for the past. 
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been based on the principle of “willing-buyer – willing seller”243 in an attempt to 
treat all parties fairly. It has been difficult to implement, however, with many 
farmers holding out for prices that the government believes are higher than 
market value. This has slowed the entire process down, though there are voices 
within both the land claimants and the current owners groups that do accuse the 
government of unnecessarily delaying the process.   
 
The net result has been, that President Mbeki has stated, in his February 2006 
opening of parliament speech, that the state “…will play a more central role in the 
land reform program, ensuring that the restitution program is accelerated”244. The 
message implies that government would override the principle of “willing buyer - 
willing seller”245.  White farmers in the Waterberg area have recently received 
notices of intent to expropriate their land246. 
 
The issue of land, and its ownership and occupation is always an emotive one, 
as land transcends the definition of simple resource. It always contains elements 
that link it to the values and needs of parties. Farms are not simply the site of 
one’s own home and source of income; they are also a link to the past, and 
previous generations. The land issue is also of heightened importance to white 
                                                 
243 See, for instance statement by Land Affairs Minister Thoko Didiza in October 2004, quoted in South Africa.info 
 
244 Reported by Chiahemen and Bell for the Washington Post on Feb 3 2006 
 
245 For an explanation of policy with regard to land restitution and redistribution in South Africa, see International 
Crisis  Group (2004: 139 – 150) 
 
246 According to Segalwe (2006), Agriculture and Land Affairs Minister Lulu Xingwana has issued notices for possible 
expropriation of four portions of a farm in  Limpopo. The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) said through 
its Chief Land Claims Commissioner, that  that "The notice for expropriation is our last resort following lengthy 
negotiations with the land owners, which to date have yielded no results in terms of restoration of land rights to the rightful 
owners," The Commission has repeatedly stated that it faced challenges with landowners who delayed the negotiation 
process, inflated land prices and also questioned the validity of the claims. It said the decision to issue the notices for the 
possible seizure of portions 18, 20, 32 and 33 of the Turffontein Farm 499 KR was part of speeding up the country's land 
reform progamme. The land was claimed by the Letlhakane community in Bela Bela. 
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South African farmers, who draw parallels to the events in neighbouring 
Zimbabwe, where the land issue has given rise to the wholesale, brutal eviction 
of white farmers and their African labourers from their farms, and to the ultimate 
collapse of the commercial farming sector in that country. According to Sunter 
(2004:214) “We know that land is a highly emotive issue and, were land 
invasions to start on a wide scale in South Africa, international confidence would 
crumble. Probably nothing else could cause a tumble in world economic rankings 
as quickly as an unauthorised move of this nature." The land issue therefore has 
the potential to lead to highly destructive conflict behaviour, with high potential 
costs for the country. This has been recognized by the International Crisis Group, 
a conflict resolution organization that has warned of the possibility of increased 
rural violence unless the government increases the pace of land reform 
(International Crisis Group, 2004: 191). The land issue impinges directly on the 
security needs, and identity needs of all parties, making it a vital issue for conflict 
resolution in the form of problem-solving workshops in the eyes of the analytical 
conflict resolution school. 
 
An additional, and related fault-line in South African society is to be found in the 
large numbers of white farmers who have become the victims of crime; 
particularly murder in the rural areas. Although there have been very few 
incidents of public, or political violence in the country since the 1994 election, one 
area of particular concern has been in the number of white farmers that have 
been murdered on their farms247. Although it may be argued that within the 
context of South Africa’s high crime rate, the number of these murders is not 
particularly significant, these attacks, which are often excessively brutal, do 
attract widespread media attention and sow much fear in the comparatively small 
white farming community, who see this as at best, a real attempt to push them off 
                                                 
247 Since 1994, 1600 white farmers have been murdered in over 8000 attacks on farms. Nyanto (2006a: 14) maintains 
that the muder trate for South Africa’s white farmers is the highest for any specific group in the world, at 313 per 100 000.   
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the land, and at worst; a creeping form of genocide248.  No evidence has been 
found that these attacks are anything more than random crimes of opportunity, 
but, as in most instances of conflict, it is the perceptions of the people involved 
that are important in this context249.  
 
Pierre du Toit (2001: 126) has made the point that a feature of the farm killings 
has been that all the victims were white, and almost all of the perpetrators were 
poor, young and black. Du Toit makes the point that this is not ordinary crime, 
“…but rather crime which serves as a public statement of anger and resentment 
which has its roots in the denial of dignity, in the attempt to regain such dignity, 
and in the disillusionment of finding that the promised liberation failed to deliver 
either material or symbolic goods able to satisfy this need,” (Ibid. 127). This fault 
line illustrates frustrated identity needs, and also frustrates the security needs of 
the parties involved.  
 
 
9.3.9 Emigration 
Given South Africa’s particular racial composition and wealth distribution, some 
of the manifestations of the conflict, though they persist, are not readily 
observable as conflict behaviour, such as protests, violence and argumentation. 
For instance, much conflict behaviour takes the form of emigration and temporary 
migration. Particularly in the white population, many young South Africans 
migrate, initially temporarily, though often for extensive periods, to countries 
around the world, where they work in temporary employment, maintaining links 
with their families at home.  According to some reports, as many as half a million 
such people are located in London, as an example. Many others have also 
emigrated to the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and United Arab 
Emirates.  Though this process occurs without overt violence or coercion, many 
                                                 
248 See, for instance, the website Stop Boer Genocide.Com 
http://www.Stopboergenocide.com/124553/125053.html)  
 
249 According to the report of a special commission of enquiry into the issue of farm killings, issued in 2003, full 90% of 
the farm attacks were related strictly to robbery (Nyanto, 2006a: 14).  
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of the migrants perceive that they have very little option, and that employment 
options in South Africa are either very slim, or practically non-existent as a result 
of affirmative action and black economic empowerment policies. The high levels 
of violent crime and corruption are also often cited as reasons for their departure. 
The phenomenon is damaging the economy of the country, through a flight of 
skills, especially in the highly sought-after employment categories such as 
engineering, and the other professions, and a flight of capital and potential tax 
revenue. The South African Institute of Race Relations’ 2006 SA Survey cites 
emigration as the chief reason for the dwindling number of white South Africans.  
According to demographics researcher at the SAIRR Macfarlane, the declining 
white population would have serious consequences for the country's skills base 
as well as its tax revenue (The Herald, 5 April 2006: 10). According to Frans 
Cronje of the South African Institute of Race Relations, crime and affirmative 
action are the main causes of the emigration of approximately a million white 
South Africans. These findings are based on Statistics South Africa's Household 
Surveys, between 1995 and 2005.  The losses are particularly among young 
South Africans, where a “whole generation” has disappeared. Implications 
include the fact that remaining tax-paying whites are getting older, and will soon 
no longer be contributing to the South African economy.250 The phenomenon 
places South Africa fairly high on the list of refugee-generating countries in the 
world. If accurate, it implies the departure of fully twenty percent of all white 
South Africans. Fortunately, there has been a realization of the seriousness of 
the situation, and measures have been put in place to attract South Africans 
abroad back home, with job offers and similar enticements, although indications 
are that this has not proved successful.  The flight of predominantly white South 
Africans represents their solution to seek needs satisfaction elsewhere. Their 
choice of leaving, in itself will heighten the identity and security needs frustrations 
on the part of those group members left behind. 
                                                 
 
250 See, for instance report by Van Aardt in Rapport newspaper (24 September 2006, p1). Also, in the same 
newspaper, it is reported, quoting Macfarlane of the SAIIR, that the normal population pyramid is skewed in the 
white case, with a massive gap in the age cohort between 20 and 39 years old (Rapport, 24 September 2006, p 4).  
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9.3.10 The Rise of ethnicity, primordialism,  and the re-racialization  
of South Africa. 
Over the past few years, developments in South Africa point towards the rise of a 
politics of populism, the pre-modern and a lack of respect for the practice of 
liberal democracy. 
 
The series of conflicts surrounding the former deputy president of South Africa 
also provide a warning of more serious rifts in the governance of the country. 
Jacob Zuma, accused of unethical behaviour, including the receiving of bribes in 
the context of South Africa’s major arms purchasing deal, was relieved of his 
position as deputy state president, by president Mbeki, as a result of the finding 
of the court in the Schabir Shaik251 fraud hearings,  that he had participated in a 
generally corrupt relationship with Shaik.  Zuma was subsequently to be 
prosecuted in his own right for the alleged crime. In the interim, he was accused 
of, and stood trial for the rape of a young woman. Although found innocent of the 
rape, the trial uncovered what has been slated by many as highly questionable 
personal behaviour, or behaviour unbefitting a national leader, especially with 
regard to his disrespectful attitude towards women, and his cavalier approach 
towards HIV/AIDS, where Zuma was concerned (Nyanto, 2006 b: 15). At the time 
of writing, the corruption trial has been struck off the roster due to the tardiness of 
the prosecution in preparing their case, and it is currently uncertain whether the 
former deputy president will indeed stand trial.  
 
It is not so much the behaviour, or the guilt or otherwise of the former deputy 
president that is of most concern in this development, but rather the behaviour of 
his very prominent, and visible supporters. All of his trial appearances have been 
accompanied by vociferous public demonstrations by a supporters club, who 
                                                 
251 Shaik was found guilty of corruption in respect of the arms deal, and in the process, of being involved in a 
“generally corrupt” relationship with the deputy president. 
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chant, burn effigies of the State President, cast stones at the rape accuser, and 
indulge in various forms of unruly or violent behaviour.  Zuma is being promoted 
by this group, which includes elements in the ANC Youth League, and the Trades 
Union movement, as the next president of the country. There have been calls for 
his re-instatement as Deputy President. There is a triumphalism surrounding 
Zuma, and his successes in avoiding conviction, that suggests that any form of 
immoral behaviour, or instances of poor judgement would be immaterial to his 
suitability for election to the top office. For some, it seems as though these 
incidences of poor judgement make him more attractive as a candidate; someone 
with whom they can identify, as opposed to the more remote, cold figure of the 
President. Zuma’s supporters believe that the cases against him have been 
trumped up by President Mbeki and his supporters in the government and the 
ANC.252.  The issue has led to numerous acrimonious exchanges between Mbeki 
and the Trade Union movement, the ANC Youth League, and most recently the 
South African Communist Party. The situation is that the disaffected sections of 
South African society, especially the marginalized poor, who seem to be 
increasingly worse off, and more numerous, see in Zuma the kind of leader who 
they would most like to see rule the country.  
 
Another politician culpable of the corrupt practice of taking gifts from arms deal 
contractors, Tony Yengeni, also a populist, provides a similar example. After 
being found guilty and sentenced, his triumphal entrance to the prison became a 
public celebration, instead of a public disgrace. It was attended by many 
                                                 
252 See, for instance Sapa  (20 September 2006) report "Cosatu looks forward to a future in which democracy can 
flourish free of the machinations of secretive and manipulative agencies, and where decisions about the political 
direction of the country and about the selection of leadership can proceed without fear of delays and interruptions 
from spurious and abusive use of the courts." – accessed from IOL website19 October 2006 url: 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=2996&art_id=qw1158761521512B223. See also the article by 
Nyanto 2006 b, where she writes of Zuma: "He believes he has become a target of a conspiracy to prevent him from 
succeeding Mbeki. Thus the conspirators within the ANC have connived to use the National Prosecuting Authority to 
hound him with charges." 
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approving government luminaries, and was aired on public television in a 
carnival-like and excited fashion.  
 
 As yet, the ethnic factor has not become overt and is being downplayed by the 
organizations, but the increasing resentment at a concentration of Xhosa-
speakers in the government and sharing the spoils of government, is a factor 
causing great disaffection. Zuma is a Zulu, and that factor is sometimes played 
up by his supporters and detractors alike – a fact that Home Affairs minister 
Buthelezi has seen fit to warn about 253. At the same time, government is intent 
on passing legislation that will make it compulsory for employees to indicate their 
racial affiliation in order to facilitate the BEE process. A number of political 
observers have noted that this is exactly what the previous government did, in 
order to advance the interests of one racial group above the rest 254. 
 
There is, among the citizens of South Africa, a form of behaviour here that spurns 
the niceties of liberal democracy. It reflects a lack of concern for issues of justice, 
human rights and equality before the law, and tolerance of opposition, that have 
become the hallmark of sound democratic governance. The attention of the 
world’s markets has been drawn to these events, and the exoneration of Zuma in 
his rape trial, and the “throwing out” of his corruption trial have both been 
accompanied by sudden declines in the value of the national currency, indicating 
a concern abroad over South Africa’s political stability.  The state of affairs, along 
with the high levels of violent crime dicussed above has recently led Archbishop 
                                                 
253 Buthelezi has recognized the danger of inciting ethnic hatred in SA according to the Mail and Guardian (13 – 
19 October 2006: 10)  "At the IFP's national conference in Ulundi at the weekend, [Buthelezi] warned that Inkatha 
members peddling the theory that Jacob Zuma was being ill-treated by his comrades because he was Zulu were 
'playing with fire'. Africa is sick and tired of ethnic wars, as we can see in Darfur, bandying about this kind of 
allegation is most dangerous for us as a country and as one South African nation. It can start a conflict that we do 
not need.” 
 
254 In this regard, both Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, and Allan Boesak have publicly indicated their  refusal to 
comply with such legislation. See Du Toit’s page 4 article (24 September, 2006) in Rapport. 
 
 305
Desmond Tutu, in a lecture at the University of Cape Town, to launch a 
passionate indictment of the rainbow nation, saying it was “losing its moral 
bearings."  He continued by asking "What has come over us? Perhaps we did not 
realise just how apartheid has damaged us so that we seem to have lost our 
sense of right and wrong." He listed appalling incidents including the rape of a 
nine-month-old baby by an adult man, and the throwing of people off of moving 
trains, simply because they did not join a strike. He went on to ask “What has 
happened to us? It seems as if we have perverted our freedom, our rights into 
license, into being irresponsible." 255 The archbishop makes a very good point,  
one that calls into question the nature of post-apartheid South African society. 
There is a lack of a moral core that indicates that something has indeed gone 
horribly wrong with the South African resolution process that began so hopefully 
in 1994. 
  
9.3.11 Meta Conflict 
As a facilitator and mediator into various conflicts in South Africa, this author has 
experienced the phenomenon of what we are calling a metaconflict, which 
impinges on the day-to-day conflicts that we deal with. It is our experience that in 
this country, localized conflicts, involving specific development or other low-level 
issues, continually take on aspects of deep-rooted social conflict. Values, and 
needs-related bases of conflict assume great importance, seemingly beyond the 
scale of the immediate conflicts at hand256. These aspects impinge, to make what 
seem to be commonplace and otherwise straightforward disputes resemble 
intractable conflict. Normal, or traditional techniques of conflict management have 
very little impact on the conflicts, which seem to become unnecessarily 
                                                 
255 Cited in The Herald, 28 September 2006 p 3 
 
256 See for instance The Conflict Cube as an explanation of the different bases of conflict in Bradshaw, (1999: 3-
6). Instead of resource (interest-based) conflicts routinely being resolved through straightforward negotiation and 
mediation processes, unresolved value and basic human needs elements seem to impinge from the historical 
conflicts in the country. This also indicates past relationship issues relating to inter-communal trust that have been 
left unresolved.  
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protracted. Invariably, there is a larger conflict in the background, that is 
unspoken, that has to do with frustrations that have not been adequately 
addressed through the macro conflict management processes in South Africa’s 
political transformation, that insinuate themselves into otherwise ordinary 
disputes. This is what we are calling meta-conflict. 
 
Meta-conflicts manifest themselves in many different ways in the social, 
economic and political life of South Africans. Examples would be community 
policing representatives often not being willing to accept the police as allies in 
fighting crime, in the years following the political transition,  because they remain 
unable to see the police, not as political opponents, and representatives of the 
oppressor, but as their own police, charged with their protection. This has 
hindered the process of the establishment of community policing structures in the 
country. It has led to unreasonable demands by the population on the police, 
such as the demand for the use of police facilities, such as vehicles, for use 
outside of strictly policing functions, (such as to provide transport to meetings), to 
demonstrate the bona fides of the police 257. 
 
A further example of the power of meta-conflict is when environmental disputes 
such as the continued functioning of a waste disposal site, become highly 
politicized, as protagonists use the situation of previously disadvantaged 
communities as a political football, to finesse perfectly sound and legally correct 
consultation processes, and in the process undermine the highest standards of 
environmental protection. No satisfactory solutions to the dispute could be found, 
and the local authority is rendered powerless simply by accusations, no matter 
how unfounded, that it supports development at the expense of the health of 
previously disadvantaged citizens. The dispute continues for years, with the 
waste disposal company cutting down the range of its services, and the larger 
                                                 
257 This author acted as consultant to the Police of the Province of the Eastern Cape during the period 2004 – 
2007, as convenor of the change management team of the Department of Safety and Security in the province. One 
of the duties associated with the function was the facilitation of the development of the community policing 
approach in the province. These are some of the problems experienced during that time. 
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community suffering as a result of the higher cost of shipping waste out of town, 
the dumping of waste in another city, and the practice of less than safe waste 
disposal, of some categories of waste, of necessity, which results in more, rather 
than less local pollution258. 
 
In the case of a land development dispute in the Joe Slovo informal settlement, 
outside Port Elizabeth, despite going to the greatest lengths to ascertain the will 
of a particular community with regard to the development of a residential area, by 
facilitating a democratic decision-making process, a resolution could not be 
achieved 259. Notwithstanding an overwhelming, democratically arrived-at 
decision in support of a specific course of action, a minority refuses to support 
the process, and the local government does not have the will to enforce the 
decision of that majority. Parties appear to be driven by external values,  that 
bear very little relation to the issues in conflict. The dispute continues, and the 
community suffers without adequate services to its residents.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
In summary, in measuring the South African experience against the theoretical 
requirements for conflict resolution, presented by the analytical conflict resolution 
school, the following lessons can be drawn: 
 
Burton and his colleagues have made it clear, that pre-negotiation interventions 
need to take place, according to a strict process formula. In the South African 
case a number of comparable workshops were carried out. They followed a 
number of different patterns, some of which were similar to the requirements of 
the Analytical Conflict Resolution School, but by no means closely following 
                                                 
 
258 This author acted as facilitator in some of a series of disputes between 1994 and 2000, during which attempts 
were made to mediate disputes between a local waste disposal company WasteTech. See facilitator reports 
concerned. 
 
259 See for instance, facilitators report in respect of the Joe Slovo dispute to the NMMM, submitted by Bradshaw 2003. 
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those guidelines. These workshops include the “business” meetings with the 
ANC, the Dakar meeting and follow-up workshops organized by Idasa, and the 
Mells workshops between Afrikaner leaders and the ANC leadership in England.  
What the workshops lacked in methodological rigour, or their faithfulness to the 
theoretical model, they made up for in transfer effects. This is especially true of 
the Mells workshops, which, though concealed from public scrutiny, in true 
Burtonian fashion, were far superior to many interventions attempted in other 
contexts260. In this regard then, it seems as though the procedural requirements 
for resolution of the theory of the analytical conflict resolution school is largely 
borne out. 
 
Many of the analytical conflict resolution authors, including John Burton have 
stressed the importance of restored relationships as being at the core of conflict 
resolution. This aspect cannot be dealt with in a static sense. It is of necessity 
time dependent. The data gathered by recent opinion surveys however indicate 
that ten years on there is a lack of trust at an interracial level in South Africa, 
which stubbornly persists after a decade of democracy. Interracial collaboration 
and socializing outside of the workplace is quite rare, and there is a lack of 
understanding across the racial divide. Burton and his colleagues would be 
disappointed by this evidence. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given their emphasis on the importance of basic human needs, 
the conflict resolution scholars identify a high level of human needs satisfaction 
as indicative of conflict resolution. In the South African case, there is clear 
evidence of a lack of needs satisfaction. Scholar after scholar stresses the 
concern with the lack of attention in the country to the satisfaction of physical 
                                                 
260 For instance, many of the workshops held in the Middle East have been based on meetings of student 
leadership on both sides of the conflict (See, for instance, Herb Kelman in this regard) The chances of significant 
transfer effects in such cases are clearly not as good as using individuals with already established, and close 
relationships to the political leadership as in the South African case. As some have alluded, these were essentially 
track “one and a half” with ANC leadership actually present. 
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needs, particularly. The protests around the lack of service delivery illuminate a 
widespread dissatisfaction with the situation, which is exacerbated by the neo-
liberal economic policies of the government.  Burton has stated that “Within a 
human needs frame it could be deduced that within poverty there is a lack of role 
and identity.” (1997: 148). Poverty and inequality remain at extremely high levels 
in the country. 
 
The importance of distributive justice has been stressed by the conflict resolution 
movement. This is linked, in the case of Burton to his notion of human needs, in 
his stated “need for distributive justice”261. Though many of those involved in the 
TRC process seem to have made a virtue of necessity in their praise for 
restorative justice in the South African reconciliation process, it has left many 
others, including legal scholars, concerned about the long-term effects of a lack 
of traditional notions of justice, and the impact that that will have on the ability of 
the country to sustain a human-rights based democracy, and the absence of 
distributive justice is clearly problematic for the analytical conflict resolution 
school. 
 
Burton, especially in his later work, has stressed the importance of conflict 
“provention”. He stresses the need for ongoing transformation of society, moving 
it away from the traditional notions of democracy, and rights, towards a more 
progressive society, based on the ongoing engagement with problem-solving and 
needs-satisfying processes. Structures should continually evolve to satisfy 
human needs. Though the South African experience included the National Peace 
Accord, which provided just the type of interaction required, the arrival of formal 
democracy has been disappointing, with less and less consultation, and a 
general feeling of government not taking the needs of people sufficiently 
seriously. A lack of follow through on the Truth and Reconciliation process 
supports this line of reasoning, as does the switch away from a community 
                                                 
261 See our treatment of Burton’s human needs in chapter four. 
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policing approach, to a law and order model that became evident in 1997. 
Increasing signs of government intolerance mentioned above also bear out this 
argument. 
 
Burton has been at pains to stress the importance of accommodating the needs 
of the minorities in post-deep-rooted-conflict societies. In this regard, he has 
stressed special representation for minorities, and special constitutional 
arrangements. Once again, the South African case has been disappointing in 
delivering such structures. The Government of National Unity was established to 
guarantee the opposition parties a share of participation in the government of the 
country. Although the IFP’s leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi retains a ministerial 
position, the Government of National Unity did not survive the first electoral term 
of office.  
 
The watered-down, pseudo-federal nature of the South African constitution also 
does very little to set the minds of South Africa’s minorities at ease. The 
constitution is sufficiently flexible to be changed by the current ANC 
parliamentary majority, and the history of South Africa has shown how a 
determined government can substantively change a constitution to deny the 
expansion of democracy262. The powers of the provinces are extremely limited, 
and do nothing to guarantee any form of regional political autonomy. Burton has 
stated: “South Africa has become a multiracial society, largely as a result of 
exceptional leadership, but it remains to be seen whether minorities will 
experience a sense of participation in the new system. It may transpire that 
separate autonomies within the same nominal federal structure would have been 
a more behaviourally realistic system” (1997: 75). Talk of President Mbeki 
seeking a third term of office indicates an intention to concentrate power, and 
only exacerbates this situation. 
                                                 
262 The machinations of the National Party in removing Coloured South Africans from the voters roll provides an 
instructive case in point. It was due to the ability of the National Party to override the various protections in the 
constitution, that they succeeded in their aims in this regard. 
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Finally, the conflict resolution school does not require of resolution that there be a 
future free of any form of conflict. Burton’s statement (1972: 137 – 138) “Conflict, 
like sex, is an essential creative element in human relationships. It is the means 
to change, the means by which our social values of welfare, security, justice and 
opportunities for personal development can be achieved…conflict  like sex is to 
be enjoyed.”, is probably the clearest in the literature in this regard.  Everything 
depends for them, on how ongoing conflict is managed. Ongoing conflict 
management and provention is expected, as mentioned above. South Africa has 
managed to contain its value differences, and competing interests in a stable 
manner to date, but the fault lines that have been mentioned above still persist, 
and need extremely careful management. In this regard, we agree with the 
sentiments of Gibson and Gouws (2003), and Esterhuyse (2004) who stress the 
importance of the role of leadership, in pushing forward reconciliation and the 
other necessary elements of a stable, resolved conflict. According to Gibson and 
Gouws, for instance: “A tolerant future for South Africa thus may rely heavily 
upon the role of elites - as the most obvious example, such an outcome relies 
upon a tolerant Constitutional Court. But our conclusion also necessitates 
someone making an argument in favour of tolerance; without an argument, no 
deliberation takes place, and therefore there can be no persuasion." (2003:221). 
 
In summary of the survey results of Lombard (2004) Hofmeyer (2005) and others; 
though there have been improvements in some areas, the lack of respect for the 
rule of law, the lack of acknowledgement of the evils of apartheid, and the lack of 
commitment to forgive or forget the past remain problematic. The surveys 
therefore present a mixed picture, with slow but steady improvements in 
indicators of reconciliation across time, but with some areas, as highlighted 
above remaining quite problematic. 
 
The various elements of conflict resolution are reflected in our South African 
conflict resolution scorecard matrix in table 9.1 below. 
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TABLE 9.1:   MEASURING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST  
        CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY 
  
Conflict Resolution Theory South African Practice 
Procedurally - the conflict is 
resolved according to analytical 
problem-solving workshop 
processes,  which make 
negotiation possible. 
Analytical workshops were used, between 1985 and 1990, 
though not always in accordance with Burton’s 
prescriptions. There were very good transfer mechanisms, 
however, that might be said to offset this weakness. It is 
felt that the pre-negotiation interventions were an 
important factor in enabling negotiations. 
Evidence of restored 
relationships, and “valued 
relationships” exists. 
Evidence collected in opinion surveys, during  2004, 2005 
and the outcome of  elections since 1994  indicates that 
there is a lack of trust, especially with regard to interracial, 
political collaboration. Social distance is high, and 
Government is seen as “distant”. 
High level of identity needs 
satisfaction,  maximization of 
autonomy and self-determination  
Clearly, a lack of needs satisfaction in South Africa 
remains a cause for concern, especially as far as physical 
needs are concerned. The fact that government is 
perceived as not heeding the demands of the people for 
services, etc. is also problematic from an identity and 
control needs, and valued relationships perspective. 
A high degree of distributive 
justice. 
Distributive justice was compromised in the TRC process, 
and in the country generally, with regard to human rights 
abuses and oppression of the past. Gross economic 
inequality is still the order of the day in South Africa. 
A high degree of security needs 
fulfilment 
In South Africa, security remains problematic. High levels 
of violent crime, and violent means of conflict settlement in 
schools persist. Farm killings continue. 
Ongoing analytical “provention” 
processes, to bring about basic 
human needs satisfaction 
continue. A problem-solving 
decision-making framework 
predominates. 
There is a serious lack of attention to ongoing conflict 
resolution processes of any kind, in the country, by the 
government, and perhaps insufficient interest in conflict 
resolution shown by strategic sectors within South African 
society. The NPA was discontinued. There is a need for 
institution-building in the conflict transformation 
management and resolution field in South Africa. A 
“power” or “deterrence” framework still persists. 
Political Institutions need to be 
structured to give protection to 
minorities. 
There is very little evidence of such restructuring in South 
Africa. It is essentially a unitary state. The first five years 
saw an accommodation of opposition interests in a 
Government of National Unity, but subsequently, 
minorities have not received special protection, except 
through respect for the equal status of languages.  
Resolved conflict does not imply 
a future without any form of 
conflict 
 
Current levels of conflict behaviour in South Africa seem to 
be sustainable, although certain areas, mentioned above, 
give cause for great concern, and may deteriorate if not 
specifically addressed. 
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In measuring the South African process against the predicted outcomes of the 
analytical conflict resolution school, we come to the following conclusions: 
 
To a very large extent, the approach of the analytical conflict resolution school 
has been vindicated. This is especially true of the procedural elements 
concerning conflict resolution. The methods that the school proposes were 
indeed applied to a large extent, and together with the ripeness hypotheses of 
Zartman, could be said to explain what seemed at the time, an unlikely miracle of 
the South African negotiated settlement of 1994. However, the analytical conflict 
resolution school accepts that resolution in this sense is only an event,  that on its 
own will not lead to a permanent state of resolution, or the reconciliation of a 
deeply divided society. For that to occur, provention  must take place. By this is 
meant the continual use of problem-solving, as opposed to adversarial, or 
deterrence processes.  Burton, (1990 b: 18) states: "...the removal of causal 
conditions, and the positive promotion of environments conducive to collaborative 
relationships - extends the scope of our concerns beyond the narrow area of 
conflict resolution."  
  
The South African settlement of 1990 to 1994 could be well explained in respect 
of the analytical conflict resolution approach. Even as an instance of deep-rooted 
social conflict, the South African situation responded to a series of interventions, 
and predicated upon hurting stalemates and a  ripeness that, in retrospect would 
indicate the possibility of a successful outcome; one that would deliver a 
reasonably durable negotiated agreement263. The process was facilitated in its 
more delicate moments, when violence threatened to devastate the negotiations, 
by the implementation of the National Peace Accord; a conflict management 
system.  
 
                                                 
263 By comparison to some of the conflicts that were constantly cited by the analytical conflict resolution school as 
similar to the South African case, such at Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, or Sri Lanka, the South African outcome to 
date seems miraculous. 
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A realization that the deep-rootedness of the South African case demanded 
further attention to the deeper, psychological aspects of the conflict, if the miracle 
was to prove sustainable, resulted in the establishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Unfortunately, the TRC did not live up to its promise, 
as evidenced by deep dissatisfaction among many of the victims, and the lack of 
adequate reparations, the absence of remorse on the part of the perpetrators, the 
partial nature of the process, and the sad squabbling and multiple dissatisfactions 
evinced by many of those who had been associated with the establishment and 
functioning of the commission.  These shortcomings, along with the premature 
truncation of the NPA, and the lack of continual opportunities for problem-solving, 
human needs-centred processes in Burton’s sense of provention, has again, 
quite predictably undermined the sustainability of the South African conflict 
resolution process. This process has proved unable to transcend the (first-level 
change) notion of resolution, and achieve Burton’s  (second-level change) 
conception of conflict provention. According to Burton (2001 b), the ultimate 
challenge of sustainable conflict resolution is the establishment of social and 
political institutions that are problem solving, and not adversarial or 
confrontational. If street violence or ethnic conflict is to be avoided, then party 
political and ideological approaches must give place to interactive analysis, even 
at a political level.  
 
In general, the South African process has proved unable to satisfy basic human 
needs, and in respect of a series of critical needs satisfactions therefore, there 
has been a tendency to seek the alternative forms of satisfaction set out below: 
 
Identity needs: 
Favour elite ethnic in-groups, or challenge the ethnic incumbents, in order to 
overcome the frustration of identity needs. Attempts to re-racialise the workplace 
are a further expression of insecurity around identity, which will be experienced 
by others as exclusion and marginalization. It will lead to higher outward 
migration statistics, among other negative effects.  
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Need for distributive justice: 
Any need for distributive justice remains largely frustrated among the vast 
majority of South Africans, as distributive justice enjoyed a low priority in the 
National Peace Accord (where the Socio-economic dimension failed to 
materialize) and in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Process, where 
envisaged reparations to victims received little attention from government. 
Additionally, the socio-economic policies of government exacerbate the position 
of the poor, and inequality remains at previous very high levels. 
 
Security needs: 
Emigration on the part of skilled individuals who feel marginalized and alienated 
is a natural reaction of those who experience the continuing frustration of their 
security needs. Security needs frustration also leads to the greater use of private 
security companies, greater visibility of inequality and feelings of exclusion on the 
part of the poor. 
 
Relationship needs: 
The “super need” for valued relationships; the need that balances the other 
needs, is particularly frustrated in South Africa. Government is seen as 
particularly distant, and out of touch on many issues – such as in the treatment of 
aids, for example, or in respect of same-sex marriage. Although legitimated in a 
narrow, political sense, the government cannot be regarded as “close” to the 
people. Research indicates poor identification with the government. The white 
minority group feels especially alienated. All the polls point to a very low instance 
of cross racial relationships, and this percentage is not increasing. 
 
The evidence of needs frustrations indicated above, and the lack of 
implementation with regard to conflict provention activities hold serious 
implications for the future of South Africa, which we will address in the general 
conclusions of this study which follow. We will point out the implications of these 
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failures for the prospects of peace in South Africa, and make recommendations 
for the consolidation of conflict provention in the country. Additionally, the South 
African experience illustrates some points of learning for the analytical conflict 
resolution school, which will also be addressed in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
 
 
“South Africa has become a multiracial society, largely  
as a result of exceptional leadership, but it remains         
to be seen whether minorities will experience a sense of 
participation in the new system. It may transpire that  
separate autonomies within some nominal federal structure would 
have been a more behaviourally realistic system.” 
  
John Burton (1997: 75) 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This study has investigated the attempts to manage the South African conflict, 
especially, the various pre-negotiation initiatives to get the parties to the 
negotiating table, the National Peace Accord that aimed at keeping the parties at 
the table when violence threatened to undermine the negotiation process, and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, that in recognition of the deep-
rootedness of  South Africa’s conflict, attempted to address the emotional and 
value-laden aspects of the conflict.  In order to establish a perspective, against 
which to evaluate these initiatives, we chose the basic human needs perspective 
of the analytical conflict resolution school of scholars, which we contextualized 
within the field of theories of social conflict more generally. We finally tested, in 
Chapter nine, the South African conflict situation at the time of writing, against a 
matrix of requirements for resolution, which we developed from close reading of 
the analytical conflict resolution literature. 
 
10.2 Conclusions drawn from the study 
We set out to shed light on the South African social conflict. Seen through the 
lens of the analytical conflict resolution school, the question is posed: Is South 
Africa truly an example of protracted social conflict? The examination carried out 
in Chapter five above indicates unequivocally that it is indeed an example of 
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protracted social conflict, conforming strongly to every one of Azar’s 
characteristics of protracted social conflict. 
 
But protracted social conflict, according to the theory is not easily resolved. Yet 
observers write glibly of the South African miracle. According to theory, specific 
interventions would be necessary to reach a negotiation process.  Though not 
generally known at the time, a series of pre-negotiation workshops were held, 
most of which resembled, to an extent the process prescribed by Burton and his 
colleagues. Some scholars believe that these interventions genuinely paved the 
way for the negotiations that followed (Kruger, 1998, Lieberfeld, 2005).  Was the 
conflict “resolved” by the interventions which took place? 
 
10.2.1 An evaluation of the pre-negotiation conflict resolution processes 
It is extremely difficult to assess the efficacy of specific intervention models, 
especially in the context of macro- societal level social processes. There are 
many extraneous factors, or intervening variables at play which affect those 
processes, in addition to those interventions under examination. Tidwell                
(1999:174) makes the case very nicely as follows: “No matter what skills or 
processes are brought to bear upon a conflict, there is still the remainder of the 
world to impact upon the process.”   
 
In the South African case, for instance, we have the collapse of communism at 
the international level and the rise of de Klerk as a new leader of the National 
Party, or the shifts in the nature of the political constituency of the ruling NP. The 
success of the South African miracle might simply have been a function of 
“ripeness” due to the existence of a hurting stalemate; Zartman’s  “plateau”, with 
both major protagonists confronting the “abyss”, or  “precipice” of inheriting a 
wasteland. In this sense then, we can never be sure of the exact effect of the 
interventions. However, the pre-negotiation process was extensive and of a very 
high quality in respect of transfer potential.  
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Some general points of critique can be made before we deal with the specifics of 
the various conflict management initiatives under review: 
 
In none of the conflict interventions analysed here was initiative explicitly  
informed by a conflict resolution theoretical perspective. Approaches were 
invariably eclectic, representing a “muddling through”, reactive approach. They 
were simply a response to the political logjams of their time. They were 
conceived of as opportunities to learn more about the other side (Dakar), and to 
address issues that seemed to be preventing the parties from accepting 
negotiation as a conflict management approach. Basic human needs, though 
indirectly addressed (for instance the need for security) were not dealt with as 
explicitly as Burton prescribes, and the organizers do not acknowledge any 
intellectual debt to the ACR approach at any stage. The NPA represents a 
desperate response to a rapidly deteriorating internal security situation, and one 
of the chief architects, Peter Gastrow (1995: 36, 37) has admitted to a lack of 
explicit theoretical perspective in the establishment of the accord: “Their actions 
were determined by intuition rather than by a plan of action derived from existing 
conflict resolution models.” In the case of the TRC, we find, again a lack of 
coherent, theoretical intent, with elements of religion, psychology and law, all 
vying for dominance in the explanation of, and motivation for the Commission. 
 
Our examination of the South African experience provides a number of lessons 
for the proponents of the analytical conflict resolution school. We list them below: 
 
• One of the aspects that the study points to is a lack of clarity in the 
analytical conflict resolution literature, concerning the precise nature of 
conflict resolution – how do we measure it? How do we know when 
conflict, in the sense used by the analytical conflict resolution school, is in 
fact, “resolved”? It is hoped that this lacuna has been addressed, at least 
to some extent, in the development of our “scorecard matrix” in our 
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Chapter nine above. There is much more work that remains to be done in 
this area, however. 
• Related to the above point, is the vagueness of the human needs concept. 
The acrs will have to be more specific as regards indicators of needs and 
their satisfiers if they are to earn the respect of a broader conflict field of 
scholarship, and maintain the credibility of the needs concept. This 
remains problematic, even though the approach is seen by most in the 
conflict resolution field as the best candidate for the development of a 
general theory of deep-rooted social conflict. Perhaps the work of Clarke 
(2005) in the development field might serve as a model for the generation 
of measures of needs satisfaction in conflict resolution1. 
• It is clear that track two processes, with very good transfer mechanisms, 
as in the case of the South African meetings, held in the UK, Dakar, and 
elsewhere, did serve very useful purposes in the pre-negotiation, 
exploratory phases of the conflict resolution process. To some extent, 
these meetings addressed the security needs of the parties. 
 
Additionally, it is patently clear that the intervention processes were 
effective despite their not having been carried out according to a self-
consciously human needs oriented framework, nor even a conflict 
resolution one, for that matter. Burton (1987a) gives a categorical 
prescription of the analytical problem-solving workshops as very strictly 
rule-bound – if they are expected to work at all. The entire process has to 
conform precisely with the prescriptions of his framework.1 In the South 
African case, many of Burton’s non-negotiable rules were broken; the 
organizers were not even aware of  Burton’s rules;  yet the processes 
worked to the extent that the parties did get to the table, against all expert 
expectations to the contrary, indicating that the communication process 
does not necessarily have to be controlled as closely as Burton envisages. 
The point of learning here, is that an approach loosely based on Burton’s 
track-two problem solving workshops can bring deep-rooted social conflict 
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to a negotiation, when there is a moment of ripeness, and if there are 
significant opportunities for transfer effects to take place. 
• The fact that the South African interventions were effective, despite their 
lacking a close conformity with the Burtonian model indicates that all 
conflict situations are different to some extent, and that therefore an exact, 
“one size fits all” solution to all conflicts is impracticable; which is not to 
say that the analytical problem-solving workshop is ineffective in bringing 
parties to the table; it clearly is, even in adapted forms. 
• The analytical conflict resolution school insists that its facilitator panel of 
experts consists of scholars only (Burton, 1987: 41- 47). The South African 
experience has amply demonstrated that individuals from other social 
institutions, such as business and the church have an immensely potential 
role to play, not only in taking the lead in discreet acts of conflict 
intervention, but in establishing and supporting conflict management 
systems as well.  We argue that this experience should be taken on board, 
and accommodated by the analytical conflict resolution school. 
 
The above point underlines the crucial role of an active and strong civil 
society in a transitional context, which provides a constant supply of 
talented individuals, capable of playing facilitative and related roles in 
various conflict management processes.   
 
• The ACR theorists need additionally to take on board the possibility of 
using “insider partials” in their processes. There is so much concern for 
impartiality, or even neutrality on the part of the facilitating panel, that the 
approach seems to have lost sight of the usefulness of “insider partials” 
such as provided by business and the church in the South African context. 
• The ACR scholars have continually insisted that participants should be 
well-placed, non-decision makers. The South African case  indicates that it 
is also possible to successfully include informal with formal leaders, in a 
“track one and a half” process, and still arrive at a negotiated agreement. 
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• The ACRS interventions are always presented in their literature as stand-
alone ventures. Current circumstances demand that the ACRS approach 
links to other initiatives, which might be occurring simultaneously. The 
South African case through the history of the NPA demonstrates the 
importance of multi-level, multi-agency interventions, with many different 
actors playing complementary roles.  
 
The ACRS has shown itself to be an extremely useful theoretical approach to 
protracted social conflict. As an approach it has shown itself capable of fully 
explaining the genesis and development of the South African conflict. In terms of 
the problem-solving approach, it was shown to be one of the factors instrumental 
in bringing about a democratic transformation in 1994, and that development fits 
the expectations of the approach.   
 
The theory does, however, also speak to the post-settlement, or even the post-
resolution phase, and explains, very accurately the growing tensions and fault 
lines in the country twelve years into the democracy. Extrapolatory reasoning 
would therefore suggest that the warnings of the ACR school should be taken 
seriously, and that provention be built into the society, and that opportunities be 
taken by the leadership for the building of relationships, and the satisfaction of 
basic human needs wherever possible. We address the analysis of South African 
society at the time of writing, and a future prognosis from an ACRS perspective in 
the next section. 
 
10.2.2  A Post-Resolution South Africa 
For many political theorists, the desired outcome of a conflict management 
exercise would be a functioning liberal democracy. Even measured against that 
yardstick, though, there would be question marks surrounding the performance of 
the South African polity at the time of writing.  The investigation presented in 
Chapter nine indicates among other issues that: 
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• In respect of delivery, not only is the non-delivery of services a source of 
conflict in the society, but inequality has not been addressed, nor have the 
high levels of poverty. Unemployment remains a problem. The majority of 
South Africans have not experienced real improvement in these areas. 
Delivery, to the extent that it occurs is also skewed, with certain sectors 
benefiting at the expense of others. Perceptions of unfairness abound.  
• Looking for evidence of increased tolerance, and improved race relations, 
surveys indicate very little improvement in this area. The continued 
racialization of political parties is a case in point.  
• Liberal democracy, despite the model constitution of 1996, is threatened 
by the moves to undermine local and provincial government, the 
independence of the judiciary, and the freedom of the press.  
• The government of national unity has rapidly made way for acrimonious 
relationships between the governing party and its opposition, and growing 
tensions among the members of the alliance of COSATU, the SACP and 
the ANC.  
• The special arrangements for ongoing conflict management throughout 
the country through the agency of the National Peace Accord, were rapidly 
terminated, with the winding up of the NPA. The other specialist conflict 
resolution initiative of the South African conflict resolution process, the 
TRC, has stuttered on the acrimony of many of those who were involved in 
the process, accusing government of not bringing its side of the bargain.  
• High levels of violent crime in South Africa continue to mitigate against the 
satisfaction of security needs in the country. The growth of gated 
communities and private security companies indicate the insufficiency of 
the security provided by the state, and the attempts by the wealthy to 
improve their own security. Though the rich are able to provide their own 
security, this cannot be a solution for the society as a whole, and simply 
highlights the inequalities of the system. 
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• Economic policies followed by the South African government continue to 
exacerbate inequality, with a concomitant frustration of a need for 
distributive justice.  
• Some begin to write about the re-racialisation of South Africa, bearing out 
the warnings of Bernstein (1998), mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 
eight.   
 
However, the analytical conflict resolution approach requires more than a simple, 
functioning democracy, as indicated by the quote at the beginning of this 
conclusion. Burton and others have pointed to the failures of some of the most 
well-established democracies to meet basic human needs. In this regard, he has 
shown the failings of Britain and the United States, in the alienation of large 
segments of those societies. Burton (1997 a) thus writes of “80% solutions” that 
marginalize and alienate the remaining 20% of society.  
 
The analytical conflict resolution school identifies two elements to their model of 
conflict intervention. The first element is the earlier concern that they have, with 
getting parties to the table. This element is termed “conflict resolution”, and takes 
the form of discreet interventions with conflict parties, with the intention of 
enabling “track one” processes to take off.  Their second element,  and the one 
that emerges later in the development of the approach, concerns ongoing 
problem-solving activity in society, to augment “normal” politics. Normal politics is 
seen to be based on power relationships and deterrence, a system that no longer 
works effectively, and cannot prevent high levels of what Burton calls ‘deviant’ 
behaviour (1979); the drive to satisfy basic human needs through violent and 
other socially unacceptable ways. 
 
The South African conflict management process was quite successful in getting 
the parties to the table. Based fairly closely on Burton’s problem-solving 
approach, a number of problem-solving workshops were held at “track two”, and 
eventually at “track one-and-a-half’ levels, that led quite directly to full first track 
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‘pacting’, and eventually to the negotiations themselves. This activity, in 
conjunction with the rapid alignment of a favourable negotiating context; a 
moment of ‘ripeness’; allowed sensible leadership on both sides the South 
African divide to grasp the moment and accomplish a successful negotiated 
settlement of the conflict. South Africa satisfies the requirements of conflict 
resolution, at least in so far as the first element of conflict resolution is concerned. 
 
At the second level; the level beyond negotiation; the achievement of second 
order learning, or the provention of conflict, we draw very different conclusions. 
The South African leadership has not managed to institutionalize a human 
needs-based, problem-solving conflict management ethic in the “Rainbow 
Nation”. This higher level was never achieved. Encouraging beginnings, in the 
establishment of community policing policies and structures, the establishment of 
the NPA, active development forums and the like, were never followed through. 
Politics became “business as usual”, and the moral core which the TRC 
attempted to establish was allowed to collapse, partially through a lack of 
concerted conflict management ‘focus’ and the non-prioritization of conflict 
resolution in the country, and partly as a result of the unwillingness of the 
government to invest in it. Of most concern from the acrs perspective is that all 
signs reviewed in Chapter nine above indicate a lack of concern for a continuing 
focus on the satisfaction of basic human needs in the country. 
 
 The institutionalization of conflict resolution, or conflict provention as John 
Burton has termed it, implies ongoing conflict management, in the form of 
continual human needs fulfillment, thus going beyond the requirements of liberal 
democracy. 
 
Some of the primordial issues in South Africa, such as the high levels of violence 
in society; and different, and conflicting “webs of meaning”,  cannot be dealt with 
in second track episodic interventions.  They also cannot be effectively 
addressed through standard liberal democratic structures and processes (Burton 
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1979, 1984, 1997a). History shows that these structures alone will not prevail 
against the manifestation of the pre-modern, the patrimonial systems, and the 
communal competition, that bedevils politics and hamstrings development in 
countries experiencing deep-rooted social conflict. In the words of Burton (1997 
a: 67) ”The reality is that modern democracies are failing in the areas of 
economic justice. Widespread conflict, violence and crime are realities.” 
 
It is here that the ACR approach does offer solutions, and based on their 
reasoning,  we offer the following advice to South Africa’s decision-makers;  
 
The only way to deal with these challenges, according to the ACR school is to 
follow the route of conflict provention – in all spheres of social activity – to 
continually work to adjust institutions to accommodate basic human needs, and 
not to attempt to force individuals to conform with the requirements of institutions. 
In our Chapter seven above we have demonstrated how the National Peace 
Accord provided space for conflict management activities, including problem-
solving and relationship building, in many different places and at many different 
levels. The NPA also provided a context for relationship-building across the 
divides of race, class and ideology. This is the closest that South Africa has come 
to a true “provention” of deep-rooted social conflict. The following policy 
recommendations stem from the ACRS critique: 
 
10.3 Policy recommendations: 
This study strongly recommends that, in general, a definite focus be placed upon 
the concept of basic human needs and their satisfaction in South Africa. This will 
provide a non-ideological, or neutral focus for policy instruments through which to 
address some of the ills of the current South African situation. Specifically: 
 
• We recommend that a stronger emphasis be placed on reconciliatory 
rhetoric on the part of political leadership. Leadership often comes across 
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as excessively partisan (See Chapter nine references to intolerance, and 
re-racialization), and is not explicitly reconciliatory. 
• A re-examination of an economic policy, that goes further to satisfy human 
needs than current neo-liberal policy, without undermining the productive 
basis of the market economy in South Africa is necessary. Not only should 
neo-liberalism be reconsidered, but also, the notion that economic policy is 
always a stark choice between the tyranny of the socialist approaches, 
and the freedom of the market should be rejected in favour of an approach 
that explicitly takes as its point of departure, the maximization of basic 
human needs. 
• An urgent addressing of the issue of reparations for those who bore the 
brunt of apartheid era abuses must take place. Such reparation should be 
financial and material where appropriate, but must also take forward the 
notion that reparation can additionally be symbolic. In this spirit, simple 
triumphalism should also be avoided, in favour of an approach that 
addresses the identity and belongingness needs of all South Africans. 
Monuments to democracy and peace would be more appropriate than to 
political heroes of any flavour. 
• A greater emphasis should be placed on conflict resolution in the country 
as a whole; but particularly in the educational system, where conflict 
management and resolution skills must be given a prominent position in 
life-skills training, and where  a conflict resolution approach is taken to the 
teaching of history, for instance.  
• There must be a continual affirmation and celebration of South Africa’s 
own accomplishments in conflict resolution, with a due appreciation for 
their brittleness, and an affirmation of the need to preserve them by 
continued vigilance.  
• The overwhelming need for the building of conflict analysis and handling 
skills in local government must be met by extensive skills training 
programmes. This should address the tendency for tensions in the area of 
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state delivery to be contained, and ultimately resolved, within a 
constructive, basic human needs framework. 
• The establishment, with government funding and support, of centres for 
the study and peaceful resolution of conflict, peace studies and related 
issues; One thinks of the United States Institute for Peace, or the UN 
Peace University campuses in various countries. 
• Academic programmes and courses on conflict and its resolution, 
alternatives to violence, and non-violent communications should be 
offered at South African universities; far more extensively than is currently 
the case. 
• Finally, and perhaps most importantly, conflict management should be 
built into society through the establishment of a network of peace centres, 
or dispute resolution centres, staffed by volunteers, but with professional 
support.  Such a conflict management system would more than cover its 
costs, by facilitating efficient and durable decision-making processes, and 
avoiding many of the deadlocks that currently delay the delivery of 
government services to communities throughout the country. The 
architecture of the South African National Peace Accord might provide a 
model for such a conflict management system. 
 
Perhaps, when all is said and done, we need to accept that there are limits to the 
management of social conflict. To finally resolve conflict would be impossible, 
futile and of questionable value. To institutionalize conflict management to the 
extreme, would be to stifle development. It would be to limit change, and sustain 
conditions of inequality, oppression, and so forth. It is a truism of most social 
theory that conflict never truly ends. Perhaps that is after all the greatest 
weakness of the notion of conflict resolution. Conflict can be managed, but 
certain tensions will always remain, that will continue to give life to the social 
processes in the new South Africa.  In this light, there are those who have made 
the point, that it is perhaps the very high levels of violence that stimulated the 
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negotiation process in South Africa, as they provided the abyss from which 
parties were forced to retreat; to return ultimately to negotiations.  
 
Most theorists of conflict support the notion of destructive, versus constructive 
conflict, and urge that it is only in the case of the former that specialized 
intervention needs implementation. Of course, one person’s constructive conflict 
may well be another’s destructive conflict, and few theorists provide a method by 
which the difference between the two might be distinguished.  The current travail 
of South Africa’s social tensions might simply represent the necessary working 
out of contradictions and inequalities,   and consequently be best left 
unmediated. Ultimately, however, the South African people will satisfy their basic 
human needs; either deviantly, or legitimately, through the express actions of our 
decision-makers.  Whichever route is chosen, is ultimately a decision that our 
political leaders will have to take, for better or for worse.  
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NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD 
 
To signify our common purpose to bring an end to political violence 
in our country and to set out the codes of conduct, procedures and 
mechanisms to achieve this goal 
 
 
WE, participants in the political process in South Africa, representing the political parties and 
organisations and governments indicated beneath our signatures, condemn the scourge of political 
violence which has afflicted our country and all such practices as have contributed to such violence in 
the past, and commit ourselves and the parties, organisations and governments we represent to this 
National Peace Accord. 
 
The current prevalence of political violence in the country has already caused untold hardship, 
disruption and loss of life and property in our country. It now jeopardizes the very process of peaceful 
political transformation and threatens to leave a legacy of insurmountable division and deep bitterness 
in our country. Many, probably millions, of citizens live in continuous fear as a result of the climate of 
violence. This dehumanising factor must be eliminated from our society. 
 
In order to achieve some measure of stability and to consolidate the peace process, a priority shall be 
the introduction of reconstruction actions aimed at addressing the worst effects of political violence at 
a local level. This would achieve a measure of stability based on common effort thereby facilitating a 
base for broader socio-economic development. 
 
Reconstruction and developmental actions of the communities as referred to above, shall be 
conducted within the wider context of socio-economic development. 
 
In order to effectively eradicate intimidation and violence, mechanisms need to be created which shall 
on the one hand deal with the investigation of incidents and the causes of violence and intimidation 
and on the other hand actively combat the occurrence of violence and intimidation. 
 
The police force, which by definition shall include the police forces of all self-governing territories, has 
a central role to play in terminating the violence and in preventing the future perpetration of such 
violence. However, the perception of the past role of the police has engendered suspicion and distrust 
between the police and many of the affected communities. In recognition of the need to promote more 
effective policing, a commitment to sound policing practices and a co-operative relationship between 
the police and the communities are necessary. 
 
This Accord is intended to promote peace and prosperity in violence-stricken communities. The right 
of all people to live in peace and harmony will be promoted by the implementation of this Accord. 
 
The Accord is of such a nature that every peace-loving person can support it. The Accord reflects the 
values of all key players in the arena of negotiation and reconciliation. 
 
The implementation and monitoring of the Peace Accord represents a crucial phase in the process to 
restore peace and prosperity to all the people of South Africa. 
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Noting that the majority of South Africans are God-fearing citizens, we ask for His blessing, care and 
protection upon our Nation to fulfil the trust placed upon us to ensure freedom and security for all. 
 
 
Bearing in mind the values which we hold, be these religious or humanitarian, we pledge ourselves 
with integrity of purpose to make this land a prosperous one where we can all live, work and play 
together in peace and harmony. 
 
 
The signatories have agreed upon: 
 
* a Code of Conduct for political parties and organisations to be followed by all the political 
parties and organisations that are signatories to this Accord; 
* a Code of Conduct to be adhered to by every police official to the best of his or her ability, as 
well as a detailed agreement on the security forces; 
* the guidelines for the reconstruction and development of the communities; 
* the establishment of mechanisms to implement the provisions of this Accord. 
 
 
The signatories acknowledge that the provisions of this Peace Accord are subject to existing laws, 
rules and procedures and budgetary constraints. New structures should not be created where 
appropriate existing structures can be used. 
 
 
This Accord will not be construed so as to detract from the validity of bilateral agreements 
between any of the signatories. 
 
WE THE SIGNATORIES ACCORDINGLY SOLEMNLY BIND Ourselves TO THIS ACCORD AND 
SHALL ENSURE AS FAR AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE THAT ALL OUR MEMBERS AND 
SUPPORTERS WILL COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACCORD AND WILL RESPECT 
ITS UNDERLYING RIGHTS AND VALUES AND WE, THE GOVERNMENT SIGNATORIES, 
UNDERTAKE TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS ACCORD AND SEEK TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO ITS PROVISIONS BY WAY OF THE LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE AND BUDGETING 
PROCEDURES TO WHICH WE HAVE ACCESS. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PRINCIPLES 
 
1.1 The establishment of a multi-party democracy in South Africa is our common goal. 
Democracy is impossible in a climate of violence, intimidation and fear. In order to ensure 
democratic political activity all political participants must recognise and uphold certain 
fundamental rights described below and the corresponding responsibilities underlying those 
rights. 
 
1.2 These fundamental rights include the right of every individual to: 
 
* freedom of conscience and belief; 
 
* freedom of speech and expression; 
 
* freedom of association with others; 
 
* peaceful assembly; 
 
 
* freedom of movement; 
 
* participate freely in peaceful political activity. 
 
1.3 The fundamental rights and responsibilities derive from established democratic principles 
namely: 
 
* democratic sovereignty derives from the people, whose right it is to elect their 
government and hold it accountable at the polls for its conduct of their affairs; 
 
* the citizens must therefore be informed and aware that political parties and the media 
must be free to impart information and opinion; 
 
* there should be an active civil society with different interest groups freely participating 
therein; 
 
* political parties and organisations, as well as political leaders and other citizens, have 
an obligation to refrain from incitement to violence and hatred. 
 
1.4 The process of reconstruction and socio-economic development aimed at addressing the 
causes of violent conflict, must be conducted in a non-partisan manner, that is, without being 
controlled by any political organisation or being to the advantage of any political group at the 
expense of another. 
 
1.5 Reconstruction and developmental projects must actively involve the affected communities. 
Through a process of inclusive negotiations involving recipients, experts and donors, the 
community must be able to conceive, implement and take responsibility for projects in a co-
ordinated way as close to the grassroots as possible. In addition, reconstruction and 
development must facilitate the development of the economic and human resources of the 
communities concerned. 
 
1.6 The initiatives referred to in 1.4 and 1.5 above, should in no way abrogate the right and duty 
of governments to continue their normal developmental activity, except that in doing so they 
should be sensitive to the spirit and contents of any agreement that may be reached in terms 
of 1.5 above. 
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1.7 The parties to this process commit themselves to facilitating the rapid removal of political, 
legislative and administrative obstacles to development and economic growth. 
 
1.8 The implementation of a system to combat violence and intimidation will only succeed if the 
parties involved have a sincere commitment to reach this objective. Only then will all the 
people of South Africa be able to fulfil their potential and create a better future. 
 
1.9 It is clear that violence and intimidation declines when it is investigated and when 
the background and reasons for it is exposed and given media attention. There is, 
therefore, need for an effective instrument to do just that. It is agreed that the Commission 
established by the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991, be used as an 
instrument to investigate and expose the background and reasons for violence, thereby 
reducing the incidence of violence and intimidation. 
 
1.10 Since insufficient instruments exist to actively prevent violence and intimidation at regional 
and local levels, it is agreed that committees be appointed at regional and local levels to 
assist in this regard. Peace bodies are therefore to be established at both regional and local 
levels to be styled "Regional Dispute Resolution Committees" (RDRC) and "Local Dispute 
Resolution Committees" (LDRC) respectively. These bodies will be guided and co-ordinated 
at a national level by a National Peace Secretariat. At the local level the bodies will be 
assisted by Justices of the Peace. 
 
1.11 The Preparatory Committee has played a crucial role in the process of bringing the major 
actors together to negotiate a Peace Accord. There is still much to be done implement the 
Accord and establish the institutions of peace. To assist in this regard, a National Peace 
Committee shall be established. 
 
1.12 There should be simple and expeditious procedures for the resolution of disputes regarding 
transgressions of the Code for Political Parties and Organisations by political parties and 
organisations who are signatories to the National Peace Accord. 
These disputes should wherever possible, be settled at grassroots level, through participation 
of the parties themselves; and by using the proven methods of mediation, arbitration and 
adjudication. 
 
1.13 An effective and credible criminal judicial system requires the swift and just dispensation of 
justice. This in turn will promote the restoration of peace and prosperity to communities, 
freeing them of the ravages of violence and 
intimidation. Special attention should be given to unrest related cases by setting up Special 
Criminal Courts specifically for this purpose. 
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CHAPTER 2  
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND  
ORGANISATIONS 
 
The signatories to this Accord agree to the following Code of Conduct: 
 
2.1 We recognise the essential role played by political parties and organisations as mediators in a 
democratic political process, permitting the expression, aggregation and reconciliation of 
different views and interests, and facilitating the translation of the outcome of this process into 
law and public policy, and respect the activities of political parties and organisations in 
organising their respective structures, canvassing for support, arranging and conducting 
public meetings, and encouraging voting. 
 
2.2.1 All political parties and organisations shall actively contribute to the creation of a climate of 
democratic tolerance by: 
 
* publicly and repeatedly condemning. political violence and encouraging among their 
followers an understanding of the importance of democratic pluralism and a culture of 
political tolerance; and 
 
* acting positively, also vis-à-vis all public authorities including local and traditional 
authorities, to support the right of all political parties and organisations to have 
reasonable freedom of access to their members, supporters and other persons in 
rural and urban areas, whether they be housed on public or private property. 
 
2.3 No political party or organisation or any official or representative of any such party, shall: 
 
* kill, injure, apply violence to, intimidate or threaten any other person in connection 
with that person's political beliefs, words, writings or actions; 
 
* remove, disfigure, destroy, plagiarise or otherwise misrepresent any symbol or other 
material of any other political party or organisation; 
* interfere with, obstruct or threaten any other person or group travelling to or from or 
intending to attend, any gathering for political purposes; 
* seek to compel, by force or threat of force, any person to join any party or 
organisation, attend any meeting, make any contribution, resign from any post or 
office, boycott any occasion or commercial activity or withhold his or her labour or fail 
to perform a lawful obligation; or 
* obstruct or interfere with any official or representative of any other political party or 
organisation's message to contact or address any group of people. 
 
2.4 All political parties and organisations shall respect and give effect to the obligation to refrain 
from incitement to violence or hatred. In pursuit hereof no language calculated or likely to 
incite violence or hatred, including that directed against any political party or personality, nor 
any wilfully false allegation, shall be used at any political meeting, nor shall pamphlets, 
posters or other written material containing such language be prepared or circulated, either in 
the name of any party, or anonymously. 
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2.5 All political parties and organisations shall: 
 
* ensure that the appropriate authorities are properly informed of the date, place, 
duration and, where applicable, routing of each public meeting, rally, march or other 
event organised by the party or organisation; 
 
* take into account local sentiment and foreseeable consequences, as well as any 
other meetings already arranged on the same date in close proximity to the planned 
event, provided that this shall not detract from the right of any political party or 
organisation freely to propagate its political views; and 
 
* immediately and at all times, establish and keep current effective lines of 
communication between one another at national, regional and local levels, by 
ensuring a reciprocal exchange of the correct names, addresses and contact 
numbers of key leaders at each level, and by appointing liaison personnel in each 
location to deal with any problems which may arise. 
 
2.6 All political parties and organisations shall provide full assistance and co-operation to the 
police in the investigation of violence and the apprehension of individuals involved. The 
signatories to this Accord specifically undertake not to protect or 
harbour their members and supporters to prevent them from being subjected to the processes 
of justice. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SECURITY FORCES: GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
3.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
3.1.1 The police shall endeavour to protect the people of South Africa from all criminal acts and 
shall do so in a rigorously non-partisan fashion, regardless of the political belief and affiliation, 
race, religion, gender or ethnic origin of the perpetrators or victims of such acts. 
 
3.1.2 The police shall endeavour to prevent crimes and shall attempt to arrest and investigate all 
those reasonably suspected of committing crimes and shall take the necessary steps to 
facilitate the judicial process. 
 
3.1.3 The police shall be guided by a belief that they are accountable to society in rendering their 
policing services and shall therefore conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the 
respect and approval of the public. Through such accountability and friendly, effective and 
prompt service, the police shall endeavour to obtain the co-operation of the public whose 
partnership m the task of crime control and prevention is essential. 
 
3.1.4 The police, as law enforcement officers, shall expect a higher standard of conduct from its 
members in the execution of their duties than they expect from others and in pursuance 
hereof, supports prompt and efficient investigation and prosecution of 
its own members alleged to have acted unlawfully and shall commit itself to continue the 
proper training and retraining of its members in line with the objectives of professional policing 
and the principles set out in Chapters 3 and 4 of this Accord. The police in particular shall 
emphasise that there is no place in the police force for policing practices based on personal 
or racial prejudice, corruption, excessive force or any unlawful actions. 
 
3.1.5 The police shall exercise restraint in the pursuance of their duties and shall use the minimum 
force that is appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
3.1.6 Parties, organisations and individuals acknowledge that they too have a contribution to make 
in the process of sustaining, developing and encouraging a police force of which all South 
Africans can be proud. This involves a respect for the professionalism of the police force, and 
assisting the police in the performance of their legitimate duties. 
 
3.2 THE POLICE SHALL OBSERVE THE FOLLOWING MORE DETAILED SET OF 
REQUIREMENTS: 
 
3.2.1 The police shall endeavour to protect the people of South Africa from all criminal acts and 
acts of political violence, and shall do so in a rigorously nonpartisan fashion, regardless of the 
political belief and affiliation, religion, gender, race, or ethnic origin of the perpetrators or 
victims of such acts. 
 
3.2.1.1 The police must always respond promptly to calls for assistance and intervention. 
 
3.2.1.2 Where prior notification is given of possible violence, the police must take all reasonable 
steps to prevent such an outbreak of violence. 
 
3.2.1.3 The police shall endeavour to disarm those persons illegally bearing dangerous weapons in 
any gathering or procession. 
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3.2.2 The police shall endeavour to prevent crimes and shall attempt to arrest 
and investigate all those reasonably suspected of committing crimes and shall 
take the necessary steps to facilitate the judicial process. 
 
3.2.2.1 Where violent clashes occur the police shall attempt to arrest all those 
reasonably suspected of participating in any unlawful act. If the police 
are unable for any reason to arrest all suspects, efforts must be made to 
photograph, video or otherwise identify the suspects. 
3.2.2.2 After a suspect has been arrested, the police shall conduct a full, proper and 
expeditious investigation into the complaint, shall endeavour to submit the 
necessary evidence to the Attorney-General as soon as possible and shall 
give all the necessary co-operation in this regard. 
3.2.2.3 In addition to rights arrested persons have in terms of the law, suspects 
arrested solely for crimes related to political violence should be informed of 
their rights and given the opportunity to telephone their family or a lawyer. 
Judges Rules shall consistently be applied by all police officials. 
3.2.2.4 All criminal complaints shall be accepted at a charge office. After the 
complaint is accepted, the complainant shall be given a form containing the 
complaint number and the nature of the charge. The name and the telephone 
number of the investigating officer shall be made available or dispatched 
within seven days to the complainant. 
3.2.2.5 The complainant shall, upon request, be entitled to any relevant information 
from the investigating officer on the progress and outcome of the 
investigation. 
3.2.2.6 In order to investigate all crimes relating to "political violence", which 
includes public violence as defined in the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation Act, 1991, the police shall establish a special police 
investigation unit on the following basis: 
A police investigation unit shall be established under the command of a police 
general (or senior police officer in the case of self-governing territories). 
(ii) This police general shall monitor, co-ordinate and supervise investigations 
into crimes of political violence. 
(iii) A senior police officer shall be appointed in the region of each special 
criminal court and shall carry out his duties and functions under the command 
of the said police general. 
(iv) It will be the responsibility of each such officer as assisted by such officials as 
are seconded to him or appointed on an ad hoc basis to assist him, to conduct 
or supervise investigations into crimes of political violence, in the region of 
that special criminal court. 
(v) When necessary each such officer shall liaise with the prosecutor of the special 
court in regard to the conduct of investigations into crimes of political 
violence. 
(vi) Each such officer may personally investigate such crimes and/or supervise 
investigations performed by ordinary units of the police. 
(vii) The police general who commands the special investigation unit as well as 
each such officer shall, where possible, have sufficient personnel and 
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resources at his disposal to enable him to effectively carry out his powers and functions. 
 
(viii) Each such officer shall be responsible for compiling a monthly report on the progress of 
investigations and for referring it to the police general who commands the special 
investigation unit. The Standing Commission and/or the National Peace Committee may 
inquire on the progress of the investigations and the police general shall submit a report. 
 
(ix) In all cases where an affidavit containing evidence is submitted to the National Peace 
Committee or Regional Dispute Resolution Committee to the effect that the local police in any 
station and/or district have acted with bias towards a political party or organisation in that 
district, the investigation into any incident of alleged political violence shall, on basis of the 
affidavit, be conducted by the special investigation unit with jurisdiction in that region or under 
the supervision of an officer from such unit. 
 
(x) The National Peace Committee shall be informed of the appointment of the police general 
and the senior officers. 
 
(xi) The Commissioner of Police shall have regard to recommendations of the National Peace 
Committee. 
 
3.2.3 The police shall be guided by a belief that they are accountable to society in rendering their 
policing services and shall therefore conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the 
respect and approval of the public. 
Accountability in this paragraph and also referred to in clause 3.1.3 above, as well as in the 
Police Code of conduct, entails the following: 
 
3.2.3.1 In order to facilitate better communication with the community, the police shall, in each locality 
where a Local Dispute Resolution Committee exists: 
 
(i) consult regularly with: 
 
(a) the Local Dispute Resolution Committee, or in its absence, community leaders, 
including representatives of signatories to this accord, and 
(b) community leaders, 
 
on the efficient functioning of the police in that community and shall regularly communicate 
with such committee, representatives or leaders on the issues raised by them with the police. 
 
(ii) establish a liaison officer of rank not lower than a warrant officer, in each police district, to 
which requests for urgent assistance may be directed. The police shall notify the LDRC of the 
identity of liaison officers. 
 
3.2.3.2 In addition to the normal channels available within the Department of Law and Order, 
complaints against the police may also be referred to the Police Reporting Officer or, 
depending on the nature of such complaints, to the Standing Commission on Violence and 
Intimidation. 
 
3.2.3.3 If the police feel that they are unfairly victimised or harassed by any person or body or 
organisation they will have the right to raise a complaint to the National Peace Committee or 
any other appropriate body. 
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3.2.4  The police shall expect a higher standard of conduct from themselves than they expect 
from others 
 
3.2.4.1 Complaints of alleged police misconduct which is of such a serious nature that it may 
detrimentally affect police/community relations should be referred to the Police 
Reporting Officer or the Commissioner of Police, for 
investigation by a unit of the police specifically established for this purpose, under the 
supervision of a designated general of the police. Where the complaint is directed to 
the Police Reporting Officer it should be referred by him to the Commissioner of 
Police for investigation by such a unit. The units will be available as far as possible in 
each police region. 
 
3.2.4.2 The unit shall submit to the Police Reporting Officer, a report on the complaints 
submitted to it, as well as the progress and outcome of investigations into complaints. 
The Police Reporting Officer will have the 
authority to ensure that the investigation is a full and proper investigation and 
accordingly will be entitled to refer the report back to the unit. The Police Reporting 
Officer shall be appointed in the following manner: 
 
(i) The Association of Law Societies and General Council of the Bar shall recommend to 
the Minister of Law and Order three candidates per region for the appointment of a 
Regional Police Reporting Officer. If the Minister is not prepared to make an 
appointment from the names so received, he may refer the recommendation back to 
the Association of Law Societies and the General Council of the Bar for additional 
three names from which he has to make an appointment. 
(ii) Such Police Reporting Officer may be a former prosecutor, a former member of the 
attorney general's staff, a lawyer in private practice, a former magistrate, or a former 
policeman. 
 
3.2.4.3 The Police Reporting Officer may recommend to the Commissioner of Police the 
suspension or transfer of the police official under investigation until the completion of 
the investigation. 
 
3.2.4.4 The Police Reporting Officer shall, on the completion of the investigation, make a 
recommendation to the Commissioner of Police as to the disciplinary action that 
should be taken against the police involved in the misconduct. The complainant shall 
be notified of the recommendations and the outcome of this complaint. The Police 
Reporting Officer may, with the consent of the complainant, provide the National 
Peace Committee with the recommendations and outcome of the investigation. 
 
3.2.4.5 All police officials in uniform should carry a legible external form of identification. 
 
3.2.4.6 All official police vehicles shall have an identification number painted on the side, and 
all military vehicles acting in support of the police shall display an identification 
number on the side and no such number may be removed for as long as such military 
vehicles are used in support of the police, provided that this shall not apply to police 
vehicles which are required for official undercover work, not in breach of clause 3.5 
related to clandestine or covert operations. It shall be an offence for a police or 
military vehicle to be driven on a public road without number plates or without the 
number plates allocated to such vehicle by the relevant registration authority. 
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3.2.5 The police shall exercise restraint in the pursuance of their duties and shall use the minimum 
force that is appropriate in the circumstances. 
3.2.5.1 Clear guidelines shall be issued by the police for dealing with unlawful gatherings and the 
following aspects shall clearly be addressed in such guidelines. 
 
(i) When a confrontation between a police unit and a gathering is reasonably 
foreseeable, a senior police official shall where possible be in command of that unit. 
 
(ii) The police unit performing crowd control duties shall, where possible, be equipped 
with public address systems and someone who can address the crowd in a language 
the crowd will understand. 
 
(iii) Before ordering a gathering to disperse, an attempt must be made to ascertain the 
purpose of the gathering and to negotiate the immediate dispersal of the group. 
 
(iv) Where residents of a community or a hostel are clearly the subject of an attack, the 
police shall endeavour to disarm and disperse the aggressors. 
 
(v) A reasonable time must be given to the gathering to comply with the requests or 
instructions of the commanding officer. 
 
(vi) The commanding officer shall only authorise the use of injurious or forceful methods 
of crowd dispersal if he believes that the crowd constitutes a danger to the public 
safety or to the safety of any individual or to any valuable movable or immovable 
property and if he has reason to believe that less injurious methods will not succeed 
in dispersing the gathering. The least possible degree of force should be used in 
attaining the aim of policing. Unless circumstances prevent it, persuasion, advice and 
warnings should be used to secure co-operation, compliance with the law and the 
restoration of order. 
 
(vii) The police should focus on making less injurious equipment also available to police 
stations in order to minimize the risk of forceful actions. 
 
3.3 POLICE BOARD 
 
3.3.1 A Police Board shall be established whose composition shall comprise of both members of 
the public and representatives of the police in equal numbers. The chairperson is to be 
appointed by the Minister of Law and Order from one of the members representing the public. 
 
3.3.2 The members of the public shall be appointed by the Minister of Law and Order to the Police 
Board from names put forward by unanimous decision by the National Peace Committee. The 
Minister of Law and Order shall have the discretion to appoint further members from parties 
who are not represented on the National Peace Committee. 
 
3.3.3 The function of the Police Board shall be to consider and to make recommendations to the 
Minister of Law and Order in regard to the policy relating to the training and efficient 
functioning of the police, with a view to reconcile the interests of the community with that of 
the police. 
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3.3.4 The Police Board shall be empowered to do research and call for representations from the 
public regarding any investigation conducted by it. 
 
3.3.5 The Police Board shall not have a role in regard to the day to day functioning of the police. 
 
3.3.6 The recommendations of the Police Board in regard to the above matters shall be made 
public, insofar as it is essential in reconciling the interests of the community with that of the 
police. 
 
3.4. COMPOSITION OF THE POLICE FORCE 
 
3.4.1 The relationship between, and the status of, the South African Police and the Police Forces in 
the Self-governing Territories in the transitional phase, can only be decided by the interested 
parties through negotiations. 
 
3.4.2 Where the Police Forces of any self-governing territory is alleged to be a party to the conflict, 
the Standing Commission shall investigate this and make appropriate recommendations. 
 
3.5 CLANDESTINE OR COVERT OPERATIONS 
 
3.5.1 No public funds shall be used to promote the interests of any political party or political 
organisation and no political party or political organisation shall accept any public funds to 
promote its interests which shall have the effect of interfering negatively in the political 
process. 
 
3.5.2 The government shall not allow any operation by the security forces with the intention to 
undermine, promote or influence any political party or political organisation at the expense of 
another by means of any acts, or by means of disinformation. 
 
3.5.3 If any of the signatories to this accord has reason to believe that any operation is being 
conducted in breach of this clause, it may lodge a complaint with the Police Reporting Officer 
or the Commission as the case may be. 
 
3.5.4 In addition to any civil/criminal liability he/she may incur, any individual member of the police 
who is found to have breached this clause shall be dealt with in accordance with the Police 
Act, Regulations and Standing Orders. 
 
3.5.5 In addition to any civil/criminal liability he/she may incur, any individual member of the 
defence force who is found to have breached this clause shall be dealt with in accordance 
with the defence statutes and codes and the Code of Conduct for the members of the 
defence force. 
 
3.5.6 In order to monitor ongoing compliance with this provision the Commission, or a person 
authorised by it, shall upon receipt of any request by a party, or a complaint or on information 
received by it, be entitled by warrant to enter and inspect any place and interrogate any 
security force member, and seize any record or piece of evidence. 
 
3.6. DANGEROUS WEAPONS 
 
3.6.1 The parties agree that the disastrous consequences of widespread violence and the urgent 
requirement of peace and stability on which to build the common future make it necessary to 
act decisively to eliminate violence or the threat of violence from a political sphere. 
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3.6.3  In pursuit of this understanding the parties agree that no weapons or fire-arms may be 
possessed, carried or displayed by members of the general public attending any political 
gathering, procession or meeting. 
 
3.6.3  All political parties and organisations shall actively discourage and seek to prevent their 
members and supporters from possessing, carrying or displaying weapons or fire-arms when 
attending any political gathering, procession or meeting. 
 
3.6.4 The Government undertakes to issue the necessary proclamations to implement the 
principles of paragraph 3.6.2 after consultation with the interested parties. 
 
3.7 SELF PROTECTION UNITS (previously called self-defence units) 
 
3.7.1 The Law accords all individuals the right to protect themselves and their property, and to 
establish voluntary associations or self protection units in any neighbourhood to prevent crime 
and to prevent any invasion of the lawful rights of such communities. This shall include 
the right to bear licensed arms and to use them in legitimate and lawful self-defence. 
 
3.7.2 The parties also agree that no party or political organisation shall establish such units on the 
basis of party or political affiliation, such units being considered private armies. 
 
3.7.3 No private armies shall be allowed or formed. 
 
3.7.4 The parties also recognise that a liaison structure should operate between any community 
based self protection unit and the police so as to facilitate education on citizens' rights, police 
responsiveness and other aspects in respect of which there is a legitimate and common 
interest. 
 
3.7.5 The police remains responsible for the maintenance of law and order and shall not be 
hindered in executing their task by any self protection unit. 
 
3.7.6 All existing structures called self-defence units shall be transformed into self protection units 
which shall function in accordance with the principles contained in paragraph 3.7. 
 
3.8 GENERAL 
 
3.8.1 This Accord shall, where applicable, be issued as a directive by the Commissioner of Police 
and if necessary, the Police Act and regulations will be amended accordingly. 
 
3.8.2 In view of the changing policing demands of a changing South Africa the police shall continue 
to take steps to retrain their members on the proper functions of the police as set out in the 
Code and in this agreement and in particular in methods of defusing conflict through 
discussion. 
 
3.8.3 This Accord shall, where applicable, be honoured by and shall in terms of paragraph 3.8.1 be 
binding on the police. 
 
3.8.4 This Accord shall, where applicable, be binding on the defence force in as much as it 
performs any ordinary policing function. 
 
3.8.5 Where a government of a self-governing territory becomes a signatory to this Accord, the 
provisions of this Accord will, mutatis mutandis, be applicable to such a government as well 
as the police force of such a government. 
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3.8.6  A government of a self-governing territory which is a signatory to this Accord may opt to 
accept the jurisdiction of the Police Board or Police Reporting Officer established in respect of 
the South African Police Force. 
 
3.9 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE DEFENCE FORCE 
 
A Code is in the process of being negotiated under the auspices of the National Peace 
Committee. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SECURITY FORCES: POLICE CODE OF CONDUCT 
 
MISSION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE 
 
"We undertake, impartially and with respect for the norms of the law and society, to protect the 
interests of the country and everyone therein against any criminal violation, through efficient 
service rendered in an accountable manner." 
 
 
CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE 
 
All members of the South African Police shall commit themselves to abide by the Code of Conduct in 
the following terms: 
 
As a member of the South African Police, I undertake to adhere to the following Code of Conduct to 
the best of my abilities: 
 
As POLICE OFFICIAL I will observe the oath of loyalty which I made to the Republic of South Africa 
by performing the task that is required of me by law, with untiring zeal, single-mindedness and 
devotion to duty, realising that I accept the following principles: 
 
* In order to preserve the fundamental and constitutional rights of each individual by the use of 
preventive measures, or alternatively, in the event of disruption, to restore social order by the 
use of reactive policing. 
 
* The authority and powers accorded to the Police for the maintenance of social order, and the 
subsidiary objectives they adopt are dependent upon and subject to public approval, and the 
ability to secure and retain the respect of the public. 
 
* The attainment and retention of public approval and respect include the co-operation of the 
public in the voluntary observance of the laws. 
 
* Any offence or alleged offence by any member of the South African Police, of the common 
law or statutory law, including the Police Act and the regulations promulgated in accordance 
thereof, shall be thoroughly investigated and in the event of any violation thereof, appropriate 
measures shall be taken. Such an offence or alleged offence, depending on the nature 
thereof, may be referred to a Police Reporting Officer or the Commission established in terms 
of the Prevention of Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991, or to a commission that shall be 
specifically appointed for that purpose. All assistance and co-operation possible shall be 
rendered to a commission such as this, and the Police Reporting Officer and where 
investigations are undertaken by the Police at the request of the commission or the Police 
Reporting Officer, a special investigation team shall be used for this purpose. 
 
* The extent and quality of public co-operation proportionally diminishes the need for corrective 
measures. 
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* The favour and approval of the public shall be sought by: 
 
- enforcing the law firmly, sensitively and with constant and absolute impartiality; 
 
- giving effective and friendly service to each individual, regardless of the political and 
religious belief, race, gender or ethnic origin; 
 
- reacting as quickly as possible on requests for help or service; 
 
- making personal sacrifices in order to save lives; and 
 
- encouraging police community relationships, and by promoting participation by the 
community. 
 
* The least possible degree of force be used in attaining the aim of policing, and then only 
when persuasion, advice and warnings have failed to secure co-operation, compliance with 
the law and the restoration of order. 
 
* Judges' Rules shall consistently be applied by all police officials. 
 
* Police officials must adhere to the executive function of policing and refrain from taking it 
upon themselves to perform a judicial function. 
 
* All police officials in uniform shall wear a clearly distinguishable mark of identification. 
 
* The integrity of policing is reflected by the degree of personal moral responsibility and 
professional altruism evident in the behaviour and actions of every individual member of the 
police. 
 
* The stability of society, and the vitality and continuity of democratic ideals are dependent 
upon policing that: 
 
- is consistently aware of the sensitive balance between individual freedom and 
collective security; 
- is consistently aware of the dangers inherent in illegal and informal coercive actions 
and methods; and 
- will never give in to the temptation to sacrifice principles by resorting to reprehensible 
means to secure good ends. 
 
* The professionalisation of policing depends primarily upon intensive selection, training, 
planning and research. 
 
* The needs of the community shall be considered in the training programme of the Police, and 
the contribution made by communities in this regard, shall be taken into account. 
 
* Every member should strive and apply him/herself to individual and institutional 
professionalism by self-improvement and study. 
 
* Any offence by any member of the police, committed in the presence of a fellow member of 
the police, shall be dealt with by such a fellow member in accordance with the powers and 
duties conferred upon him or her by any act relating to such an offence. In addition such a 
fellow member shall forthwith notify his or her commander. 
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In order to maintain these principles, I undertake to: 
 
* make my personal life an example worthy to be followed by all; 
 
* develop my own personality and also create the opportunity for others to do likewise; 
 
* treat my subordinates as well as my seniors in a decent manner; 
 
* fulfil my duty faithfully despite danger, insult or threat; 
 
* develop self-control, remain honest in thought and deed, both on and off duty; 
 
* be an example in obeying the law of the land and the precepts of the Force; 
 
* prevent personal feelings, prejudice, antagonism or friendships from influencing my 
judgement; 
 
* receive no unlawful reward or compensation; and 
 
* remain worthy of the trust of the public, by unselfish service, seek satisfaction in being ready 
to serve and to dedicate myself in the service to my God and my country. 
 
 
"SERVAMUS ET SERVIMUS - WE PROTECT AND WE SERVE" 
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CHAPTER 5 
MEASURES TO FACILITATE SOCIO-ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
5.1 Reconstruction and development projects must actively involve the affected communities. 
Through a process of inclusive negotiations involving recipients, experts and donors, the 
community must be able to conceive, implement and take responsibility for projects in a co-
ordinated way as close to the grassroots as possible. In addition reconstruction and 
development must facilitate the development of the economic and human resources of the 
communities concerned. 
 
5.2 Projects at a local level require the co-operation of all members of the community irrespective 
of their political affiliation. The people within local communities must see local organisations 
working together on the ground with common purpose. Parties with constituency support in 
an area must commit themselves to facilitating such an approach to development projects. 
 
5.3 Reconstruction projects must work on the ground at local level. This requires a combined 
effort by all political organisations and affected parties to raise the required level of capital 
and human resources for development. Public and private funds will have to be mobilised for 
this purpose. 
 
5.4 Sustainable development implies that all individuals must be assisted and encouraged to 
accept responsibility for their socio-economic well-being. Each actor must define and accept 
his/her role and there must be an acceptance of coresponsibility for and co-determination of 
socio-economic development. 
 
5.5 This development initiative should in no way abrogate the right and duty of governments to 
continue their normal development activity, except that in doing so they should be sensitive to 
the spirit and contents of any agreement that may be reached. 
 
5.6 The parties to this process commit themselves to facilitating the rapid removal of political, 
legislative and administrative obstacles to development and economic growth. 
 
5.7 The National Peace Committee and the Regional Dispute Resolution Committees will 
establish permanent sub-committees on socio-economic reconstruction and development. 
 
5.8 Both the national and regional sub-committees defined above could establish advisory and 
consulting groups to facilitate their work. 
 
5.9 The functions of these sub-committees would be to: 
 
5.9.1 assist the peace structures in regard to socio-economic reconstruction and development; 
 
5.9.2 take initiatives to implement the principles outlined above and to deal with the issues set out 
hereunder; 
 
5.9.3 the combined inputs of the sub-committees participants would be to facilitate, coordinate and 
expedite reconstruction and development in terms of the principles outlined above. 
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5.10 The general guideline on issues to be dealt with is to move from immediate issues related to 
violence and the peace process toward pre-emption of violence and then toward integrating 
into the overall need for socio-economic development. 
 
5.11 The sub-committees should identify areas at community level where they could begin to 
facilitate the co-ordination of the following issues: 
* reconstruction of damaged property; 
* reintegration of displaced persons into the community; 
* expansion of infrastructure to assist in consolidating the peace process; and  
* community involvement in the maintenance and improvement of existing community facilities 
and the environment. 
 
5.12 The sub-committees should facilitate crisis assistance that will link to socioeconomic 
development in the following areas: 
dealing with the immediate effects of violence and the resultant social effects, displaced 
persons problem and homelessness; and 
where infrastructure is itself a spark to violence, eg water, electricity transportation, schools 
etc. 
 
5.13 In addressing the above issues attention will have to be paid to: 
* the equitable allocation of state resources, including state-funded development 
agencies (physical and financial) for both public and community-based initiatives; 
* mobilisation of additional resources - both public and private; 
* the cumbersome nature of governmental structures in the provision of resources and 
services; 
* the position of the very poor and marginalised groups; 
* land, its accessibility and use; 
* basic housing; 
* provision of basic services; * education; 
* health and welfare; 
* job creation and unemployment; and 
* the availability of land for housing and basic services. 
 
5.14 The sub-committees should identify potential flash points and co-ordinate socioeconomic 
development that will defuse tension eg squatter settlements: squatter settlement-township 
interfaces; hostels: hostel-township interfaces, provision and 
maintenance of basic services and rural resource constraints. The sub-committees should 
identify areas of socio-economic development that would prevent violence. 
 
5.15 The sub-committee would attempt to ensure that overall socio-economic development is 
cognizant of the need to reinforce the peace process and defuse the potential for violence. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE AND 
INTIMIDATION ("the Commission") 
 
 
6.1 It is acknowledged that the police is primarily responsible for the investigation of crime. The 
police is, as a result, also responsible for the investigation and bringing to book of all 
perpetrators of violence and intimidation. 
 
6.2 Post mortem inquests play an important role in exposing and opening presiding 
circumstances relating to unrest and violence. Inquests with judges as presiding officers have 
taken place more frequently since the implementation of the Inquests 
Amendment Act, 1990 (Act 45 of 1990). The Inquests Amendment Act, 1991 (Act 8 of 1991), 
has furthermore streamlined the process and inquests can be disposed of more rapidly. 
Records of all inquest proceedings relating to public violence should be submitted to the 
Commission. 
 
6.3 It is clear that violence and intimidation declines when it is investigated and when the 
background and reasons for it is exposed and given media attention. There is therefore need 
for an effective instrument to do just that. It is agreed that the Commission established by the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991, be used as an instrument to 
investigate and expose the background and reasons for violence, thereby reducing the 
incidence of violence and intimidation. However, in order to improve the efficacy of the Act in 
preventing violence it may be necessary to amend the Act, to accommodate the provisions of 
this Chapter. Where amendments are necessary, the National Peace Committee shall send 
its proposals to the Minister of Justice as soon as possible. 
 
6.4 In terms of the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991, the Commission 
shall function as follows: 
 
6.5 The Commission shall function on a permanent basis. 
 
6.6 The Commission's objectives shall be to: 
 
6.6.1 inquire into the phenomenon of public violence and intimidation in the Republic, the nature 
and causes thereof and what persons are involved therein; 
 
6.6.2 inquire into any steps that should be taken in order to prevent public violence and 
intimidation; 
 
6.6.3 make recommendations to the State President regarding: 
 
6.6.3.1 the general policy which ought to be followed in respect of the prevention of public violence 
and intimidation; 
 
6.6.3.2 steps to prevent public violence or intimidation; 
 
6.6.3.3 any other steps it may deem necessary or expedient, including proposals for the passing of 
legislation, to prevent a repetition or continuation of any act of omission relating to public 
violence or intimidation; 
 
6.6.3.4 the generation of income by the State to prevent public violence and intimidation as well as 
the compensating of persons who were prejudiced and suffered patrimonial loss thereby; 
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6.6.3.5 any other matter which may contribute to preventing public violence and intimidation. 
 
6.7 It is agreed that the Commission shall be composed as follows: 
 
6.7.1 A judge or retired judge of the Supreme Court or a senior advocate with at least 10 years 
experience in the enforcement of the law. This will ensure that the Commission has suitable, 
independent and objective leadership, fully versed in the law and fearlessly given to grant all 
parties an equal opportunity to state their views and give their facts. This person will be the 
chairman. 
 
6.7.2 A senior advocate or a senior attorney or a senior professor of law. The incumbent will assist 
the chairman of the Commission, providing balance from a legal point of view. Because of his 
status this person will not be susceptible to influence from other parties. This person will be 
the vice-chairman. 
 
6.7.3 Three other duly qualified persons. 
 
6.8 The National Peace Committee shall submit a short list of persons to be considered for 
appointment. 
 
6.9 It is acknowledged that it is desirable that the Commission should be and be seen to be 
independent and non-partisan. 
 
6.10 Members of the Commission are appointed for a period of three years. 
 
6.11 The Commission will be assisted by a secretariat to provide administrative and logistical 
services. 
 
6.12 The Commission's functions will include the following: 
 
6.12.1 to investigate the causes of violence and intimidation; 
 
6.12.2 to recommend measures capable of containing the cycle of violence; 6.12.3 to recommend 
measures in order to prevent further violence; 
 
6.12.4 to initiate research programmes for the establishment of scientific empirical data on violence; 
and 
 
6.12.5 to make recommendations concerning the funding of the process of peace. 
 
6.13 Any individual will be able to approach the Commission with a request to investigate any 
particular matter relevant to combating violence and intimidation. If any such individual is held 
in detention, the relevant authorities will facilitate the transmission of such a request to the 
Commission. If a request is unfounded, trivial or designed for purposes other than the 
prevention of violence and intimidation, the Commission may in its discretion decline to act 
upon the request. The Commission does not only act upon receiving a request from an 
individual, but may of its own accord investigate matters. 
 
6.14 The investigation by or at the behest of the Commission shall not affect any legal processes. 
 
6.15 Where a matter has already been dealt with as a result of legal processes, the Commission 
shall not re-investigate the matter but may take cognizance of the evidence presented during 
such processes and the findings emanating from such proceedings. 
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6.16 The Commission shall be empowered to enlist the help of other institutions in its 
investigations. Investigations by the Police Reporting Officer referred to in this Accord shall 
not be affected by the Commission. 
 
6.17 Members of the Commission and its secretariat (insofar as they may not be employed by the 
State) shall be remunerated by the State. The State shall provide funds for the operation of 
the Commission. 
 
6.18 The Commission shall be empowered in order to conduct an investigation and insofar as it 
may be relevant to: 
 
6.18.1 require any person to give evidence on the matter being investigated; 
 
6.18.2 require any person to put any document or other evidentiary material at the disposal of the 
Commission; 
 
6.18.3 order that the identity of any person mentioned in 6.18.1 and 6.18.2 shall not be revealed if 
that person's life or property or his family may be endangered because of his assistance to 
the Commission; 
 
6.18.4 order that the relevant authority provide appropriate protection to a person mentioned in 
6.18.1 and 6.18.2 if his life is endangered because of his assistance to the Commission; and 
 
6.18.5 order that the contents of any document or other evidentiary material shall not be revealed or 
published if circumstances so demand. 
 
6.19 The proceedings of the Commission shall take place in public, unless the Commission 
decides that circumstances demand otherwise. This is designed to ensure that the safety of 
witnesses can be guaranteed. 
 
6.20 The Commission shall determine if legal representation is desirable in any particular given 
case. 
 
6.21 After completion of an investigation the Commission shall compile a report on its findings and 
recommendations. This report will be handed to the State President who may make known for 
public information the facts in question and the findings of the Commission which he deems 
necessary in the public interest. Without derogating from the State President's discretion, the 
State President is requested to make such reports available to inter alia the National Peace 
Committee. 
 
6.22 Measures shall be enacted to provide for the expenses and mechanisms of the Commission. 
 
6.23 In order to ensure that steps are taken against perpetrators of violence and intimidation, the 
Commission may refer any evidence constituting an offence to the relevant Attorney-General 
and to the Special Criminal Courts. 
 
6.24 Anyone hampering or influencing the Commission or any of its members in the 
execution of their duties shall be guilty of an offence. This will ensure that the status of the 
Commission is established and that it does not fall prey to pressures. 
 
6.25 The above-mentioned is reflected in the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 
1991. 
 
6.26 Fully aware of the fact that the composition of the proposed body will determine its relevancy 
and legitimacy, the Minister of Justice indicated during the Second Reading Debate of the Act 
that no appointments would be made without 
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consultation and negotiation with the relevant role players. Consensus will be the key 
word. The group agrees that for this system to be effective, it needs to be credible. 
 
6.27 In terms of section 4 of the Act, committees may be established to assist the Commission in 
the exercise of its functions. The relevant players will therefore also be able to be 
represented on these committees by their own members and experts. These committees will 
enjoy the same far-reaching powers as the Commission itself. Regional committees of the 
Commission should be established in each of the regions identified by the Commission to 
monitor and inquire into public violence and intimidation. Local and regional security force 
commanders, and the LDRC and RDRC members, should advise the Commission or a Sub-
committee of the Commission of any advance warning of anticipated or current public 
violence. 
 
6.28 The parties agree that for the Commission to be effective it needs to be a credible instrument. 
It will furthermore only obtain credibility if it is to be constituted after the National Peace 
Committee has been consulted. If this condition is met, the establishment of the Commission 
should be given unconditional support. 
 
6.29 In order to function properly within a legal framework, to exercise the considerable powers 
given and to obtain State funding, there is no alternative to making use of a statutory 
enactment, such as the Act. It is suggested that the Act be employed to fulfil this role, 
because it can be utilised immediately and does not require further statutory attention. 
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CHAPTER 7 
NATIONAL PEACE SECRETARIAT, REGIONAL AND LOCAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
COMMITTEES 
 
7.1 It is clear from the aforegoing that sufficient instruments exist to investigate violence and 
intimidation and to bring the perpetrators thereof to book. Insufficient instruments exists 
however to actively combat violence and intimidation at grassroots level. It is therefore 
proposed that committees be appointed at regional and local levels to assist in this regard. 
These committees will require national coordination. 
 
7.2 In order to provide management skills, budgetary commitment and statutory empowerment 
and sanction, State involvement is essential. 
 
7.3 A National Peace Secretariat 
 
7.3.1 A National Peace Secretariat shall be established, comprising at least four persons 
nominated by the National Peace Committee and one representative of the Department of 
Justice. Further members, up to a maximum of four may also be appointed. 
 
7.3.2 The function of the National Peace Secretariat will be to establish and co-ordinate Regional 
Dispute Resolution Committees and thereby Local Dispute Resolution Committees. 
 
7.3.3 The National Peace Secretariat will take decisions on a consensus basis. 
 
7.3.4  The required financial and administrative resources of the National Peace Secretariat, and 
the other bodies established by it, will be provided by the Department of Justice. 
 
7.4 Regional and Local Dispute Committees 
 
7.4.1  Peace bodies are to be established at both regional and local level, to be styled "Regional 
Dispute Resolution Committees" (RDRC) and "Local Dispute Resolution Committees" (LDRC) 
respectively. 
 
7.4.2  Just as the Commission will gain its legitimacy from its composition, reflecting the interested 
and relevant organisations, the RDRC's and LDRC's will gain their legitimacy by representing 
the people and communities they are designed to serve. 
 
7.4.3 The areas of jurisdiction of the RDRC's shall be decided by the National Peace Secretariat 
until such time as statutory provision is made. 
 
7.4.4 RDRC's will be constituted as follows: 
 
7.4.4.1  representatives from relevant political organisations; 
 
7.4.4.2  representatives from relevant churches; 
 
7.4.4.3  representatives of relevant trade unions, industry and business in the region; 
 
7.4.4.4  representatives of relevant local and tribal authorities; and 
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7.4.4.5  representatives from the police and the defence force. 
 
7.4.5 Duties of RDRC's shall include the following: 
 
7.4.5.1 attending to any matter referred to it by the LDRC, the National Peace Secretariat or 
the Commission; 
 
7.4.5.2  advising the Commission on matters causing violence and intimidation in its region; 
 
7.4.5.3 settling disputes causing public violence or intimidation by negotiating with the parties 
concerned and recording the terms of such settlements; 
 
7.4.5.4  guiding LDRC's in their duties; 
 
7.4.5.5  monitoring current applicable peace accords and future peace agreements entered I
 nto in the relevant region and settling disputes arising from them; 
 
7.4.5.6 informing the National Peace Secretariat of steps taken to prevent violence and 
intimidation in its region including breaches of Peace Agreements; and 
 
7.4.5.7 consulting with relevant authorities in its region to combat or prevent violence and 
intimidation. 
 
7.4.6  The communities within which LDRC's are to be established should be identified by 
the RDRC's. 
 
7.4.7  LDRC's will be constituted by drawing representatives reflecting the needs of the 
relevant community. 
 
7.4.8  Duties of the LDRC's shall include the following: 
 
7.4.8.1  attending to any matter referred to it by either the Commission or the RDRC's; 
 
7.4.8.2 creating trust and reconciliation between grassroots community leadership of relevant 
organisations, including the police and the defence force; 
 
7.4.8.3 co-operating with the local Justice of the Peace in combating and preventing violence 
and intimidation; 
 
7.3.8.4 settling disputes causing public violence or intimidation by negotiating with the parties 
concerned and recording the terms of such settlements; 
 
7.4.8.5  eliminating conditions which may harm peace accords or peaceful relations; 
 
7.4.8.6  reporting and making recommendations to the relevant RDRC's; 
 
7.4.8.7 to promote compliance with currently valid and future peace accords and agreements 
entered into in the relevant area; 
 
7.4.8.8  to agree upon rules and conditions relating to marches, rallies and gatherings; and 
 
7.4.8.9 liaise with local police and local magistrates on matters concerning the prevention of 
violence, the holding of rallies, marches and gatherings. 
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7.5 Justices of the Peace 
 
7.5.1 It is proposed that additional Justices of the Peace be appointed after consultation with the 
relevant parties and the LDRC's. The purpose of the Justices of the Peace will essentially be 
to promote the peace process at grassroots level and to assist the LDRC's in their activities. 
 
7.5.2 Duties of Justices of the Peace shall include the following: 
 
7.5.2.1 investigating any complaint received from anyone pertaining to public violence and 
intimidation, except where legal processes or investigations instituted by the South African 
Police, other police forces, the Commission,the RDRC's, the Police Reporting Officer or a 
commission of inquiry are dealing with the relevant matter; 
 
7.5.2.2 mediating between relevant parties to a dispute by negotiation; 
 
7.5.2.3 applying rules of natural justice when issuing an order which will be fair and just in the 
particular circumstances in order to restore peaceful relations; 
 
7.5.2.4 referring facts constituting an offence to the relevant Attomey-General; 
 
7.5.2.5 in co-operation with parties and in consultation with the LDRC's acting as the ears and eyes  
of LDRC's and reacting in urgent cases; 
 
7.5.2.6 in all matters relating to public violence reporting to the LDRC; and 
 
7.5.2.7 to pronounce as a judgment the terms of a settlement reached at LDRC's or RDRC's, 
provided that the terms of such settlement are executable. 
 
7.6 RDRC's, LDRC's and Justices of the Peace shall be empowered to: 
 
7.6.1 request the presence of any person with knowledge of any acts of violence or intimidation to 
give evidence; 
 
7.6.2 request that any person in possession of any relevant document or other evidentiary material 
put the same at their disposal; and 
 
7.6.3 protect the identity and safety of anyone assisting the relevant body as contemplated in 7.6.1 
and 7.6.2 by excluding the public and/or media from its proceedings or by limiting access to 
its documents or reports or by prohibiting the publication of the contents of any of its 
documents or reports. 
 
7.7 The National Peace Secretariat shall assist RDRC's in the exercise of their duties. 
 
7.8 RDRC's may limit the number of members of a LDRC taking into account the prevailing 
circumstances in the community. 
 
7.9 RDRC's shall determine the boundaries of the area constituting the jurisdiction of LDRC's 
within their own areas of jurisdiction. 
 
7.10 The National Peace Secretariat and the Commission will advise on the policy to be applied to 
and by the RDRC's and the LDRC's and the management of the said bodies. 
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7.11 Members of the RDRC's, LDRC's and Justices of the Peace not in the full-time employment of 
the State shall be entitled to remuneration and allowances to be paid by the State. 
 
7.12 RDRC's and LDRC's shall appoint chairmen and vice-chairmen to represent the RDRC or 
LDRC concerned for a period of one year. 
 
7.13 RDRC's and LDRC's shall furnish the National Peace Secretariat, the Commission or the 
relevant RDRC, as the case may be, with any information required by such bodies. 
 
7.14 In view of the lack of effective peace promoting mechanisms at grassroots level it is urgent 
that these proposals be implemented as soon as possible. Because of the said urgency, it is 
agreed that the proposals be implemented on a voluntary basis at the outset. In order to give 
permanency and effectivity to the proposed structures it will have to be given statutory 
recognition as soon as possible. This should also ensure that the structures be funded by the 
State. In drafting the required legislation there should be wide consultation including with the 
National Peace Committee. The proposed legislation will also be published for general 
information and comment. 
 
7.15 In order to ensure the proper functioning of the LDRC's, it is necessary to: 
 
7.15.1 give them high status in their communities for their role in the peace process; 
 
7.15.2 compensate the members of LDRC's for out-of-pocket expenses for attending meetings; and 
 
7.15.3  train the members of the LDRC's in conciliating disputes, running meetings, negotiating skills, 
etc. 
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CHAPTER 8 
NATIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE 
 
8.1 COMPOSITION 
 
8.1.1  Those political parties and organisations currently represented on the Preparatory Committee 
shall constitute the National Peace Committee together with representatives drawn from other 
signatory parties where the National Peace Committee believes such inclusion will give effect 
to the National Peace Accord. 
 
8.1.2  The National Peace Committee shall appoint a chairperson and vice-chairperson, who shall 
be drawn from the religious and business communities. 
 
8.2  OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the National Peace Committee is to monitor and to make recommendation 
on the implementation of the National Peace Accord as a whole and to ensure compliance 
with the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organisations. 
 
8.3  FUNCTIONS 
 
8.3.1 The functions of the National Peace Committee shall be, inter alia to: 
 
8.3.1.1 perform those functions imposed upon it by the National Peace Accord; 
 
8.3.1.2 receive and consider reports by the National Peace Secretariat and the Commission; 
 
8.3.1.3 decide disputes concerning the interpretation of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and 
Organisations; 
 
8.3.1.4 resolve disputes concerning alleged transgressions of the Code of Conduct for Political 
Parties and Organisations; 
 
8.3.1.5 convene a meeting of the signatories in the event of an unresolved breach of the National 
Peace Accord; and 
 
8.3.1.6 recommend legislation to give effect to the National Peace Accord. 
 
8.4  POWERS 
 
8.4.1 The National Peace Committee shall have the following powers: 
 
8.4.1.1 promote the aims and spirit of the National Peace Accord; 
 
8.4.1.2 convene a meeting of the signatories where necessary; 
 
8.4.1.3 amend the constitution of the National Peace Committee; 
 
8.4.1.4 negotiate and conclude further agreements to achieve the objects of the National Peace 
Accord. 
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8.5  MEETINGS 
 
8.5.1  The National Peace Committee shall elect a chairperson who shall not be a representative of 
any of the signatory parties. 
 
8.5.2 Meetings shall take place on a regular basis at a date and time agreed to in advance. 
 
8.5.3  Urgent meetings shall be convened by the chairperson on not less than 48 hours' notice in 
writing to the authorised representatives. 
 
8.5.4 The service of written notice of a meeting at the specified address of the authorised person 
shall constitute due notice. 
 
8.5.5 An urgent meeting shall be called by the chairperson on a written request of one of the 
signatory parties to the National Peace Accord. 
 
8.6 VOTING 
 
8.6.1 All decisions shall be by consensus. 
 
8.6.2 In the event of a dispute over the interpretation of the National Peace Accord, the failure of 
the National Peace Committee to achieve consensus at the meeting at which the dispute is 
raised or at such further meetings as agreed, the dispute shall be referred to expedited 
arbitration in the manner set out in paragraph 9.4. 
 
8.6.3  In the event of a breach of the National Peace Accord not being resolved by consensus at a 
meeting of the National Peace Committee, the chairperson of the National Peace Committee 
shall convene a meeting of national leadership of the signatories within 30 days of that 
meeting. 
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CHAPTER 9 
ENFORCING THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
 
9.1 There should be simple and expeditious procedures for the resolution of disputes regarding 
transgressions of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organisations by political 
parties and organisations who are signatories of the National Peace Accord. These disputes 
should wherever possible, be settled: 
 
9.1.1 at grassroots level; 
 
9.1.2 through the participation of the parties themselves; and 
 
9.1.3 by using the proven methods of mediation, arbitration and adjudication. 
 
9.2 Disputes and complaints regarding the transgression of the Code of Conduct for Political 
Parties and Organisations shall be referred to the National Peace Committee or a committee to whom 
it has referred the matter for resolution, if the parties were not able to resolve the dispute themselves. 
 
9.3 Where the dispute cannot be resolved by the National Peace Committee or the committee to 
whom it has been referred to by the National Peace Committee, it shall be referred for arbitration. 
 
9.4 The arbitrator shall be a person with legal skills, appointed by the relevant parties by 
consensus, failing which the arbitrator shall be appointed by the National Peace Committee within 21 
days of being requested to do so in writing and failing which the Chairperson of the National Peace 
Committee shall appoint an arbitrator. 
 
9.5 Subject to the above, the procedure of the arbitration shall be as follows: 
 
9.5.1 the complaint shall be referred to the arbitrator by the complaining parties; 
 
9.5.2 the arbitrator shall decide on a date of hearing and call upon the parties to the dispute to be 
present at the hearing with their witnesses; 
 
9.5.3 the hearing shall be conducted in private; 
 
9.5.4 the arbitrator shall make a finding on the facts and make an order on the organisation 
concerned to remedy the breach either by a public distancing of the organisation from the events or 
by steps to be taken to prevent further breaches of the Code and the time within which the order has 
to be implemented; 
 
9.5.5 the arbitrator shall hold a compliance hearing once the time period has expired to determine 
compliance; 
 
9.5.6 the arbitrator will then submit a report of its findings to the National Peace Committee. 
 
9.6 The signatories agree to consult each other in the National Peace Committee on methods of 
ensuring that the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organisations is enforceable on all such 
bodies, including the possibility of statutory enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 10 
SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
 
10.1 An effective and credible criminal judicial system requires the swift but just dispensation of 
justice. This in turn will promote the restoration of peace and prosperity to communities, 
freeing them of the ravages of violence and intimidation. Special attention should be given to 
unrest related cases, cases of public violence and cases involving intimidation by setting up 
Special Criminal Courts specifically for the purpose. 
 
10.2  It is agreed that the Department of Justice, in co-operation with local legal practitioners of the 
Law Societies and the Bar, should establish project committees to advise the Department of 
Justice on the administration of the proposed Special Criminal Courts. 
 
10.3 These Special Criminal Courts will not deal with ordinary day-to-day crime. Its function will be to 
deal with unrest related cases. As a result, cases being heard in these courts will be disposed 
of swiftly and effectively without delay. Cognizance is taken of the initiative to establish 
mobile courts in certain areas to bring justice closer to the people. The initiative is supported. 
 
10.4 Special Criminal Courts should be located in areas where its services are most urgently 
needed. This implies that cases can be heard more expeditiously than ordinary criminal courts 
would be able to. This ensures that perpetrators of violence and intimidation will not 
unnecessarily be let out on bail enabling them to become re-involved in violence and 
intimidation. This also ensures that those who are maliciously accused of being violent can 
have their names cleared sooner than is the case at present. 
 
10.5 The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1991 provides a mechanism for a programme 
of witness protection. It is based on the voluntary co-operation of the person threatened by 
others and can also protect his family members. It is agreed that these provisions be actively 
utilised in areas affected by unrest. 
 
10.6  For unrest, political violence and intimidation related offences to be effectively combated, 
criminals should be prosecuted as effectively as possible and at the earliest instance. 
 
10.7 It is acknowledged that for Special Criminal Courts to be effective, special procedural and 
evidential rules should apply. The parties therefore commit themselves to promoting procedural 
and evidential rules that will facilitate the expeditious and effective hearing of criminal cases. 
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